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The study of how regional communities socialise human rights via membership 
has long been wedded to the detailed focus on the European Union (EU) as the 
most prominent example of that phenomenon. However, this over focus has 
unbalanced studies of how regional communities, membership and socialisation 
intersect, and the over concentration on a single atypical case has created an 
unhealthy preoccupation with notions of conditionality. This work corrects this 
myopia through a focus on the ASEAN relationship with Myanmar and the 
Organization of American States (OAS) relationship with Panama, as well as the 
EU relationship with Turkey. 
A comparative investigation of how membership, regional communities and 
socialisation interact provides not only empirical novelty, but requires innovative 
methodologies and theoretical frameworks. Methodologically, this study rests on 
the move towards analytical eclecticism already well established in the discipline 
more broadly. However, to do justice to the extended range of empirical studies, 
this work moves the foundations of this eclecticism into how we define norms 
and socialisation. To investigate the shortcomings of unreconstructed eclectic 
efforts, and to suggest new ways forward, this study rests on a Critical Realist 
definitional framework, shifting the foundations of studying socialisation to a 
post positivist premise. Based upon this, the theoretical framework presents 
rational choice and constructivist accounts of socialisation embedded in an 
empirically rich analysis along the spectrum of membership, running from 
applying to a regional community through to maintaining that right once 
achieved. 
The combination of empirical, methodological and theoretical innovations 
suggests a sequence of conclusions. Different types of regional community 
present different socialisation mechanisms, in different combinations and with 
different stories of success and failure. Rationalist explanations are revealed to 
be only part of the socialisation jigsaw when the EU is compared to different 
examples. Whilst always present, rationally construable processes are potentially 
joined by member-states pushing forwards their own agendas via the community 
membership process. Extending our analysis into socialisation once a member 
reveals the significance of community building dynamics. Community building 
creates rich discursive environments, where potential future plans compete with 
each other for dominance. Revising standards also creates the possibility of 
Social Sanction, Rhetorical Action and Naming and Shaming. The ultimate 
success or failure of these socialisation efforts rest on a combination of the 
strength of the norm in question, the mechanisms by which it is promoted and 
protected and a broader impression that those standards are meant to be binding 
in the real world. 
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1. Introduction 
In May 1997, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), 
against both fierce criticism from the United States and a number of European 
states and the reluctance of a few of its own members, admitted Myanmar as a 
full member. It did so in the belief, held more strongly by some than others, that 
membership would in some way "civilise" the regime and bring it into dialogue 
about, and ultimately engender change in, its human rights record. In the same 
year, some 13,000 km away from Yangon, the Organisation of American States 
(OAS) in Washington, D.C. created a Special Rapporteur to protect and promote 
freedom of expression in its members as part of its already expansive 
commitment to the defence of human rights across the hemisphere. Finally, again 
in 1997, the European Union (EU) published Agenda 2000 in which it criticised 
the Turkish record on human rights and noted that Turkey's inability to reach EU 
standards on human rights and democracy rendered it ineligible to commence 
formal membership negotiations with the Union. 
These regional communities have emerged as a crucial part of 
international relations, helping to shape distinct groupings of states. They 
achieve this in part by offering to states a central point around which certain 
norms coalesce, some of which are legal in character, and some of which are 
social. Regional communities of states seek to socialise their members, whether 
potential, new or long-standing, into these standards, of which human rights 
constitute a particularly important subset. Superficially, regional communities 
appear disparate in their pursuit of these efforts. The EU focuses on bringing 
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states into alignment with standards before they become members through 
establishing clear legal and financial conditionality. The OAS has erected 
impressive courts and commissions to bring about change in states that are 
already members. ASEAN has spent the last 10 years not only discussing 
whether it should develop an interest in human rights at all, but articulating a 
range of pressures on Myanmar that have sought to socialise it into evolving 
human rights standards. These different ways of altering and discussing 
standards of human rights exert different pressures, and this variance is the 
empirical puzzle at the heart of this study. Underlying this diversity is one 
common thread that binds these cases together: the issue of membership. 
Whether one looks at how membership is offered, denied, or redefined once it as 
been bestowed, membership is both the bundle of material and social rights and 
responsibilities that drives socialisation forward and the unifying theme upon 
which this study rests. 
To investigate the issue at hand, the key question underpinning this work 
1s: "What are the socialisation mechanisms that arise from applying, 
achieving and maintaining membership of regional communities?" Within 
this question we must bear in mind the question of agency. Both before and after 
membership is achieved, communities and existing member states play an active 
role in the attempts to socialise states. A focus on the efforts of both forms of 
agency is necessary to address the full range of socialisation consequences of 
membership. Addressing this central research question requires an appreciation 
of the following subsidiary questions. Firstly, what are the mechanisms by which 
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socialisation occurs, and secondly, how can we understand the various stories of 
success and failure of the mechanisms that we observe? 
The problem that drives this key question rests upon the contrast between 
a global phenomenon-that of regional communities attempting to socialise 
states into human rights standards via the issue of membership--and modes of 
analysis that have been, until now, essentially local in focus. The body of 
literature that has done most to investigate regional communities, membership, 
and socialisation rests almost solely on the European example, and even more 
heavily on the EU itself. This literature, explored in chapters two and three, 
offers a range of important insights into socialisation phenomena pertaining to 
regional communities. Scholars such as Frank Schimmelfennig would suggest 
that membership is only relevant as a process by which a state joins a 
community, and that this political journey is characterised by a focus on the 
centrality of conditionality and bargaining processes resting on a sophisticated 
rational choice theoretical framework to conceptualise the socialisation 
consequences of such processes. 1 This conclusion is unsatisfactory because of 
the limited empirical sample upon which the argument rests. The ignoring of 
other sites where regional communities socialise, and the role of membership in 
that process, undercuts our ability to discern more fully the many different ways 
in which regional communities of states socialise members. 
Whilst a focus on the EU makes sense if one is interested in questions 
such as "how does the EU socialise states via membership?" it does little to 
address the broader question of "how do regional communities socialise via 
membership?" As I investigate in considerable depth in chapter two, EU studies 
1 An argument made most powerfully in Frank Schimmelfennig and Ulrich Sedelmeier, The 
Europeanization of Central and Eastern Europe, Cornell Studies in Political Economy (Ithaca, 
NY: Cornell University Press, 2005). 
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supply incomplete conclusions because the EU is just one example of regional 
community design, and it is the design of the regional communities themselves 
that has a powerful effect on the nature of socialisation that they display. The EU 
rests upon highly institutionalised and exacting legal standards, which requires 
applicants to be socialised before membership can be bestowed. As such, the EU 
reveals only some of the ways in which socialisation occurs, namely those 
socialisation processes that flow from imparting exacting legal standards to 
applicants. As I show in chapter two, those who study the EU have revealed two 
socialisation mechanisms, namely bargaining and persuasion that in tum rest on 
a wider theoretical debate between rationalists and constructivists.2 It presents 
distinct understandings of what those mechanisms resemble, and also clearly 
argues that bargaining is of greater importance. The EU is highly bureaucratic 
and legalised, and enforces its standards through strict conditionality before 
states join it. In the absence of a comparative study, there is no stable foundation 
for believing that these are the only ways in which regional communities 
socialise, nor that we should ascribe one or other set of expectations as being in 
some way more correct. 
We can conceive of other types of community and the very fact that they 
are different may be significant for how socialisation occurs. ASEAN is a 
community that is coming to terms with human rights standards and grappling 
with such fundamental questions as its purpose and effectiveness. ASEAN 
member states have attempted to develop a human rights commitment that covers 
pre-existing members by evolving new commitments that have to be agreed upon 
by members before those standards can bind them. The OAS has a 60-year 
2
• Alastair Iain Johnston, "Conclusions and Extensions: Toward Mid-Range Theorizing and 
Beyond Europe," International Organization 59, no. 04 (2005) offers a precis of these 
conclusions at the close of the famous fall 2005 International Organizations edition. 
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record of varying attempts at influencing its members; first through the erection 
of weak legal and declaratory standards on human rights and later via an 
intensely discursive environment that resulted in courts and commissions being 
established to police radically upgraded standards. I argue that ASEAN and the 
OAS are just as much communities as the EU, and all three are engaged in 
socialising rights standards, yet do so differently. Without further analysis, the 
literature that addresses regional community socialisation and membership by 
focusing only on the EU does so to the omission of the empirical richness of 
these phenomena. 
The move towards regionalism, both politically and as a distinct field of 
academic enquiry, has become a prominent trend. 3 This study concerns itself 
with that phenomenon, focusing on the example of regional communities of 
states attempting to socialise human rights norms. Given the increasing 
importance of regionalism, it is vital that we develop a far more sophisticated 
understanding of the way in which various political manifestations of 
regionalism operate and change. We can only progress so far through either EU-
centric studies or localised and non-comparative studies. If regions are going to 
play an increasing role in shaping international politics, then we need both more 
insight into their activities as well as enhanced cognitive tools for appraising that 
behaviour. This study responds to those two requirements. 
3 Andrew Hurrell, "One World? Many Worlds? The Place of Regions in the Study of 
International Society," International Affairs 83, no. I (2007) p. 130. Hurrell explores regions in 
the global context through an English School appreciation. For a different example, see Barry 
Buzan, "Security Architecture in Asia: The Interplay of Regional and Global Levels," The Pacific 
Review 16, no. 2 (2003). 
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PROPOSITION, ARGUMENT AND FINDINGS 
My proposition is that in exploring the multifaceted ways in which 
questions of membership are used by communities and other member states we 
can generate more robust, coherent and cogent understandings of the very 
processes by which socialisation occurs and as such, how norms diffuse. I argue 
that existing theoretical and conceptual approaches that focus either on a rational 
choice analysis of bargaining, or constructivist accounts of persuasion and 
identity change, are limited in their explanatory power because neither, on its 
own, can act as an adequate theoretical framework to encapsulate the varied 
socialisation mechanisms that arise when states, membership and regional 
communities intersect. This suggests that analytical eclecticism is a necessary 
tool to resolve those explanatory weaknesses. 4 
However, I argue that existing approaches to eclecticism are flawed. 
They currently rest eclecticism on a wilfully ignored grey-zone . where rival 
definitions of norms and socialisation co-exist. The process of identifying, 
critiquing and improving upon this use of dual definitions of norms and 
socialisation represents the conceptual argument of the study. When I tried to 
relate the existing literature on norms and socialisation to the cases at hand, a 
rather strange issue emerged. Whichever definition of these phenomena I used 
did not "capture" the richness of what I was able to observe. These definitions 
suggested that norms were either intervening variables that affected only the 
behaviour of actors or they were social structures that operated at an ideational 
level on the very identity of those who encountered them. The studies I had at 
4 See Peter J Katzenstein and Nobuo Okawara, "Japan, Asian Pacific Security and the Case for 
Analytical Eclecticism," International Security 26, no. 3 (2001/02). I discuss this in more depth 
below as well as conceptually in chapter two. 
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hand were telling me they were both, and that a single standard was being used 
as the basis for differing processes at the same time. I was surprised when even 
the sophisticated eclectic accounts of EU socialisation seemingly ignored this 
definitional issue. Responding to this, I make an argument about what it means to 
theorise eclectically about political action by suggesting that the eclectic insight 
must be deepened by opening for investigation the very definitions we use in our 
analytical arguments, to best ensure that we do not deploy definitions that 
actually exclude norms and socialisation from being, or meaning, something that 
is clearly an important part of their nature. This is vitally important if we are to 
avoid "defining" ourselves out of an ability to appraise as much of varied effects 
of norms and life of socialisation as we can. 
When first critiquing existing bridge-building accounts at the close of 
chapter two I use Critical Realism to note that not only have they failed to 
present a single definitional account of norms and socialisation, but also that they 
are philosophically unable to do so. 5 This is because ultimately they are both 
wedded to a certain approach to the philosophy of science that rests on an 
implicit anthropomorphism, that is, that what is real is in some way defined by 
what we perceive.6 This need to perceive things in their entirety in tum rests 
upon an explicit notion of what a cause is. Norms cause something to happen, 
and because rationalists and constructivists focus on different "things" 
happening·, that is either changed behaviour or changed identity, they are forced 
apart by the imperative to isolate and identify empirical invariance as the pre-
5 Critical Realism within international relations is a rapidly growing area of enquiry. For an 
assessment on the possibilities of this research agenda, refer to Colin Wight, "A Manifesto for 
Scientific Realism in IR: Assuming the Can-Opener Wont Work!" Millennium: Journal of 
International Studies 35, no. 2 (2007) and Chris Brown, "Situating Critical Realism," 
Millennium: Journal of International Studies 35, no. 2 (2007). 
6 Heikke Patomaki and Colin Wight, "After Post-Positivism? The Promises of Critical 
Realism," International Studies Quarterly 44 (2000) p. 217. 
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requisite for a definition to be "correct". Through the Critical Realist reframing 
of reality away from something we can discern fully towards a realm that we 
may appreciate with more or less, but never total, clarity, we can break this 
causal logic. 7 Doing so allows for us to construct definitional accounts of norms 
and socialisation that can incorporate within one definition of each term both a 
constructivist and rationalist appreciation of the differing effects. As such, at the 
close of the first section of chapter three I define norms as standards around and 
over which directions of change in behaviour are debated and socialisation as 
the process of changing a third party towards different standards, a change 
which otherwise would not have occurred in the absence of that interaction. In 
cementing these definitions in a strong philosophical argument, Critical Realism 
saves us from the Scylla of exclusivity and the Charybdis of blind adherence to 
theoretical precepts, whilst at the same time providing a firm foundation on 
which to wed rationalist and constructivist accounts of socialisation. 
Employing these definitions, I develop an analytically eclectic 
framework, fully explored in chapter three, that provides me with the tools I need 
to explore the practices of membership socialisation, and through this to 
articulate a more robust and conceptually sophisticated account of the various 
mechanisms of socialisation that potentially can occur. I chart how, and why, 
socialisation pressures change both along the spectrum of applying, joining and 
remaining a member and across differing regional communities. To do this, I 
argue that we can discern a three-fold hierarchy of claims. Firstly, we can 
identify a socialisation process, that is a political tool deployed by an actor in 
order to engender an outcome. Secondly, a socialisation mechanism, that is a 
7 Ibid. p. 223. 
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deeper conceptual appreciation of the nature of that political process. 8 Thirdly, at 
a fundamental level, a broader theoretical tradition in which the previous two 
layers of analysis nest. With this in mind, I first construct an account of the 
socialisation pressures before membership is achieved. Prior to membership we 
can identify two such discreet hierarchies. Firstly, we can discern the presence of 
conditionality as a socialisation process, which in turn is conceptualised as a 
series of bargaining mechanisms ultimately embedded in broader rational choice 
accounts. We see this in all three cases, although its significance for freedom of 
expression waxes and wanes across those enquiries. Secondly we can discern 
situations where existing member states try to convince the applicant that 
membership is significant for human rights and freedom of expression. These 
processes do not rest on the formal community offer of membership, but existing 
member states do use that offer as an umbrella for their own machinations. These 
processes I suggest exist outside of bargaining assumptions and I present them as 
conceptually akin to persuasion mechanisms aligning with constructivist 
expectations, given that it is the very identity of members and the meaning of 
membership that is in play. 9 
I then traverse the membership threshold. I take the two established 
frameworks erected in accounting for pre-membership processes and travel them 
into the post-membership context. This allows us to chart how it is that 
socialisation changes by generating a framework of expectations. The transition 
8 Michael ZUrn and Jeffrey Checkel, "Getting Socialized to Build Bridges: constructivism and 
Rationalism, Europe and the Nation-State," International Organization 59, no. 04 (2005) p. 1049. 
They argue that these mechanisms are the "intermediate processes along which international 
institutions may lead actors toward accepting the norms ..... mechanisms connect things: they link 
specified initial conditions and a specific outcome". 
9 Note the preliminary discussion of persuasion at Jeffrey Checkel, "Why Comply? 
constructivism, Social Norms and the Study of International Institutions," ARENA Working 
Paper 99, no. 24 (1999), http://www.arena.uio.no/publications/wp99 _24.htm. 
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to being a member marks a moment where the power configurations of the 
various actors change. The new member state is empowered through its 
enjoyment of the rights of membership. It can participate in the erection of new 
standards and revised enforcement mechanisms. It is also, however, as an 
inexorable consequence of that transition, inserted into a maelstrom of competing 
pressures as community building ensues. The renegotiation of the rights of 
members, and what standards they should subscribe to in order to avail 
themselves of those benefits, exert socialisation effects in themselves. This 
shows that the constructivist accounts have much to tell us about the community 
building process and the socialisation pressures that arise. The discursive nature 
of community building whereby states seek to persuade each other about certain 
courses of action ultimately manifests itself as debates about the identity of 
communal membership. 
The rationalist framework sees considerable alteration within the 
membership context. Accounts of conditionality as a discreet process become far 
scarcer. The only area in which conditionality retains relevance is where the 
community possesses, or creates, clear court systems which can sanction the 
transgression of behavioural standards. There is, however, nothing inherent about 
the mechanism of bargaining that necessitates the process of conditionality. In 
both the OAS and ASEAN studies we can discern a broad range of what I term 
"social influence" techniques, resting on the strategic use of language to promote 
socialisation. 10 This can come in three discreet forms. Firstly, Rhetorical Action, 
which draws on the work of Thomas Risse, whereby actors engage in discussion 
about future behaviour but, in contradistinction to a constructivist account, at 
10 See Trine Flockhart, "'Masters and Novices': Socialization and Social Leaming through the 
Nato Parliamentary Assembly," International Relations 18, no. 3 (2004) p. 366. 
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least one party is not motivated to change its own interests and identity. 11 Instead 
this party pronounces truth claims and seeks to force other actors to agree with 
those pre-conceived ideas. Secondly, a process of Naming and Shaming where 
actors spread information about a third party's behaviour when that behaviour in 
some way falls short of agreed standards in the hope that this publicity promotes 
censure and change. Finally, Social Sanctioning, the denial of some of the rights 
that members enjoy, be that a prestigious chairmanship of meetings or 
participation in certain fora of a community. These three different processes, I 
suggest, rest as much on bargaining mechanisms, given the absence in all of 
them of any commitment to persuasive engagement, as conditionality. 
In the process of making these arguments, this study rests on what has 
been actually found in the three case studies. While the above claims represent 
my direct response to the research question, in exploring the intersection between 
regional communities, membership and socialisation, this dissertation also makes 
a series of empirical contributions based on those separate findings. Each study is 
a discreet investigation into a different mode of socialisation, the examination of 
which tells us something about the community propagating it. ASEAN, and its 
members, have used broad terms such as human rights and democracy, and 
refused, or been unable, to detail what they actually mean by these. In this study 
we see strong member state attempts to persuade Myanmar, both before and after 
membership, to alter its ways. We also see ASEAN itself using various social 
influence mechanisms, particularly Social Sanction and Rhetorical Action to 
influence Myanmar. These broad standards have, therefore, promoted 
11 Thomas Risse, "'Let's Argue!' Communicative Action in World Politics," International 
Organization 54, no. 01 (2003) p. 8. 
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socialisation efforts that are surprisingly consistent, at least since the turn of the 
millennium. This leads to a rejection of many prevailing assessments of ASEAN 
as impassive and little more than a hollow shell. 12 Detailing the pressures 
ASEAN has brought to bear on Myanmar, and the role of discussion and censure 
in that story, suggests that ASEAN is a far more complex and nuanced actor than 
many give credit for. 
The OAS study presents a form of socialisation whereby community 
building processes have developed substantially revised standards and 
expectations that those standards are binding on states. It tells us about how 
socialisation modes can change and evolves as a community establishes ever-
stronger frameworks as the basis of socialisation attempts. The OAS has shifted 
from broad commitments, the mode of socialisation evident in the ASEAN case, 
to detailed and legally binding commitments. Again we see the extension of 
social influence techniques alongside community building, but we also see a 
situation where they have become increasingly successful. The literature that 
talks of the OAS and its actions is extensive, but it has systematically failed to 
integrate the broad nature of the OAS's socialisation efforts. Too much focus is 
on the incoherence of the OAS and its failure to act consistently. 13 The study of 
its actions with regards to Panama reveals that socialisation efforts have become 
consistent and effective. 
Finally the EU study reveals a mode of socialisation that rests on strong 
legal standards that operate as the basis of socialisation efforts from the moment 
that a state applies for membership. We can clearly identify conditionality being 
12 David Martin Jones and Michael L.R. Smith, "ASEAN's Imitation Community," Orbis 
(2002) p. 93. 
13 Craig Arceneaux and David Pion-Berlin, "Issues, Threats and Institutions: Explaining OAS 
Responses to Democratic Dilemmas in Latin America," Latin American Politics and Society 49, 
no. 2 (2007) stands out as a well-reasoned example. 
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deployed repeatedly over the course of the relationship, tied to flow of financial 
assistance and on going goal-setting by Brussels. In investigating this, however, I 
take issue with the unproblematic assertion that the socialisation we see within 
the EU account is successful, and that rational choice accounts explain this 
fully .14 Here the mode of socialisation clearly rests on detailed legal standards. It 
returns us to the centrality of conditionality and asks whether or not that process, 
and its attendant intellectual baggage, is necessarily the right one to achieve the 
EU's aims. 
INVESTIGATING REGIONAL COMMUNITIES AND MEMBERSHIP 
In this thesis I argue that regional communities of states are identified by 
the common characteristic that they all engage in the practice of human rights 
socialisation. ASEAN, the OAS and the EU may vary in their commitment to 
human rights standards, both in terms of the length of time they have engaged in 
discussion about human rights and the nature of their commitment to those 
standards, but that attempting to socialise human rights has become an important 
part of each community. 15 Making the step away from the simple regulation of 
international affairs, towards a more intrusive concern with the rights and 
wellbeing of individuals, is the hallmark of regional communities. This is 
common between ASEAN, the OAS and the EU and marks them as distinctly 
more sophisticated social environments than the term system, or even society, 
14 As already noted a position adopted by Frank Schimmelfennig, "Strategic Calculation and 
International Socialization: Membership Incentives, Party Constellations, and Sustained 
Compliance in Central and Eastern Europe," lnternationa!Organization 59, no. 04 (2005). 
15 Note the body of literature that analyses from various perspectives the theoretical 
significance of regionalism. The European perspective is nicely encapsulated in Walter Mattli, 
The Logic of Regional Integration: Europe and Beyond (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1999) A focus on power and regionalism is offered by Thomas Pedersen, "Co-Operative 
Hegemony: Power, Ideas and Institutions in Regional Integration," Review of International 
Studies 28 (2002). 
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can encapsulate. These communities are engaged in moving beyond the 
"conspiracy of silence entered into by governments about the rights and duties of 
their respective citizens"16 by elevating a concern with individual justice to the 
community level through the legitimisation of its place within the discourse 
between member states and regional communities. 
I recognise that this is a contentious statement that differs from more 
conventional definitions. Even Amitav Acharya's attempt to present ASEAN as a 
"security community", drawing on Karl Deutsch's famous work, provoked 
sustained criticism, 17 and I am using the term regional community to denote a far 
more sophisticated arrangement of states than either Acharya or Deutsch ever 
intended. Those who reject definitions of regional communities of states, 
especially in the ASEAN example, argue that many groupings of states do not 
succeed in changing anything, and so they are some less sophisticated 
assemblage of actors. 18 I suggest that it is erroneous to argue that just because 
nothing happened, it automatically infers that nothing was attempted and that 
therefore the community was passive. The practice of socialisation, the 
deployment of various mechanisms with the intention to alter a state, is not the 
same as actual successful socialisation. One shortcoming of the literature on 
regional community socialisation is that it has only focused on successful 
16 Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics (London: 
MacMillan Press, 1977) p. 80. 
17 Amitav Acharya, The Quest for Identity: International Relations of Southeast Asia 
(Singapore: Oxford University Press, 2000), ---, "Do Norms and Identity Matter? 
Community and Power in Southeast Asia's Regional Order," The Pacific Review 18, no. 1 (2005) 
For a critical response see Nicholas Khoo, "Deconstructing the ASEAN Security Community: A 
Review Essay," International Relations of the Asia Pacific 4 (2004). A thoughtful piece is 
offered by Donald K. Emmerson, "Security, Community and Democracy in Southeast Asia: 
Analyzing ASEAN," Japanese Journal of Political Science 6, no. 2 (2005). 
18 David Martin Jones and Michael L. R. Smith, "Making Process, Not Progress," International 
Security 32, no. I (2007) for an insightful typology of differing regional arrangements, refer to 
Mohammed Ayoob, "From Regional System to Regional Society: Exploring Key Variables in the 




when in fact questions of the success or failure of socialisation attempts 
are of secondary importance. Investigating the story of success and failure of 
socialisation would be a strange tale indeed if we only dealt with successful 
examples. Stories of failure are as much part of the regional community 
experience as success. Defining communities on the condition of success would 
close our eyes to manifestly important events. I investigate the existing claims 
about success, and my response to them, more fully in chapter three, and then 
again in specific reference to the three cases in each empirical chapter. 
There are many who would argue that, even given the above, ASEAN is 
still far from a community. They would ask whether ASEAN has really 
attempted to socialise human rights standards to its members. 20 I am happy to 
argue, as I do in chapter four, that ASEAN has proven woefully unsuccessful in 
socialising Myanmar, but a focus on ASEAN since 1997 shows far more than a 
simple rejectionist stance would suggest. In Vision 2020, ASEAN committed 
itself to "caring communities", a step which has led to dramatic changes within 
ASEAN directly over rights. The Bali II Declaration and Vientiane Action Plan 
of 2004 centralised a concern with human rights within the so-called Political 
Pillar of a proposed A SEAN Community. The A SEAN Charter itself, the 
culmination of this 10-year community building exercise, explicitly calls for a 
Human Rights Mechanism as the centrepiece of the Community. Within this 
process, ASEAN has talked about human rights and democracy, and it has issued 
19 This heeds the prescient but still too often ignored analysis offered by Sonja Cardenas, 
"Nonn Collision: Explaining the Effects of International Human Rights Pressure on State 
Behaviour," International Studies Review 6 (2004) pp. 224-226. 
20 Note the review by Donald K. Emmerson, "Will the Real ASEAN Please Stand Up? Security, 
Community, and Democracy in Southeast Asia," in The Walter H. Shortenstein Asia-Pacific 
Research Center (Stanford University: 2005). See also the more positive assessment offered by 
Umar Hadi; "Human Rights Promotion in the ASEAN Security Community: An Overview" 
(paper presented at the AICOHR - ASEAN-ISIS Colloquium on Human Rights, Manila, 15-16 
May 2006). 
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direct and telling criticism of Myanmar on exactly those issues, as well as acting 
as a unifying roof under which various fellow members have also critiqued the 
regime. Such critiques have taken the form of discussions about rights; they are 
an engagement with questions of socialisation, of attempting to elevate Myanmar 
to some regionally acceptable threshold. 
If my line of argument is correct, that regional communities are united by 
their socialisation of human rights attempts, then the next step is to identify and 
explore the motor of that socialisation, regardless of the particular process or 
mechanism that it is attempted by. The issue of membership of regional 
communities stands out as a key site on which to ground this study because the 
processes of becoming and remaining a member are intimately linked with 
socialisation.21 This is so because membership acts as a gatekeeper to resources, 
material or social, which are desired by a member or potential member state.22 
The membership of international organisations, of which regional communities 
of states are a specific example, "has been one of the most hotly contested issues 
in recent years".23 The act of bestowing political agency on some through 
empowering them as members of an in-group, and denying it to others by 
excluding them from that group, results in one of the great divisions between 
21 The importance of membership within .International Relations has a long history. The English 
School has focused on the expansion of the .international society, with membership as a 
transformative moment for the qualitative relations between states. See Hedley Bull and Adam 
Watson, eds. The Expansion of International Society (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985) 
And Gerrit Gong, The Standard of Civilisation in International Society (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1984). For a modem reinterpretation with a critical edge, note Shogo Suzuki, "Japan's 
Socialization into· Janus-Faced European International Society," European Journal of 
International Relations 11, no. 1 (2005). 
22 A study on state motives for creating and joining regional communities can be Accessible at 
Sheila Page, Regionalism among Developing Countries (Basingstoke MacMillan Press, 2000) pp. 
14-44. 
23 Barbara Koremenos, Charles Lipson, and Duncan Snidal, "The Rational Design of 
International Institutions," International Organization 55, no. 4 (2001) p. 770. 
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otherwise juridically equal sovereign states, and is clearly of considerable 
import, as the ever growing list of EU applicants - and the consternation they 
cause in Brussels and some Western European capitals - testifies. Even 
Myanmar, a usually reticent state, was keenly interested in joining ASEAN, 
which itself speaks of how desirable the benefits that membership can be. 
My conceptualisation of membership as investigated in chapter three is 
broad. It covers the process of applying for, and then maintaining, a particular 
bundle of rights and responsibilities. Socialisation into human rights standards 
through membership of regional communities of states is not only about 
questions of admission and expulsion. Instead those two phenomena act as 
conceptual bookends for a far broader internal array of on-going discussion 
between member states, as well as the community itself, about what it means to 
be a member, and what rights, responsibilities and notions of behaviour 
characterise membership. Regional communities continually revise the 
obligations of membership through the erection of new legal standards, and 
prolonged and intense discussion about norms and how to enforce them. The 
history of the OAS is in part a history of an evolving regional commitment to the 
protection and promotion of rights and democracy in ways never imagined at its 
founding in 1948. ASEAN has, as noted, discussed and then established a human 
rights mechanism. These change what it means to be a member, and engender 
socialisation through revising the notions of what a "good" member is. As a fluid 
bundle ofrights and responsibilities, it makes little sense to limit our appreciation 
of membership to only those examples of the initial effort to achieve those social 
and material goods. Regional communities use membership, both in the forms of 
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its initial offering and the maintenance of its benefits, to condition the behaviour 
of states. 
My emphasis on only membership driven socialisation serves to both 
focus the empirical parameters of this study while isolating an important but oft-
overlooked aspect of regional community socialisation. This should not be 
interpreted as an attempt to argue that membership and socialisation are 
synonymous.24 The EU has made part of its Common Foreign and Security 
Policy (CFSP) the promotion of human rights across the globe; something that 
can be construed as an attempt to socialise in the absence of membership. 
Similarly, much of the academic literature on the socialisation power of the EU 
does not rest on an explicit focus of membership as a driver of that process. My 
focus on membership is not because it is the only way that communities socialise 
human rights, but because it is by far the most important, enduring, and 
successful· example of that intention. Disaggregating the focus on EU 
socialisation generally from the EU, membership and socialisation relationship 
offers both a window of contribution for this study as well as positioning the 
relevant literature most accurately. Membership stands as the common theme 
across different examples of communities.25 
24 Indeed, much of the literature on the socialisation power of the EU to be discussed in chapter 
two talks about this ability in the absence of a focus on membership. See for example Judith 
Kelley, Ethnic Politics in Europe: The Power of Norms and Incentives (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2006). 
25 Human rights do play some role in the external relations of ASEAN and the OAS. Hiro 
Katsumata, "Establishment of the ASEAN Regional Forum: Constructing a 'Talking Shop' or a 
'Norm Brewery'?" The Pacific Review 19 (2006) offers an appreciation of the role of ASEAN 
external relations. Also see, with specific focus on Myanmar and human rights, Magnus 
Petersson, ''Myanmar in EU-ASEAN Relations," Original Paper - Institute of Defense and 
Strategic Studies, Nanyang Technological University (2006). Although the notion of inter-
regional community discussion on rights has developed in recent years Anne Pieter Van Der Mei, 
"The New African Court of Human and Peoples' Rights: Towards an Effective Human Rights 
Protection Mechanism for Africa?" Leiden Journal of International Law 18 (2005) notes the 
dialogue between OAS and AU on the issue. 
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HUMAN RIGHTS, DEMOCRACY AND FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 
Within this broad focus on regional communities socialising their 
members through the pressures exerted by questions of membership, I propose to 
study a complex of standards that broadly fits under the human rights label with 
a particular focus on freedom of expression. At the core of this right are the 
freedoms to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds.26 
Freedom of expression 1s considered a fundamental right, presented in the 
Preamble to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (as the freedom of 
speech) as well as enshrined in Article 19 of the Declaration.27 
We must be mindful that freedom of expression is not held equally across 
regional communities. The EU has a clear set of standards that emerge from the 
European Court of Human Rights, and have become embedded in its belief that 
applicants must be democratic (part of the famous Copenhagen Criteria). The 
OAS began in 1948 with relatively weak standards regarding freedom of 
expression, but has spent the last 60 years refining them in terms of the regional 
standard itself (the 1948 Declaration on Human Rights was rather vague, the 
1969 Convention was considerably more rigorous, and the 2001 Declaration on 
Freedom of Expression stands as perhaps the most detailed account of this right 
to be found in any regional community, including the EU). ASEAN presents a 
different case as a consequence of its newness to community building and human 
rights. Despite this, and it is certainly an issue to remain mindful of, I argue that 
including the Myanmar and ASEAN study in this work is not only valid but vital 
if I am to investigate socialisation. 
26 It is closely related to the right of freedom of speech, the prime articulation of which is 
Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948. 
27 Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to 
hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through 
any media and regardless of frontiers. 
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As shown in chapter four, ASEAN has most certainly discussed concepts 
of democracy and human rights, and has acted as a lens through which member-
-states have critiqued Myanmar on rights and democracy. How are these issues 
related to freedom of expression? I offer two suggestions, one practical and the 
other conceptual. Firstly, freedom of expression provides a thread with which to 
chart the competing pressures and outcomes on Myanmar. The various reports of 
the United Nations (UN) Special Rapporteur's on Myanmar make explicit 
reference to freedom of expression, both in terms of its status within Myanmar 
and also as a constituent part of democratic standards, about which ASEAN and 
others have most definitely spoken. Secondly, additional light is shed on the 
matter by the concept of what I term "norm-sets". A norm-set can be said to exist 
when a group of inter-related norms together define a collective social good. 
Much as collections of protons, neutrons and electrons combine to form various 
atoms, so a combination of individual norms can be brought ,together to cover 
more sophisticated notions of the social good than can be expressed in any one 
standard. Freedom of expression is just one norm that together with others (such 
as norms that govern elections, civil society and government) comprises a norm 
set that articulates standards of democracy; "freedom of expression is one of 
democracy's fundamental values",28 although it is not necessarily determinative 
of democracy.29 This is referenced in both the OAS and EU cases, with both 
communities explicitly stating that freedom of expression is a fundamental part 
of democratic standards. As Robert Dahl has noted: 
28 Claudio Grossman, "Freedom of Expression in the Inter-American System for the Protection 
of Human Rights," ILSA Journal of International and Comparative Law (2001) p. 448. 
29 Furthermore, freedom of expression itself is comprised of a variety of separate standards that 
must come together before we can claim that this freedom is being protected. Freedom of 
expression is itself a norm-set, and the recursive nature of norm-sets is of great importance when 
assessing the success of any socialisation attempt. 
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[A] belief in desirability of democracy does not exist in isolation from 
other beliefs. For more other people it is part of a cluster of beliefs. 
Included in this cluster is the belief that freedom for expression, for 
example, is desirable in itself .... Like the other rights essential to a 
democratic process, free expression has its own value because it is 
instrumental to moral autonomy, moral judgement and a good life. 30 
I recognise that the ASEAN study does not deal with "the socialisation of 
freedom of expression". It does, however, deal with the related question of "the 
socialisatfon of human rights and democracy standards generally". It is a study 
about how efforts to socialise these broad norm-sets have socialisation effects for 
the component standards within that broader assemblage. All across the globe we 
see weak and general standards being erected as the precursor of deeper and 
more substantive appraisal of individual standards. For example, the OAS 
commitment to freedom of expression was for a long time mediated through a 
concern with democracy. To deny this case a "place at the table" would be to 
weaken our ability to appraise weak efforts to socialise alongside strong ones. It 
would also close our eyes to a particular mode of socialisation, that of using 
these broad declaratory standards as the basis of political action. A comparison 
between three "strong" cases is not an empirically inclusive one. With this 
context in mind, and to aid comparability, I use freedom of expression as a 
thread to chart the outcomes of the discussions and revisions to ASEAN over 
time. If ASEAN has begun along the path towards successfully limiting the 
harshest anti-democratic tendencies of Myanmar, and if its talk about democracy 
and caring communities has any substance, then it is in freedom of expression, as 
a fundamental component of those standards, that we will first see change. 
30 Robert Dahl, On Democracy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998) pp. 50-51. 
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Freedom of expression serves as both a thread for analysis and a beacon of 
change. 
CASE STUDIES AND METHODOLOGY 
The study focuses on three examples of where states apply, become, and 
maintain the privilege of being, members; the ASEAN-Myanmar study, the 
OAS-Panama example and finally the EU-Turkish case. Why these studies and 
not alternate ones? If regional communities and membership and socialisation 
interact all over the world, there has to be a rationale for focusing our attention 
on some of those, as opposed to potential alternatives. I justify my case study 
selection by first observing the variation between communities and then situating 
my studies so as to encapsulate that variation. 
Variation between communities can be fruitfully conceptualised via an 
appreciation of three issues. Firstly, while all regional communities are 
institutions in international politics, and they all display some degree of 
organisational sophistication, this sophistication vanes between those 
communities.31 This difference coexists with two other variations. Regional 
communities can vary depending upon the range of issues that they deal with, 
whether primarily a single concern or a far wider range of issues. Finally, 
regional communities possess different strategies of governance: while some 
such as ASEAN are intergovernmental in nature, others exhibit varying degrees 
of supranational governance, with the EU the most extreme example. The 
31 I will use the term organisation to refer to the bureaucratic arrangement of international 
affairs in a given geographic setting. Institution refers to the deeper level of an arrangement of 
understandings about cooperation and co-existence. This draws on the definitions found in 
Christian Reus-Smit, "The Constitutional Structure of International Society and the Nature of 
Fundamental Institutions," International Organization 51, no. 4 (1997). The literature on 
international institutions and organisations is vast, with a range of competing definitions, 
approaches imd theoretical traditions. A good overview of this is offered by John Duffield, "What 
Are International Institutions?," International Studies Review 9 (2007). 
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specific combination of these variables is dependent on the history of each 
region, the diversity of its constituent states and the length of time that the 
regional community has existed. 32 I note that as a result of this we are presented 
with two forms of variation: the variation in the regional community along the 
three lines just outlined, and the potential variation of socialisation that then 
ensues. The situating of the case studies aims at facilitating an exploration, 
discussed in chapter three, of whether these two forms of variation can be seen to 
co-vary; that is whether variation in the nature of the regional community 
necessarily correlates with an alteration in socialisation. 
ASEAN in 1997 represented the "low" point on each of the three themes; 
it was weakly institutionalised, operated within the strictest of intergovernmental 
logic and was competent in comparatively few issue areas. This case allows us to 
identify and appraise both the role of the regional community as an actor in its 
own right and the role that existing member states play in using membership as a 
vehicle for their own socialisation agendas. Thailand and the Philippines, as the 
then most democratic of the ASEAN member states were keen to use the 
membership process to draw Myanmar into a web of institutions, discussions and 
norms that were important to them, but were not shared at an ASEAN level. The 
Myanmar case also represents an excellent example of the ongoing politics of 
membership within a community building process. Since 1997, ASEAN has been 
re-imagining itself in fundamental ways. It has upgraded its commitment to first 
being a "caring community", then one that is both procedurally democratic as 
32 There appears to be a strong correlation between the length of time a regional community has 
been active and the breadth of its purview and depth of its engagement. It is also a plausible 
argument to posit that earlier examples of regional communities provide a foundation for more 
recent versions to build upon, influencing the sophistication of any one community. 
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well as fostering democracy at a national level, and now most recently has on 
paper commitments to "human rights" within its member states. 
Secondly, I investigate the ongoing relationship between the Organization 
of American States and Panama since 1948. The history of the OAS reveals the 
significance of how the evolution of a community can have socialisation 
consequences. The OAS case differs from that of ASEAN in two ways. First, it 
embraces the charting of membership politics from the very inception of a 
regional community through to the seemingly successful socialisation of 
Panama, a process that took over 50 years. Second, it presents an example of 
how changes in the nature of the community, the developed of courts and 
commissions which oversee regional standards, have interacted with changing 
understandings of what it means to be a member, what the regional community 
itself is understood by members to be, and how Panama has reacted to those 
changes in order to maintain a comfortable fit between itself and the OAS While 
the process of increasing obligations of membership is the same in both the 
ASEAN and OAS cases, the story has progressed much further in the OAS 
example, shedding more light on how it is that membership, its meaning, and the 
processes of socialisation that lead to it, have interacted. 
Finally, I study the relationship between the European Union and Turkey 
in terms of the ongoing negotiations towards possible Turkish membership. The 
EU represents the "high" point across the axes of variation. It is heavily 
institutionalised across the full spectrum of issue-areas, and is governed by a 
blend of supranational and intergovernmental strategies depending on the 
specific issue in question. Here, the regional community is involved less in the 
politics of self-construction than in policing the already established norms that 
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characterise the EU today. It should be noted that while the studies of ASEAN 
and the OAS have been investigated via primary and secondary sources, as well 
as interviews, the EU case is based only on the documentary record. This is 
because the transparency of EU socialisation efforts is high, and the outpouring 
of documents, speeches and press releases by Turkey, and the various organs of 
the EU allow for considerable insight to be generated from those resources. 
As already introduced, to investigate my question through the prism of 
the above focus on freedom of expression across these three studies, I rest, albeit 
critically, on the shoulders of the trend towards analytical eclecticism. I draw on 
insights offered by the recent work of Peter Katzenstein, who has argued in a 
series of publications the usefulness of downplaying the sharp divisions between 
theories in favour of empirically informed discussions. 33 As Katzenstein and 
Okawara note, "the privileging of parsimony has become the hallmark of 
paradigmatic debates"34 with the consequence that "strict formulations" along 
these paradigmatic lines "sacrifice explanatory power in the interest of analytical 
purity". 35 Contemporary analyses of regional communities and socialisation, 
such as that offered in the Fall 2005 International Organization edition, have 
attempted to "bridge-build" between rational choice analysis and constructivist 
approaches as a remedy to the lack of explanatory power that Katzenstein has 
identified, 36 and I position myself consciously amidst this trend. This approach 
33 Refer to J.J. Suh, Peter J Katzenstein, and Allen Carlson, eds. Rethinking Security in East 
Asia: Identity, Power and Efficiency (Stanford University Press, 2004), especially the chapter by 
Rudra Sil and Peter Katzenstein, "Rethinking Security in East Asia: A Case for Analytic 
Eclecticism." 
34 Katzenstein and Okawara, "Japan, Asian Pacific Security and the Case for Analytical 
Eclecticism," p. 154. 
35 Ibid.p.167. 
36 Here an excellent example is offered by Checkel, "Getting Socialized to Build Bridges: 
constructivism and Rationalism, Europe and the Nation-State." 
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has sought to use both rational choice and constructivist accounts to investigate 
how the EU socialises, although the process of their merging has varied. This 
agenda has emphasised not "a unified synthetic approach, but rather greater 
flexibility of a particular research tradition vis-a-vis the others; [where] the 
objective is not to encourage theoretical integration but to ward off the criticisms 
each approach typically faces from proponents of competing approaches". 37 I 
note, and agree with, the analysis offered in perhaps the most recent study of 
analytical eclecticism by Katzenstein and Sil that such eclecticism "should not be 
confused with theoretical synthesis or the building of a unified theory". 38 The 
conceptual analysis developed in this study eschews the goal of presenting a 
single "theory" of socialisation. Instead, my aim is to both use existing 
frameworks simultaneously to best "capture' what socialisation processes are 
attempted but also as a set of guidelines towards a revised and enhanced 
conceptual frame resting on revised definitions as suggested previously. 
What exactly does it mean to think eclectically, and what within this 
comparative study am I actually comparing? Eclectic theorising rests on the 
assertion that "rival" methodological frameworks should be deployed together to 
investigate the same empirical puzzles with the aim of developing as far as 
possible our understanding, using different lenses at the same time. As such, I 
will deploy two sets of existing "scope conditions" that have emerged from the 
focus on the EU. These scope conditions, one emerging from constructivist 
analysis, the other from rational choice accounts are, as I investigate in chapter 
37 
-Rudra Sil, "The Foundations of Eclecticism: The Epistemological Status of Agency, Culture 
and Structure in Social Theory," Journal a/Theoretical Politics 12, no. 3 (2000). 
38 Christian Reus-Smit and Duncan Snidal, eds. The Oxford Handbook of International 
Relations, The Oxford Handbooks of Political Science (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008) 
Chapter by Peter Katzenstein and Rudra Sil, Eclectic Theorizing in the Study and Practice of 
International Relations p. 118. 
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three, a way to discern when socialisation is intended, and the process by which 
it actually occurs.39 They represent contemporary accounts as to what constitutes 
good data and how investigation into socialisation, whether that is from a 
rationalist or constructivist starting line, should proceed. They both focus on the 
same sets of information, documentary archival records, interview based analysis 
and process tracing methodological beliefs, and as such are broadly qualitative in 
nature.40 They also both rest on process tracing methodological choices.41 To be 
eclectic, I shall deploy those scope conditions across my cases and across the 
membership spectrum, that is both before states join a community and afterwards 
as they seek to maintain the benefits of being part of that community. Each set of 
scope conditions, because of its origins within either rational choice or 
constructivist accounts, talks about a single socialisation mechanism, bargaining 
or persuasion. Deploying these across the studies allows comparisons of different 
socialisation mechanisms, where we see bargaining or persuasion accounts, and 
what precise socialisation process they are manifested through. Through 
systematising the link between theoretical tradition, socialisation mechanism and 
scope condition, I can develop a way of making the empirical evidence speak to 
theoretical expectations. 
Two further methodological points need to be made. First, how do you 
discern a failed socialisation attempt, if there is no behavioural change to trace? I 
achieve this through triangulating the intentions of various actors through 
39 Jeffrey Checkel, "Why Comply? Social Leaming and European Identity Change," 
International Organization 55, no. 03 (2001) offers an excellent recap of these scope conditions 
and the relative merits and forms a substantive basis for the more detailed discussion of 
methodology in chapter three. 
40 Qualitative data is not inimicable to a rational choice analysis. Note the discussion in Reus-
Smit and Snidal, eds. The Oxford Handbook of International Relations. Chapter by Andrew H. 
Kydd, Methodological Individualism and Rational choice p. 429. 
41 I therefore subscribe to the discussion in Ibid. Chapter by Andrew Bennett and Colin Elman, 
Case Study Methods p. 510. 
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examining their public statements, their other related behaviour and any relevant 
documents. This provides a basis to extrapolate the desires of any particular actor 
in relation to socialisation. Secondly, how do I investigate the success and failure 
of these attempts? In each case, I draw on the documentary record produced as to 
the standards of human rights within the target state. In the Myanmar case this 
involves referring to the annual reports generated by the Special Rapporteur on 
Myanmar. For the OAS and EU studies, I draw on reports created by the regional 
community itself. I recognise, as discussed in chapters five and six respectively, 
that these are both evidence of change and through their publicity, a process of 
socialisation themselves. 
STRUCTURE OF STUDY 
Chapter two presents the existing literature on how regional communities 
engage in socialisation in order to provide the intellectual backdrop for an 
investigation into those socialisation processes. I investigate the difference 
between a broad appreciation of regional community socialisation and the more 
focused question of regional community socialisation via membership. I reveal 
how this literature is currently dogged by both limited empirical travel and 
ultimately partisan definitional frameworks that have not been overcome by 
existing bridging accounts, two factors that undercut its utility in addressing the 
ways in which regional communities attempt to socialise states. The final part of 
chapter two presents the Critical Realist-inspired critique of the reasons why this 
definitional impasse came about, and how it cannot be solved with recourse to 
established approaches. In chapter three I present and unpack the key conceptual 
claims of this work. Here I establish my definitional framework through wedding 
a Critical Realist sensibility with existing theoretical accounts. I then present the 
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conceptual claims of this study, fleshing out the conceptual framework on 
process, mechanism and tradition both before and after the act of membership, as 
well as investigating the variations in success and failure that we see. 
Chapters four, five and six present the empirical dimension of this study, 
focusing on ASEAN, the OAS and the EU respectively. In each I isolate and 
interrogate prevailing accounts of those communities and the academic 
packaging that has surrounded them to date. This provides a platform to explore 
the theoretical and definitional arguments and also provide space for the 
empirical investigation of the socialisation, membership and regional community 
nexus. Finally, in chapter seven, I present my conclusions, I draw together these 
lines of argument to provide an account of what has been discerned and the 
innovations that have helped reveal them. This also provides a space in which to 
demonstrate possible theoretical extensions of this work towards the creation of a 
full Critical Realist methodological account of socialisation, as well as to 
highlight the broader significance of this study to related areas of research on 
norm socialisation in world politics. 
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2. Regional Communities, Membership and Socialisation 
This chapter serves to critically assess existing accounts of the 
relationship between membership, regional communities and socialisation. 
Focusing on the literature that has emerged from the study of how the EU 
socialises, I will suggest that whilst the academy has promoted some insightful 
analysis, it also manifests sustained flaws, both conceptual and empirical, that 
limit the explanatory power of that analysis in terms of my research. To illustrate 
this, I outline the theoretical positions of two established rival accounts of how 
regional communities socialise, the rational and the constructivist. I critique this 
literature as inadequate for answering my research question on two grounds. 
Firstly the limited empirical horizons of EU scholarship are inadequate given the 
unique nature of the EU, which creates a unique set of socialisation processes. As 
such the conclusions based upon them as to which process is dominant are not 
truly representative of how socialisation, membership and communities interact. 
Secondly, the existing literature facilitates a division between rival 
understandings of norms and socialisation that actively impedes a fuller account 
of how regional communities socialise. 
APPRAISING THE MEMBERSHIP, REGIONAL COMMUNITY AND SOCIALISATION 
NEXUS 
The belief that organisations promote socialisation is not novel.42 
Analysis emerging from the academy that studies the EU has focused on the 
42 Susan Park, "Norm Diffusion within International Organizations: A Case Study of the World 
Bank," Journal of International Relations and Development 8 (2005) p. 43. A compelling 
account of the link between institutions and socialisation is offered by David H. Bearce and Stacy 
Bondanella, "Intergovernmental Organizations, Socialization, and Member-State Interest 
Convergence," International Organization 61 (2007). Another intriguing account from a slightly 
36 
fundamental question of why, and how, do states comply with the standards of 
others. 43 This analysis has been divided between what Alexander Wendt has 
termed two "second order" frameworks, rational choice and constructivism. 44 
Second order approaches are concerned with the "ontological and 
epistemological questions" surrounding human agency, social structures, ideas 
and material forces in social life, 45 and as such are umbrella terms for a variety of 
"first order theories", such as neo-realism or its liberal alternatives, that are 
derived from the second order theory which stands behind them. Both accounts 
understand norms and laws differently, in ways that are compatible with their 
own theoretical heritage, and the next sections will outline these positions. I 
present the theoretical backdrop of each account before moving on to how each 
has dealt with the question of the EU socialising states in a specific way. 
RATIONAL CHOICE APPROACHES TO SOCIALISATION 
Rational choice is based upon assumptions that concern actors and the 
environment they find themselves in, resting on a "methodological approach that 
explains both individual and collective (social) outcomes in terms of individual 
goal seeking under constraints".46 Actors are assumed to be strategic and 
different perspective is offered by Emilian R. Kavalski, "The International Socialization of the 
Balkans," Review of International Affairs 2, no. 4 (2003). 
43 Checkel, "Why Comply? Constructivism, Social Norms and the Study of International 
Institutions." p. 3. 
44 Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics (Cambridge; New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1999), James Fearon and Alexander Wendt, "Rationalism Vs. 
Constructivism: A Skeptical View," in Handbook of International Relations, ed. Beth Simmons 
and· Thomas Risse Walter Carlnaes (New York: Sage, 2002). Note this theoretical distinction 
forms the basis of the analysis in Bearce and Bondanella, "Intergovernmental Organizations, 
Socialization, and Member-State Interest Convergence," as well, although their flavour of 
constructivism is particularly positivist. 
45 Mark A Pollack, "Rational choice and EU Politics," ARENA Working Paper (2006) p. 3. 
46 Duncan Snidal, "Rational choice and International Relations," in Handbook of International 
Relations, ed. Beth Simmons and Thomas Risse Walter Carlnaes (New York: Sage, 2002) p. 74 
Note the similar assertion at Reus-Smit and Snidal, eds. The Oxford Handbook of International 
Relations Chapter by Andrew H. Kydd, Methodological Individualism and Rational choice p. 
439. 
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instrumentally rational, seeking to maximise their own power and welfare, 
operating on a "logic of consequence" basis.47 Behaviour is ultimately 
explainable as the aggregate of an individual's discreet choices.48 As utility 
maximisers, it is assumed that actors are motivated to better their own position; 
"Individuals with fixed preferences over possible states of the world calculate the 
expected utility of alternative courses of actions and choose the action that is 
most likely to maximise their utility".49 Finally, actors are also under constraint, 
they must "weigh and choose among alternate courses of action within the 
constraints of the physical and social surroundings, often on the basis of 
incomplete information". 50 
The first order theories derived from a rational choice orientation display 
a remarkable degree of variation whilst remaining true to the beliefs of their 
second order commitment. This is attributable to the fact that adopting rational 
choice assumptions in no way prejudices what the target of investigation is. First 
order theories remain free to identify "particular social systems as the object of 
study" and to make "specific assumptions about those systems and their 
constituent actors and specific causal or interpretive claims about them". 51 
Within this second order framework approaches such as the various textures of 
realism and liberalism all have within them something to say about 
socialisation.52 However, the body of literature that has evolved out of the study 
47 Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, The Europeanization a/Central and Eastern Europe p. 9. 
48 Pollack, "Rational choice and EU Politics." p. 3. 
49 Ibid. p. 4. 
50 Ibid. 
51 Ibid. 
52 They do not all necessarily talk about norms, however. For example, the socialisation 
embedded in neorealism as a structural imperative derived from anarchy is not based on 
normative propositions, Kenneth Neal Waltz, Theory of International Politics (New York: 
Random House, 1979) p. 76. Also see Peter G Cerny, "Mapping the Varieties of Neoliberalism" 
(paper presented at the International Studies Association Conference, Montreal, Quebec, Canada, 
l 7-.20th March 2004). For an excellent overview of the various neoliberal accounts and Andrew 
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of the European Union from a rational perspective has advanced both relevant 
and seemingly convincing arguments about how membership of a regional 
community is significant for socialisation consequences. 
EUROPEAN INTEGRATION RATIONALISM 
Scholarship surrounding the European example comes m a myriad of 
forms and with a similarly broad array of interests, from classic (neo)-
functionalist works53 studying the integration process54 to much of the more 
detailed work on individual aspects of the Union, such as studies on the 
legislative, executive and judicial process.55 It should be borne in mind, 
especially in light of the critique to come, that there are two bodies of closely 
intertwined literature to be dealt with here. The first details the broad 
appreciation of the EU' s socialisation power in Eastern Europe. The second 
comprises those studies that make explicit reference to the three-way nexus 
between the regional community, membership and socialisation. The addition of 
membership to the equation does, as will be shown, have significant 
consequences for the conclusions generated. 
Moravcsik, "Explaining International Human Rights Regimes: Liberal Theory and Western 
Europe," European Journal of International Relations 1, no. 2 ( 1995) for the recent liberal 
lntergovernmentalist account. 
53 See for example Ernst Bernard Haas, The Uniting of Europe; Political, Social, and 
Economic Forces, 1950-1957 (London: Stevens & Sons Limited, 1958). 
54 Henry Farrell and Adrienne Heritier, "A Rationalist-Institutionalist Explanation of 
Endogenous Regional Integration," Journal of European Public Policy 12, no. 2 (2005). 
55 Questions of legislative harmonisation are explored in the work of Amie Kreppel, "The 
European Parliament's Influence over EU Policy Outcomes," Journal of Common Market Studies 
37, no. 3 (1999) and---, The European Parliament and Supranational Party System: A 
Study in Institutional Development, Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics. (Cambridge; 
New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002). The development of the EU as a centre of 
executive authority is explored in Jonas Tallberg, European Governance and Supranational 
Institutions: Making States Comply, Routledge Advances in European Politics; 14 (London; New 
York: Routledge, 2003). A focus on judicial socialisation is offered by Karen Alter, Establishing 
the Supremacy of European Law: The Making of an International Rule of Law in Europe 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001 ). 
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In the European rationalist account, regional communities are interested 
in expanding membership as a way to condition the behaviour of other actors to 
enhance the predictability of that behaviour and to gain access to some desirable 
consequence of membership. Norms and laws offer ways in which that 
behavioural conditioning can be articulated and transmitted. Norms are 
positioned as intervening variables mediating between interest and political 
outcomes with scant independent explicatory power,56 whilst laws possess 
relatively unproblematic binding power and are respected due to the relative 
power between enforcer and target state. The work of Frank Schimmelfennig is 
an exemplar of this European integration rationalist approach, his work focusing 
around a quest to explain socialisation as a product of the membership process 
between the EU and potential member states without having to assume non-
egoistic actor utilities.57 In a recent work, Schimmelfennig argues that 
socialisation is understood as a "process of reinforcement" that rests upon three 
major components.58 Firstly he indicates the centrality of the "highly material 
and political rewards of membership" as the only phenomena that has sustained 
change. Secondly, he argues that the main channel of international reinforcement 
is intergovernmental, given that the weakness of societies and electorates is such 
that they are unable to act as effective agents of socialisation. He finally indicates 
that the prospects for socialisation, and stable adherence to any new behaviour, 
56 Refer to Stephen D. Krasner, International Regimes, Cornell Studies in Political Economy 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983). 
57 Frank Schimmelfennig, "International Socialization in the New Europe: Rational Action in 
an Institutional Environment," European Journal of International Relations 6, no. 1 (2000) p. 
110. 
58 Schimmelfennig, "Strategic Calculation and International Socialization: Membership 
Incentives, Party Constellations, and Sustained Compliance in Central and Eastern Europe," p. 
828. 
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are dependent upon the long-term constellation of political parties and power in 
the domestic arena in the target state. 59 
The rational approach delivers specific understandings of how laws affect 
other actors. It has also, under the weight of the constructivist critique, developed 
detailed understandings of norms as intervening variables and socialisation as 
changing behavioural patterns. It does so in a particularly rationalist way, one 
that pays heed to the belief that the identity and interests of actors are assumed to 
be exogenous and static, and that as such socialisation can only refer to changed 
behaviour on the part of actors.60 This is part of a wider trend in recent 
scholarship that has split rationalists between so called "thick" and "thin" 
varieties of rationalism. Whilst "thick" rationalists dismiss normative factors as 
wholly irrelevant to the understanding of international relations, "thin" 
rationalists have responded to the growth of normative concerns within the 
discourse by offering a reinterpretation of the utility of norms. In this 
interpretation, ideational factors are viewed in highly circumscribed ways, and 
when they are used, it is instrumentally. Thin rationalists are open to the 
possibility of construing incentives, rewards and punishments as either material 
or social. European rationalist scholarship is comfortable with the notion of 
change on the domest.ic level, where sub-national elites, NGOs and civil society 
more widely, are actively affected by normative concerns. This domestication of 
norms provides for internal sanctioning, whereas using coercion to change 
behaviour is successful only as long as the coercive pressure is applied, and thus 
is costly and of a short-term nature. Socialising actors rationally seek to aid the 
59 Ibid. pp. 828-830. 
60 Although it should be noted that recent scholarship has started to engage with endogenous 
preference formation from a rational choice perspective, although this field is still new. A good 
example is offered by Farrell and Heritier, "A Rationalist-Institutionalist Explanation of 
Endogenous Regional Integration." 
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internalisation of norms as a preference for a mechanism that best ensures 
compliance. The external states also seek to minimise the costs of their being 
socialised via normative manipulation that aims at maximising the net benefit to 
be gained from socialisation.61 
To illustrate this, whilst earlier incarnations of rational choice showed 
little interest in ideational or social phenomena such as legitimacy, 62 
Schimmelfennig's more recent work is based explicitly on these concerns. A 
rationalist "tum" in the understanding of legitimacy is provided by the insight 
that "the basic self interest of politicians and political organizations is to come to 
and stay in power".63 Legitimacy is understood as an external institutional fact 
that impacts upon their cost-benefit calculations of power motivated actors.64 
This is of central importance in an institutional environment such as the EU 
where notions of what is, and is not, a legitimate action are central in achieving 
success because they define the parameters of what behaviour can be used to 
achieve ones goal. As Schimmelfennig puts it, "those who seek positions of 
authority have to base their political ambitions on the system's constitutive 
political values and norms in order to be perceived as legitimate."65 
Schimmelfennig provides three consequences of adopting the thin rationalist take 
on socialisation. Firstly, actors do not automatically take the rules and norms of 
the community as a given, rather they confront them as external institutional 
facts that work as a resource of support for norm-conforming behaviour and as a 
61 Schimmelfennig, "International Socialization in the New Europe: Rational Action in an 
Institutional Environment," p. 129. 
62 Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, "International Norm Dynamics and Political 
Change," International Organization 52, no. 4 (1998). 
63 Schimmelfennig, "International Socialization in the New Europe: Rational Action in an 




constraint that imposes costs on norm-violating behaviour. Actors weigh up the 
costs and benefits of reinforcement and compliance in light of their goals and 
finally actors manipulate the norms strategically so as to avoid or reduce the cost 
to them of socialisation.66 Through this process, actors "learn" the best way to 
behave to ensure desirable outcomes, and are therefore socialised into certain 
patterns of behaviour that are more legitimate than the alternatives. Rationalist 
understandings of learning tend towards a high degree of individualism that 
do\vnplays the social aspect of this phenomenon. In what has been termed 
"simple-learning", rational choice posits that actors acquire new information as a 
result of interactions, and that this information may be used to alter strategies, 
but not preferences, which remain static.67 
THE CRITIQUE OF RATIONAL CHOICE 
Before moving onto an account of the constructivist counter charge, a 
few words on the limitations of the rational choice approach are appropriate. 
Rational choice accounts of EU socialisation rest upon a set of accepted "no-go" 
areas that are bred of rationalist ontological choices. Most interestingly for this 
research, it is unable, I suggest, to outline exactly how a set of EU goals becomes 
institutionalised in the heads of lawmakers, jurists and individuals in any target 
state. The EU effort in Turkey is concerned with two things; firstly a 
reorientation of the Turkish legal system in terms of the written law, penal codes 
and even the constitution, and secondly the alteration of the opinions of 
government and the judiciary and the instilling of these rights into civil society. 
Rational choice approaches are excellent at answering the first question. We can 
66 Ibid. 
67 Checkel, "Why Comply? Constructivism, Social Norms and the Study of International 
Institutions." p. 7. 
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clearly trace (if we subscribe at least to certain notions of causality) EU 
statements on the need to change a specific law actually being filtered through 
into Turkish plans to change that same law, followed by Turkey acting to do so. 
What we cannot do is create a similar chain of events that link EU conditionality 
with the shared norms of freedom of expression that exist in civil society and 
which are guarded by an informed and proactive judiciary. Why is this the case? 
Because rational choice black boxes identities when it makes explicit 
assumptions about the nature of actors as closed, rational egoists. As such, it 
effectively closes off a vital area of insight, one that is crucial to actually 
explaining what the intentions of the EU are when it extends membership to new 
states. 
Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier indicate that rational choice approaches 
are the best way to understand the socialisation that we see with the expansion of 
the EU,68 leaving room for broadly constructivist accounts in the subsidiary 
capacity of explaining the minutiae of the eventual outcome.69 It appears 
somewhat strange to describe the embedding of freedom of expression in civil 
society, something the EU explicitly states as of central importance when it 
demands that not only should standards exist on paper, but also they should be 
clearly and routinely enforced throughout society, as "minutiae". The rational 
choice account offers an excellent analysis of how the EU is able to influence the 
68 Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, The Europeanization of Central and Eastern Europe p. 
224. Corroborating research is offered by Dimitris Papadimitriou and David Phinnemore, 
"Europeanization, Conditionality and Domestic Change: The Twinning Exercise and 
Administrative Reform in Romania," JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies 42, no. 3 (2004) 
and Frank Schimmelfennig, Stefan Engert, and Heiko Knobel, "Costs, Commitment and 
Compliance: The Impact of EU Democratic Conditionality on Latvia, Slovakia and Turkey," 
JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies 41, no. 3 (2003). 
69 Frank Schimmelfennig and Ulrich Sedelmeier, The Politics of European Union 
Enlargement: Theoretical Approaches, Routledge Advances in European Politics (New York, 
London: Routledge, 2005). This additional emphasis shows clear signs of being derived from the 
work of Jeffrey Checkel, a sociological scholar. Detailed analysis of Checkel's position can be 
found below. 
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rewriting of laws and constitutions in Turkey; it offers, however, an exceedingly 
poor account of how it goes from the constitution to the minds of the great and 
the good in Ankara and Istanbul. 
THE CONSTRUCTIVIST APPROACH TO SOCIALISATION 
Could a constructivist appraisal of socialisation offer a superior account 
to that of the rationalists just presented? Constructivism is a broad school that 
incorporates numerous approaches to the study of politics.70 Apart from the work 
of Alexander Wendt who explicitly tries to construct a socially informed theory 
of international relations to replace the neorealist intellectual hegemony, the vast 
majority of constructivist work has eschewed that goal, preferring a contextual 
approach that limits how universalisable it is outside its own empirical horizons. 
In opposition to a "logic of consequence" approach constructivists of all hues 
adopt a "logic of appropriateness", whereby actors are presumed to be motivated 
by internalised identities, values and norms.71 Whilst the most sophisticated 
rational choice approaches have incorporated norms and social phenomena such 
as legitimacy into their analysis, some argue that despite this they are inherently 
limited by their ontological commitments to a full understanding of the potential 
70 Typologies of the variety of constructivism vary almost as widely as the approach itself. 
Systemic constructivists, most notably Wendt himself, seek to create an explicitly social theory 
of international relations, a third image approach, with much the same motives as Waltz and his 
neorealist account. See Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics and Alexander Wendt, 
"Anarchy Is What States Make of It - the Social Construction of Power Politics," International 
Organization 46, no. 2 (I 992). Many who sought to use the social insight in a more focused way 
rejected this, Kathryn Sikkink, Ideas and Institutions - Developmentalism in Brazil and Argentina 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991) is a good example of this second image-reversed 
approach that looks inside states in order to discuss the social origins of political behaviour. 
Constructivism can also vary along epistemological lines from a positivist account of norms 
through to various linguistic constructivists who focus on the formative power of language which 
at the extreme can become a radical (de) constructivism that approaches the theorists own role in 
the reproduction of the social world. Note the extensive discussion of this at Jeffrey Checkel, 
·"Social constructivisms in Global and European Politics: A Review Essay," Review of 
International Studies 30 (2004) Also refer to Steve Smith, "Social constructivisms and European 
Studies: A Reflectivist Critique," Journal of European Public Policy 6, no. 4 (1999). 
71 Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, The Europeanization of Central and Eastern Europe p. 9. 
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of norms, because norms ultimately interact" with both the identities and interests 
of actors at a fundamentally constitutive level.72 Interests and identities are 
therefore not bracketed away, but become the key focus of analysis, and their 
social endogenous origins are central in accounting for political behaviour. 
Constructivists unite around a mutually constitutive ontological stance that rests 
upon the_ irreducibly intersubjective dimension of human action, 73 and the 
consequences that this has for understanding sub-national, national and 
international processes. 
Constructivism endeavours to understand the world through a focus on 
normative and ideational factors that, through an ever-changing social process 
between actors, constantly form and reform actor identities, where "identities and 
interests are learned and sustained by inter-subjectively grounded practice". 74 
The constructivist approach seeks to understand the full range of roles that ideas 
can play in world politics, rather than specifying a priori roles for actors and 
ideas as the rational choice approach tends to.75 It does not automatically exclude 
the possible significance of material issues such as power, but it does argue that 
any approach that excludes ideational factors at a constitutive level is seriously 
lacking. The constructivist approach to socialisation rests upon problematising 
what rational choice approaches take for granted, namely the nature of actors and 
interests themselves. Actor identity and interests are not exogenous; rather they 
are the product of a complicated and constantly active feedback between actors, 
72 Annika Bj5rkdahl, "Norms in International Relations: Some Conceptual and Methodological 
Reflections," Cambridge Review of International Affairs 15, no. l (2002) p. 9. 
73 John Gerard Ruggie, "What Makes the World Hang Together? Neo-Utilitarianism and the 
Social Constructivist Challenge," International Organization 52, no. 4 (1998) p. 856. 
74 Maya Zehfuss, "Constructivism and Identity - a Dangerous Liaison," European Journal of 
International Relations 7, no. 3 (2001) p. 316. 
75 Ruggie, "What Makes the World Hang Together? Neo-Utilitarianism and the Social 
Constructivist Challenge," p. 867. 
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identities and norms. States are not normatively alike; rather they possess a range 
of different identities and domestic configurations that lead to every state 
possessing multiple identities.76 Norms are not instrumental tools but are 
independently held by a variety of social actors, and they play a central role in 
explaining identity and interests, as well as the continuous interaction of the two. 
Audie Klotz states succinctly the constructivist interpretation of norms when she 
makes the case that they are not merely a constraint of self interested action, 
rather they play an explanatory role by problematising identity and interest 
formation, 77 with "irreducible ontological status". 78 What this results in is an 
argument that socialisation occurs because actors discuss with each other the way 
ahead, drawing on norms and laws to substantiate their particular truth claims. 
Socialisation occurs because actors agree, down to the individual level, that it is 
the right thing to do. True to the majority of constructivist accounts, the ultimate 
agents of political action are individuals, and as such the linkage between 
changed individual beliefs and shifts towards pro-norm behavioural changes are 
important, the progress in understanding how actors change their interests and 
their behaviour will come from the interaction of strategic behaviour with social-
psychological socialisation mechanisms.79 
76 Daniel C. Thomas, The Helsinki Effect: International Norms, Human Rights, and the Demise 
of Communism (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2001) p. 14. 
77 Audie Klotz, "Norms Reconstituting Interests: Global Racial Equality and U.S. Sanctions 
against South Africa," International Organization 49, no. 3 (1995) p. 460. 
78 Bjorkdahl, "Norms in International Relations: Some Conceptual and Methodological 
Reflections," p. 11. 
79 Johnston, "Conclusions and Extensions: Toward Mid-Range Theorizing and Beyond 
Europe," p. 1014. The constructivist focus on the sociological has a sequence of methodological 
consequences. Note the discussion in Reus-Smit and Snidal, eds. The Oxford Handbook of 
International Relations, Chapter by Friedrich Kratochwil, Sociological Approaches pp. 455-458. 
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THE CONSTRUCTIVIST ACCOUNT OF SOCIALISATION AND THE EUROPEAN UNION 
The constructivist approach to understanding why the EU has 
successfully socialised its laws and norms to others notes that the simple fact that 
the EU is powerful, where its power is manifested as the structural asymmetry it 
exhibits vis-a-vis applicants, does not explain the socialisation that we see. Such 
structural considerations may define the outer boundaries of what is possible, but 
in understanding the precise nature of the change that has occurred, we must be 
aware of the social understanding that surrounds that relationship. 80 Laws are not 
simply obeyed, rather they are assessed as being "right or wrong", an assessment 
that is constantly in flux as actors interests and identities evolve under a welter of 
constant discussion, pressure and interaction. 
Interestingly, within this broad conclusion, constructivist studies of the 
EU have focused less on the processes of membership than on the day-to-day 
politics of the Union itself and how those politics influences existing states and 
their representatives. 81 There is a conceptual difference between a focus on the 
day-to-day politics of being a member of the EU, where constructivism has a 
distinct voice, and a focus on the socialisation consequences of membership. In 
the former, membership is the permissive condition, the backdrop against which 
specific socialisation pressures occur, but it is not itself problematised. In the 
latter example, the one at the heart of this study, it is questions of membership 
that are at the forefront of the socialisation story. Revisions to the obligations and 
meanings of membership are themselves vital sources of socialisation pressure. 
Representative of the constructivist focus on the occurrences within membership 
8° Carol Atkinson, "Constructivist Implications of Material Power: Military Engagement and 
the Socialization of States, 1972-2000," International Studies R,erspectives 50 (2006) p. 534. 
81 For a broad theoretical overview of the constructivist account of the EU note Thomas 
Christiansen, Knud Erik Jorgensen, and Antje Wiener, "The Social Construction of Europe," 
Journal of European Public Policy 6, no. 4 (1999). 
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contexts, Jeffrey Lewis presents an analysis of the Committee of Permanent 
Representatives (COREPER) of the EU in an attempt to investigate how state 
delegates to that Committee have their "cognition, attitudes and identity" altered 
by membership of CO REPER in ways that create a gap between their behaviour 
and the rational expectation that they would fulfil their national governments 
desires unquestioningly. 82 Lewis concludes, "COREPER's institutional 
architecture challenges the conventional dichotomy that sharply demarcates the 
national and European levels"83 with the result that Brussels based decision-
makers, ensconced in a dense institutional and normative environment with 
strongly held standards of behaviour come to internalise, albeit partially, these 
norms and respond in ways that are not simply "national" in outlook.84 
Constructivists therefore seem to have ceded the study of the 
membership, community, and socialisation nexus to the rationalists. They focus 
very much on the socialisation consequences of being a member, not of gaining 
and maintaining membership. Where is the constructivist riposte to 
Schimmelfennig? This is really quite surprising, given that the limitations of 
rational choice scholarship on the socialisation history of the EU just outlined 
above seem to offer the perfect "social moment". It is also a rather strange state 
of affairs given that, within the broader realm of International Relations, 
constructivism has become a well-rounded and embedded research programme 
across multiple disciplinary agendas. It even has great traction in the broader 
account of international organisations as "teachers" of norms outside of explicit 
82 Jeffrey Lewis, "The Janus Face of Brussels: Socialization and Everyday Decision Making in 
the European Union," International Organization 59, no. 04 (2005) p. 938. 
83 Ibid. p. 967. 
84 Ibid. p. 968. 
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questions of membership.85 There is something about the addition of EU 
membership that leads to rationalists becoming the "winner", for reasons that 
will be more fully investigated below. 
THINKING PLURAL? THE STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES OF BRIDGE-BUILDING 
At face value, the literature offers a simple binary opposition that 
encapsulates the exclusive nature of the rival meta-theoretical approaches. 
Rationalists focus on conditions of asymmetry promoting changed behaviour, 
while constructivists focus on changing social structures promoting changed 
identities and thus interests. In response to this, and in the interest of creating a 
more holistic account of socialisation, the EU Academy has innovated 
methodologically in light of the complexity of the socialisation process itself, 
and the variety of outcomes that it engenders. There has also been an increased 
awareness that viewing every event through only one of these two lenses creates 
an unhealthy distortion in the analysis of phenomena. 86 Here we can identify an 
intriguing gap between the study of EU membership-driven socialisation and a 
broader account of EU socialisation. This bridge building has come to the fore in 
the broad study of the EU's socialisation ability, not in the study of EU 
membership driven socialisation. Jeffrey Checkel's comparative study between 
Germany and Ukraine is an excellent example of this bridging in the broader EU 
context. 87 Such bridge-building efforts downplay the theoretical incompatibility 
of rationalist and constructivist approaches.88 Instead Checkel advocates an 
85 Susan Park, "Theorizing Norm Diffusion within International Organizations," International 
Politics 43 (2006) Also note Park, "Norm Diffusion within International Organizations: A Case 
Study of the World Bank," p. 112. 
86 Fearon and Wendt, "Rationalism Vs. Constructivism: A Skeptical View." 
87 Checkel, "Why Comply? Social Leaming and European Identity Change." 
88 Much of the work of Jeffery Checkel has focused on these issues and his response to them. 
An excellent recent overview of his position can be Accessible at Jeffrey Checkel, "International 
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"empirically informed dialogue" that facilitates our ability to examine 
socialisation events by combining the insights of both approaches. 89 .This work is 
an interesting starting point for this study, focusing as it does on the eclectic 
appreciation of the insights of both rational choice and constructivist scholarship. 
The argument rotates around the belief that rational and constructivist insights 
may be "better" at explaining socialisation depending on different contexts, a 
safe suggestion and one that this study supports. In the Fall 2005 edition of 
International Organization edition, Checkel advocates the use of dual "lenses" to 
analyse events, now arguing that instead of one theoretical lens being better than 
the other in different contexts, that they should both be used simultaneously, 
moving from an either/or account to one that seeks to adopt a both/and 
methodology. As he states, "this double interpretation seems a necessary step to 
identify issues and dimensions on which rationalism and constructivism come to 
clearly competing predictions".90 Adopting such a perspective opens our eyes to 
a surprising degree of complementarity between the two approaches, allowing 
constructivism to "focus mainly on the explanation of preference and the 
rationalist perspective on the explanation of behaviour with given preferences". 91 
Checkel' s interpretation on scholarship in reference to the European example has 
hetped to break the simple binary zero-sum analysis that characterised the early 
rational choice/constructivist discourse, and has revealed the paucity of 
Institutions and Socialization in Europe: Introduction and Framework," Working Paper submitted 
to International Organizations (16/05/03). See also Andrew Moravcsik, "ls Something Rotten in 
the State of Denmark? Constructivism and European Integration," Journal of European Public 
Policy 6, no. 4 (1999) for an analysis of the shortcomings of constructivist approaches to 
socialisation. The counter critique is Accessible at Thomas Risse and Antje Wiener, ""Something 
Rotten" And the Social Construction of Social Constructivism: A Comment on Comments," 
Journal of European Public Policy 6, no. 5 ( 1999). 
89 Checkel, "Why Comply? Social Learning and European Identity Change," p. 581. 
90 
---, "Getting Socialized to Build Bridges: constructivism and Rationalism, Europe and 
the Nation-State," p. 1065. 
91 Ibid. 
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approaches that seek to link causes and consequences with a specific theoretical 
perspective. 
This bridge-building is both a promising avenue for this study and at the 
same time. more than a little strange, and I use the coming analysis as a window 
into the broader criticisms that this study levels at current accounts. Why does 
Checkel advocate a well-reasoned bridging account of EU socialisation powers, 
and yet Schimmelfennig can forward the conclusion that EU expansion (that is, 
the EU, membership and socialisation nexus) is best understood through rational 
choice? Could it be that the form of the EU itself, a point discussed in greater 
depth below, facilitates such a conclusion? If so, then the conclusion that rational 
choice is the main solution to the regional community, membership and 
socialisation nexus is not generalisable without further comparative analysis. 
While I do not wish to pre-empt the coming analysis, I suggest here that the 
bridge-building insight into the broad affects of the EU needs to be imported into 
the study of membership driven socialisation by regional communities. 
Secondly, and at a conceptual level, these bridging efforts, despite their insight, 
rest on a rather problematic omission. It is bridge-building that does not translate 
that eclecticism to the level of definitions. Rather, it builds on top of rationalist 
and constructivist understandings of norms and socialisation. Addressing these 
two lines of investigation turns our attention to the broader shortcomings of the 
established literature. 
CRITICISM OF THE THEORETICAL UNDERSTANDINGS OF REGIONAL 
COMMUNITIES, SOCIALISATION AND MEMBERSHIP AS A WHOLE 
There are two strands of criticisms which addresses the existing literature 
just covered that I wish to forward. When viewed together these two strands 
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reveal how existing scholarship is unable to address or answer the research 
question at the heart of this study, that of exploring the socialisation mechanisms 
that arise from applying, achieving and maintaining membership of regional 
communities. I will firstly investigate how the limited geographical travel of this 
work undercuts its ability to truly account for the socialisation that we see, even 
if we adopt the unreconstructed bridge-building approach of Checkel. Secondly, 
and building upon that, I will focus on how this limitation has facilitated the 
development of an incomplete definitional framework that actually contradicts 
the methodological intent of the eclectics. It should be noted that these are not 
criticisms of their project as a whole, and the next chapter will advance 
theoretical and practical arguments that rest upon them. 
THE PERILS OF LIMITED HORIZONS 
The literature discussed bases itself, in whatever theoretical and 
methodological configuration, on a single site of how communities, socialisation 
and membership interact. An empirical set of criticisms, and a window into the 
theoretical shortcomings, focuses on the danger of conflating a focus on a single 
case study with wider claims that aim to be definitive of socialisation by regional 
communities. The literature on the EU has not investigated how their conclusions 
travel to other occurrences where regional communities, membership and 
socialisation interact. This has not gone un-remarked upon by the academy itself, 
and some have called for the extension of socialisation studies away from a strict 
focus on Europe.92 Zfun and Checkel in 2005 noted that the over-whelming 
preponderance of rational choice accounts of socialisation which emerge out of 
92 Johnston, "Conclusions and Extensions: Toward Mid-Range Theorizing and Beyond 
Europe." 
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the study of the EU are less to do with universal truths of socialisation and more 
to do with the analytical focus on the EU as a constraining factor on state 
behaviour. 93 This limited travel is important because new empirical examples of 
socialisation by regional communities via membership may well indicate that the 
conclusions generated by the EU both in terms of what socialisation processes 
actually exist, and then which ones are more or less important, or are myopic. 
The EU shows only one way in which socialisation, membership and 
regional communities can interact; a way that is unique because of the nature of 
the EU itself as the most atypical of communities in the most extreme of 
situations.94 The EU rests upon a massive body of treaty law and jurisprudence, 
known as the acquis. For Turkey to become a member, it must first, before 
membership, incorporate that framework into both its domestic legal system and, 
even more intrusively, into its social fabric and broader civil society. The EU 
tightly controls the variation of its member states as a consequence of its 
elaborate political, economic and social goals. There could be no common 
market if states were not liberal capitalist democracies. There could be no 
commitment to, let alone progress towards, "ever closer union" if some states 
violated freedom of expression and some states enshrined it. You must be similar 
to existing member states to become a member, and that similarity must occur 
93 Checkel, "Getting Socialized to Build Bridges: constructivism and Rationalism, Europe and 
the Nation-State," p. 1069. 
94 Refer to Charlotte Bretherton and John Vogler, The European Union as a Global Actor 
(London: Routledge, 1999). An interesting take from a different perspective is found in Thomas 
Diez, "Constructing the Self and Changing the Other: Reconsidering "Normative Power 
Europe"," Millennium 33, no. 3 (2005). We must also be aware of the specific context of Central 
and Eastern Europe after the fall of communism in the 1989-1991 period, because this rendered 
those states especially amenable to socialisation by the various European organisations and 
regimes. The new democracies sought a historic "return to Europe" to paraphrase Vaclav Havel 
and as such were especially sensitive to the norms that were perceived as characterising Europe 
in general and the European Union as the prime organisation within that region. Note Joshua A. 
Trucker, Alexander C. Pacek, and Adam Berinsky, "Transitional Winners and Losers, and 
Attitudes Towards EU Membership in Post-Communist Countries" (paper presented at the 
Annual Meeting of Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, April 19-21 2001 ). 
54 
prior to your accession. The focus on EU socialisation is understandable given 
that it is both the most impressive example and that the majority of scholars who 
study regional community, membership and socialisation live within its borders, 
making it accessible and directly relevant to policy. The offer of EU membership 
is the most impressive example of socialisation in the modem world. Billions of 
Euros are dispensed in a tightly focused way towards clearly enunciated goals 
that cumulatively build an applicant state up to the standards of existing 
members. Each Annual Report on Turkey numbers hundreds of pages and is 
poured over by the Accession Partnership Committees, and by the Union itself, 
to determine whether change is sufficient and fast enough. 
As such the conclusions generated by the work on EU membership-
driven socialisation are not conclusions that speak to regional community, 
membership and socialisation as a global phenomena. Instead they are 
conclusions about one community, that because of its uniqueness cannot be 
broadly representative of how communities socialise human rights via 
membership broadly. The EU study of socialisation when it interacts with 
membership is not a study of all socialisation, it is a study of the centrality of a 
specific notion of conditionality resting upon the belief that the socialisation of 
freedom of expression is achieved as the pre-requisite of becoming a member. Is 
this really the same as how the OAS or ASEAN have acted? This would have to 
be the case were the EU example to serve as an adequate representative basis for 
the phenomenon of regional community socialisation as a whole. The OAS and 
ASEAN are communities concerned with socialising human rights using 
membership, but they do so in different ways and in a differing context. This 
difference plays out both in terms of the processes of becoming a member, and 
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also in the way a member retains membership. Centrally, the studies show us that 
socialisation can occur within the context of existing members engaging in 
community building efforts. I do not attempt to argue here that the EU is 
disengaged from building a community, the interminable rumblings of the EU 
Constitution and then the more prosaically named "Reform Treaty" are eloquent 
testimony to the error of such a claim. However, in terms of freedom of 
expression and democracy, the EU achieves its goals before membership is 
bestowed. There is no more development on these issues; they represent settled 
legal frameworks within the Union that are socialised via conditionality before 
membership occurs. In counterpoise to this, the process of achieving membership 
for Panama and Myanmar was, in both cases ultimately insignificant for freedom 
of expression and democracy. However, over the histories of their respective 
memberships, these questions have come to the fore as part of how the OAS and 
ASEAN have sought to reinvent themselves. 
These processes of community building might exert socialisation effects 
in and of themselves that the EU study cannot capture because it is an example 
where this does not happen with regard to freedom of expression. It suggests that 
discursive environments and persuasion may well be more important in a 
community that is undergoing revision than in the European case. In turn this 
indicates that to conclude the centrality of rational choice accounts in all 
examples of where communities, socialisation and membership intersect is 
dangerously presumptive. Crucially, these discussions remain focused on 
membership; they are processes of reformulating what it means to be a member, 
and what mechanisms exist to bind members to any revised standards. The point 
here is that the EU case simply cannot talk to us about these potential 
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socialisation processes because they are simply absent, and if that is the case then 
we confront a stark truth about existing bridge-building accounts. The bridge-
building efforts so far have been constructing bridges between two accounts that 
have not been given a level field or equal starting point. The attempted bridges 
are being grounded on an example in which one camp, the rationalist, is clearly 
superior because of the nature of the EU and the socialisation it engenders. This 
allows Schimmelfennig to say that rational choice analysis best explains what we 
are seeing when we look at EU membership socialisation.95 If we are interested 
in a broader appreciation of regional communities and how they socialise via 
membership, and if we are concerned with membership as a process of achieving 
and maintaining a set ofrights and duties, then we must look beyond the EU. 
Similarly at the conceptual level limited empirical horizons are damaging 
not only to a balanced account of socialisation, and to the role of a constructivist 
ethos in addressing socialisation, but also to the richness that rationalists can 
bring to the discussion. The rationalist account of EU socialisation through 
membership has focused on one process by which socialisation occurs; explicit 
bargaining based accounts rotating around conditionality. Despite the work of 
Schimmelfennig in extending the rationalist take on socialisation into the domain 
of social goods and away from brute materialism, the EU as an example rests 
clearly on conditionality as the motor that drives socialisation forwards. While 
this is not incorrect within its confines, it is, again, not definitive of the insight a 
rational choice approach may possess. There is no intrinsic reason why rational 
choice accounts should relate only to the politics of conditionality. Breaking the 
EU focus not only possesses potential benefits for the constructivist account but 
95 Schirnmelfennig and Sedelmeier, The Europeanization of Central and Eastern Europe p. 
224. 
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also, though breaking the rational choice-bargaining-conditionality link that so 
predominates at currents, opens the door to a more nuanced rationalist 
investigation of socialisation. 
THE PERILS OF PARTISANSHIP 
The second criticism is based on a simple observation. Rationalist and 
constructivist accounts result in rival understandings of norms and socialisation, 
which in tum are related to their commitments in how norms and socialisation 
may be identified. This has two shortcomings, a conceptual one that is 
cognitively central to this study, albeit with far wider ramifications, and a 
practical one directly related to answering my question of how socialisation by 
regional communities via the different ways in which membership can be 
significant. This has deleterious consequences for the investigation of norms 
because it focuses the attention of the studies of the EU on questions of 
identifying the effects of norms, not an appreciation of what norms actually are. 
Whilst my analytical innovations must await the next chapter, it is necessary here 
to first identify this misstep and then outline its consequences for my question. 
A CONCEPTUAL MISSTEP 
Socialisation studies rest on rival claims about the nature of norms. Those 
whose focus is sociological define norms in a way that is compatible with that 
perspective, as inherently social phenomena that alter identities at the most 
fundamental level. Trine Flockhart presents one such example when she 
conceives of norms as part of a process of "social construction" where they "may 
shape behaviour and reconstitute institutions and actor identities" (italics 
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added).96 Those who engage in a rationally inspired instrumentalist account will 
shun the sociological definition, as it is incompatible with their ontological 
predilections, preferring to view norms as intervening variables in the rational 
process of utility maximisation, "mediating between interest and political 
outcomes with little or no independent explanatory power".97 It is worth pausing 
for a moment and assessing whether this claim is quite accurate. Is it really the 
case that these approaches posit that norms are different things, or is it more 
accurate to believe that they share a definition, norms as standards, but then 
disagree as to their effect? 
There is undoubtedly mileage in this account, and I certainly concur that 
at a bare minimum, the notion of "shared standards" certainly underpins both. 
However, as shown, it is not this definition per se that drives the various research 
agendas. The problem comes in the exclusive way that differing approaches 
understand those effects. A shared assessment of norms as common standards 
means little when the methodological lenses rationalists and constructivists 
deploy to identify the presence of those norms depend on identifying their 
effects. We cannot go out and simply "see" a norm; 98 rather we can see second-
hand evidence that appears to support the presence of norms (be it in the form of 
changed state behaviour or the altered identities of actors). If we are looking for 
different things, such as evidence of changed ideational commitments or 
behavioural modification, then the emphasis of the problem merely shifts from 
96 Trine Flockhart, "Ideas - the Key to Comparing "Apples and Oranges." Co-operation and 
Conflict: Journal of Nordic International Studies Association 37, no. l (2002) p. 75 Also note 
Klotz, "Norms Reconstituting Interests: Global Racial Equality and U.S. Sanctions against South 
Africa." 
97 Bjorkdahl, "Norms in International Relations: Some Conceptual and Methodological 
Reflections," p. 11 Also note Stephen D. Krasner, "Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: 
Regimes as Intervening Variables," International Organization 36, no. 2 (1982) 
98 Bjorkdahl, "Norms in International Relations: Some Conceptual and Methodological 
Reflections," p. 13 
59 
forwarding different and exclusive definitions to forwarding different and 
exclusive understandings of effect. 
Rational choice and constructivist approaches take these appreciations 
and translate them into differing assessments of what socialisation is and how it 
actually occurs. Both emphasise that change occurs both in a states external 
behaviour vis-a-vis other international actors, and in its internal political make 
up~99 indicating that socialisation refers to change on both sides of the 
international/domestic divide. 100 The divergence comes when one considers the 
"depth" at which one must locate change. Constructivists argue that norms affect 
actors' identities and interests at a psychological level, 101 and therefore 
socialisation is understood to be the process by which norms are "internalised" 
into the psychological makeup of actors through a process that seeks to alter 
actors understandings of what is "correct" or socially acceptable behaviour. Their 
analysis is "deep" in the sense that they seek to identify attitudinal changes at a 
fundamental psychological level and to appraise the "cognitive and ethical 
dimensions" of decision-makers. 102 Rational choice accounts seek to explain 
change through shifts m behaviour induced not by changes in belief but a 
99 Most recent examples of scholarship explicitly on compliance would bear this out. Refer to 
James Hughes, Gwendolyn Sasse, and Claire Gordon, "Conditionality and Compliance in the 
EU's Eastward Enlargement: Regional Policy and the Reform of Sub-National Government," 
JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies 42, no. 3 (2004). Substantiating scholarship, again 
from the European context, is offered by the work of Frank Schimmelfennig, including 
Schimmelfennig, Engert, and Knobel, "Costs, Commitment and Compliance: The Impact of EU 
Democratic Conditionality on Latvia, Slovakia and Turkey." 
100 Indeed socialisation into human rights norms would appear to necessitate domestic change; a 
state that pays lip service to such norms, but violates them at home, cannot be said to be fully 
socialised, although it may be on the way to that goal. An interesting perspective on this is 
offered by Oona A. Hathaway, "Do Human Rights Treaties Make a Difference?," Yale Law 
Journal 111, no. (2002). 
101 See, for example, Judith Kelley, "International Actors on the Domestic Scene: Membership 
Conditionality and Socialization by International Institutions," International Organization 58, no. 
03 (2004) p. 428. 
102 James G. March and Johan P. Olsen, "The Institutional Dynamics of International Political 
Orders," International Organization 52, no. 4 (1998) p. 951. 
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strategic realignment of behavioural patterns to ensure best outcomes. 103 Here 
socialisation is the process by which actors are made to conform to normative 
propositions and incorporate them as an instrumental truth in their decision-
making processes. This approach does not seek to engage with the psychological 
motivation for behaviour in the individual and psychological levels. 
A PRACTICAL IMPEDIMENT 
Identifying the issue is only the first step in locating why it is likely to be 
a problem for this study. I suggest that this plurality of definitions of effect 
provides little traction in the analysis of norms. An examination of the nature of 
the case studies suggests why this should be. The EU has socialised freedom of 
expression through rationalist accounts in which clearly held legal standards are 
projected via strong statements of conditionality that Turkey must comply with. 
The OAS has engaged in both rationalist and constructivist methods to promote 
socialisation, creating courts and commissions, but also engaging in a radical 
overhaul of the discursive environment within which socialisation has been 
attempted. It has upgraded its own norms on freedom of expression and 
ultimately, albeit unconsciously, has changed the very meaning of what it is to be 
a member of a community. ASEAN has only the thinnest of legal standards, and 
yet it has discussed democracy and human rights both through its own 
community building efforts and directly through pronouncements and actions 
concerning Myanmar. 
Adopting an explicitly rational choice or constructivist definition to 
underpin this study would serve to close ones eyes to potentially vital 
103 An excellent precis of the range of rational choice approaches to socialisation is offered by 
Alastair Iain Johnston, "Treating International Institutions as Social Environments," International 
Studies Quarterly 45 (2001 ). 
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socialisation processes that exist and are best understood from an alternate 
perspective. If one only seeks standards that can be identified via changed 
individual beliefs, and you may well find a different set of norms, and processes, 
which spread them, than if you only looked for changed behaviour, and 
processes that reinforce that shift. The value of a comparative study such as the 
one at hand is that it presents a wider range of processes to consider, which focus 
attention on a single standard, freedom of expression, and a single process, 
socialisation. An inherently comparative enterprise such as this one, must 
establish firmer definitions than existing accounts if it is truly to be able to 
compare just how it is that freedom of expression is being altered in three spaces 
and in multiple timeframes. Bridge-building may have opened the door to such 
an approach by rejecting the quest for a single theory to answer socialisation 
puzzles, but it remains an incomplete endeavour in the absence of an 
investigation of the definitional foundations of possible answers, however 
eclectic they may in fact be. 
GOING CRITICAL: THE PHILOSOPHICAL SHORTCOMINGS OF CONVENTIONAL 
ACCOUNTS 
It is at this juncture that we confront a choice. We could simply note the 
shortcoming in definitional structures as interesting but ultimately intractable and 
rest our eclectic socialisation accounts upon this grey zone. This is intellectually 
unappealing and shaky ground on which to base any investigation. If the 
constructivist critique of rationalism is that there is value in breaking open the 
black box of identity, then it seems a short-sighted step to then merely rest the 
open black box on a wilfully ignored grey one. What is needed is a definition of 
norms and socialisation that underpins both rationalist and constructivist 
62 
accounts equally, and as such keeps our eyes open to what the empirical world is 
telling us. The remainder of this chapter will present how Critical Realism 
critiques the existing definitional accounts and helps reveal why we cannot rest 
our definitions on either existing approach, before turning in chapter three to the 
(re) construction of a definitional frame that does offer sufficient grounding for 
both the theoretical requirements of constructivist and rational choice 
programmes whilst at the same time doing justice to the empirical findings of 
this study. To investigate this I will present a criticism of the existing causal 
accounts that underpin the rational choice and constructivist accounts of 
socialisation previously encountered, showing how they cannot offer a solution 
to the conundrum. 
THE INSIGHT OF CRITICAL REALISM: THE EPISTEMIC FALLACY AND ITS 
CONSEQUENCES FOR STUDYING SOCIALISATION 
The discussion so far has revealed that rational and constructivist 
accounts of socialisation rested on an apparent disagreement over the effects of 
no1ms, and that this plays negatively against my need to investigate socialisation 
broadly. Critical Realism provides a different approach to appraising this 
division as a first step to rebuilding our definitions. It does so by identifying what 
Roy Bhaskar, the father of philosophical realism has termed the epistemic 
fallacy. 104 The argument is complicated, but ultimately fruitful for the discussion 
here. Stated broadly, the epistemic fallacy is a belief that much thinking in the 
social sciences generally confuses reality with the representation of that reality. It 
identifies that the ontological statements put forward, both within International 
104 I follow Kurki in differentiating between Philosophical Realism as a broad movement and 
Critical Realism, the version of this movement with relevance to the social sciences. Milja Kurki, 
Causation in International Relations: Reclaiming Causal Analysis (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2008) p. 168. Also note the discussion in Brown, "Situating Critical Realism,". 
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Relations and elsewhere, are arguments about being that rest implicitly on certain 
expectations about knowing. We make assessments about what is in the world 
through our ability to know the world. 105 Critical Realism argues that this is 
fundamentally the wrong way around. It suggests that the transitive 
epistemological dimension (that which we can possibly know) is not the same as 
the intransitive ontological one (that which exists, but is beyond our senses to 
fully comprehend). In Bhaskar's own words, "knowledge follows existence, in 
logic and in time; and any philosophical position which explicitly denies this has 
got things upside down". 106 Kuhn, Popper, Lakatose and their intellectual 
disciples, the luminaries upon which International Relations as a social science 
rests, and as such on which existing accounts of socialisation are based, 
fundamentally mistook reality for what they perceived it to be, not what it 
actually was. 
The value of this line of reasoning becomes apparent when we trace the 
effects of this mistake on the existing definitions of norms and socialisation. 
When rationalists and constructivists talk about norms, they are doing so while 
mistaking their ability to discern what norms are, which is ultimately an 
epistemological question, for what norms actually really are, which is an 
ontological question. They may share an understanding of norms as shared 
standards, but the differing ways in which they then take that understanding to 
mean that norms exert different effects is in fact an argument about what the 
"true" effect of norms really is. Rationalists and constructivists thus follow 
divergent paths because of the fundamental similarities in their respective 
philosophical positions. Positivists ultimately denote the real in "terms of the 
105 Philip J. Dobson, "The Philosophy of Critieal Realism - an Opportunity for Information 
Systems Research," Information Systems Frontiers 3, no. 2 (2001) p. 200. 
106 Roy Bhaskar, A Realist Theory of Science (Hassocks: Harvester Press, 1978) p. 39. 
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experienced" whilst post positivists understand what is real in terms of "language 
and discourse". 107 These may seem like opposing positions, but the commonality 
between them is that what is "real" in both cases is anthropomorphically defined, 
to be "real" something has to be in some way discernable by human observation. 
Illustratively, Waltz's contention that "what we think of reality is itself an 
elaborate conception constructed and reconstructed through the ages. Reality 
emerges from our selection and organisation of materials that are available in 
infinite quantity,"108 is alarmingly similar to post positivist assertions of the 
socio-linguistic construction of reality, 109 stating that nothing exists outside of 
the discourse of understanding we construct around it. 
This results in both rationalist and constructivist approaches asking how 
we can identify norms, not asking what norms actually are in the first place, 
because the norms themselves are not directly observable. This then results, 
vitally or our story, in ratio'nal choice and constructivist approaches seeking to 
understand norms and socialisation through epistemological questions that rotate 
around how we can know norms, and then mistakenly transferring that, true to 
the epistemic fallacy, into a statement about what norms are and what 
socialisation is. Both answer the question "how can we know norms" by seeking 
to identify changes in actors characteristics, whether that be "merely" 
behavioural or at a deeper level of identity and ideational. The definition of what 
norms are comes from looking out into the world, seeing change, and then 
attributing that change to a "norm". The need to be able to "discern norms fully" 
norms leads to detailed and rival accounts of what those· norms are, how they 
reach significance, and then how they finally exert influence. The danger of 
107 Patomaki and Wight, "After Post-Positivism? The Promises of Critical Realism," p. 217. 
108 Waltz, Theory of International Politics p. 5. 
109 Patomaki and Wight, "After Post-Positivism? The Promises of Critical Realism," p. 217. 
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letting our "identification of norms" lead to a "reification of theory'', 110 seems to 
be have been ignored by rational choice and constructivist approaches both of 
which continue to discuss the nature of norms in this vacuum, resulting in the 
disagreements just presented. 111 The key issue here is that "our knowledge of 
unobservables is much more dependent on what our theories rather than our 
senses tell us", 112 with the result that the definition of norms has for too long 
been dependent on the intellectual heritage of the particular observer. 113 Put 
another way, because we do not discern norms directly, we have relied on our 
theoretical understandings, derived ultimately from epistemological concerns, to 
bridge the gap. 
THE EMPIRICIST CAUSAL LOGIC, THE TYRANNY OF BEHAVIOUR AND THE SOURCE OF 
DEFINITIONAL SHORTCOMINGS 
Underpinning this line of reasomng is the deepest level on which 
definitions rest, and that is the level of causality. Norms cause things, and 
socialisation is the process by which that causality plays out. To escape the 
definitional impasse identified, we must first analyse the similarities in the causal 
arguments of rational choice and constructivist accounts of norms, before, in the 
next chapter, turning to elaborate on the Critical Realist approach to cause as the 
first building block in redefinition. 
110 Harald Muller, "Arguing, Bargaining and All That: Communicative Action, Rationalist 
Theory and the Logic of Appropriateness in International Relations " European Journal of 
International Relations I 0, no. 3 (2004) p. 426. 
ll I Note that this is not a new observation, even if my analysis of it is novel. Raymond notes in 
1997 that "norms appear to be many things to many people" Gregory A. Raymond, "Problems 
and Prospects in the Study of International Norms," Mershon International Studies Review 41, 
no. 2 ( 1997) p. 216. 
112 Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics p. 61. 
113 Bjtlrkdahl, "Norms in International Relations: Some Conceptual and Methodological 
Reflections," p. 13. 
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At one level, the issue of causality has been a contested notion for much 
of the history of International Relations theorising. 114 Indeed, substantial time 
has been spent within the discipline in discussing rival approaches and 
forwarding specific agendas. 115 These debates have translated into seemingly 
different causal accounts of socialisation. As noted earlier rational choice 
approaches argue for the importance of material motivations. Constructivists, 
meanwhile draw upon on a range of ideational factors as primary causal forces. 
The EU rationalists think that normative statements are complied with because 
they are linked to structurally asymmetric relationships and material sanctions, 
whilst constructivists present norms as competing truth claims that are ultimately 
internalised when one is held to be morally better than any of the alternatives. 
Vitally, both of these accounts are based on a hidden unity, the centrality of 
establishing the presence of causal relationships through the coincidence of 
empirical regularity. Within International Relations theorising therefore there is 
very little debate on the philosophy of causality. 116 Both rational choice and the 
majority. of constructivist perspectives adopt an unquestioningly empiricist 
philosophy. Both seek to establish causality through general patterns of observed 
behaviour. 117 This "Hume an notion" of cause is based on the deductive argument 
that "the explandandum is the logical conclusion of a general law and the 
occurrence of a set of initial conditions which together constitute the 
114 Milja Kurki, "Critical Realism and Causal Analysis in International Relations," Millennium: 
Journal of International Studies 3 5, no. 2 (2007) p. 361. 
115 A justly famous account is Gary King, Robert Keohane, and Sidney Verba, Designing Social 
Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1994). 
116 Kurki, Causation in International Relations: Reclaiming Causal Analysis p. 8. 
117 
---,"Critical Realism and Causal Analysis in International Relations," p. 362. For a full 
list of the consequences of Humeanism within social scientific research see---, Causation in 
International Relations: Reclaiming Causal Analysis p. 291. 
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explanans'', 118 or more succinctly that a causal relationship can be denoted 
through the presence of unvarying regularity in the interaction of presumed cause 
and effect. There is, according to this approach, a conjunction between the 
recognition of empirical regularities in world politics and the development of a 
predictive theoretical basis for explaining that regularity. Cause in the Humean 
sense, is the logical corollary of the repeated conjunction of cause and effect as 
revealed through the theoretical appraisal of dependent and independent 
variables. 
What this creates is the need for both rational and constructivist accounts 
to wed their approach to identifying norms to empirical invariance, to consistent 
behavioural change. A norm exists to rational choice accounts of socialisation 
when we see states coming up against "something" and then exhibiting changed 
behaviour as a result of that interaction, thereby enabling the definition of norms 
as a consequence of that interaction. Freedom of expression exists in the EU 
legal framework. When Turkey applied for membership the norm of freedom of 
expression causes a change in Turkish behaviour, identified through the 
alteration of Turkish legal and constitutional practices, and the norm is socialised 
when Turkish practice is in step with the EU standard. This is exactly the same 
identification mechanism as the constructivist appraisal of the norm to freedom 
of expression within the OAS, where the norm exists as a social truth in the OAS 
structure, is socialised via discursive practices and then can be said to be finally 
socialised when we see not only Panamanian behaviour in conformity with that 
118 Patomaki and Wight, "After Post-Positivism? The Promises of Critical Realism," p. 228. 
This is known as the DN Covering Law Model, which was systematised into International 
Relations Theory through the behaviouralist contribution in the 1960's. For a fuller discussion 
refer to Milja Kurki, "Causes of a Divided Discipline: Rethinking the Concept of Cause in 
International Relations Theory," Review of International Studies 32 (2006) p. 193. 
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norm but also the very identity of Panama as a member of the hemispheric 
community. 
The ultimate source of rival definitions of norms and socialisation, and 
the inability to resolve them without further analysis, is the way that existing 
accounts which do forward arguments about such phenomena share this Humean 
notion of causality. The necessity to base analysis on empirical invariance, and 
the decision to focus on different things (identities or behaviour) weds definitions 
to different things, and thus promotes differing definitional frameworks. In both, 
the processes are different, and the secondary markers of the norms presence are 
different, but the way in which cause underpins the analysis is identical. This is 
erroneous because it ties the identification of norms into methodological 
processes that in fact are not realistic. The determination of cause and effect 
through the necessary empirical conjunction of effects rests on a "closed world" 
assumption, that is on abstracting certain things that are deemed "important" and 
excluding those that are considered "unimportant". There is no absolute reason 
why something is important, or not. The decision rests far more on the theorists 
own theoretical prejudices (norms cause effects because of material asymmetries 
between actors, or norms cause effect because of the power of arguments that 
surround them), than on an awareness of the real world in which norms exist. 
This also has the methodological consequence oflinking one's understandings of 
norms, and the ability to identify socialisation, through the presence of change. 
However, what if there is no change? Failed socialisation efforts would not elicit 
change in either identity or behaviour, and so there is nothing to measure, but, as 
in the ASEAN-Myanmar relationship, they clearly exist. The link between causal 
logic-empirical invariance-definitions must be broken if we are to both ground 
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rational and sociological perspectives equally, as well as to account for failed 
socialisation attempts. Could this be the ultimate origin of the fixation of existing 
accounts of socialisation with successful outcomes? 
CONCLUSIONS 
These criticisms are ultimately nested within each other. The empirical 
limitations of existing scholarship have facilitated limited theoretical discussion 
resting on incomplete bridge-building. This in turn has both permitted and then 
promoted unstable and partisan definitional frameworks. Critical Realism 
provides a useful platform from which to perceive these limitations, focusing our 
attention on the causal logics that have created the space in which exclusionary 
definitions can exist. It also serves to forward our understanding to those 
criticisms, a vital task if we are to accurately conceptualise what norms and 
socialisation really are. In the next chapter, I will I suggest the direction that this 
should take is in realising the fundamental unity of norms. One norm of freedom 
of expression is eliciting numerous socialisation outcomes. Critical Realism 
serves to both break down existing accounts and also to rebuild our appreciation 
of norms and socialisation, as well as providing a firm basis to think eclectically 
using rationalist and constructivist insight. The process of socialisation may well 
be one where different theoretical perspectives have more or less traction, and 
can tell us greater or lesser truths about what we are seeing, just as the eclectics 
tell us, but the need to create a new definitional framework to underpin this 
work, is not an "optional extra". It is vitally important to account for the variety 
and texture of socialisation processes that occur when regional communities 
offer membership and states maintain the bundle of rights, duties and obligations 
that are necessary to uphold that membership 
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3. Theorising the Membership, Socialisation and Community 
Nexus 
The criticisms presented in the previous chapter rest on the realisation 
that existing approaches to membership, communities and socialisation are 
derived from weak empirical and definitional grounds. Together these 
shortcomings have significantly retarded how we conceptualise the relationship 
between communities, membership and socialisation. This. chapter presents the 
conceptual corrections to those shortcomings. The first response is to create new 
definitions of norms and socialisation to underpin the empirical analysis to come. 
Over this I will present an eclectic methodology that facilitates the identification 
of socialisation. I will then construct an analytical framework that corrects the 
over focus on the EU through extending existing work first geographically 
outwards from the EU study and conceptually across the membership spectrum. 
This provides an inclusive platform that analyses socialisation in the many forms 
that are engendered where membership and regional communities interact. 
THE DEFINITIONAL ARGUMENT 
Critical Realism enables us to identify the reasons why rational choice 
and constructivism mistake epistemology for ontology, and how this leads to all 
manner of definitional questions that retard answering my research question. It 
takes this argument all the way down to the very processes by which norms 
cause events, and the markers that distinguish the presence of a norm and 
socialisation. The next step is to outline how Critical Realism can move the 
discussion forwards in a direction that does help my research. It does so by 
offering a solution to the epistemic fallacy, and the causal logics therein, 
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providing a platform for rational and social accounts, whist also promoting a 
basis from which to assess failure. 
LINKING CRITICAL REALISM WITH EXISTING APPROACHES 
Critical Realism is not proffered here as a new theory of socialisation, 
rather it's utility comes from the ability to re-base existing accounts of 
socialisation on new definitions. This is a vital step if we are to engage critically, 
but constructively, with existing scholarship and travel that work to the ASEAN 
and OAS studies. We are helped in this goal by the realisation that Critical 
Realism is a philosophy of science, not a theory of society. As such, it does not 
answer any first order empirical questions. 119 This provides the basis for re basing 
our understanding of norms and socialisation because "any theory of society or 
international politics can be interpreted in realist terms", 120 and as such is 
compatible with a range of theories. 121 Varying different theoretical perspectives 
can interpret the same "unchanging world in radically different ways."122 The 
value of Critical Realism is that it serves to increase our "stock of knowledge" 123 
not to advance any one theoretical perspective on that knowledge. To quote 
Bhaskar at some length, 
Transcendental [Critical] Realism explicitly asserts the non-identity 
of the objects of the transitive and intransitive dimensions, of thought 
and being. And it relegates the notion of a correspondence between 
them to the status of a metaphor for the aim of an adequateing 
practice. It entails acceptance of the principle of epistemic relativity, 
which states that all beliefs are socially produced, that all knowledge 
119 Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics p. 61. 
120 Ibid. 
121 Brown, "Situating Critical Realism," p. 415. 
122 Patomaki and Wight, "After Post-Positivism? The Promises of Critical Realism," p. 224. 
123 Wight, "A Manifesto for Scientific Realism in IR: Assuming the Can-Opener Wont Work!" 
p. 383. 
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is transient, and neither truth values nor criteria of rationality exist 
outside historical time124 
Critical Realism, given it is methodologically and epistemologically 
agnostic, provides a foundation upon which to reground Rational and 
Constructivist scholarship on norms without rejecting either of them. By 
suggesting that norms and socialisation are never fully knowable, because they 
are irreducibly complex phenomena much like the world in which they are 
embedded, Critical Realism leads to a conclusion that rival competing theoretical 
explanations of them would do well to adopt non-partisan definitions that heed 
the Critical Realist insight that we are dealing with a "real world" situations 
where one norm, and one socialisation consequence, is amenable to multiple 
theoretical lenses of analysis. 
CRITICAL REALISM'S APPROACH TO CAUSE 
Critical Realism stands in counterpoise to the notion of cause that to date 
has underpinned the study of norms and socialisation. The Critical Realist 
approach to cause is broad, challenging the regularity-determinism of 
Humeanism by asking whether the principle of empirical invariance is either 
necessary or sufficient in identifying and explaining cause. 125 The empirical 
regularities, the heart of both rational and constructivist accounts, that appear so 
convincing only actually exist under constructed "closed" conditions, 126 that is 
under the ,assumption that the world is fully knowable, something that they are 
happy to commit to given their already discussed anthropomorphism. Critical 
124 Roy Bhaskar, Reclaiming Reality: A Critical Introduction to Contemporary Philosophy 
(London: Verso, 1989) p. 23. 
125 Kurki, "Causes of a Divided Discipline: Rethinking the Concept of Cause in International 
Relations Theory,"' p. 202 Patomaki and Wight, "After Post-Positivism? The Promises of Critical 
Realism," p. 228. 
126 Bhaskar, A Realist Theory of Science p. 14. 
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realism argues that this ignores the irreducibly complex nature of reality. 127 The 
world "consists of more than the actual cause of events and experiences and/or 
the discourses about them". 128 Through their focus on the relations of 
independent and dependent variables, positivist models can lack holistic 
ontological engagement with complex causal environments, even when they try 
to negotiate causal complexity through methodological processes. 129 The Critical 
Realist understanding of causality is a product of their rejection of a world 
defined by what we can perceive in favour of a world that is both real and 
beyond our senses to ever fully comprehend. 130 As such, the objects of enquiry 
and the causal laws that mesh them together are both ontologically real and 
tantalisingly beyond our senses to ever fully appreciated ... "what we experience 
is the result of complex interaction of structures, mechanisms and processes that 
are often not accessible to the senses" .131 
This translates into the requirement to define norms and socialisation in a 
way that pays heed to the irreducibly socially complex world in which they exist. 
We cannot identify the full range of reasons why a norm causes anything, nor 
can we ever definitively encapsulate the consequences of that norm. These things 
are lost to us in the complexity of a reality that truly exists but that is veiled from 
us. Rationalist and constructivist definitions that rest on the assumption that the 
world is closed and that as such they can make apparently causally underpinned 
arguments about what norms are, and the effects that they have. The Critical 
Realist approach to cause makes us suspect of those claims. The study of norms, 
127 Patomaki and Wight, "After Post-Positivism? The Promises of Critical Realism," p. 223. 
128 Ibid. 
129 Kurki, "Critical Realism and Causal Analysis in International Relations," p. 366. 
13° For a fuller account of the influence of Critical Realism's ontology on its conception of 
causality, see Ibid. p. 364. 
131 Wight, "A Manifesto for Scientific Realism in IR: Assuming the Can-Opener Wont Work!," 
p. 398. 
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as causal structures in the world, and of socialisation, as the process by which 
those norms take effect, must define. both processes true to the intransitive and 
open causal nature of that phenomenon. 
CRITICAL REALISM, NORMS AND SOCIALISATION 
We now have a statement of how Critical Realism identifies the problem 
and how it provides a basis for creating a solution that builds upon existing 
approaches whilst correcting their identified shortcomings. As argued in chapter 
two, the existing definitional approaches offer little traction for analysis because 
they exclude norms exerting certain effects. The breaking of existing causal 
underpinnings of norms allows us to think about definitions that are not 
exclusive of differing effects, because there is no longer the need to prove a 
definition solely through empirical regularity. I recognise this results in far from 
"absolute" definitions; that is definitional statements that may appear looser than 
those forwarded in unreconstructed form by rationalists and constructivists. 
However, I suggest that this is something to be valued, not rejected. If the 
shortcomings of existing accounts for this study are that attempts at absolute 
categorisation, then a degree of reflexivity, with the belief that definitions can 
always be improved upon and refined in the future, is a healthy corrective. The 
case studies note that the same norm, freedom of expression, is transmitted in 
different ways, and exert different effects. Existing approaches respond by 
focusing on diverging effects and translating that backwards into separate 
ontological statements. I, in keeping with the Critical Realism arguments 
presented, reverse the equation, starting with a definition based in a real world, 
and allowing different theoretical approaches to take it from there in focusing on 
differing aspects of how that norm exerts effect. 
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A Critical Realist inspired definition of norms would pay heed to this 
multiplicity of functions by accepting that norms exert a variety of influences 
that differing theoretical perspective shed varying degrees of light upon. As such, 
I define norms as "Standards around and over which directions of change in 
behaviour are debated. " Such a definition avoids the shortcomings of previous 
attempts to define norms by refocusing attention away from the necessity of 
proving norms epistemologically to the realisation of their ontological existence. 
As such, it reveals that previous definitions have been constructed at the level of 
the irreal, and as such are implicitly exclusionary. Shifting the focus of 
definitional efforts to the "real", the Critical Realist account of norms allows for 
multiple irreal perspectives to enjoy explanatory insight into the same real world 
phenomenon, and as such reveals the true value of the corpus of work on 
socialisation studies. 
The study of socialisation when reconceptualised along Critical Realist 
suggestions requires a plural approach that accepts rational choice and 
Constructivist insights to shed differing light on the same phenomenon. This is 
not a call for definitions to be neutral as such a goal is both chimerical and 
counter-productive, but it does require definitions that are exclusionary of 
manifestly significant processes of socialisation. Previous attempts to answer a 
seemingly simple question "what is socialisation?" have elicited far too many 
responses, often answering that question in "mutually incompatible ways". 132 As 
Flockhart amongst others has indicated, discovering when socialisation has 
occurred is considerably easier than discovering the causes of that 
132 Kai Alderson, "Making Sense of State Socialization," Review of International Studies 27 
(2001) p. 416. Of course the term socialisation is used outside of Regional Community studies 
when talking about how any type of institution or organisation provokes change. For example 
Ann Kent, "China's International Socialization: The Role of International Organizations," Global 
Governance 8 (2002). 
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phenomenon. 133 Given this, and the paradoxical simultaneously ideational and 
material roles that the norms that underpin that process seem to play, it would 
pay to retain an open mindedness when confronting issues of socialisation. I have 
focused here on norms as effecting behavioural patterns. What I do not state, 
however, is that they only affect behaviour. Changed identities are manifested 
through behavioural patterns. I intend behaviour to be "open" to the sociological 
insight, not the end of the debate. 
As such, my definition is considerably more "open" in a philosophical 
sense than Zfun and Checkel, whose definition of socialisation as "the process of 
inducting actors into the norms and rules of a given community" 134 is 
superficially appealing, but flawed in two regards. Firstly it takes that definition 
as inferring the ultimate importance of logic of appropriateness accounts of 
socialisation 135 and secondly it rests upon an unproblematised appreciation of 
how the theoretical constructs that create definitions relate to· each other and the 
empirical world. Just as defining norms in either rational choice or constructivist 
language undermined the real world consequence of norms, so definitions of 
socialisation along similar lines are equally as myopic to the complex nature of 
socialisation in the real world. 
We should therefore define socialisation in a Critical Realist inspired 
manner as the foundation as the shared language of multiple perspectives to use 
and yet to retain mutual comprehension. Socialisation is, therefore the process of 
133 Refer to Trine Flockhart, "Critical Junctures and Social Identity Theory: Explaining the Gap 
between Danish Mass and Elite Attitudes to Europeanization," JCMS: Journal of Common 
Market Studies 43, no. 2 (2005) and also Flockhart, "'Masters and Novices': Socialization and 
Social Leaming through the NATO Parliamentary Assembly," as well as Checkel, "Why 
Comply? Social Leaming and European Identity Change." 
134 Checkel, "Getting Socialized to Build Bridges: constructivism and Rationalism, Europe and 
the Nation-State," p. 1046. 
135 Jeffrey Checkel, "International Institutions and Socialization in Europe: Introduction and 
Framework," International Organization 59, no. 04 (2005) p. 805. 
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changing a third party towards different standards, a change which otherwise 
would not have occurred in the absence of that interaction. What do we mean by 
change? First of all that it refers to a change in state behaviour that is "sticky". 136 
To be truly honest to bridge-building accounts, we cannot ascribe to the notion 
only behavioural or ideational/identity change. Change must refer to both aspects 
in a non-exclusionary way if it is to be a definition that adequately encompasses 
the range of real world outcomes that we see. It refers to the internalisation of a 
norm or law into a state, but it makes no further comment on the nature of that 
internalisation and the processes that invoked it. There is simply not room for a 
definition of socialisation that operates successfully at both levels. I recognise 
that this definition stands against those who feel that socialisation refers either 
only to "internalisation" as a process of ideational change 137 or solely to 
externally manifested behavioural alteration. As such this definition is m 
conscious distinction from that of Checkel who presents socialisation as 
intrinsically a logic of appropriateness concept, resting on complex learning. 138 
As suggested, the philosophical underpinnings of the distinction between 
behavioural and attitudinal approaches to socialisation are chimerical 
foundations. 
THE METHODOLOGICAL DIMENSION 
Building up from the definitions towards a conceptual framework 
requires two aspects. Firstly an ability "to establish how socialisation happens 
136 Alderson, "Making Sense of State Socialization," p. 423. 
137 Ibid. p. 417. Note here I agree with the criticisms offered by Cameron G. Theis, "Sense and 
Sensibility in the Study of State Socialisation: A Reply to Kai Alderson," Review of International 
Studies 29 (2003) p. 547 who argues that rational choice accounts have just as much light to shed 
on socialisation as sociological. 
138 Checkel, "International Institutions and Socialization in Europe: Introduction and 
Framework," p. 809. 
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(the socialisation mechanism) and secondly to account for under what conditions 
socialisation via different approaches occurs (identify the scope conditions). 139 
Whilst a discussion of the mechanisms of socialisation awaits the next section of 
this chapter, it is important here to discuss how one is able to identify 
socialisation. This methodological framework is vital to make sense of the 
empirical evidence discovered. True to my eclectic aims, the methodological 
framework constructed to analyse my question is precise but encompassing. We 
must be able to identify when socialisation, regardless of the theoretical lens best 
suited to conceptualising that process, has happened. The academic response to 
EU driven socialisation is vital to unpacking this set of requirements, offering 
answers to how it is we can actually identify socialisation, what its empirical 
indicators might be and what counts as "good" data. 140 Just as we encountered in 
the previous chapter two different ways to conceptualise socialisation, so those 
frameworks posit two different ways in which we can identify socialisation when 
we see it. They do so by isolating the contexts in which different types of 
socialisation are presumed to occur. This provides a methodological map to aide 
our identification of various types of socialisation. We need to utilise both of 
these if we are to capture as much of the socialisation that happens, or is intended 
to happen, as possible. 
Rational choice accounts of discerning socialisation rest on conditions 
where there exists structural asymmetry between socialiser and socialisee that 
allows the socialiser to act as "the gatekeeper for resources in the social 
139 
--, "Getting Socialized to Build Bridges: constructivism and Rationalism, Europe and 
the Nation-State," p. 1049. 
140 
--, "International Institutions and Socialization in Europe: Introduction and 
Framework;'' p. 803. 
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environment which the actor needs or desires to have". 141 This structural 
dependency triggers, Schimmelfennig believes, a learning process on the part of 
the external state in which it comes to adopt the constitutive beliefs and practices 
of the community. 142 His argument is rooted in the assumption that state 
governments are rational actors operating in a normatively institutionalised 
environment. 143 Breaking this down further, bargaining is more likely when the 
determinacy of conditions, referring to the need for the benefits to be clearly 
expressed by the socialising agent in a clear and constant manner, is high. 
Related to this is the fact that the perceived size of the benefits to be accrued by 
complying, together with the speed of which that benefit will be enjoyed can also 
effect greatly the pace and success of the process. Additionally, the credibility of 
any conditionality attached to the possible benefits, and the likelihood of 
punishment or denial of benefits will also impact on the process. It is also noted 
that the adaptation costs of any changed behaviour must also be considered. 144 
This is less a condition for identifying socialisation than in accounting for its 
success. The bleeding together of these two uses of the framework, the 
id~ntification of socialisation, and then accounting for its success, shall be 
investigated further below. 
The constructivist sensibility also presents a set of scope conditions as to 
where they expect to see socialisation occurring. Checkel has best delineated 
these. 145 They include the requirement that the target of socialisation is in a novel 
141 Schimmelfennig, "International Socialization in the New Europe: Rational Action in an 
Institutional Environment." p. 117. 
142 Ibid. 
143 Ibid. p. 116. 
144 Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, The Europeanization of Central and Eastern Europe pp. 
31-35. 
145 As well as Jeffrey Checkel, "Persuasion in International Institutions," ARENA Working 
Paper (2002), http://www.arena.uio.no/publications/wp02 14.htm. Also refer to Checkel, "Why 
Comply? Social Leaming and European Identity Change," and Jeffrey Checkel, "Going Native in 
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and uncertain environment and has few ingrained prior beliefs. Within the 
grouping where we are looking for socialisation, the socialising agent must be 
considered authoritative. The socialising agent should engage in serious 
deliberative argument and finally the agency/target interactions occur in a less 
politicised and more insulated setting. 146 Constructivist efforts to identify 
socialisation therefore rest on the absence of "overt coercion". 147 As such ·we can 
meaningfully extrapolate from this requirement that constructivist socialisation is 
identifiable in the absence of hierarchy, whether that be institutional hierarchy 
through material hierarchy (a larger country pushing its opinion roughshod over 
the competing opinions of others). Private discussions between state 
representatives and broader civil society actors are assumed to be the most likely 
site where such socialisation efforts occur. 
Two final methodological points are necessary. I note that these scope 
conditions, especially the constructivist accounts, are designed to identify 
socialisation that rests ultimately on the meeting of individuals that is free 
reasoning humans. In applying this framework to the behaviour of regional 
communities, I am making a deliberate attempt to transpose this assessment onto 
those communities as actors in their own rights. The focus of constructivist 
accounts of regional community socialisation introduced in the previous chapter 
is on the need to trace individual belief change within organisational contexts. I 
intend to 'deploy this insight at the level of community interaction. Second, 
socialisation does not automatically flow from when we can identify a situation 
Europe? Theorizing Social Interaction in European Institutions," ARENA Working Paper (2001), 
hllB://www.arena.uio.no/publications/wpO 1 23 .htin. 
46 Checkel, "International Institutions and Socialization in Europe: Introduction and 
Framework," p. 813. 
147 Jeffrey Checkel, "It's the Process Stupid! Process Tracing in the Study of European and 
International Politics," ARENA Working Paper No. 26 (2005) p. 8. 
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as congruent with one or other scope conditions. Socialisation depends on an 
actor intending socialisation to occur, and then operationalising that intention 
through one or other mechanism, dependent on the situation that they find 
themselves in and the material and social tools at their disposal. Identification of 
intention is achievable through analysis of public pronouncements, private 
deliberations as revealed through the documentary and archival records, and 
interview based research. 
THE SOCIALISATION CONSEQUENCES OF GAINING MEMBERSHIP 
With the definitional and methodological frameworks established, it is 
time to move to the conceptual focus of this work. The following arguments run 
sequentially along the membership process, from applying to joining to 
maintaining. To aide comparability I will focus as suggested in the introduction 
on a threefold chain of thought. Socialisation rests on a political act (the 
socialisation process). In turn, this can be conceptualised via a discreet 
socialisation mechanism (either bargaining or persuading). Finally, each 
mechanism rests of a theoretical perspective to underpin its expectations (rational 
choice or constructivist). This "tree" can be traced in each example of 
socialisation, helping reveal at what level variations are encountered. 
The first task is to analyse the socialisation that occurs before a state joins 
a community. I will focus on the ever present mechanism of bargaining, which 
rests on the legal conditionality of gaining membership. I will also investigate the 
presence of a separate process, member state driven socialisation that potentially 
exists alongside that, and suggests a constructivist analysis. I will also provide an 
assessment of the co-variation of socialisation and regiOnal community type. 
After a discussion of the transformative moment of membership itself, I tum to 
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an analysis of how being a member is also significant for socialisation, especially 
within a community building context. Investigating this, I will "flip" the 
established framework that characterises pre-membership socialisation into the 
post-membership context, assessing how they travel. Doing so presents the need 
for a range of modifications to the rational choice account that the EU has 
developed to extend those observations away from conditionality into a fuller 
account of the use of language and the deployment of Social Sanctions. In all 
cases, I suggest that socialisation processes exist independently of questions of 
success or failure. I will provide a framework for accounting for that success, as 
well as defining what success actually means. 
COMMUNITIES AS ACTORS: THE CONDITIONALITY OF MEMBERSHIP 
Regional Communities can act both as actors in socialisation (that is, 
they promote socialisation pressures with a desire to change an actor) and also as 
sites of socialisation (the fora in which others attempt socialisation). 148 Dealing 
with the first of these, it is clear that to become a member, a state must become 
like the community to which it has applied to join. Membership is conditional on 
adopting the existing framework of the community. Together with Collingwood I 
define conditionality as "the practice of attaching political and economic 
conditions to incentives such as loans, aid and membership of international 
organisations" .149 It requires "a government to do something it would not 
otherwise do" through the provision of incentives. 150 It is a "classic management 
148 I take inspiration for this division from Checkel, "International Institutions and Socialization 
in Europe: Introduction and Framework." p. 806. 
149 Vivien Collingwood, "Power and Conditionality in Global Governance," in The Fifth Pan-
European International Relations Conference (The Hague, Holland: 2004). 
150 Peter Larmour, "Conditionality, Coercion and Other Forms Of "Power": International 
Financial Institutions in the Pacific," Public Administration and Development 22 (2002) p. 249. 
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instrument used to hep foster change in a predetermined reform process". 151 All 
three cases show that membership is conditional on the accession to the collected 
laws that characterise any one Community, although that conditionality was 
significant for Freedom of Expression only in the EU study. 
THE SOCIALISATION MECHANISM DRIVING CONDITIONALITY 
We can conceptualise of a link between conditionality as a political 
process, to the socialisation mechanism of bargaining that in turn rests on 
rational choice theoretical frameworks. 152 Bargaining refers to the process of 
negotiation about the future course of an actor's behaviour. Only that future 
behaviour is up for debate. Actors have preformed endogenous identities and 
interests that they bring to the table in a black box. They may help explain what 
the process of bargaining resembles, but in no way can bargaining effect what is 
in the black box. As shown, rationalist theorising adopts an individualistic 
ontology where the choice mechanism assumed is a cost/benefit analysis. These 
assumptions lead many to cast the role of language and communication in purely 
strategic/informational terms, 153 with the consequence that the infamous "black 
box" is erected around the "interaction context from which decisions to comply 
emerge" .154 
Such bargaining processes rotating around conditionality rest upon 
simple learning accounts where actors engage with the external provision of 
models and alter their behaviour accordingly. EU conditionality works in such a 
151 Dorothee Schmid, "The Use of Conditionality in Support of Political, Economic and Social 
Rights: Unveiling the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership's True Hierarchy of Objectives?" 
Mediterranean Politics 9, no. 3 (2004) p. 397. 
152 Checkel, "International Institutions and Socialization in Europe: Introduction and 
Framework," pp. 808-810. 
153 
--, "Why Comply? Social Leaming and European Identity Change," p. 556. 
154 Ibid. 
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way, and is driven forwards by asymmetric relationships between the community 
as a sociaiiser, the gatekeeper to desired resources, and the socialisee, the state as 
desiring access to those resources. The EU acts in a position of extreme 
empowerment vis-a-vis Turkey. It has detailed the Turkish situation with regards 
to the fuli range of required obligations, drawn up intrusive plans about what 
needs to change, and provided extensive financial assistance for that process. The 
process is conditional in terms both of the ultimate aim of membership being 
conditional on full Turkish compliance and also in the continued provision of 
financial assistance from year to year. The whole process is monitored both by 
Brussels itself and through in situ EU bodies integrated into the Turkish 
government. There are no negotiations over who is right or wrong, indeed in a 
pedantic sense it is not a negotiation at all. It is a structured imposition of one set 
of standards on Turkey. 
Domestic political actors engage in a sequence of strategic calculations in 
order to achieve goals that are best addressed internationally. For example, the 
significant upswing in Turkish socialisation in 2002, even more noticeable with 
the election of the Ada/et ve Kalkinma Partisi (AKP) in 2003 is attributable to 
different constellations of domestic political power. A comparison between the 
three studies also reveals the importance of recognising that the necessary 
precursor of socialisation is a gap between regional and national standards where 
it is the community standards that are more "advanced". Panama discussed the 
founding, and then joined, the OAS at a time when it was more committed to 
protecting freedom, of expression than many others were. As such, we can 
conceptualise this engagement not as one of potential socialisation, but one of 
"locking-in" national standards into a regional framework. 
85 
EXPLAINING THE SUCCESS OF CONDITIONALITY 
Success is a relative term, to be judged through the interplay of intentions 
and outcomes. It is also a debatable one. I have sought to detach the study of the 
socialisation attempt from the study of socialisation success, but success itself 
can mean multiple things. Is socialisation successful when we can see some 
response to a socialisation attempt, or should we reserve the term for only ever 
"complete" socialisation, and how would we identify "completeness"? I argue 
that to answer questions of success, one must identify first the presence of a 
socialisation attempt, through examining actor's intentions within the scope 
condition frameworks. When you have identified a situation where socialisation 
via one mechanism can occur, and then established that an actor actually wanted 
socialisation to occur, it is then valid to talk about the success of that outcome. 
The lack of interest in the ASEAN study of the regional community itself in 
socialising rights to Myanmar means it cannot be claimed to be a failure. It 
simply did not occur. The OAS case shows some considerable interest in 
questions of rights, but ultimately these rested not on legal conditionality 
processes, and again are not relevant for success. It makes sense, from a practical 
perspective, to identify graduations in success. When a mechanism invokes a 
change, it is in part successful, even if that change is somewhat less than the 
actors themselves may desire. The analysis here is that success rests on, true to 
my definition of socialisation above, modifications in actor behaviour that would 
not have occurred in the absence of the interaction. From this basis the 
graduations of success can be judged relative to the intentions of those "doing" 
the socialising. 
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We do see both the clear intent and a record of considerable success in 
EU socialising Turkey into freedom of expression norms, although this success if 
not absolute as will be detailed in Chapter six. How are we to account of that? 
The scope conditions presented above offer a partial clue because they "generate 
expectations" for when socialisation is likely to occur. 155 They both present a 
methodological framework for discerning socialisation as well as a conceptual 
clue as to how to account for its success, albeit with the requirement of additional 
insight. When a state exists in the inferior position with regards to those 
conditions, we can expect socialisation via that process and mechanism to 
commence. Underpinning this is the question of intention on the part of target 
state, as a qualifier to the pacing and nature of that socialisation itself. A position 
of structural dependency may be the necessary requirement but it is not 
sufficient, especially when one is interested not simply in broad success and 
failure, and rather in explaining the pacing of socialisation and why that alters 
over time. Intention here has two characteristics, firstly the willingness to see the 
rewards of membership as something valuable, and secondly an assessment of 
just how valuable those rewards is in the context of competing domestic political 
pressures. Socialisation via conditionality is successful when the domestic 
alignment of political forces is one that facilitates that process. The elections of 
2002 saw a decided shift within Turkey both to a single party government and 
also to the ascendancy of a pro-EU discourse. The rapid increase in socialisation 
after the election, in the face of all other considerations remaining the same, 
substantiates the claim that it is domestic "constellations" that determine the 
pacing of socialisation via bargaining, even if it is external desires that condition 
155 
--, "It's the Process Stupid! Process Tracing in the Study of European and International 
Politics," p. 9. 
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the ultimate end point of that process. 156 The Turkish case also suggests that their 
exist boundaries as to what conditionality driven socialisation can achieve. 
Whilst the realignment of legal standards within Turkey has proceeded apace, the 
inability of the EU to "get inside the heads" of judges to convince them of the 
rightness of the new legal standards, has led to continued shortcomings. Given 
that the EU focuses not only on legal reform but its impartial and consistent 
delivery to society, the success of bargaining is left ultimately with a sense of 
incompleteness. 
COMMUNITIES AS SITES: MEMBER-STATE DRIVEN SOCIALISATION 
MEMBER STATES AND CONSTRUCTIVIST SOCIALISATION 
Existing scholarship has understood the division between communities as 
either actors or sites in the socialisation story as a distinction between a rational 
choice focus on communities as actors and then a constructivist account of 
individuals within community contexts socialisation (exactly as the Lewis study 
presented in the previous chapter discussed). This division is useful, but 
incomplete. It is useful in the sense that it denotes the split between differing 
ways that communities and socialisation interact, but there is no need to make 
the constructivist focus solely on individuals within dense institutional 
environments. The ASEAN study reveals that states can seek to use the formal 
offer of membership by a community mean more than the community itself 
intends. 
In such situations, states are not able to make recourse to material 
sanction or structural asymmetry to forward their own interests, in the way that 
156 Schimmelfennig, "Strategic Calculation and International Socialization: Membership 
Incentives, Party Constellations, and Sustained Compliance in Central and Eastern Europe," p. 
842. 
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the community itself can. They do not play the role of gatekeeper. Rather, states 
interact with each other, within the framework of the prospect of membership of 
a shared community, to discuss what upcoming membership for a state should 
mean. This finds strong affinities in the constructivist account of socialisation 
that I term persuasion. 157 This refers to empirical and normative statements put 
forward with the intention of being held valid and truthful, with the purpose of 
changing beliefs. As such, it refers not only to changes in state behaviour, but in 
keeping with its constructivist heritage, altering beliefs of actors, down to the 
individual level of analysis. 158 In its purest form, persuasion promotes norm 
consistent action through a process of interaction that involves changing attitudes 
without reward or coercion. 159 When this occurs, actors actively and reflectively 
internalise new understandings of appropriate behaviour and change their 
behaviour accordingly .160 The theoretical process by which persuasion is 
assumed to occur is a Habermasian account of Communicative Action. 161 This 
focuses on the way in which "argumentative and discursive processes challenge 
the truth claims inherent in identities and perceived interests. 162 This is rooted in 
the belief that communicative processes occur in an "ideal speech situation" 
157 Variously referred to as argument, argumentation or normative suasion. Note Checkel, 
"International Institutions and Socialization in Europe: Introduction and Framework," pp. 812-
813. Further note that I use the term persuasion to refer to a specifically constructivist process of 
realignment of identities, not to a broader approach to change that can be engendered by either 
rational or constructivist accounts. See ---, "Persuasion in International Institutions." for 
such an approach. 
158 Rodger Payne, "Persuasion, Frames and Norm Construction," European Journal of 
International Relations 7, no. 1 (2001) p. 41. 
159 Flockhart, "'Masters and Novices': Socialization and Social Leaming through the Nato 
Parliamentary Assembly." 
16
° Checkel, "International Institutions and Socialization in Europe: Introduction and 
Framework," p. 812. 
161 Refer to Thomas Diez and Jill Steans, "A Useful Dialogue? Habermas and International 
Relations," Review of International Studies 31, no. 1 (2005) for an introduction to the role of 
Habermas in international political theorising. A more general discussion of the potentialities 
within Habermas can be Accessible at Fred Dallmayr, "Conversation across Boundaries: Political 
Theory and Global Diversity," Millennium 30, no. 2 (2001). 
162 Thomas Risse, "International Norms and Domestic Change: Arguing and Communicative 
Behaviour in the Human Rights Arena," Politics and Society 27, no. 4 (1999) p. 530. 
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where the goal is the achievement of consensus about truth claims. 163 This rests 
on notions of moral discourse; that is discussion that rests not only on norm 
justification but also on identity related arguments. 164 Not only were Thailand 
and the Philippines seeking to change what Myanmar did, within the notion of 
membership of ASEAN, so was Myanmar forwarding its own arguments about 
what was legitimate topics for discussion, which in turn potentially influenced 
Bangkok and Manila's identities as members. 165 
Persuasion seeks to operationalise the roles of communication and social 
interaction, and given its constructivist heritage, "restores a sense of agency to 
the social norms that may be central to learning". 166 Given that the ontology here 
is not individualist but relational, social dynamics are given a much greater role 
in the formation of both preference and behaviour. Persuasion translates into a 
range of political acts designed to alter an actor's behaviour in the absence of 
overt conditionality. Central to this are processes of discussion and attempts to 
convince others of the "wrongness" of their current behaviour, whilst crucially 
remaining open yourself to reconstitution by the process of discussion. These are 
analysable sociologically because the process of discussion rests on the mutual 
constitution of actors and the identities that they project. Persuasion rests on 
altering the social advantages and costs of a particular action and then 
convincing actors that change is required as a consequence, and as such the 
sodal learning that underpins persuasion breaks with strict methodological 
163 Ibid. p. 534. 
164 Thomas Risse, Steve C. Ropp, and Kathryn Sikkink, The Power of Human Rights: 
International Norms and Domestic Change, Cambridge Studies in International Relations; 66. 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999) p. 13. 
165 Alice Ba, "Who's Socializing Whom? Complex Engagement in Sino-ASEAN Relations," 
The Pacific Review 19 (2006) p. 162. Ba promotes a constructivist appraisal of the relationship 
between China and ASEAN that could well be translated to the focus here on human rights 
between ASEAN and Myanmar. 
166 Checkel, "Why Comply? Constructivism, Social Norms and the Study of International 
Institutions." Op. Cit. p. I 0. 
90 
individualism. 167 I make this claim, as opposed to conceptualising these 
pressures as some rational choice account of language (which we will encounter 
shortly) because of the relationship between the various interlocutors within this 
situation. In the ASEAN situation, the detachment of these negotiations from the 
official offer of ASEAN membership significantly reduced the presence of 
vanous forms of hierarchy between the participants. I do not contend that 
relations between participants ever reached full congruence with a Habermasian 
lifeworld, where total "true" discourse is required, but nor do I subscribe to the 
arguments of some that this renders the persuasive process a dead end in 
socialisation studies. The justification for this is as follows. 
I agree with those who have argued that the Habermasian focus solely on 
truth seeking arguing between actors is flawed and that the discursive process is 
characterised not by free debate but by actors advancing their arguments via the 
exploitation of asymmetries between them, be they material or social in nature. 168 
At a fundamental level, the Foucauldian critique suggests Habermas is 
constructing an illusion when he talks of ideal speech, unsurprising given that 
Foucault believes that power resides in the structure of discourse itself, and it is 
this latent power that has a determinative influence on who speaks and who 
stands the greatest chance of being agreed with. One does not, however, have to 
adopt a Foucauldian analysis to believe that on a more pragmatic level, the 
notion of ideal speech is too divorced from the context of any persuasion 
attempt, a context that necessarily interfaces with the relative power of those 
engaged in the persuasion act. They are still engaged in persuasion attempts; in 
167 Jeffrey Checkel, "Social Construction and Integration," Journal of European Public Policy 
6, no. 4 (1999) p. 548. 
168 Laura K. Landolt, "(Mis)Constructing the Third World? Constructivist Analysis of Norm 
Diffusion," Third World Quarterly 25 (2004). 
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the process of changing others opinions and beliefs, but they may well adopt 
material techniques, either actively or passively, to ensure the success of that 
process. 
I further believe that the various attempts to "weaken" the Habermasian 
commitment to "ideal speech" are doomed to failure given this commitment is so 
deeply rooted in truly understanding persuasion. Whilst it may well be the case 
that "international institutions... provide an information rich and normative 
framework structuring interactions"169 with multiple public spheres to enable a 
process of challenge and counter challenge, Risse's belief that we can "relax" the 
assumption that power imbalances in these contexts is in error. 170 It 
fundamentally misconstrues the nature of Habermas' ideal project and applies it 
falsely to real world political institutions. The belief that power is not a universal 
constant in all speech acts, rather a matter for empirical enquiry in each context 
does little to assuage the sense that Risse is adopting an overly optimistic 
interpretation of the potential in real world circumstances for a common 
lifeworld in a truly Habermasian sense to exist. 171 Risse's back up justification, 
that "the ideal speech situation is not meant as a statement about the empirical 
world", but rather as a counterfactual does not alleviate the fundamental 
quandary. It only works if actors "communicate as if they were in an ideal speech 
situation", 172 a statement that requires the investigation of an actors beliefs, a 
task the outcome of which is dependent more on the viewers preferences than on 
impartial enquiry. Given this line of reasoning I argue, that the value, of 
persuasion is less to do with its exacting intellectual heritage and more related to 
169 Risse, ""Let's Argue!" Communicative Action in World Politics," p. 33. 
170 
--, "International Norms and Domestic Change: Arguing and Communicative 
Behaviour in the Human Rights Arena," p. 535. 
171 Ibid. p. 536. 
172 Ibid. p. 535. 
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the fact that it offers an insightful cognitive "short cut" to investigating 
socialisation processes that no rationalist account can grasp. The problem comes 
in seeking to mould Habermas to the real world, not in the fundamental insight 
about the importance of persuasion in horizontally arranged discursive 
environments. 173 
The presence of this mechanism rejects the EU generated conclusion that 
constructivist accounts of socialisation play only a subsidiary role. These 
member state driven approaches central, both substantively and in terms of their 
potential significance for freedom of expression as a marker of broader domestic 
reform, given the comparatively "light" nature of ASEAN as a regional 
community. The EU focus on a community that is highly bureaucratic and 
legalised creates little space for these member state driven accounts to exist. The 
ASEAN study reveals the value of comparative analysis, and broader definitional 
categories underpinning that. 
THE QUESTION OF SUCCESS 
Accounting for the success or failure of persuasive socialisation efforts is 
again embedded in the dual nature of the established scope conditions. Actors 
who enter a situation with either weakly held, or totally absent, codes for notions 
of appropriate behaviour in any given situation are more likely to be susceptible 
to persuasive actions. Within such contexts, authoritative and recognised actors 
should interlocute frequently and "honestly" with the target state, ideally over an 
extended period of time. The importance of these accounts is evidenced by a 
173 Note in this regard the importance to persuasion actually being persuasive of those actors 
who are attempting to impart new standards being "enabled and legitimated by the broader social 
discourse in which they are embedded." Jeffrey Checkel, "Constructivist Approaches to 
European Integration," ARENA Working Paper 06, no. 06 (2006), 
http://www.arena.uio.no/publications/working-papers2006/papers/wp06 _ 06.htm. p. 15. 
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counterfactual appreciation of the nature of Myanmar's engagement with 
existing members of ASEAN. 
Myanmar can plausibly be described as being in a novel environment, but 
it certainly did not come to the table with few deep beliefs about the correctness 
of its own behaviour, and nor can Thailand and the Philippines be considered 
truly authoritative given they could not by themselves make membership 
conditional on the fulfilment of their goals. Whilst Thailand and the Philippines 
were "genuine" in their recourse to dialogue between ASEAN, member states 
and Myanmar, the Junta itself dealt with those debates instrumentally, and 
adroitly negated their impact over the actual conditions that stood between itself 
and membership of ASEAN. In contrast to the EU study, the question of 
intention is also important. Rights issues were never central to the process of 
constructive engagement. Whilst Thailand and the Philippines expressed rights 
concerns, Thailand especially was interested in other matters such as border 
security and stemming the flow of narcotics. Whereas the intent to socialise was 
clear in the EU study, the intent was conflicted in the constructive engagement 
example. 
Constructivist accounts of successful socialisation emphasise the 
importance of enduring, repeated and genuine discussion between actors. The 
length of time Myanmar was part of the constructive engagement process was 
simply to() short a time to persuade Myanmar. The occasional meeting between 
heads of state, or the more regular bureaucratic processes that underpinned 
Myanmar'·s integration of ASEAN law were insufficient fora for member states 
to exert their own influences. Finally, that the Constructive Engagement process 
between ASEAN and Myanmar was animated in part by rights concerns is not 
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the same as arguing that it was predominately organised around shared notions of 
rights. It was a broad strategy of enmeshing Myanmar. Rights were just one 
competing voice in a chorus of competing desires, and were only being sung "in 
tune" by a minority of ASEAN members themselves. 
Co-VARIATION OF REGIONAL COMMUNITY AND SOCIALISATION PRE-MEMBERSHIP 
Before membership is achieved, legal conditionality processes are always 
present as the conditioner by which a non-member becomes like a member. The 
need for all regional communities to limit the heterogeneity of their members, to 
define the "in-group" from the outsiders, flows from the requirement to shape 
who holds what benefit. The variation between these examples comes in terms of 
what exactly each Regional Community holds membership to be conditional on. 
The broader and deeper the agreement embodied in the existing legal framework 
of a Community, the more "traffic" there is being socialised ultimately to the 
target applicant state and the more significant the change promoted will be. 
The role that member states play in exerting their own socialisation 
pressures varies between the cases. There is an inverse relationship between the 
scope for member state driven activities and the sum obligation of membership 
as defined through the three types of variation outlined. We see this strategy 
most clearly emerging in the ASEAN case. Conversely, the state behaviour 
within the EU was largely limited to petulant displays of vetoing membership on 
grounds as chimerical as "not European enough" or somewhat more worryingly, 
"too Islamic". Why this difference? The answer is to be found in the degree of 
homogeneity that membership of the Community requires. As outlined, the 
requirements to be a member of ASEAN, both legal and normative, were so 
nebulous that they facilitated the induction of various political regimes from 
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democracy of varying secular and religious flavours through to autocracy and 
communist dictatorship. As such, there existed the ever-present fact that the legal 
and normative frameworks of domestic and regional governance could diverge 
sustainedly and that this divergence was an accepted and legitimate fact. 
This results in members whose own goals are far more complex, and of 
many varying flavours, than those that can be expressed at the regional level, 
where unanimity is required before a law, or a norm, can be said to be held by 
the Community itself. Intense heterogeneity of ASEAN member states 
necessarily limited that which was expressed regionally, creating space for 
member driven strategies to arise. The contrast with the EU could not be greater. 
Here, sophisticated obligations in terms of governance structure and human 
rights engendered significant continuity between domestic and regional 
normative allegiance, with the result that the space between domestic and 
regional was narrow or non-existent. All member states were democracies, and 
liberal capitalist ones at that, and as such these rights became embedded within 
the legal and normative frameworks of the Union because all could agree both 
that these norms were "correct" and that it was the role of the Union to protect 
and promote them. 
SOCIALISATION AFTER MEMBERSHIP 
To this point I have identified and theorised about two discreet 
socialisation processes that occur prior to membership being granted, bargaining 
and persuasion. I have also identified the conditions under which those can be 
expected, as well as accounts of their success. The next step is to continue the 
focus on socialisation via shifting our appreciation to what being, as opposed to 
becoming, a member entails. The significance of expanding our analysis across 
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the membership spectrum is to open our eyes to otherwise ignored ways in which 
regional communities potentially attempt socialisation. 
Crossing the membership threshold is significant for socialisation 
because, put succinctly, "membership has its privileges" .174 Not only does it 
mark the point at which applicant states finally gain access to the benefits they 
craved; it fundamentally recasts the relationship between the now-member state 
and the Community. It alters the socialisation pressure states are under, and their 
ability to influence that process. Vitally it grants the new member the right to 
influence the future course of the Regional Community. This means that once a 
member, states can control to some degree, depending on the nature of the 
Community they joined, the pressures that they are under to conform to new, 
existing or evolving standards over time. The OAS and ASEAN studies promote 
the importance of community building as something that promotes socialisation 
into new and revised standards. Regional communities rarely remain static; they 
and their members are constantly exposed to changing fortunes and 
circumstances, both ideational and material. Devising responses to these shifting 
contexts exposes the participants of that process to the discussion of rival ideas 
and plans for the future that they themselves may not share, as well as attempts 
by the proponents of those ideas to proselytise their opinions. They change and 
develop in response to both the goals of their members and external pressures. 
ASEAN is in the process of overhauling itself with a commitment to human 
rights and democracy. The OAS has developed a forceful commitment to 
freedom of expression where none existed before, which is now protected by 
commissions and courts that patrol and enforce revised standards. Discussions 
174 Pamela A. Jordan, "Does Membership Have Its Privileges? Entrance into the Council of 
Europe and Compliance with Human Rights Norms," Human Rights Quarterly 25 (2003) p. 688. 
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about revised standards precede legal reform of those standards, and the creation 
of courts to address them. As such, the analytical framework must be able to 
incorporate an appreciation of both the transformative moment of membership 
and how socialisation processes occur once a member. The aim here is to 
"travel" the above two arguments about the nature and success of socialisation 
into the post membership environment. This provides a basis of comparison 
across the membership spectrum and suggests ways in which our analysis needs 
to be furthered to cover new examples of socialisation. 
Whilst the role of membership prior to accession to a regional community 
is clear, a point of clarification should be made for the role of membership 
subsequent to that event. I do not argue that all politics between member-states 
and community after joining is automatically related to membership. However, I 
do argue that membership remains important in two respects. Firstly, the 
continued provision of the benefits of membership by the regional community 
remains contingent on member states not violating the agreements that first 
gained them access to those resources. Where states have transgressed those 
contracts the community and other members question their membership, and the 
suspension of membership rights, or the withdrawal of membership itself, 
becomes possible. Secondly, the on-going politics of membership interacts with 
the processes of community building. By community building I mean those 
internal political debates over the future course of the community. A SEAN has 
engaged since 1997 with fundamental questions of the purpose of the community 
and how that purpose is best served through institutional and legal reform, and 
the OAS has over its 60 year history expanded the depth and breadth of its own 
activities. The studies reveal that community building exerts socialisation effect, 
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whether intentional or otherwise, on existing members both through the 
substance of debate and through the final agreed reforms. 
THE DISCURSIVE ENVIRONMENT OF COMMUNITY BUILDING 
Community building involves two stages. Whilst the ultimate form is the 
creation of new legal standards, perhaps accompanied by courts and 
commissions to monitor those standards, community building always involves 
discussing different visions of the future of the Community. Community building 
comes about as states, and the community itself, evolve in response to both their 
own political goals and external stimuli, be that economic crisis or political re-
orientation. States discuss with each other their identities as members in order to 
forward their own goals in an attempt to persuade other states that theirs is the 
"correct" vision of future plans. Both the structure and nature of these 
discussions push us to ascribing this to constructivist lenses. Rational choice 
understandings fail to capture either the negotiation dynamics themselves or the 
precise outcomes of any given set of negotiations because we are dealing with 
constant renegotiation of the communal identity, seeking answers to what it 
means to be a member of any given community. 
These discussions ultimately rest on the identity of those states as 
members. What does it mean to be a member of a community, is that identity one 
that includes concerns with human rights, or which rejects that? Regional 
communities legal frameworks enshrine state equality, at least with regards to 
discussing the future design of that community. ASEAN and the OAS are clear 
about state equality, and even the EU requires all member states agree to 
something like the failed Constitution. As such, formal power imbalances are not 
relevant within these discussions. States must be persuaded to agree that one 
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course of action is preferable to another. This requirement of consensus and 
persuading actors leads us away from rationalist expectations. For example such 
expectations would suggest that Indonesia as the largest and most important 
member would create significant pull effects over the evolution of human rights 
within A SEAN, that it would ultimately achieve its aims. Whilst I am 
comfortable arguing that the role of Indonesia is important, the scale of the final 
outcome was far less ambitious than if Indonesia was truly able to exert 
overwhelming power.buy it The way in which interested parties suggested future 
visions of community building was through discursive acts where states with 
different identities and interests sought to establish revised understandings of 
themselves as community members. Indonesia, and other interested states 
together with a range of civil society actors engaged in intense discussion about 
the what membership of ASEAN actually meant, just as the U.S.A. and the 
attendant civil society in the Americas discussed what the OAS meant. The 
evolution of a human rights component within ASEAN and the OAS occurred as 
a series of discussions and normative propositions, where ASEAN members 
discussed with each other their competing goals. The maximalist agenda 
espoused by Indonesia and others, together with the civil society actors that 
mapped out future changes in ASEAN, and were then presented for discussion 
with other members who disagreed and_ resulted in outcomes that are only 
explicable from a persuasive, not bargaining, perspective. These discussions 
were where differing perceptions of what membership meant, and should mean, 
came into contestation with each other, much as the process of constructive 
engagement bought competing claims together before membership was granted. 
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I suggest therefore that the constructivist appraisal of pre-membership 
socialisation can indeed be transferred to the post membership environment. I 
further suggest that the established conceptual framework presented above 
required no conceptual modification to account for post membership 
constructivist accounts of community building. Given that its persuasive 
mechanism rests ideally outside questions of power imbalance, the shift from 
non-member to member does not alter the texture of conversation between 
actors. Just as states sought to influence Myanmar prior to entry, so they sought 
to do the same after it was a member. Indeed, membership, by institutionalising 
regular contact in a shared set of governance organs as well as heightened 
interactions only serves to upgrade the utility of constructivist accounts. 
RATIONAL CHOICE IN THE COMMUNITY CONTEXT: R.ELEV ANCE BEYOND 
CONDITIONALITY 
THE DECLINING RELEVANCE OF CONDITIONALITY 
The role of conditionality as a political act resting on bargaining prior to 
membership is clear. It's presence and importance subsequent to membership 
being achieved requires careful attention. Prior to membership it was the 
community itself that was withholding membership until change was achieved. 
Subsequent to membership, this right bestowed, the role of the community is 
reduced. The precise nature of this reduction can be outlined by an appreciation 
firstly of the nature of any one community at the time a state joins that 
community, and secondly to whether or not community building results in the 
creation of organs of a community that promote pressures that can be construed 
as conditionality. 
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If a state has joined a community that has established court systems, 
which create asymmetry between community organs and member states, then 
rational choice accounts of conditionality retain their relevance by allowing for 
an investigation of that relationship where clear material sanction is deployed to 
condition behavioural excess. Membership within the EU, if Turkey achieves it, 
places it under the jurisdiction of the European Court of Human Rights. Of 
course, socialisation of standards has occurred prior to membership, but court 
systems and hierarchical systems of redress ensure that monitor that socialisation 
and ensure that relapses, if they occur, are corrected. If a community building 
process results in the creation of hierarchical enforcement structures such as 
Courts that can clearly censure members and demand a change, then 
conditionality again plays a role. However, the utility of conditionality processes 
within community building would appear to be not a forgone conclusion. Whilst 
the OAS has developed a Court of Human Rights (although as noted in Chapter 5 
there is a distinct lack of jurisprudence directly between it and Panama on 
freedom of expression concerns), ASEAN has not created such an effective 
parallel. 
Accounting for this, we should be aware of the significance of the nature 
of the community being joined. The structure of ASEAN at the time of joining 
has helped retard the discussion and promotion of the very norms and even 
perhaps eventually laws that would have effectively socialised Myanmar. 
Yangon was able to use its privileges of membership to influence the evolution 
of the community in such a way as to limit any socialisation into norms that it 
disagreed with via the rejection of plans that had to be agreed upon unanimously, 
or as in the recent ASEAN Charter process, agreeing to "empty" institutional 
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reform such as a Human Rights Court that has no mandate. Its presence, together 
with other reluctant members who are wary of constitutionalising any intrusive 
obligations within ASEAN, retards the formation of new norms. They may be 
proposed by "progressive" states, but they are constantly argued over between 
those progressives and the other traditional interpretations. 
EXPANDING THE BARGAINING INSIGHT: QUESTIONS OF SOCIAL INFLUENCE 
Conditionality is not the only way in which rational choice accounts have 
traction in terms of socialisation within the community context. Whilst the EU 
study itself makes strong linkages between the political practice of conditionality 
and the socialisation mechanism of bargaining, there is nothing intrinsic about 
this relationship. EU conditionality, and the study of it, is based on a materialist 
account of the relation between actors, but we can conceive of hierarchical 
relationships that exist outside of material sanction. Communities can engage in 
the sanctioning of members through a diverse range of political acts. The 
rhetorical use of language, the denial of the social rights of membership as well 
as Naming and Shaming processes shows that the utility of rational choice 
accounts metamorphoses across the membership boundary. These are as much 
bargaining processes, in the meaning established above, as conditionality driven 
socialisation pre-membership. They are manifested, however, through differing 
political actions. The argument is therefore that whilst constructivist accounts of 
persuasion survive the transition from pre to post membership, the rational 
choice account of socialisation diversifies substantially. This is a result of the 
changing nature of hierarchies and the shifting tools that are available to 
communities to engage with their members. These processes can be broadly 
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categorised under the "social influence" approach to socialisation, 175 understood 
as the distribution of social rewards and punishment. 176 All three are based upon 
hierarchy and non-persuasive political action designed not to discuss openly 
future plans, but to impress upon an actor that they are categorically "wrong". 
Rhetorical Action does not rest on an enforcement organ utilising its 
position of empowerment to legally censure offending states. 177 In the absence of 
conditionality, the central organs of a community can still use their hierarchical 
position to forward statements of "truth" in the absence of any discursive intent, 
and with the desire to condition a behavioural response. 178 I understand this as 
Rhetorical Action within Risse's definition of the term (note therefore that my 
criticism of Risse above was focused specifically on the cognitive shortcomings 
of downplaying Habermas's commitment to persuasive processes, not to his 
work as a whole). Rhetorical Action is designed to convince actors to "mend 
their ways" in the face of no material incentives to do so. 179 They rest on the use 
of language to convey information and preferences. 18° For example, ASEAN's 
preferences were fixed when it spoke of Myanmar's "wrongness" in failing to 
democratise. It did not engage with Myanmar over the validity of its claims or 
wishes. Instead, through the medium of public communiques at the end of both 
the Annual Ministerial Meetings and the ASEAN Summits, it stated clearly both 
175 Flockhart, "'Masters and Novices': Socialization and Social Learning through the Nato 
Parliamentary Assembly," p. 366. 
176 Michael Zurn and Jeffery Checkel, Op. Cit. p. 1052. 
177 See the analysis of Rhetorical Action at Millier, "Arguing, Bargaining and All That: 
Communicative Action, Rationalist Theory and the Logic of Appropriateness in International 
Relations " p. 404. Brining it in directly to socialisation studies see Frank Schimmelfennig, The 
EU, NATO and the Integration of Europe: Rules and Rhetoric, Themes in European Governance 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003). 
178 Risse, "International Norms and Domestic Change: Arguing and Communicative Behaviour 
in the Human Rights Arena," p. 532. See also---, ""Let's Argue!": Communicative Action 
in World Politics," p. 8. 
179 Darren Hawkins, "Explaining Costly International Institutions: Persuasion and Enforceable 
Human Rights Norms," International Studies Quarterly 48 (2004) p. 781. 
180 Muller, "Arguing, Bargaining and All That: Communicative Action, Rationalist Theory and 
the Logic of Appropriateness in International Relations," p. 398. 
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its own displeasure at Myanmar's behaviour and, on occasion its desire for 
Myanmar to in some way change its behaviour. I note that Rhetorical Action is 
"located on the borderline between strategic-instrumental rationality and 
argumentative rationality'', that is between mainstream rationalist and 
constructivist accounts. 181 
Closely related to Rhetorical Action is the Naming and Shaming 
process. 182 Whereas Rhetorical Action rests on an actor forwarding exact 
statements to promote change, Naming and Shaming appears to be more indirect, 
where the mere publicity of news about how national and regional standards 
have diverged in itself creates pressure to change. Here communities do not state, 
"change in this way", rather they identify areas of incongruence between national 
and regional standards without addressing how to correct that. For example, the 
OAS from the late 1970's first via the Commission and later the Special 
Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression, a sequence of reports that identified 
shortcomings in Panamanian compliance with regional standards on freedom of 
expression. These reports, especially early on, were designed solely to publicise 
the situation, especially given the then inability of the Commission to publicly 
call for change. I note that the distinction between Rhetorical Action and Naming 
and Shaming is a conceptual, not a practical one. In actual political practice both 
processes occur, often simultaneously and often within the same documentary 
record. The distinction here is for conceptual purposes. The final socialisation 
181 Risse, "International Norms and Domestic Change: Arguing and Communicative Behaviour 
in the Human Rights Arena," p. 533 ---,""Let's Argue!" Communicative Action in World 
Politics," p. 9. See also Frank Schimmelfennig, "The Community Trap: Liberal Norms, 
Rhetorical Action and the Eastern Enlargement of the European Union," International 
Organization 55, no. l (2003) p. 48. 
182 For a broader analysis in a different context, refer to James H. Lebovic and Erik Voeten, 
"The Politics of Shame: The Condemnation of Country Human Rights Practice at UNHCR," 
International Studies Quarterly 50, no. 4 (2006). 
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effort that the studies reveal that falls within the rational category is what I term 
Social Sanction. Distinct from the above Rhetorical Action, this involved not the 
judicious use of language but the denial of the social rights of members. In 2005 
ASEAN ultimately, under considerable internal and external pressure, denied 
Myanmar the position of chair. This came with no material cost or benefit to 
either party, but it did act as a point of censure. Panama at the height of the 
democratic crisis in the late 1980' s was denied participation in the mechanism of 
consultation of the OAS, a similar example. 
I suggest there is a link between all three of these mechanisms of social 
influence and attempts to manipulate the legitimacy of certain members in order 
to promote socialisation. The identification of Myanmar and Panama as in some 
way deficient with regards to the established community standards can be 
conceptualised as a process of publicly undermining the legitimacy of those 
states within the membership context. There is nothing inherently sociological 
about focusing on legitimacy in this way. Conceptually, I link this to 
Schimmelfennig' s work on legitimacy. 183 Schimmelfennig' s suggestion that 
legitimacy is an external institutional fact helps us understand events. For 
example, ASEAN's comments on Myanmar, increasingly strident over time, 
together with the eventual denial of the Chair of ASEAN to Myanmar in 2005, 
rested on attempts to alter the perceived legitimacy of Myanmar as a member. It 
was an attempt to influence Myanmar through identifying its position as 
something less than a full member, as worthy of less than the regular 
entitlements of members. 
183 Schimmelfennig, "International Socialization in the New Europe: Rational Action in an 
Institutional Environment," p. 117. 
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Co-VARIATION OF REGIONAL COMMUNITY AND SOCIALISATION POST-
MEMBERSHIP 
Co-variation after membership is conceptually more complex than the 
pre-membership context. Community building rests on discursive acts where 
members. debate the future identity of the community itself, together with their 
own identities as members. All regional communities engage in this process, it is 
a natural consequence of political debate between members in part as a response 
to changing external stimuli. Whereas before membership I conceptualised of 
member state driven processes as a discreet socialisation avenue, after 
membership, those same member-states form the substantive part of community 
building processes. This process often broadens to include an array of civil 
society actors who cluster around these communities as a locus of authority and 
legitimacy. Persuasive accounts always have something to say about 
socialisation within community contexts. 
As a potential consequence of community building, the nature of the 
agreements changes. Standards are revised and institutional oversight upgraded. 
This can lead to conditionality as a political process occurring once again. The 
rareness of this occurrence suggests that states are very careful locking in their 
compliance to court systems. However, community building is the necessary pre-
cursor to a broader range of social influence attempts. Community building 
processes help · create gaps between the desired regional standard and 
contemporary national behaviour. This gap, in turn, is a platform for Rhetorical 
Action, Social Sanction and Naming and Shaming processes. The greater the 
regional community building process, the greater the potential gap in standards 
and the more likely social influence becomes. Social influence strategies 
dominate both when regional community consensus is lacking, as in the ASEAN 
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study, and also when there exist apparent shared standards but members 
transgress these, as we see in the OAS case. 
Subsequently, the negotiations between member states become part of the 
broader community building project. The story of socialisation varies at different 
points on the membership spectrum, as the empowerment of various actors' 
waxes and wanes in response to their relative positioning. When power is 
imbalanced, rational accounts seem to predominate as communities adopt a role 
of gatekeeper. When power is balanced between members who each enjoy the 
ultimate power of veto and the community becomes again a forum within which 
these states act, the boundaries of shared meanings, then constructivist accounts 
predominate. Crucially, these processes potentially co-exist with each other. 
Standards embodied in court systems also form the substance of discursive 
engagement as well as the basis for Social Sanction and Rhetorical Action. 
Single standards are the cause of multiple attempts to spread that standard, 
processes that are best construed by a range of approaches. This speaks to the 
question, dominant not only in socialisation studies but elsewhere, as to "under 
which circumstances does which type of logic (the rational, or the constructivist) 
apply?" 184 The evidence suggests that both logics apply simultaneously. It is not 
a matter of determining which logic is "clear" and which "unclear". 185 Rather the 
simultaneous application of both logics to real world events is the only way to 
capture the detail of socialisation, and the many ways by which it occurs. 
Reducing one into the other, or seeking to place them into a hierarchy falls into 
the unnecessary trap of reductionism. 
184 Millier, "Arguing, Bargaining and All That: Communicative Action, Rationalist Theory and 
the Logic of Appropriateness in International Relations," p. 401. 
185 March ~d Olsen, "The Institutional Dynamics oflntemational Political Orders," p. 952. 
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SUCCESSFUL SOCIALISATION IN A COMMUNITY BUILDING CONTEXT 
INTERROGATING SOCIALISATION 
This realisation requires of the observer great care m attributing 
significance precisely. What socialisation pressure was most significant at 
various points in the story? Whilst inevitably a degree of caution must surround 
any suggestions, a few avenues of investigation can be forwarded. There is scant 
evidence for community building by itself promoting successful socialisation. 
Community building in both the ASEAN and OAS example created discursive 
contexts in which actor's identities as members were in the mix as states sought 
to renegotiate their identities as members and as such their relationships with 
each other, their citizens and the community itself. However, Myanmar dealt 
with these pressures strategically and as such was deaf to the competing 
pressures upon it. The Panama example is more complex inasmuch as the period 
in which change did occur was one where both community building and social 
influence pressures were brought to bear. However, even here light on the 
relative importance can be discerned. I suggest that community building 
processes resting on discursive engagement were necessary but not sufficient for 
socialisation to occur, at least in the form that they occurred within the 
parameters of this study. Community building was necessary because it was the 
origin of the revised standards, even when states such as Myanmar and Panama 
were disingenuous in their acquiescence to those revisions that become the basis 
for Social Influence efforts. Had there been no community building within 
ASEAN, no revised commitment to democracy and human rights, then ASEAN 
would never have been able to criticise Myanmar on those issues in the last five 
years. Equally, had community building not arisen within the OAS then the 
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Commission would not have been created, or the Convention or the Special 
Rapporteur. Whilst these instruments may have exerted socialisation pressure 
rationally, I suggest that we cannot conceptualise of their initial creation without 
recourse to discussion and persuasion. This nesting of conceptual frameworks 
within each other further substantiates the importance of eclecticism in capturing 
the nature of regional community socialisation. 
Community building was not sufficient because neither the OAS nor 
ASEAN was able to sufficiently alter the ability of Myanmar or Panama to deal 
with these discussions in a meaningful way. The absence of formal censure and 
hierarchical authority as the source of that ability is both the defining quality of 
persuasive acts as well as the source of their weakness in the absence of a 
genuine commitment. The constructivist accounts of socialisation with relation to 
the EU encolintered in the previous chapter offer a clue. Lewis' account rests on 
individuals ·existing in intense and enduring contact. Community building 
examples in the ASEAN and OAS do not resemble those. Whilst the only way to 
conceptualise them is as discursive, the identification of type is not the same as 
an identification of success. 
REVISING OUR ACCOUNT OF SUCCESS 
Traversing the membership threshold alters the tale of success and failure 
that we see. It does so because states interact with each other differently under 
different contexts. I suggest a sequence of conceptual innovations is required to 
mesh the existing accounts presented above to the changed context of post-
membership socialisation. 
THE QUESTION OF NORM STRENGTH. 
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The established scope conditions for both rational and sociological counts 
of successful socialisation do not appreciate as part of their analytical framework 
the strength of the norms in question, The analytical frameworks of European 
scholarship assume a flat playing field where norms exist or not 
unproblematically, at least in reference to the socialisation that occurs as states 
seek to become members. It does not grapple with the varying socialisation 
consequences of weak norms vis-a-vis strong ones, and thus fails to question 
whether there is a relationship between the strength of any one norm and the way 
in which it is socialised. Whilst this · is perhaps understandable given the 
prevalence of European scholarship where norms are strong and often embedded 
in legal frameworks, it is radically at odds with rival sites of socialisation, which 
reveal the complex and contested nature of normative debate in the real world. 
The logical concomitant to the belief that norms emerge is that they do not come 
into the world at "full strength". Both ASEAN, and the OAS for a time, were 
attempting to socialise only weakly held norms that were also are undergoing 
constant revision as member states negotiate between each other. Commitments 
to democracy and human rights, even explicitly to freedom of expression, do not 
emerge perfectly formed. Weak standards exist as a necessary precursor to strong 
ones. 
The simple presence of the words "democracy", "human rights" or 
"freedom of expression" in any form, even legal documents, in the absence of 
detailed understandings of what those mean are insufficient to promote 
successful socialisation. Broad terms in the absence of detailed and "in house" 
enunciations of what those terms actually mean in the regional context offer no 
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substantive benchmarks against which to judge state performance. 186 We must 
remain aware of the relevance of "norm-sets". Attempts to socialise something as 
complex as "democracy" or "human rights" requires the composite norms of 
those ideas of the social god to be clearly stated and perceived as both widely 
legitimate and actually followed by states themselves. Clear and detailed norms 
are themselves more persuasive, as well as providing greater exactitude to legal 
accounts of those norms, because they seem to represent settled normative 
standards within the Community itself. ASEAN and its member states have been 
unsuccessful in socialising democracy or rights since 1997 because those norms, 
for political reasons, have never reached anything more than the most abstract of 
enunciations, and so have never been convincingly presented to Myanmar as 
representing revised standards of membership. Mere political dialogue between 
member states is insufficient, in the absence of clear outcomes, to promote 
socialisation. 
186 Interestingly, Regional Communities that reference external standards in these regards have 
been unable to socialise them. ASEAN made reference to the Vienna Treaty on Human Rights 
but this has never been invoked as an internal standard. Equally, the OAS for a long time made 
reference to UN standards but again, was unable to move towards enforcing those. 
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THE QUESTION OF SOCIAL MEANING 
A second revision to our accounts of success requires an appreciation that 
the scope conditions that generate conclusions about success rest upon 
unproblematised assumptions that laws and norms are regarded not only as 
strong, but also as being a binding source of authority. However, we can 
conceptualise of a law that fulfils all the apparent requirements of strength but at 
the same time is ignored. It can be clearly written down, with states agreeing to 
it. They can go into detailed enunciations of the various components of that 
standard, and they can be embedded in court systems that monitor and enforce 
compliance. Despite all of this, these "laws" mean nothing; they are routinely 
and legitimately ignored. The reason why, I suggest, is the "social meaning" of 
membership. This ties into the body of academic work that claims that signalling 
your agreement with human rights treaties, even when those offer detailed 
specifications about what Freedom of Expression actually is, does not 
automatically infer that you intend to be bound by those stipulations. 187 Existing 
studies reveal how signalling such intent offers a rational path for states to adopt 
to avoid criticism from other actor. To account for success therefore, one must 
investigate the attitude of actors towards otherwise strong standards. Successful 
socialisation of Panama occurred not solely because of the discussion of norms 
and then the erection of revised legal standards, but because of the shifting 
meaning that was ascribed to existing legal standards. There is no automatic 
187 Hathaway, "Do Human Rights Treaties Make a Difference?" offers a famous appraisal of 
this. Note the continuing discussion coming from this article in Ryan Goodman and Derek Jinks, 
"Measuring the Effects of Human Rights Treaties," European Journal of International Law 14, 
no. 1 (2003) And Eric Neumayer, "Do International Human Rights Treaties Improve Respect for 
Human Rights?" Journal of Conflict Resolution 49, no. 6 (2005). James Raymond Vreeland, 
"Political Institutions and Human Rights: Why Dictatorships Enter into the United Nations 
Convention against Torture," International Organization 62, no. Winter (2008) offers an up to 
date analysis. 
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process by which creating laws creates an equal set of understandings that those 
laws are binding, and the investigator should pay heed to that potential gap. 
SUCCESSFUL SOCIAL INFLUENCE 
The extension of our account of rational choice accounts of socialisation 
resting on membership requires a critical reflection on the success conclusions 
generated by existing accounts. The conditions for success presented above rest 
heavily on conditionality as a motor towards socialisation. Social influence 
accounts eschew that political process, and as such require differing frameworks 
for judging success. The conceptual similarities between the various forms of 
social influence presented above allow for the presentation of a shared 
framework for investigating their success or failure. Trine Flockhart offers a 
starting point for analysis of social influence success, noting that it requires a 
clear understanding and consensus on what constitutes good behaviour against 
which behaviour can be judged. 188 As the above discussion on strength indicates, 
norms that are weakly institutionalised or hollow declaratory statements cannot 
be held to be clear and consensual. Community pronouncements such as 
ASEAN' s call for Myanmar to embrace democracy did not rest on any settled 
meaning of "democracy" that allowed the community to speak authoritatively on 
that issue. OAS oversight in the 1970' s and 1980' s equally did not rest on 
established and meaningful commitments to rights. Social influence processes 
stand greater chances of success when the standards upon which those efforts are 
based are themselves clear and consistently held, promoted and protected by the 
actor making that attempt. 
188 Flockhart, "'Masters and Novices': Socialization and Social Leaming through the Nato 
Parliamentary Assembly," p. 367. 
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Given that social influence is about the enhancement of status in an 
international setting by joining a group that has a positive value attached to it, the 
"forum through which socialisation takes place cannot be either private or 
unobservable, as that will not generate social pressure for compliance."189 The 
broader the audience of any social influence effort, and the more relevant and 
willing that audience is to note the particular attempt and recognise it as 
substantive, the more likely social influence is to prove successful. This is 
particularly the case with Naming and Shaming processes, but I suggest that it is 
also relevant for the broader appreciation of success of social influence accounts. 
It is the public expression of displeasure, and the deployment of social costs as a 
potential corrective, that drives this process forwards. Concomitantly, social 
influence depends on the target state either sharing the assessment of the 
rebuking party about what is "right" behaviour (for Naming and Shaming and 
Rhetorical Action) or valuing the rights of membership that have been denied it 
(the Social Sanction account). This shared appreciation of right and wrong, and 
of the valuing of certain social functions of membership 
At the deepest level, and facilitating the establishment of these shared 
appraisals, social influence is dependent on "at least one person in the audience 
being prepared to be convinced by the better argument."190 As explored in 
chapter four, Myanmar dealt with these interactions in a strongly strategic way. It 
did so because A SEAN' s efforts to promote change were never linked in a 
meaningful way with threats to deny Myanmar what it desired membership for, 
strategic cover from western criticism. ASEAN never seriously entertained that 
prospect, and despite occasional dire forecasts from regional leaders, member 
189 Ibid. 
190 Risse, ""Let's Argue!" Communicative Action in World Politics," p. 9. 
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states never pushed for it either. Myanmar was not in the mood to be persuaded, 
and it could not be forced to take A SEAN seriously, and to value the rebukes that 
ASEAN was clearly deploying. Socialising agents must ensure, therefore that 
pressure for reform is consistent across the range of activities where agent and 
target interact. Communities cannot expect success via any social influence 
process unless the message that they seek to transmit from that sanction is 
consistent. The multifaceted relations between Myanmar and ASEAN allowed 
Myanmar to ignore criticism from ASEAN when that community at the same 
time provided ASEAN with continued social goods, specifically the protection 
from western criticism. 
THEW AY FORWARDS 
The following chapters focus on specific examples of membership in 
regional communities and the socialisation consequences that ensue from that 
relationship. Whilst diverse, I will be interrogating them in the same way, in line 
with the definitional, methodological and conceptual reasoning presented above. 
In each case the first task is to address the socialisation processes that led (or in 
the Turkish case continues to lead) up to the point of membership. This requires 
analysing not only how the regional community themselves socialise states (and 
how they go about that with specific reference to freedom of expression) but also 
how membership acts as a conduit for other socialisation pressures. For the 
Panama and Myanmar, a focus on the socialisation pressure after membership 
carries the analysis forwards. The focus in both is firstly on how gaining 
membership dramatically alters the nature of socialisation pressure, in ways that 
are dependent upon the nature of the regional community being joined. The 
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subsequent story of being a member rests on an analysis of the nature of 
community building. 
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4. ASEAN and Myanmar: Community building, Social Influence 
and the Failure of Socialisation 
In the wake of the 1993 Vienna Conference on Human Rights, ASEAN 
states committed themselves to investigating regional arrangements for the 
protection and promotion of those rights. Some 15 years later, the ASEAN 
Charter seemingly fulfilled that commitment, calling for the establishment of a 
regional human rights mechanism. 191 In parallel to this deepening of the 
community has been a process of widening membership to include four new 
members. This has finally fulfilled ASEAN's inauguration commitment, 
contained in the Bangkok Declaration of 81h August 1967, that it was "open for 
participation to all states in the Southeast Asian region". 192 Myanmar became a 
member of ASEAN on July 23rd 1997. The confluence of widening ASEAN and 
then introducing a concern with human rights opens up the question of how 
ASEAN attempts to socialise its members. 
This is a study about a particular mode of socialisation. It is about 
investigating how a community can use broad definitional terms, democracy or 
human rights, to try and exert socialisation influence in the absence of any 
agreement about detailed understandings of those terms. In the wake of the Asian 
Financial Crisis of 1997, ASEAN came to renegotiate its very nature and through 
191 The ASEAN Charter, Article 14. Accessible at www.aseansec.org/ASEAN-Charter.pdf. 
192 The ASEAN Declaration, Bangkok, Thailand, 81h August 1967. Accessible at 
http://www.aseansec.org/1212.htrn. the five original members were lndonesia, Malaysia, 
Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand. Brunei Darussalam joined on 8 January 1984, Vietnam on 
28 July 1995, Laos and Myanmar on 23 July 1997, and Cambodia on 30 April 1999. The 10 
member states have a population of about 500 million, a total area of 4.5 million square 
kilometres and a combined gross domestic product of US$737 billion. Currently East Timor 
remains separate to ASEAN, although it enjoys observer status. For an interesting discussion of 
the relationship between ASEAN as a political term and Southeast Asia as a geographic term 
refer to Donald K. Emerson, "Challenging ASEAN: A "Topological" View," Contemporary 
Southeast Asia 29, no. 3 (2007) pp. 426-428. 
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that process, the rights and obligations that members both enjoy and must fulfil. 
The basis of socialisation was not detailed legal standards, such as we will 
encounter in the later period of the OAS-Panamanian relationship or the EU-
Turkey study. This should not be surprising; ASEAN was and remains a 
community wedded to a unique method of structuring relations not only between 
itself and members but also its external contacts with dialogue partners across the 
globe. We would fall quickly into the trap of western centricity were we to 
suggest that this different mode of socialisation is in some way not comparable to 
other examples. 
STATEMENT OF ARGUMENTS 
This study is framed by the first structured relationship between ASEAN 
and Myanmar in 1993 through to the final ratification of the ASEAN Charter on 
15th December 2008. The chapter forwards two clusters of relevant conclusions. 
In terms of the specific literature on ASEAN, the story of human rights 
socialisation within ASEAN is one that has not been told before. Too often the 
appreciation, or to be more accurate depreciation, of ASEAN assert it is little 
more than a fac;:ade where norms have no affect on members. 193 ASEAN, this 
account suggests, is an "imitation community" or "rhetorical shell" with little or 
no substantive content. 194 Based on this, ASEAN is assumed to be a weak 
international actor as well, at the whim of external powers. 195 However, in 
revealing the pressures that have been exerted on Myanmar and the various ways 
that these pressures have been articulated, I rebut this line of reasoning. ASEAN 
has developed considerable interest in human rights and democracy, it and 
193 Khoo, "Deconstructing the ASEAN Security Community: A Review Essay," p. 45. 
194 Jones and Smith, "ASEAN's Imitation Community," p. 93. 
195 
--, "Making Process, Not Progress." 
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various members have used those revisions to exert multiple socialisation efforts 
on Myanmar. The presence of these mechanisms evidences my contention that 
ASEAN is a far more complex community than previous scholarship has 
suggested. Where I agree with the broader ASEAN literature is in the contention 
that these norms achieved little. We will see no successful socialisation over the 
coming study. The separating of socialisation intent from socialisation outcome, 
as previously explored in the Introduction, allows a more nuanced interfacing 
with existing literature. 
At the broader conceptual level, before membership was granted legal 
conditionality resting on bargaining mechanisms was present and successful. In 
this case, however, there was no account of freedom of expression within that 
process of becoming a member, and as such human rights socialisation was not 
part of the story. However, alongside this a distinct second mechanism can be 
identified, the importance of member state efforts to socialise Myanmar. This 
pressure, which I conceptualise as discursive and amenable to persuasive 
analysis through a constructivist lens, failed to result in any change in Myanmar 
because of the lack of clarity these member states had about what exactly they 
were arguing for, together with their contradictory desires to both make 
membership meaningful for human rights and to get Myanmar into ASEAN as 
quickly as possible. I study these mechanisms separately to isolate the nature of 
soCialisation that occurs before membership. 
After membership occurred the nature of socialisation pressures changed. 
There is no role for conditionality in the analysis, but three types of pressure can 
be identified. Firstly the direct pronouncements of ASEAN on Myanmar, which I 
suggest we can conceptualise as Rhetorical Action. Secondly, the use of what I 
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term Social Sanction, understood as the denial of the social benefits of 
membership, was used in 2005 over the issue of the chair of A SEAN. Both of 
these I position within the rational choice tradition. Thirdly the processes of 
discussion that surrounded the ongoing ASEAN community building project 
where Myanmar was enmeshed in a process of discussion and normative debate 
with other members about the future direction of the Community where 
questions of rights and democracy played an increasingly central role. I suggest 
that this process is inherently discursive and thus bound to the persuasion 
mechanism of socialisation as this process of community building rests on the 
creation of, and contestation over, a distinct community identity. This is vital for 
our understanding of socialisation because it created revised standards that went 
towards increasing the gap between the community identity, and the 
understandings other members had as part of ASEAN, and Myanmar. Finally, 
despite these avenues of pressure, change in Myanmar was not forthcoming. I 
will suggest that the continued lack of clarity about what ASEAN was trying to 
socialise Myanmar into, together with the inherent "weaknesses" of ASEAN as a 
regional community and its own relationship with external criticism fatally 
undermined the success of these attempts. The mode of socialisation here, resting 
on broad standards and declaratory statements was both the foundation for 
socialisation attempts, and a central reason for the failure of those attempts. 
THE SOCIALISATION AFFECTS OF GAINING MEMBERSHIP. 
The first task is to account for any socialisation pressures, and then their 
outcome, in the process leading up to Myanmar's entry into ASEAN on 23rd July 
1997. There are two aspects to consider. First, the official ASEAN position on 
human rights and second the distinct member state-driven processes separate to 
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ASEAN' s own engagement with Myanmar. Only when these are both unpacked 
can we tum to the track record of those attempts to promote change within 
Myanmar to gauge the efficacy of these processes. In both cases we must note 
that the discussion was not about freedom of expression, but about broad terms 
such as democracy and human rights, and in the case of member states a sense of 
unease at being formally grouped with a regime as intransigent and unpopular as 
Myanmar's. Freedom of expression therefore is used, through our ability to trace 
its course within Myanmar via United Nations documentation, as a marker of the 
effectiveness, or otherwise, of these more general avenues of pressure. 
CONDITIONALITY AND THE HUMAN RIGHTS SIGNIFICANCE OF JOINING ASEAN 
The socialisation that flowed from gammg membership was 
intimately linked to the legal standards that ASEAN had developed in the run up 
to 1997. Membership was conditional on accession to all the basic documents 
and agreements of ASEAN. 196 The Protocols of Membership signed by 
Myanmar lists the treaty obligations that it undertakes and its subscription to 
these documents, 197 and the accompanying declaration of accession notes "the 
Union of Myanmar has agreed to subscribe or accede, as the case may be, to all 
ASEAN Declarations, Treaties and Agreements". 198 Signing this array of 
documentation locked Myanmar into becoming like ASEAN, either immediately 
or in terms of the economic agreements, over an agreed time. This conditionality 
196 Mya Than, Myanmar in ASEAN - Regional Cooperation Experience (Singapore: !SEAS, 
2005) p. 86. For a historical analysis of the evolution of ASEAN Membership, note R.P. Anand, 
ed., Cultural Factors in International Relations (New Delhi: Abhinav Publications, 1981) pp. 
176-180. 
197 Refer to the Protocol of Accession of the Union of Myanmar to ASEAN Agreements, 
Su bang Jaya, Malaysia, 23rd July 1997, Accessible at http://www.aseansec.org/l 830.htm. and the 
Second Protocol for the Accession of the Union of Myanmar to ASEAN Agreements, Subang 
Jaya, Malaysia, 16th October 1997. Accessible at http://www.aseansec.org/ 1833.htm. 
198 Declaration on the Admission of the Union of Myanmar into the Association of Southeast 
Asian Nations, Subang Jaya, Malaysia, 23rd July 1997. Accessible at 
http://www.aseansec.org/ 1829.htm. 
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marks the first potential socialisation avenue of membership. The question 
confronting the investigator is therefore was there anything within the process of 
conditionality that spoke about an ASEAN concern with human rights within its 
members, which would then act as a conduit for socialisation pressure upon 
Myanmar? An examination of the both the. areas of ASEAN cooperation as well 
as the specific goals of the community with relation to Myanmar indicates that 
human rights and democracy were not part of the membership negotiations, and 
as such socialisation of freedom of expression was not intended. Assessing the 
goals of ASEAN requires recourse to its evolution. The Bangkok Declaration, 
which founded ASEAN in 1967, offered a list of ASEAN goals: 
1. To accelerate the economic growth, social progress and cultural 
development in the region through joint endeavours in the spirit of 
equality and partnership in order to strengthen the foundation for a 
· prosperous and peaceful community of South-East Asian Nations; 
2. To promote regional peace and stability through abiding respect for 
justice and the rule of law in the relationship among countries of the 
region and adherence to the principles of the United Nations Charter. 199 
ASEAN goals were intrinsically "negative" inasmuch as they wedded 
ASEAN and its members to "not doing" something which unduly violated the 
sovereignty of fellow members. These political goals of ASEAN were enhanced, 
but not fundamentally modified by both the Declaration of ASEAN Concord,200 
and the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation,201 both signed in Bali on 24th February 
1976. There was certainly no concern with rights here. ASEAN's pacifying 
199 The ASEAN Declaration, Bangkok Thailand. August 8th 1967, Accessible at 
htt:p://www .aseansec.org/ 1212.htm. 
200 Declaration of ASEAN Concord, Jakarta, Indonesia 24th February 1976. Accessible at 
http://www.aseansec.org/3630.htm. 
201 Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia, Jakarta, Indonesia. 24th February 1976. 
Accessible at http://www.aseansec.org/l2 l 7.htm. 
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effect was based on the Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality Declaration, 
signed on 2ih November 1971 in Kuala Lumpur, which stated: 
1. That Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand 
are determined to exert initially necessary efforts to secure the 
recognition of, and respect for, South East Asia as a Zone of Peace, 
Freedom and Neutrality, free from any form or manner of interference 
by outside Powers; 
2. That South East Asian countries should make concerted efforts to 
broaden the areas of cooperation that would contribute to their strength, 
solidarity and closer relationship.202 
This is not to say that ASEAN itself had never discussed questions of 
human rights. At the 1993 ASEAN Annual Ministerial Meeting after the June 
1993 Vienna World Conference committed itself to "respect human rights and 
fundamental freedoms as set out in the Vienna Declaration.203 The Declaration 
affirmed commitment to the full gamut of international human rights 
instruments, including the United Nations Charter, the Universal Declaration, the 
1966 Covenants on both Civil and Political and Economic, Cultural and Social 
rights, and the continuing evolution of treaty law since then.204 As a result of this 
ASEAN had affirmed its commitment to the UN derived programme in relation 
to freedom of expression; Article 18 of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights spoke of the right to "freedom of thought, conscience and religion" whilst 
Article 19 referred explicitly to the "right to freedom of opinion and 
expression".205 Article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights also spoke, in greater detail, of the right to freedom of expression, noting 
202 Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality Declaration, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, 27th 
November 1971. Accessible at http://www.aseansec.org/3629.htm. 
203 Joint Communique of the Twenty-Sixth ASEAN Ministerial Meeting, Singapore, 23-24th 
July 1993. Para. 16 Accessible at.http://www.aseansec.org/3666.htm. 
204
· The Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, 25th June 1993, A/CONF/157/23, 
Accessible athttp://www.unhchr.ch/huridocda/huridoca.nsU(Symbol)/A.CONF.157.23.En 
205 The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, UNGAR 217 A (Ill), 10th December 1948, 
Accessible at http://www. un .org/Ovcrview/rights.htm. I 
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that "this right shall include freedom to seek, receive and impart information and 
ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, in 
the form of art, or through any other media of his choice. "206 Interestingly for 
this study, however, this commitment to rights was not in a form that bound 
ASEAN to commitment to those standards. The commitment in the Declaration 
of Ministers was not in and of itself binding on member states or ASEAN. It 
required negotiation to transfer that into the legal structures of ASEAN, 
negations that were not forthcoming. Talking about rights, even committing 
yourself in statements to them, meant little in the absence of any behaviour to 
live up to that commitment, and as such, ASEAN never translated that into a 
meaningful commitment on members, and as such on applicants. 
Overlaying the set of written general purposes for expansion generated by 
the ASEAN treaty system itself, we can discern that the specific goals of 
ASEAN in offering Myanmar membership were also silent on human rights. 
Myanmar's membership would exert ASEAN's pacifying influence over the 
Andaman Sea.207 Chinese leasing of the Coco Islands, the northern most of the 
strategically significant Andaman Island Chain in 1994 presented the worrying 
possibility of the increasing militarization of the approaches to the Malacca 
Straits, the free navigation of which was vital to the continued economic security 
of existing ASEAN states. Myanmar's membership would serve as a showcase 
of ASEAN' s durability and the effectiveness of ASEAN in ameliorating the 
tensions of the region. 208 It is not surprising that the goals of ASEAN in relation 
206 The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, UNGAR 2200A (XXI), 16th 
December 1966, Accessible at http:/iwww.unhchr.ch/htm.l/menu3/b/a ccpr.htm. 
207 Interview with Edy Prasetyono, 22/09/2006, Director of International Relations, CSIS, 
Jakarta. 
208 Interview with Dr. Hariyadi Wirawan, 26/09/2006 Chair of International Relations 
Department, Universitas Indonesia, Depok-Jakarta. 
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to Myanmar were similarly oriented, although in a different balance than those 
that characterised ASEAN's intentions vis-a-vis new members from 
Indochina.209 Whilst the Cambodian-Laotian-Vietnamese triangle presented a 
complex and multi-dimensional challenge to ASEAN,210 Myanmar, with an 
isolationist and introspective government presented little threat to traditional 
definitions of regional stability. The political motives therefore were embodied in 
the desire to complete ASEAN, bringing all Southeast Asia under one 
organisational umbrella.211 This served to increase the "weight" of ASEAN in 
order to better fulfil the self proclaimed vital "balancing role between the major 
powers". This is especially the case in terms of the ASEAN maintaining the 
leadership role within the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), and the ASEAN+3 
process." As Malaysian Prime Minister Mahatmir noted, a "complete" ASEAN 
would "form a community with a combined population of 500 million [with] the 
potential [to] be a significant player in Asia and the world". 212 
MEMBER ST ATE SOCIALISATION PRESSURES AND THE CONSTRUCTIVIST VALUE 
ADDED. 
That ASEAN itself was not motivated by socialising freedom of 
expression, or any other notion of human rights whether specific or general, to 
Myanmar in 1997 is not the end of the story. The relationship was never solely 
between Myanmar and ASEAN, rather it was a three-way discussion between 
Myanmar, ASEAN as an actor in its own right and existing members using the 
209 Ramses Amer, "Conflict Management and Constructive Engagement in ASEAN's 
Expansion," Third World Quarterly 20, no. 5 (1999) p. 1031. 
210 Ibid. 
211 Interview with Mamud Rizali, 20/09/2006, Universitas Indonesia, Depok-Jakarta. Confirmed 
in interview with Dr. Yeo Lay Hwee, 5110/2006, Singapore Institute of International Affairs, 
Singapore. 
212 
"A Green Light for Burma to Join ASEAN's Ranks," International Herald Tribune, January 
25th 1997 (http://iht.com/articles/l 997/01/25/burma-t O.php). 
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issue of membership as a forum within which to present their own views. Some 
pre-existing member states of ASEAN in the period before 1997 engaged with 
Myanmar through a process called Constructive Engagement where they sought 
to persuade Myanmar that membership of ASEAN was significant. for human 
rights issues. 
Constructive Engagement was inaugurated at the 24th Ministeri~l Meeting 
of July 1991 in Kuala Lumpur, subsequent to the failure of the Myanmar regime 
to recognise the 1990 election results. 213 It was the response of Thailand and the 
Philippines especially to house their concerns within a non-threatening 
environment. As such, the Constructive Engagement process revolved around 
creating a safe space in which states could discuss their differences and where 
activist states such as Thailand could engage with Myanmar critically but 
cooperatively. I note that at the outset this was not directly related to an active 
application by Myanmar, although it later did merge with membership concerns 
as Myanmar moved towards joining in the late 1990' s. Constructive Engagement 
was intended to draw Myanmar slowly into a web of promises and friendly peer 
pressure,214 in an "attempt that put process over proper institutionalisation of 
norms".215 
I argue that to conceptualise the significance of this process we should 
note that states could not exert influence via conditionality, as they could not 
alter the formal requirements of membership and thus the discussions occurred in 
the absence of material or Social Sanction, the denial of membership itself. 
213 Kavi Chongkittavom, "The Evolution of Constructive Engagement," in From Consensus to 
Controversy: ASEAN's Relationship with Burma's SLORC, ed. Ralph Bachoe and Debbie 
Stothard (Bangkok: Alternative ASEAN Network on Burma, 1997). 
214 Interview with Yuri Thamrin, 27/09/2006, Director of Asia-Pacific Desk, Indonesian 
Foreign Ministry, Jakarta. 
215Mann Bunyanunda, "Burma, ASEAN and Human Rights: The Decade of Constructive 
Engagement_, 1991-2001," Stanford Journal of East Asian Affairs 2 (2002) p. 123. 
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Existing members could do nothing but seek to persuade Myanmar that 
membership in ASEAN meant that it should change its approach to human rights 
issues. A focus simply on rational approaches to conditionality would miss out 
on this process, because we see no recourse to power in the sense of 
hierarchically derived conditionality or social influence approaches. This 
suggests the relevance of constructivist accounts of socialisation, where 
interlocutors seek to persuade each other as to the best course forwards through 
competing truth claims. The debate was over whether or not membership of 
ASEAN should mean something more than what was written down in the legal 
documents that Myanmar would be bound by. It was at one level a debate about 
creating new standards, not enforcing old ones. States used a process of 
enmeshing Myanmar in a discursive environment where in a situation of equality 
they could air their opinions and seek to discuss their own visions of the future. 
Member state driven socialisation therefore rested on debate between members 
and Myanmar within the framework of Constructive Engagement. 
Thailand in particular was driven by both "realities and aspirations" as 
then Prime Minister Anand Panyarachun noted.216 In 1992, the Thai government 
suggested that Myanmar be granted observer status to ASEAN. This was rejected 
by Indonesia, Malaysia and Brunei because of Myanmar's mistreatment of the 
Muslim Rohingya minority, an explicitly human rights concern.217 ASEAN 
member states made clear that Myanmar's eventual admission to the 
organization "would require further progress on the domestic front". 218 When the 
SLORC (the "State Law and Order Restoration Council", the chosen name for 
216 Ibid. p. 122. 
217 Kay Moller, "Cambodia and Burma: The ASEAN Way Ends Here," Asian Survey 38, no. 12 
(1998) p. 1089. 
218 Ibid. p. 1090. 
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the Junta in a moment of Orwellian flourish) released Aung San Suu Kyi in July 
1995, they were invited to become a signatory to the Treaty of Amity and 
Cooperation, and thus received official observer status, granted the following 
year. Interestingly, acting Thai Prime Minister Pitsuwan believed that this was a 
product of the policy of Constructive Engagement.219 It was at the 1995 ASEAN 
Bangkok Summit that Myanmar officially signalled its intention to apply for 
membership, the formal application lodged in August 1996, with the intention 
that it would be granted in 2000. 220 
As membership drew closer, so criticisms of Myanmar's preparedness 
and suitability for membership grew increasingly vociferous, even as Malaysia, 
in its role as then chair of ASEAN in 1996, unilaterally advanced Myanmar's 
membership to 1997 from the originally agreed 2000.221 In the Philippines 
President Fidel Ramos called for a reconsideration of Myanmar's application on 
the ground of "failing to familiarise itself with the political mechanisms of 
ASEAN states".222 Singapore, initially uncritical of Myanmar's application, 
shifted towards a more ambiguous position, with The Strait Times, often used as 
a mouthpiece for the government, publishing an editorial that called on Yangon 
to follow a policy of political pluralism or risk ASEAN loosing patience with 
them. Further, in an interview with Finish television, Prime Minister Goh Chok 
Tong stated, "I do not think Myanmar is quite ready in the near future to adopt 
all the obligations of being a member of ASEAN".223 Thailand was even more 
219
· Leszek Buszynski, "Trends, Developments and Challenges in Southeast Asia," in Southeast 
Asian Affairs 1996, ed. ISEAS (Singapore: ISEAS, 1997) p. 6. 
22° Carlyle A Thayer, "Challenges to ASEAN's Cohesion: The Policy of Constructive 
Engagement and a Code of Conduct for the South China Sea," in Regionalism and Globalism in 
Southeast Asia (2000). p. 9. 
221 Moller, "Cambodia and Burma: The ASEAN Way Ends Here," p. 1091. 
222 
"Burma Worries ASEAN," Nation Today, Manila, 4 October 1996. 
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severe. Prime Minister Banharn Silpa-Archa indicated that Myanmar's internal 
situation would bar it from membership.224 
What were the permissive conditions that allowed member state pressures 
to arise? As will be shown, they are not present in either the OAS or EU studies. 
I suggest the reason for the presence of members state in the ASEAN case, and 
its absence elsewhere, lies in the difference between those respective 
communities. ASEAN was a community resting on highly diverse members with 
various political, social and economic frameworks of their own created space for 
significant member state activity. As a community with far less commonality 
than the EU or even the OAS the range of member state opinions on issues such 
as rights and democracy was simply greater than in other examples. Further, as a 
strictly intergovernmental community, those states retained their own sense of 
agency, even when the formal membership process was between ASEAN and 
Myanmar. The EU as a sophisticated community resting on supranational 
governance did not have that space. As will be discussed at greater length in 
chapter six, this undercut the role of member-state driven pressure. The ASEAN 
policy wa5 always a composite of member demands, a lowest threshold of what 
could be agreed to enact regionally. It is of little surprise that states with more 
active concerns with rights were not satisfied with the formal ASEAN policy, 
and sought to forward their own opinions. 
224 The Thai position was subject to a series of radical swings due to the shifting constellation of 
domestic political power. The 1996 Thai national elections and the change of government that 
saw Chavalit Yongchaiyudh assume the Prime Ministership, the Thai official position swung 
behind that of Indonesia, Malaysia and Vietnam in support of early and unconditional entry. The 
government of Chuan Leekpai reversed this. The new foreign Minister, Surin Pitsuwan quickly 
advocated a revised policy of "Constructive Intervention" that sought to allow ASEAN to act 
when internal domestic situations in certain countries posed a threat to regional stability. 
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ASSESSING THE SUCCESS OF MEMBER ST A TE DRIVEN STRATEGIES 
To investigate the domestic situation in Myanmar as the basis for 
establishing the effects of these pressures, both here and later in this chapter, I 
use documents drawn from the then UN Commission on Human Rights, m 
particular the regular reports submitted by the Special Representative to 
Myanmar. 225 This provides the ability to trace the relationship between regional 
standards and the status of freedom of expression within Myanmar. From this 
documentary record, we can conclude that the period running up to Myanmar's 
accession to ASEAN, when member state pressure was deployed, showed no 
improvement in the condition of the right of freedom of expression. 
The preliminary assessment in 1993 by then Special Rapporteur Dr Y ozo 
Yokota noted that "in regards to restrictions on personal freedoms .... violations 
occurred primarily as a result of attempts of citizens to participate freely in the 
political process and the transition to the democratically elected civilian 
government".226 Whilst some minor improvement was noted over 1993, the 1994 
report "continues to be concerned by the serious restrictions imposed upon 
people in the enjoyment of civil and political rights. People do not generally 
enjoy freedom of thought, opinion, expression, publication and peaceful 
assembly and association".227 Change was lacking though 1995 as well. Yokota 
noted that together with continued restrictions on all forms of press and media 
225 Situation of Human Rights in Myanmar. United Nations Commission on Human Rights 
Resolution 1992/58, 3rd March 1992. See also Bunyanunda, "Burma, ASEAN and Human Rights: 
The Decade of Constructive Engagement, 1991-2001," pp. 125-127. 
226 United Nations Committee on Human Rights, E/CN.4/1993/37, 17th February 1993, para. 
205. 





"the people do not en Joy the freedoms of opm1on, expression, 
publication and peaceful assembly and association. They seem to be always 
fearful that whatever they or their family members say or do would risk arrest 
and interrogation by the police or military intelligence".229 The new Special 
Rapporteur, Rajsmoor Lallah noted in February 1997 that "the clearest evidence 
of violation of the freedom of expression continues to be found in Myanmar 
Laws, such as law no. 5/96 of June 7th 1996 'Promoting the stable, peaceful and 
systematic transfer of state responsibility and the successful implementation of 
the National Convention free from disruption and opposition".230 This law, 
amongst others, seriously undermined the freedom of individuals and 
associations to spread any ideas that were deemed to undermine the stability of 
the state or offer criticism of the SLORC regime. Whilst some minor 
improvements in the conditions of political parties in 1997, Lallah again noted 
the "virtually complete control that the authorities seem to exercise on the 
freedoms of association, assembly and expression".231 
The framework for establishing successful persuasive socialisation 
introduced in chapter three rests upon a de-politicised environment where actors 
engage in discussions with the potential outcome of changing their own opinions 
and identities as a result. This constellation of conditions did not present 
themselves during the Constructive Engagement process, and I particularly focus 
on two aspects, the importance of the authority of those seeking to persuade 
Myanmar, and then the coherence with which those pressures were put forth. 
228 United Nations Committee on Human Rights, E/CN.4/1996/65, 5th February 1996, paras 
120-122. 
229 Ibid. para. 151. 
230 United Nations Committee on Human Rights, E/CN.4/1997/64, 6th February 1997, paras. 15 
and 32. 
231 United Nations Committee on Human Rights, E/CN.4/1998/70, 15th January 1998, para. 69. 
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Those who forwarded rights related arguments could not make their claim that 
membership in ASEAN meant some degree of respect for rights standards 
" h . . " Ch k 1 232 h 1 aut ontat1ve , to use ec e 's term. T ey cou d not draw upon arguments 
that legitimated their desires in the context of what ASEAN was, and what it was 
for. The reason why it was not so convinced rest with the heterogeneity of 
ASEAN states.233 Proactive states could not rest their argument that membership 
meant some degree of human rights compliance when existing members of 
ASEAN were so divergent in their own subscription to those standards. 
Counterfactually, all member states would have to be presenting the same line of 
arguments, and discursively linking those to notions of a shared community 
identity, for the constructive engagement process to be successful. Whilst 
Thailand and the Philippines again made much of the running in terms of the role 
of human rights, it was far less important to the then Indonesian government, or 
existing Indochinese members Laos and Vietnam. 
Secondly, even proactive member states were conflicted about the 
processes of Constructive Engagement. Conflicting motives for Constructive 
Engagement retarded the ability of the states to present their opinions 
consistently. The most important goal of Constructive Engagement was never 
resuscitation of human rights in Myanmar,234 it was the umbrella under which 
ASEAN and its member states engaged with Yangon, and human rights were 
only one animating factor amongst many. They were conflicted both in terms of 
how important human rights were, and also as to whether constructive 
engagement was designed to pressure Myanmar to change before membership, or 
232 Checkel, "International Institutions and Socialization in Europe: Introduction and 
Framework," p. 813. 
233 
"Schools In: ASEAN Peer Pressure" Far Eastern Economic Review, June l 91h 1997, p. 5. 
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to move the relationship, and then membership, forwards quickly. Thailand 
especially was concerned not only about human rights but also a broad range of 
issues from border security, economic development and the flow of narcotics 
across the border. Those very member states driven to engage critically with 
Myanmar were also motivated to not retard Myanmar's membership application 
unduly. The consensus was that Myanmar should be brought quickly into 
ASEAN's protective fold to expose it to greater discursive pressure. Malaysian 
Prime Minister Mahathir Mohammed noted that were Myanmar outside ASEAN 
"it is free to behave like a rogue or a pariah, whilst if it is inside, it would be 
subject to certain norms of behaviour",235 whilst Severino asks the question, 
retrospectively, "would it be better for the people of Myanmar if their country 
was admitted to ASEAN or if it were kept out?"236 ASEAN was interested, as 
Philippine Foreign Minister Domingo Siazon noted, in providing membership as 
then "there would be better opportunities to influence Myanmar to adjust its 
internal policies and move towards national reconciliation".237 
THE IMPORTANCE OF BEING A MEMBER 
Myanmar was "deluding itself if it expected business as usual," after it 
became a member.238 Constructive engagement had shown that questions of 
rights and Myanmar's membership in ASEAN would remain at the forefront of 
at least some member's minds. The potential way in which that pressure would 
be exerted altered as Myanmar crossed the threshold from applicant to member. 
235 Agence France Press, "ASEAN Stands Finn on Burma's Entry Despite Western Pressure" l st 
Mav 1997. 
236 Rodolfo C. Severino, Southeast Asia in Search of an ASEAN Community: Insights from the 
Former Secretary-General (Singapore: ISEAS, 2006) p. 133. 
237 Domingo Siazon Jr. "No New Walls". Keynote Address at the 4th European Association for 
Southeast Asian Studies (EUROSEAS) Conference, Paris. 1st September 2004. 
238 
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Joining ASEAN was significant for socialisation because it shaped the ongoing 
relationship by providing Myanmar with the power of a member over the future 
direction of ASEAN. As a recognised participant of the ASEAN Treaty System 
up to 1997 Myanmar was granted both the negative rights of sovereign equality 
vis-a-vis other members and the positive rights of participating as an equal over 
the future development of ASEAN itself. This was especially important in a 
Community such as ASEAN that had centralised unanimity and informality and 
in 1997 possessed no Court system to ensure compliance. Myanmar from 1997 
could use its rights as a member to influence the future of the very socialisation 
pressures that it itself would be subject to. Myanmar could, because of the 
requirement of unanimity, and in cooperation with other reticent states, retard the 
formation both of shared values at the ASEAN level and then the mechanisms 
and processes to protect and promote those values. 
I will now turn to first investigate the origins and consequences of the 
two important points in the developing ASEAN, the Bali II Accords of 2004 and 
the ASEAN Charter process until its final implementation at the close of 2008. 
Within these I shall focus on the evolving discursive environment on human 
rights within A SEAN as part of the evolution of a distinct community identity. I 
will both identify that community building as representing a discursive 
socialisation process in itself, and also as the necessary precursor for a range of 
social influence processes through the creation and then expansion of a "gap" 
between the wills of the majority of ASEAN states and Myanmar's continued 
refusal to adopt a meaningful internal reform process. I will frame the increasing, 
and various, forms of social influence deployed by ASEAN itself as a separate 
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avenue of socialisation pressure. Whilst community building's relevance for 
socialisation rests on persuasion, through free debate about creating new 
standards, these pronouncements do not concern a persuasive attempt to 
socialise. They rest on specific notions of hierarchy and the judicious use of 
language and Naming and Shaming to censor, and hopefully as a consequence 
alter, behavioural patterns. Again, they are based on the notion of enforcing 
existing standards. The presence of this distinct socialisation process helps focus 
our attention on the continued, but changing, utility of rational choice analysis. 
THE QUESTION OF MYANMAR: ASEAN ENGAGEMENT WITH HUMAN RIGHTS 
1998-2004 
The initial years after membership were quiet m terms of any 
socialisation pressures brought to bear on Myanmar by ASEAN. However, there 
is a clear movement post 2000 toward such pressures. Here the story is one of an 
increasing interface with human rights and democracy, as well as discussion 
about Myanmar's participation in ASEAN. Socialisation pressure emerged from 
two directions. Rhetorical Action can be discerned where ASEAN spoke of what 
Myanmar should do. Persuasive efforts emerged out of the discussions of 
proposed community building efforts. 
TALKING TO MYANMAR: ASEAN AND RHETORICAL ACTION 
ASEAN became increasingly vocal about the situation m Myanmar. 
During this period these announcements took the form of entries into the official 
final communique of ASEAN Ministerial Meetings (AMM). Through elevating 
the issue of Myanmar to the level of the communique, states were linking 
ASEAN to these statements. The act of doing this in and of itself indicates the 
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gravity of the situation. The Joint Communique of the 34th AMM held in Hanoi 
on 23-24 July 2001 was the first to mention Myanmar, when ASEAN: 
Noted encouraging developments in the Union of Myanmar and 
appreciated the efforts of the Government of Myanmar towards these 
developments and reiterated our support to the on-going process of 
national reconciliation in this country 239 
Subsequently, there was a gradual hardening of the tone and an increase 
in the detail of the language that ASEAN has used in relation to Myanmar. The 
Communique of the 361h AMM in Phnom Penh went further inasmuch as it 
investigated in more detail domestic events, stating that: 
[We] discussed the recent political developments in Myanmar, 
particularly the incident of 30 May 2003 .... we urged Myanmar to 
resume its efforts of national reconciliation and dialogue among all 
parties concerned leading to a peaceful transition to democracy. We 
welcomed the assurances given by Myanmar that the measures taken 
following the incident were temporary and looked forward to the early 
lifting of restrictions placed on Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and the NLD 
members. 240 
By the 3?1h AMM held in Jakarta in 2004, ASEAN was acknowledging, 
in regards to the National Convention Process (the apparent bringing together of 
disparate political and ethnic elements within Myanmar for the formulation of a 
new constitution) within Myanmar: 
The potential of the Convention in paving the way for new 
constitution and the holding of elections in keeping with it. ... In this 
regard, we underlined the need for the involvement of all strata of 
Myanmar society in the on-going National Convention. We 
encouraged all concerned parties in Myanmar to continue their efforts 
to effect a smooth transition to democracy. We recognized the role of 
239 Joint Communique of the 34th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting, Hanoi, Vietnam 23-241h July 
2001, point. 17. Accessible at ht~://www.aseansec.org/3716.htrn. 
240 Joint Communique of the 36 ASEAN Ministerial Meeting, Phnom Penh, Cambodia, 16-l 7th 
June 2003. Accessible at Point 18 http://www.aseansec.org/14833.htrn. 
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the Special Representative of the United Nations Secretary-General in 
assisting Myanmar to achieve this goai.241 
These statements, although anodyne in language, were a point of 
departure for a community wedded to non-interference. It marks the outermost 
limit of the possible for ASEAN, and by far the most intrusive use of ASEAN 
announcements in the history of the community. They are also vital because they 
show that ASEAN desired Myanmar to change its behaviour. How should we 
-analyse these conceptually? The simple fact that we are focusing on language is 
no a priori reason to ascribe a constructivist lens. As shown in chapters two and 
three, rationalist accounts are theoretically happy to incorporate such 
phenomena, although their "take" on them remains different to those of a more 
sociological bent. I suggest that the announcements of ASEAN, both here and 
later, can be related to the process of Rhetorical Action. ASEAN itself was not 
interested in being persuaded, it adopted a position of non-negotiation, which 
Risse suggests as the sine qua non for Rhetorical Action to occur.242 Here the use 
of language was to act as an expression of expectation and to outline what 
ASEAN would like Myanmar's future behaviour to be. The identity of ASEAN 
was not in question here, although as will be shown below these pronouncements 
do rest on a changing ASEAN identity. The commitment to its own truthfulness 
pushes us to identify this as social influence. 
EXPLAINING THE INTEREST: THE SHIFTING ASEAN WAY 
Why had ASEAN gone from an organisation with no interest in human 
rights, to a community with a nebulous but growing concern for those very same 
241 Joint Communique of the 37th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting, Jakarta, Indonesia, 29-30th June 
2004, point. 15. Accessible at http://www.aseansec.org/l 6 192. htm. 
242 Risse, "International Norms and Domestic Change: Arguing and Communicative Behaviour 
in the Human Rights Arena," p. 532. 
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issues? The reason for this shift can be attributed to the effects of the 1997 Asian 
Financial Crisis and how that event problematised the previously sacrosanct way 
ASEAN went about its business, and member states related to each other.243 This 
traditional guide to behaviour was known as the "ASEAN Way". The ASEAN 
Way represented a settled consensus on what membership of ASEAN meant, 
what the traditional community identity was, and how states should relate to each 
other. The Treaty of Amity and Cooperation outlined the ASEAN Way best as 
the following principles: 
• Mutual respect for the independence, sovereignty, equality, 
territorial integrity and national iden~ity of all nations. 
• The right of every State to lead its national existence free from 
external interference, subversion or coercion. 
• Non interference in the internal affairs of one another. 
• Settlement of differences or disputes by peaceful manner. 
• The renunciation of the threat or use of force. 
• Effective cooperation amongst themselves. 244 
These substantive norms resulted in a set of procedural counterparts,245 
including non-discrimination and the twin concepts of musyawarah 
(consultation) and musfakat (consensus based decision making). 246 These in tum 
243 An detailed account is Markus Hund, "The Development of ASEAN Norms between 1997 
and 2000: A Paradigm Shift?," in ZOPS Occasional Papers (Center for East Asian and Pacific 
Studies, 2001). For the theoretical significance of the crisis see Jtirgen Ruland, "ASEAN and the 
Asian Crisis: Theoretical Implications and Practical Consequences for Southeast Asian 
Re~ionalism," The Pacific Review 13, no. 3 (2000). 
24 Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia, Denpasar Indonesia. 241h February 
1976, accessible at http://www.aseansec.org/1217.htm. Article 2. An interesting analysis of these 
norms and their modification is provided by Amer, "Conflict Management and Constructive 
Engagement in ASEAN's Expansion." 
245 Refer to R. Katanyuu, "Beyond Non-Interference in ASEAN: The Association's Role in 
Myanmar's National Reconciliation and Democratization," Asian Survey 46, no. 6 (2006) for an 
overview of the evolution of this position. 
246 Kraft, "ASEAN and Intra-ASEAN Relations: Weathering the Storm?" p. 460. 
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had created a predilection for decentralised decision making, informality and 
"quiet diplomacy.247 
The financial crisis undid the consensus that traditional ways of operating 
were unquestionably a good thing. As the aftershocks rumbled on, debate 
between member states rotated around how best to reaffirm the fundamental 
purposes of ASEAN, and make safe the gains that ASEAN had achieved in inter-
state peace, whilst extending ASEAN to deal with the sources of social 
instability.248 The crisis had seen member states stoic refusal to discuss with each 
other the domestic sources of the problems now facing the region, aiding its 
rapid contagion across the region. The result was the opening up "more directly 
the already difficult subject of the principle of non-intervention in the affairs of 
other members".249 The permissive space that had previously insulated ASEAN 
from criticism was closed, and ASEAN was for the first time since its foundation 
questioned and doubted. This debate ultimately dissolved ASEAN's 
overwhelming concern to not interfere with member states domestic affairs. The 
financial crisis led to the "loss of legitimacy of authoritarian structures".250 In the 
economic boisterous days of the early 1990' s, ASEAN seemed to be the 
protector of a valued regional order. The crisis called into question the norms 
247 For the origins of the ASEAN Way with regards to the regional response to Colonialism 
refer to L. Z. Rahim, "Fragmented Community and Un-Constructive Engagements," Critical 
Asian Studies 40, no. 1 (2008) p. 70. 
248 Hadi Soesastro, "ASEAN During the Crisis," in Southeast Asia's Economic Crisis, ed. H.W. 
Arndt and Hal Hill (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1999) p. 159. 
249 Stuart Harris, "The Asian Regional Response to Its Economic Crisis and the Global 
Imfolications," (1999) p. 12. 
2 0 Herman Joseph S. Kraft, "ASEAN and Intra-ASEAN Relations: Weathering the Storm?," 
The Pacific Review 13, no. 3 (2000). 
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that underpinned that perception of success because they were now held as 
complicit in causing and then exacerbating the crisis itself.251 
The Thai government once again took a lead, with "vociferous" 
questioning of received wisdom.252 Thai Foreign Minister Surin Pitsuwan 
outlined a new vision that sought to correct what he perceived as the 
shortcomings revealed by the crisis. He argued strongly that the increasingly 
intense relationships between ASEAN member states and the opportunities and 
perils that this created required a redefined relationship between ASEAN and 
members. This was bought to ASEAN-wide attention at the 31st ASEAN 
Ministers Meeting (AMM) held in Manila on July 23-31 st 1998 when Pitsuwan 
submitted for discussion his proposal for "Flexible Intervention". Pitsuwan was 
supported by Philippine Foreign Minister Domingo Siazon, who argued: 
ASEAN could achieve greater feats if we can cooperate among 
ourselves in the spirit of more openness. We should be able to 
speak more freely on issues occurring in one member country that 
affect others, with a view to building more solid ground for 
. l . 253 reg10na action. 
These statements indicate the presence of a clear wish to make 
community identity one that meshed together not only a far greater permissive 
latitude for intra-mural discussion to cross into domestic issues, but the dear 
necessity of doing so when regional issues were at stake. Whilst these plans were 
at this stage rejected, the counter proposal of "Enhanced Interaction" being 
championed by Indonesia, Malaysia, Myanmar, Vietnam and Laos, the 
251 Hund, "The Development of ASEAN Norms between 1997 and 2000: A Paradigm Shift?" p. 
102 Also see Ruland, "ASEAN and the Asian Crisis: Theoretical Implications and Practical 
Consequences for Southeast Asian Regionalism." 
252 Markus. Hund, Op. Cit. p. 13. 
253 Statement of Domingo L. Siazon Jr. Secretary of Foreign Affairs of the Philippines at 31 '1 
ASEAN Standing Committee of Foreign Ministers, Manila, Philippines, 241 July 1998, 
http://www.aseansec.org/3923 .htm. 
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reverberations of this debate filtered through into a longer-term process of 
revising ASEAN. It represented "the realization of ASEAN decision makers that 
they ultimately could not prevent each other from publicly commenting on those 
intra-state developments that had a perceived detrimental social, economic or 
political impact on other members or the association as a whole".254 
A DISCURSIVE ENGAGEMENT- BALI II AND THE QUESTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 
For ASEAN to engage in Rhetorical Action when previously it had been 
silent indicates that the standards within ASEAN were changing. If they had 
remained constant there would be little motive to engage rhetorically with 
Myanmar. The debate about the ASEAN Way had opened the door to redirecting 
ASEAN towards a more intrusive concern with standards within its members. 
Community building involved protracted discussion about which vision of 
ASEAN's future should be pursued, which I suggest are debates over a 
communal identity. This not only formed the basis of the above Rhetorical 
Action but also I suggest exerted socialisation pressure in itself, as Myanmar was 
included in these discussions with the other members, and as such encountered 
different opinions that it had to interface with, even if that was to reject them. 
The scope conditions for identifying the conditions under which 
persuasion occurs, focusing on horizontal arrangements between actors helps 
identify the relationship. Alice Ba has forwarded a constructivist account of 
254 Jurgen Haacke, ""Enhanced Interaction" With Myanmar and the Project of a Security 
Community: ls ASEAN Refining or Breaking with Its Diplomatic and Security Culture?" 
Contemporary Southeast Asia 27, no. 2 (2005) p. 189. The consequences of this destabilisation of 
received wisdom had immediate effects within the academic community. Rationalists such as 
Herman. Kraft "emphasise the trans boundary implications"(Hiro Katsumata, "Why Is ASEAN 
Diplomacy Changing? From "Non-Interference" To "Open and Frank Discussions"," Asian 
Survey 44, no. 2 (2004), p 241) of interdependence that produce rationally comprehensible shifts 
in behaviour, whilst constructivist accounts emphasise the degree to which "ASEAN diplomacy. 
Has been affected by this normative shift at the global level"(Katsumata, "Why Is ASEAN 
Diplomacy Changing? From "Non-Interference" To "Open and Frank Discussions"," p. 247). 
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Sino-ASEAN engagement within the complex engagement process between the 
two actors. 255 My argument here is similar but in the context of human rights. 
The non-coercive processes of debate between member states, and as will be 
shown broader civil society actors, over the future of ASEAN draws our 
attention to persuasive acts as member states debate with each other new visions 
for the future of ASEAN. Myanmar came under persuasive pressure as states 
sought to get agreement to a community building programme that included rights 
and democracy. Whereas before the rival visions for ASEAN's communal 
identity had seen the broad re-assertion of traditional interpretations, now we can 
see the growing ascendancy of a concern with human rights and democracy 
within A SEAN. The value of this additional analysis is that it encapsulates a 
range of processes surrounding communal identity building that cannot be 
captured through rational choice analysis as there was no sense of in some way 
sanctioning Myanmar. 
It is possible to trace the evolution of a human rights thread within 
ASEAN community building through 1998 to 2004. The process started 
tentatively in 1998 with ASEAN Vision 2020, adopted as a result of the Second 
ASEAN Informal Summit, held in Kuala Lumpur on December 151h 1997. 
Vision 2020 repackaged existing ASEAN goals within a broader "concert of 
Southeast Asian Nations" and a "partnership for dynamic development". Part of 
this was a commitment to what at this stage was termed "Caring Communities." 
These Caring Communities would ensure "all people enjoy equitable access to 
opportunities for total human development",256 and that member states are 
"governed with the consent and greater participation of the people with its focus 
255 Ba, "Who's Socializing Whom? Complex Engagement in Sino-ASEAN Relations," p. 158. 
256 ASEAN Vision 2020, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, l 65th December 1997. Accessible at 
http://www.aseansec.org/5228.htm. 
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on the welfare and dignity of the human person and the good of the 
community".257 Whilst oblique, this is the first reference by ASEAN in an 
official document to these notions of dignity, and to the belief that people should 
have some sort of consent in their own governments. 
Neither Vision 2020 nor the immediate follow up eminent persons group 
(EPG) made any reference to rights or democracy or human rights, the EPG 
restricting itself to identifying a range of "Social, Educational and Cultural" 
goals. However, by the Bangkok 33rd Ministerial Meeting of 24 - 25th July 2000 
a whole section of the Report, entitled a "People Orientated Approach" . did 
establish some substantive content to caring communities. The 34th Annual 
Ministerial Meeting (AMM) "recalled the decision made by the 26th ASEAN 
Ministerial Meeting held in Singapore on 13-14 July 1993 to consider the 
establishment of an appropriate regional mechanism on human rights". This 
interest was translated into a concern with social issues at the Bali ASEAN 
Summit of 2003. Here again the tone develops. Whilst the terms human rights 
and democracy do not exist in the document, ASEAN has clearly developed the 
meaning of "Caring Communities". The Declaration of ASEAN Concord II (Bali 
II) came to terms with what ASEAN was actually trying to achieve when it 
spoke of a community, and it translated the desire for Caring Communities into a 
far more comprehensive plan for an ASEAN Community.258 The Bali 
Declaration established that, "An ASEAN Community shall be established 
comprising three pillars, namely political and security cooperation, economic 
cooperation and socio-cultural cooperation",259 which called for the development 
257 Ibid. 
258 Declaration of ASEAN Concord II (Bali Concord II), Bali, Indonesia, 7th October 2003, 
Accessible at www.aseansec.org/l 5 l 59.htm.J 
259 Ibid. 
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of a set of "socio-political values and principles". The ASEAN Socio-Cultural 
Community (ASCC) sought to foster a "community of caring societies",260 
committing itself more specifically to "raising the standard of living of 
disadvantaged groups and the rural population".261 
Bali II was an essentially evolutionary, not revolutionary, product. Article 
5 noted that "the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia is the key 
code of conduct governing relations between states and a diplomatic instrument 
for the promotion of peace and stability in the region'',262 centralising the 
ASEAN Way within the process of community building. In line with this, the 
Socio-Cultural Community, where the commitment to caring communities 
resided, contained little that could possibly be objected to even by Myanmar as 
the most reticent of members. It noted that the Socio-Cultural Community would 
be in "consonance with the goal set by ASEAN Vision 2020", an essentially 
traditional interpretation.263 Moving forwards from 2003, the tenor of discussion 
advances again. Whilst the process up to Bali II was a discussion in the absence 
of the "rights" or "democracy" words, the follow-ups were radically different in 
flavour. The Vientiane Action Plan of November 2004 formulated by member 
states to develop the ideas embodied in Bali II marks a significant step in the 
discursive environment within the community. Vientiane promoted a sense of 
regional interest in human rights directly into the first pillar, that of the Security 
Community, and more specifically the political development aspect of that pillar. 
To quote in full: 
260 Ibid. 
261 N. M. Morada, "ASEAN at 40: Prospects for community building in Southeast Asia," Asia-
Pacific Review 15, no. 1 (2008) p. 41. 
262 Declaration of ASEAN Concord II (Bali Concord II), Bali, Indonesia, 7th October 2003, 
Accessible at www .aseansec.org/J 5 159. htm .1 Article 5. 









Completion of a stock-taking of existing human rights 
mechanisms and equivalent bodies, including sectoral bodies 
promoting the rights of women and children; 
Formulation and adoption of Memorandums of Understanding 
(MOU) to establish network among existing human rights 
mechanisms; 
Formulation of work programme of the network; 
Promote education and public awareness on human rights; 
Establish a network of cooperation among existing human rights 
mechanisms; 
Elaboration of an ASEAN instrument on the protection and 
promotion of the rights of migrant workers; 
Establishment of an ASEAN commission on the promotion and 
protection of the rights of women and children.264 
The ASEAN Security Community has been the least contentious part of 
the proposed Vision 2020, building upon pre-existing extensive ASEAN 
cooperation in the area of security and political cooperation. The inclusion of 
human rights as a part of the political programme marks a considerable upgrade 
of the standing and importance of human rights, and explicitly positions them as 
a pre-requisite for the security community to develop.265 The Philippine Foreign 
Minister Alberto Romulo noted, that the goals of the security community, and 
more generally of creating a region of peace in the context of a just, democratic 
and harmonious environment "are dependent on one crucial element - the 
commitment of each government to enact laws and policies that will promote this 
kind of environment. This must necessarily include the protection and promotion 
of human rights across the region."266 In a speech on August 18th 2004 entitled 
"Civil Society and Regional Cooperation" given to the 31st International Council 
264 Vientiane Action Plan, Vientiane, Laos, 29th November 2004, Annex I, point. 1.1.4. 
Accessible at www.aseansec.org/VAP- I Oth':'020ASEAN%20Summit.pdf. 
265 Interview with Edy Prasetyono, 22/09/06, Director of International Relations, CSIS, Jakarta. 
Dr. Prasetyono was involved in the drafting of the YAP. 
266 See Hadi, "Human Rights Promotion in the ASEAN Security Community: An Overview" p. 
6. 
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on Social Welfare in Kuala Lumpur, ASEAN Secretary General Ong noted that 
"the overarching ASEAN Community could not become a reality if we did not 
first build cohesive and caring community among the peoples of ASEAN".267 
Human rights promotion and traditional arenas of ASEAN success were 
becoming discursively linked for the first time. Human rights were becoming 
increasingly important to ASEAN's goals, and Myanmar's continued refusal to 
change its domestic situation was evolving into a matter of clear regional 
concern. 
To substantiate my conceptualisation of community building as an array 
of persuasive pressures· on Myanmar, I recognise that the fine detail of these 
discussions is lost to the academic observer behind the veil of secrecy and quiet 
diplomacy that ASEAN values. However insight is generated by an awareness of 
two things. First the origins of ASEAN's commitment to human rights, both in 
terms of civil society participation in the community building process and 
second, the shift in the political orientation of certain members, as well as the 
public announcements of ASEAN members. I suggest that when viewed together 
these form a firm basis for arguing that those discussions must have been, at least 
in part, about human rights within the broader context of ASEAN community 
building. This allows us to triangulate the nature of these discussions, true to the 
methodological choices explored in chapter three, helping to flesh out the 
discursive way in which rights were discussed within ASEAN and substantiate 
the claim that persuasive socialisation was present. 
The first substantiating fact is to chart the origins of the shifting 
commitment to human rights. There has to be a reason why community building 
267 Remarks by Mr Ong Keng Yong, Secretary General of ASEAN on "Civil Society and 
Regional Cooperation" Delivered at the 31 '1 International Council on Social Welfare, Kuala 
Lumpur, Malaysia, 18th August 2004. Accessible at, www.aseansec.ornJl 6324.htm. 
147 
came to mean, in part, enhancing ASEAN's commitment to those rights. The 
evolution of a rights component within ASEAN community building is 
attributable to the confluence of the role of Indonesia and civil society actors, 
and then the way that this renewed interest was mediating through existing 
ASEAN governance structures. The role of Indonesia as primus inter pares 
within ASEAN is important because of the latent leadership position that 
Indonesia has played in ASEAN merited by its size.268 The resignation of 
Suharto on May 21st 1998, and the fall of the Indonesian New Order, resulting 
ultimately in the election of Abdurrahman W ahdid and then Megawati 
Sukanoputri saw ASEAN's most populous state move sharply towards 
democracy and a greater awareness of the importance of human rights as a 
guarantee of domestic stability.269 This reorientation shifted Indonesia's 
international priorities. The new Indonesian government saw the chance to seize 
the leadership of ASEAN as well as demonstrate to both domestic and 
international audiences its democratic credentials.270 To Indonesia, refocusing 
ASEAN on "caring communities" played to both domestic and international 
audiences most conveniently, as well as offering solutions to ASEAN's problems 
that had already been identified.271 
268 Interview with Azis Nurwahyudi, 25/09/2006, Deputy Chair of ASEAN Desk (Political and 
Security Cooperation), Indonesian Foreign Ministry, Jakarta. Corroboration offered by interview 
with Yuri T:hamrin, 27/09/2006, Director of Asia Pacific Desk, Indonesian Foreign Ministry, 
Jakarta and with Edy Prasetyono, 22/09/2006, Director oflntemational Relations, CSIS, Jakarta. 
269 Interview with Professor Harikristuti,21/09/2006, Director of the Department of Human 
Rights, Indonesian Ministry of Justice, Jakarta. 
270 Interview with Vitit Muntarbhom, 13/10/2006, Co-Chair of the Working Group for the 
Establishment of an ASEAN Human Rights Mechanism, Chulalongkom University, Bangkok. 
This substantiates the argument of Anthony L. Smith, "ASEAN's Ninth Summit: Solidifying 
Regional Cohesion, Advancing External Linkages," Contemporary Southeast Asia 26, no. 3 
(2004) p. 423. 
271 Chandra investigates the role of the Indonesian shift to democracy on the formation and 
strength of Indonesian non-state actors and their influence on ASEAN. Alexander C. Chandra, 
"Indonesia's Non-State Actors in ASEAN: A New Regionalism Agenda for Southeast Asia," 
Contemporary Southeast Asia 26, no. l (2004). 
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An analysis of the multiple "tracks" that contribute to ASEAN sheds 
further light by allowing us to delineate how a changing Indonesia interacted 
with broader shifts in civil society.272 It was not just shifting Indonesian desires, 
but the interaction of that with a broader regional civil society push towards 
rights and democracy.273 For example it was the ASEAN Working Group on the 
Establishment of a Human Rights Mechanism (A WGHRM), a Track Three actor, 
which first presaged the addition of human rights to the security community. It 
was again the AWGHRM that called for the then "novel suggestion of having the 
ASEAN Security Community Commit itself to regional human rights" .274 Vi tit 
Muntarbhorn, co-Chair of the Working Group believes this to be the vital role of 
these actors, signposting possible ways forwards that the politicians can take 
heed of during their own deliberations.275 Contact between the Working Group 
and ASEAN is institutionalised in annual meetings as well as more informal 
personal relationships.276 Then Secretary General Severino advised the group 
that it should focus both on talking to ·ASEAN and to its member states,277 a 
process that has been developed, albeit fitfully, since 2003. Annual Roundtables 
have been organised under the aegis of the Indonesian Foreign Ministry and 
274 Track One focuses upon governments and their related institutions. Track Two refers to the 
various expert groupings across the region, whilst Track Three denotes the wider Civil Society 
process Maznah Mohamad, "Towards a Human Rights Regime in Southeast Asia: Charting the 
Course of State Commitment," Contemporary Southeast Asia 24, no. 2 (2002) pp. 236-237 Also 
see Tan Hsien-Li, "Persistent Persuasion Rather Than Consolidation: How Track Two Can 
Contribute to the Realisation of the ASEAN Community" (paper presented at the AICOHR, 
Manila, l 5- l 6th May 2006). 
273 Interview with Professor Harikristuti, 21/09/2006, Director of the Department of Human 
Rights, Indonesian Ministry of Justice, Jakarta. 
274
. Tan Hsien-Li, Op. Cit. p. 4. 
275 Interview with Vitit Muntarbhom, 13/10/2006, Co-Chair of the Working Group for the 
Establishment of an ASEAN Human Rights Mechanism, Chulalongkom University, Bangkok. 
276 Other NGO's such as the ASEAN Inter-Parliamentary Caucus on Burma have also organised 
efforts to raise the profile of Myanmar in member states of ASEAN in order to persuade 
governments to censure the regime. Interview with Teresa Kok, Deputy Chairperson of ASEAN 
Inter-Parliamentary Caucus on Burma, 16110/2006, Kuala Lumpur. 
277 Severino, Southeast Asia in Search of an ASEAN Community: Insights from the Former 
Secretary-General p. 153. 
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National Human Rights Committee. Through a step by step process that is 
conversational, not confrontational, the Working Group has sought to express its 
interest in human rights to as many parties as possible, to influence their opinion 
before they in turn translate that into discussions between ASEAN members over 
the community project. The Working Group also acts as a point of coordination 
between national level human rights bodies allowing them to transmit their 
opinions to the international level for further discussion.278 
This transferral of a domestic interest in human rights to the ASEAN 
stage had to be mediated through the way ASEAN was governed. Indonesia, 
even in potential partnership with other democracies in ASEAN, and in 
consultation with interested NGOs simply could not impose its will on ASEAN 
because the agreed nature of ASEAN centralised consensus and unanimity. 
Meaningful change could not occur with anything less than 100% support of 
members. States had to be convinced of the rightness of any particular course of 
action before agreeing to change communal identity. The debates that led to the 
emergence of human rights standards occurred in maelstrom of competing 
national opinions on the nature of what membership should mean, and how the 
community itself should reflect those. The mediation of Indonesia's commitment 
into a watered down process at the regional level is testimony to the discursive 
nature of the interaction within ASEAN community building·. 
The final substantiating fact is the increased interest of. member states 
again in the situation within Myanmar, and the use of common ASEAN 
membership to advance that opinion. Whilst we cannot know the nature of 
private discussion between ASEAN member states, we can discern other actions 
278 For a broader discussion of National Human Rights Institutions, see Philip Eldridge, 
"Emerging Roles of National Human Rights Institutions in Southeast Asia," Pacifica Review 14, 
no. 3 (2002) p. 214. 
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of those states. There were notably absent in the first few years of Myanmar's 
membership, an apparent anomaly attributable to the region wide focus on 
domestic economic and social problems the Financial Crisis wrought. The Thai 
premier Thaksin Shinawatra initiated a policy of "forward engagement" that 
sought a "softer, less confrontational" relationship than that which characterised 
the previous Leekpai government.279 2003 saw the Thai government propose a 
"road map" for further democratic conciliation with assistance from ASEAN as a 
whole. This was rejected by Yangon who devised, and subsequently 
implemented, a home grown 7-point path to democracy. Despite this, a Thai 
hosted "Forum on International Support for National Reconciliation in 
Myanmar" (the Bangkok Process) was held in December 2003.280 Myanmar 
itself participated in the forum, in the apparent belief that the forum would not 
criticise Myanmar, would offer no binding time table unpalatable to Yangon and 
would again show Myanmar's apparent commitment, however spurious it may 
be, to reform.281 The process appeared to make headway, with Myanmar Foreign 
Minister Win Aung committing to its road map to democracy; a 2004 start date 
for the National Convention and enhanced communication between the NLD and 
Government. In response, the other participants stressed the need for the process 
to be as inclusive as possible, the reconciliation process to have a clear time table 
of progress and the role of UN Envoy Razali as accepted facilitator of discussion 
b . 1 . h' M . lf 282 etween nva groups wit m yanmar 1tse . 
279 Katanyuu, "Beyond Non-Interference in ASEAN: The Association's Role in Myanmar's 
National Reconciliation and Democratization," p. 830. 
280 See Helen James, "Myanmar's International Relations Strategy: The Search for Security," 
Contemporary Southeast Asia 26, no. 3 (2004) pp. 539-542. 
281 Katanyuu, "Beyond Non-Interference in ASEAN: The Association's Role in Myanmar's 
National Reconciliation and Democratization," p. 832. 
282 Ibid. 
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In a more critical vein, in July 2003 it was reported in the Far Eastern 
Economic Review that Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamed had 
commented that ASEAN should consider expelling Myanmar for its continued 
human rights abuses, most notably in relation to the detention of Aung San Suu 
Kyi.283 It was also noted that the Prime Minister had told the Myanmarese junta 
that they had become "an embarrassment to ASEAN" as early as 2000.284 
Philippine Foreign Secretary Blas Ople and then Indonesian President Megawati 
Sukarnoputri who said "We want the democratisation process in Myanmar to 
continue and Madam Suu Kyi release before the upcoming ASEAN Summit 
(Bali II)" .285 
We therefore have evidence for both the insertion of human rights into 
the discussion between member states and civil society actors, as well as an 
ASEAN itself that had moved to commit itself to certain sectoral approaches to 
rights protection. At the same time, outside of the secret ASEAN discussions we 
have ongoing processes of member states expressing concern over joint 
membership in ASEAN with Myanmar, concerns that were explicitly human 
rights related. It would make no sense for these topics to stop "at the door". As 
ASEAN moved to understand itself what a "caring community" meant, it sought 
answers from civil society more broadly. These answers forced it along paths 
which led to human rights, and which naturally generated tension between itself 
and Myanmar. 
283 
"Booting Burma Out: Has ASEAN Had A Rethink About Intervention?" Far Eastern 
Economic Review, July 31st 2003, p. 6. 
284 Ibid. 
285 
"The Rogues of Rangoon." Far Eastern Economic Review, October 9th 2003, p. 8. 
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ACCOUNTING FOR THE FAILURE OF ASEAN PRESSURE 
Despite both Rhetorical Action and Myanmar's inclusion within 
community building processes, we can see no correlation between standards 
within the country and the pressures it was subjected to. UN Special Rapporteur 
Rajsoomer Lallah noted in 1998 that the Myanmar government refused access to 
the Special Rapporteur to conduct any investigation in the country.286 Despite 
this it was further noted that Myanmarese Law actively criminalised "or 
adversely affected freedom of thought, information, expression, association and 
assembly,"287 and noted further that the arbitrary arrest of people engaged in 
"normal civilian conduct"288 undermined any sense of civil society, free 
participation in politics and the associated individual freedoms. Myanmar had in 
no way changed since 1997 .289 This continued in uninterrupted fashion in 1999 
and 2000. The 1999 Special Rapporteur on Myanmar's Report noted the "intense 
and constant monitoring of political parties and individuals,"290 and that despite 
positive changes in terms of Myanmar's cooperation with the International 
Committee of the Red Cross and greater assistance with some UN activities 
within the country (such as the World Food Programme), there ultimately was 
"no progress in the situation of human rights in Myanmar. If anything, the 
situation is worsening".291 The 2000 Report noted that " the suppression of the 
exercise of political rights, freedom of thought, expression, association and 
286 Interim Report on the situation of human rights in Myanmar prepared by the Special 
Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights, A/53/364, 10th September I 998. Chapter II, 
para. 4. 
287 Ibid. Chapter III. Para. 6. 
288 Ibid. Chapter III. Para. 9. 
289 Ibid. Chapter VI. Para's. 55, 56, 58 and 59. 
290 Interin;i Report on the situation of human rights in Myanmar prepared by the Special 
Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights, A/54/440, 4th October 1999 Chapter II, Para. 4. 
291 Ibid. Chapter VI, Para. 52. 
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movement continues unabated'', 292 and that the situation in Myanmar was one of 
"continuing deterioration". 293 
The newly installed UN Special Rapporteur Paulo Sergio Pinheiro noted 
in 2002 that the situation in Myanmar had shown a marked improvement, and he 
welcomed "several positive initiatives addressing some of the human right's 
concerns of the Commission,"294 especially the creation of a Human Rights 
Committee within the SPDC governing structure.295 On May 6th 2002 Suu Kyi 
was released after some 19 months of house arrest, along with some 600 other 
political detainees.296 However, despite this, Pinheiro further noted that "freedom 
of expression is controlled by more than half a dozen laws, the violation of which 
may be, and in fact is, widely sanctioned by 3-20 years in prison".297 Despite 
these concerns, Pinheiro concludes that "undeniably the political atmosphere in 
the country is very gradually improving and some basis of mutual understanding 
has begun to emerge between the SPDC and NLD."298 
There is a chronological coincidence between the upswing in ASEAN 
activity documented and the UN documenting what appears, in 2002 at least, to 
be a parallel upturn in the situation within Myanmar. Can we attribute this 
change to ASEAN, and the changes outlined above? Are we seeing socialisation 
that later faded in the face of an atavistic tum in Myanmar's politics? David 
Steinberg indicates the reasons for the upswing in standards around 2002 were 
292 Interim Report on the situation of human rights in Myanmar prepared by the Special 
Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights, A/55/359, 22°d August 2000. 
293 Ibid. Chapter V, Para. 59. 
294 United Nations Committee on Human Rights, E/CN.4/2002/45, 10th January 2002. Preamble. 
295 Ibid. para. 19. 
29~ David I. Steinberg, "Myanmar: Reconciliation - Progress in the Process?" in Southeast Asian 
Af£.airs, 2003, ed. ISEAS (Singapore: ISEAS, 2003) p. 172. 
97 United Nations Committee on Human Rights, E/CN.4/2002/45, 10th January 2002 para. 30. 
298 Note the analysis at Ashley South, "Political Transition in Myarunar: A New Model for 
Democratization," Contemporary Southeast Asia 26, no. 2 (2004) as to the broad tenor of the 
relationship. 
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both economic (the "dire straits into which the military economy has fallen")299 
and political (fears of U.S. intervention, however groundless those fears were).300 
The activity of ASEAN may have increased, but this did not lead to successful 
socialisation. Were that the case, how would one explain the relapse of 
Myanmar's behaviour beyond 2003 in the presence of ever increasing activity by 
ASEAN, its organs and member states? It seems counter-intuitive to attribute the 
2002 changes to ASEAN and then ignore the failure of those changes to embed 
themselves in continued Myanmarese adherence to human rights norms. 
2003 saw a substantial relapse, one that would continue to grow m 
severity. The events of May 30th 2003 lead to the re-arrest of Suu Kyi and 
resulted in Pinheiro noting "significant setbacks" by the following years 
report. 301 Pinheiro concluded: 
"[L]ooking back at the period between May 2002 and May 2003, 
when many people had some hope, albeit mixed with uncertainty ... 
opportunities were missed to build on the earlier confidence 
building efforts. Lack of sufficiently solid bonds of mutual 
confidence led to mistrust instead of growing confidence".302 
The much heralded Road Map to Democracy, the Junta's home grown 
"solution" to the political tension, fell substantially short of the truly inclusive 
process that was intended, especially with regards to the failure of the National 
Convention to truly represent all of Myanmar's disparate ethnic and political 
factions. Pinheiro remained highly sceptical, in his view "the pronouncements 
made and action taken by the current leadership in Myanmar do not yet appear to 
signal any new policy direction in respect of the National Convention 
299 Steinberg, "Myanmar: Reconciliation - Progress in the Process?" p. 172. 
300 Ibid. p. 173. 
301 United Nations Committee on Human Rights, E/CN.4/2004/33, 5th January 2004 Also note 
the analysis at Kyaw Yin Hlaing, "Myanmar in 2003," Asian Survey 44, no. I (2004). 
302 United Nations Committee on Human Rights, E/CN.4/2004/33, 5th January 2004, para. 63. 
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Process".303 However, Pinheiro also noted in an important caveat "it would be 
unfair to refuse to acknowledge progress because the changes do not met a 
maximalist scenario. Whilst noting the slow progress in Myanmar's evolution 
towards a democratic state with full provision for the enjoyment of human rights, 
the Special Rapporteur hopes that it will continue in a steady and irrevocable 
manner",
304 
noting that despite the setbacks an air of precarious optimism was 
still possible. 
We have two avenues of socialisation pressure to deal with, and so two 
sets of interrelated arguments about the shortcomings of those attempts. In terms 
of the shifting community building programme and the increasing significance of 
a human rights component to that, we can attribute the failure of these pressures 
and reforms to the following line of reasoning. Persuasive processes of 
socialisation rest on the necessity of actors all dealing with the discussion in an 
open and frank way, within highly institutionalised contexts where contact is 
enduring. Actors meet to be convinced of the better argument. 305 It would appear 
that Myanmar never dealt with these interactions in such a way as to be 
conducive to those pressures. Yes, Myanmar had to agree to this evolution of 
human rights within the ASEAN framework, but there appears to be a disconnect 
between its commitment and its domestic situation. Discursive attempts were 
therefore matched by a strict froideur from Yangon. Actors can only be 
persuaded if they enter discursive environments with the belief that their future 
behaviour and very identities are up for discussion. Myanmar was not so 
motivated. It dealt strategically with the evolving debates surrounding ASEAN's 
303 United Nations Committee on Human Rights, E/CN.4/2005/26, 2"d December 2004, para. 
53. 
304 Ibid. 
305 Checkel, "International Institutions and Socialization in Europe: Introduction and 
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future and seems to have not stood in the way of vague commitments to rights 
sure in the knowledge that those in and of themselves meant little. 
It should be noted that at this point ASEAN had not revised any legal 
stipulations of membership. The process of community building through to 2008 
and the final ratification of the Charter rested on discussion, not legal revision. 
Significantly, however, it was this growing gap between regional standards that 
Myanmar appeared to agree with, and its failure to alter its domestic situation, 
that provided the platform from which Rhetorical Action could flow. The 
criticisms of ASEAN with regards to community building carry over in terms of 
the failure of ASEAN Rhetorical Action, although we loose the sense of mutual 
constitution and truly free debate between actors, as here ASEAN was stating 
things as "true" in order to censure Myanmar is some way. As Risse notes, 
Rhetorical Action only works when "there is at least one other actor listening 
who is prepared to change her preferences or her definition of a situation in light 
of the arguments".306 Myanmar was not interested in "listening" in this way, and 
as such "they [Myanmar and ASEAN] can argue strategically until they are all 
blue in the face and still not change anyone's mind".307 The junta seems to have 
been very adept in identifying what it had to conform to, and what it did not. 
Regardless of the social pressures mounting as member states and ASEAN 
expressed increasing disquiet over their behaviour, were never authoritative, and 
as such Yangon interpreted them as of no consequence because they did not 
ultimately threaten Myanmar's membership and the benefits that flowed from it. 
Underpinning the failure of both socialisation pressures is the realisation 
of the weakness of the standards Myanmar was being judged against. We must 
306 Risse, ·"International Norms and Domestic Change: Arguing and Communicative Behaviour 
in the Human Rights Arena," p. 533. 
307 
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understand how, when ASEAN dealt with the issue of community building, it did 
so in a unique manner. It set itself targets and goals loosely. It was easier to 
establish consensus that something should be done, or that it was desirable to 
think about doing something, and leave the details of what actually would be 
done until later.308 This created ambiguity when one asks what exactly ASEAN 
was seeking to socialise Myanmar into? Talk about human rights, or democratic 
and caring communities, meant little in the absence of a detailed account of the 
content ()f those terms. Socialisation attempts are unsuccessful when the 
socialising agent, here ASEAN, talks about complex notions of the social good 
in the absence of an appreciation of the constituent norms of that good 
themselves. Both Rhetorical Action and persuasion require that the socialising 
party in some way be truthful about its claims, where truthful infers a deep 
understanding of the content of the standards being used to suggest revisions. 
ASEAN's inability to cement a precise meaning of the standards it then acted 
upon undercut its ability to act authoritatively. Broad standards once again may 
have permitted a socialisation attempt, but they also condemned that attempt to 
failure. 
TiIE EMPTY COMMUNITY 2004-2008: REFORM AND EXASPERATION 
In the most recent period we can discern the most radical reform of 
ASEAN being discussed, the institution of some human rights mechanism and a 
firm footing for regulating member behaviour should they transgress regional 
standards. Myanmar "agreed" to those standards, not only signing the Charter but 
also ratifying it in late 2008. However, despite this we can also identify a 
308 Interview with Azis Nurwahyudi, 25/09/2006. Deputy Chair of ASEAN Directorate 
(Political and Security Cooperation), Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Jakarta. 
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continued insouciant refusal on the part of the Junta to change its respect for 
freedom of expression in ways that would be compatible with the pressure being 
brought to bear upon it. Extending the analysis into this period is relevant 
because it illustrates a diversification of social influence attempts, introducing 
ASEAN's deployment of Social Sanctioning. It also marks the further evolution, 
and escalation, of the community building process. The failure of either of these 
to change Myanmar helps us delineate more precisely where socialisation can be 
successful, as well as revealing further shortcomings in ASEAN' s efforts. 
ASEAN AND MYANMAR: SOCIAL SANCTION AND RHETORICAL ACTION 
ASEAN did more than engage in Rhetorical Action. In 2005 it, under the 
confluence of pressure from member states, some NGO's and other third parties, 
engaged in Social Sanction.309 ASEAN took the unprecedented step of denying a 
full member state the rights of a member, denying it the right to chair the 
Community (the chair rotates in strict alphabetical order amongst member 
states). I suggest that Social Sanction is a different political process, part of the 
wider arsenal of social influence strategies that rest conceptually on bargaining 
and ultimately on rational analysis. It is different from Rhetorical Action because 
whereas that process rests on the presentation of truth claims, Social Sanctioning 
rests on the denial of social benefits. 
ASEAN was under intense EU, US and British pressure to deny 
Myanmar the chair, all three threatening a boycott of the various dialogue 
summits, and was itself split for a long time split on the issue.310 Some states, 
such as Indonesia and Thailand, in private contacts with Myanmar, attempted to 
309
· Interview with Teresa Kok, Deputy Chairperson of ASEAN Inter-Parliamentary Caucus on 
Burma, 16110/2006, Kuala Lumpur. 
3 1o Tin Maung Maung Than, "Myanmar: Challenges Galore but Opposition Fail to Score," in 
Southeast Asian Affairs 2006, ed. Singh and Salazar (Singapore: !SEAS, 2006) pp. 194-195. 
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persuade the regime to relinquish its chairmanship, whilst others, especially the 
newer Indo-Chinese states, resisted that call. 311 As late as April 2005, at the 
informal ministerial retreat in Cebu, Philippines, ASEAN could only "agree to 
disagree" as to the way forwards. 312 Thai Foreign Minister Suphamongkohn was 
clear that "we [ASEAN] have impressed upon Myanmar the concerns of the 
international community",313 and the community had made clear that Myanmar 
"in reaching its decision ... should act in ASEAN's interest."314 Ultimately, in a 
last minute shift from April, it was announced at the 2005 Ministerial Meeting 
that ASEAN had "been informed by our colleague, Foreign Minister U Nyan 
Win of Myanmar, that the Government of Myanmar had decided to relinquish its 
tum to be the Chair of ASEAN in 2006 because it wanted to focus its attention 
on the ongoing national reconciliation and democratisation process,"315 an act 
that UN Special Rapporteur on Human Rights in Myanmar Pinheiro attributes to 
ASEAN pressure. 316 
The role of chairperson offered no material benefit, but it was a position 
of prestige, granting the right to host and chair various ASEAN meetings as well 
as the range of external diplomatic relations embodied by the ASEAN Regional 
Forum, ASEAN +3 (the dialogue with China, Japan and South Korea) and the 
dialogue partnerships with other actors (the USA and the EU in particular). This 
censure is the most severe rebuke ever exerted on a member state, and shows 
clear disgruntlement on the part of ASEAN about Myanmar's behaviour. The 
311 Interview with Tin Maung Maung Than, 04/10/06, ISEAS, Singapore. 
312 Emmerson, "Security, Community and Democracy in Southeast Asia: Analyzing ASEAN," 
p. 177. 
313 S. Osman, "Myanmar may not Chair ASEAN", Straits Times, 24th April 2005. 
314 Jilrgen Haacke, Myanmar's Foreign Policy: Domestic Influences and International 
Imppcations (New York City: Routledge, 2006) p. 55. 
3 5 Joint Communique of the 38th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting, Vientiane, Laos, 26th July 2005. 
Point 70. Accessible at http://www.aseansec.org/l 7592.htm. 
316 Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Situation of human rights in Myanmar, 12/02/2007, 
A/HRC/4/14 para. 29. 
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rebuke did not deny Myanmar material benefit, nor was it one that would be 
withdrawn if Myanmar changed its ways. ASEAN was sanctioning Myanmar in 
a way that affected its legitimacy as a member. How could Myanmar be a full 
and legitimate member, in the same was as the other nine members, if it was in 
some way unworthy of enjoying those rights? ASEAN was unable to deploy 
material sanction against Myanmar, but it was able to alter the bestowing of 
social rights through the disenfranchisement of Myanmar in response to its 
continued violation of ASEAN's intentions. 
In parallel ASEAN increased the scope of Rhetorical Action vis-a-vis 
Myanmar, adopting increasingly harsh language in further evidence both that the 
patience of ASEAN and the majority of member states was running thin. 317 The 
ASEAN Summit of December 2005 in Kuala Lumpur was notable for being, 
"unusually direct",318 calling explicitly for "the release of those placed under 
detention". 319 ASEAN noted the "increased interest of the international 
community" in Myanmar and in response indicates ASEAN's renewed interest in 
the implementation of the National Roadmap to Democracy, which ASEAN 
"encouraged". It also expressly "called for the release of those placed under 
detention". 320 This is the first explicit request by ASEAN on a human rights issue 
about an existing member state. It was at the Summit that Myanmar agreed to 
allbw an ASEAN Envoy, the then ASEAN Chairman and Malaysian Foreign 
Minister Syed Hamid Albar, to assess the human rights situation in Myanmar. 321 
317 Jilrgen Haacke, "ASEAN and Political Change in Myanmar: Towards a Regional 
Initiative?," Contemporary Southeast Asia 30, no. 3 (2008) p. 354. 
318 
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The 2006 AMM, held in Kuala Lumpur on 25th July 2006 ASEAN 
expressed: 
Concern on the pace of the national reconciliation process and hope to 
see tangible progress that would lead to peaceful transition to democracy 
in the near future. We reiterated our calls for the early release of those 
placed under detention and for effective dialogue with all parties 
concerned. We expressed our support for the constructive role taken by 
the Chairman of the 39th ASEAN Standing Committee and further 
discussed the outcome of his visit to Myanmar on 23-24 March 2006. 322 
The 40th Ministerial Meeting, held in Manila on July 30th 2007 calls again 
for progress; "We expressed concern on the pace of the national reconciliation 
process and urged Myanmar to show tangible progress that would lead to a 
peaceful transition to democracy in the near future." Furthermore it stated "while 
recognizing the steps taken by the Myanmar Government to release the leader of 
the NLD, we continue to express concern on the detention of all political 
detainees and reiterate our calls for their early release."323 The July 2008 AMM, 
the 41 st such meeting, "reiterated our calls for the release of all political 
detainees". 324 Ong Keng Yong noted that· "ASEAN is concerned about the 
impact of this [Myanmar] issue ... on our credibility and standing, because the 
world seems to think that ASEAN should be the one tackling this issue and 
bringing about a positive outcome".325 Emmerson is correct to draw attention to 
the changing language that this statement reveals. Whereas before ASEAN had 
called for "national reconciliation" with the effect of "making [the regime] seem 
the moral equivalent to the opposition and suggesting a compromise solution 
322 Joint Communique of the 39th AMM, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia 25th July 2006, points. 79 and 
80. Accessible at http://www.aseansec.org/ 18561.htm. 
323 Joint Communique of the 40th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting, Manila, Philippines 30th July 
2007, points 75 and 76. Accessible at http://www.aseansec.ore:/20764.htm. 
324 Joint Communique of the 41•t ASEAN Ministerial Meeting "One ASEAN at the Heart of 
Dynamic Asia". Singapore 21st July 2008. Accessible at http://www.aseansec.org/2 l 77 l .htm. 
325 As quoted in Heda Bayron, "ASEAN Losing Patience with Burma", Voice of America, 
Kuala Lumpur, 25th July 2006, and requoted in Emerson, "Challenging ASEAN: A "Topological" 
View," p. 425. 
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halfway between their two positions'',326 the call now for a transition to 
democracy denoted a shift in ASEAN preferred solution "away from mere 
compromise and towards what the very name of the National League of 
Democracy endorsed". 327 
THE EVOLUTION OF THE ASEAN CHARTER: THE CONTINUING DISCURSIVE 
CONTEXT 
The process of drafting the ASEAN Charter, as the culmination of the 
process of community building that runs through Vision 2020 and Bali II, was 
officially launched with the Kuala Lumpur Declaration on 12 December 2005. 328 
I focus on the role of community building and discussing various plans for the 
proposed community to chart the debates over community identity as Myanmar 
was exposed to diverging pressures and wishes of others. Given its newness, I do 
not discuss the consequences of the Charter; it is too early to forward anything 
but the most conjectural sketching of its possible effects. I suggest, as before, 
that the process of discussing the content of the Charter was inherently 
persuasive and construable through constructivist accounts. Its relevance here is 
in the way that it helps us both understand how even sophisticated discussions 
can result in no socialisation, as well as revealing new reasons for ASEAN's 
inability to overcome those impediments. 
The period represents a series of degradations to the proposed importance 
of human rights within ASEAN. Another Eminent Persons Group was 
established by the Kuala Lumpur Summit to discuss the full range of issues 
326 Donald K. Emmerson, "ASEAN's Black Swans," Journal of Democracy 19, no. 3 (2008) p. 
73. 
327 Ibid. 
328 Kuala Lumpur Declaration on the Establishment of the ASEAN Charter. Kuala Lumpur, 
Malaysia, l21h December 2005. Accessible at www.aseansec.org/l 8030.htm. 
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confronting ASEAN in its process of community building.329 The EPG 
comprised one representative from each member, usually a retired political 
functionary of ministerial level (Myanmar being the only state to send a 
comparatively lowly Civil Servant). The EPG reported in December 2006330 
stating that the first principle of ASEAN should be the "promotion of ASEAN's 
peace and stability through the active strengthening of democratic values, good 
governance, rejection of the unconstitutional and undemocratic changes of 
government, the rule of law, including international humanitarian law, and 
respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms"331 (italics added). It also 
noted that the problem with ASEAN is not one of "lack of vision" but of 
"ensuring compliance and effective implementation,"332 and recommended the 
establishment of a "Dispute Settlement Mechanism (in) all fields of ASEAN 
cooperation".333 Finally, it advised that "ASEAN should have the power to take 
measures to redress cases of serious breaches of ASEAN's objectives, major 
principles and commitments to important agreements" although "unless 
otherwise decided by the ASEAN Council in exceptional circumstances" there 
should be no "recourse to expulsion of members". 334 
These opinions, however, were not binding upon member states, and the 
EPG was always intended as a "free-thought" experiment. The downgrading of 
these suggestions through until the final text of the Charter reveals the reluctance 
of many members to move from a broad set of declaratory principles towards the 
very detailed standards that would actually provide a basis for successful 
329 Ibid. 
330 Report of the Eminent Persons Group on the Establishment of an ASEAN Charter, 
December 2006. Report accessible at http://www.aseansec.org/l 9247.pdf. 
331 Ibid. Executive Summary, para 3, Point 1. 




socialisation. The EPG suggestions were submitted to a High Level Task Force 
of active politicians who through a series of meetings from January - October 
2007 resolved a draft Treaty, which was signed at Singapore on 20th November 
2007. 335 The Charter itself marks a step backwards from the EPG Report in terms 
of the strength of ASEAN' s commitment to rights. In laying out the Purposes of 
ASEAN, point 7 (demoted from Point 1) refers to the strengthening of 
democracy, good governance and human rights, although it inserts the caveat that 
this should be done "with due regard to the rights and responsibilities of the 
member states of ASEAN". 336 
It is not all negative, however. The discussions did lead to an apparent 
greater commitment to notions of regional oversight. The Charter process 
necessitated a far greater attention to those parts of the deliberations that ASEAN 
had proven so averse to. ASEAN has clearly stated that the Charter will 
"transform ASEAN from being a loosely-organised political association into a 
rules-based legal regime".337 Article 14 of the Charter calls most novelly, and in 
response to the call in 1993, for the creation of an ASEAN Human Rights Body 
that operates "in conformity with the purposes and principles of the ASEAN 
Charter",338 and in accordance with terms of reference to be drawn up by the 
Fo~eign Ministers Meetings. This may sound radical, but those principles 
governing ASEAN outlined in the Charter reference not only the need to adhere 
to the "rule of law, good governance, the principles of democracy and 
335 The Singapore Declaration on the ASEAN Charter, Singapore, 20th December 2007, 
Accessible at http://www.aseansec.org/21233.htm. 
336 The ASEAN Charter, http://www.aseansec.org/ASEAN-Charter.pdf. Chapter I, Article I, 
Paragraph 7. 
337 ASEAN Bulletin December 2005, www.aseansec.org/17945.htm. 
338 The ASEAN Charter, http://www.aseansec.org/ASEAN-Charter.pdf.. Article 14. 
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constitutional governance",339 as well as "respect for fundamental freedoms, the 
promotion and protection of human rights and the promotion of social justice"340 
but also the states right to exist free of all external interference in internal affairs, 
(italics added).341 Whilst, therefore, Myanmar had agreed to a human rights 
instrument of some kind, it had most certainly not agreed to make membership 
conditional on fulfilment of human rights standards. The difference between 
EPG report and final text also reveals that states had successfully rejected any 
intrusive obligations or standards. The mode of socialisation attempts through 
broad declarations not detailed standards, was thus reaffirmed by the Charter, 
regardless of the institutional subterfuge represented by Article 14 and an 
apparent commitment to human rights. 
THE CONTINUING FAIL URE OF SOCIALISATION 
The period from 2005-2008 represents the loudest, most direct and 
precise criticism that ASEAN has ever directed towards a member-state, as well 
as the process of drafting a Charter that seemingly contains legal stipulations 
about the nature of state behaviour in precisely the area of human rights. 
Rhetorical action, Social Sanction and discursive engagement sit side by side, all 
three evidence of the displeasure of many other member states to use their 
common membership of ASEAN to promote change, and yet we still see no 
socialisation of any of standards. Pinheiro was barred from access to the country 
from 2003 onwards, but he noted in the 2006 "the humanitarian situation in 
Myanmar has shown marked signs of deterioration over the past year".342 He 
noted thar although Myanmar had engaged in the "seven point road map for 
339 The ASEAN Charter, http://www.aseansec.org/ASEAN-Charter.pdf .. Article 2 (h). 
340 The ASEAN Charter, http://www.aseansec.org/ASEAN-Charter.pdf.. Article 2(i). 
341 The ASEAN Charter, http://www.aseansec.org/ASEAN-Charter.pdf.. Articles 2(e) and 2(f). 
342 United Nations Committee on Human Rights, E/CN.4/2006/34, 7th February 2006. Preamble. 
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national reconciliation and democratic transition" that ultimately this had led to 
the political space being "defined in even narrower terms". 343 The Special 
Rapporteur was "deeply dismayed" to learn that despite the reconvention of the 
National Convention in Myanmar on December 5th 2005-31 st January 2006, "no 
progress towards instituting genuine democratic reform had been made,"344 and 
that consequently the "SPDC has continued to impose severe restrictions on 
freedom of movement, freedom on expression, freedom of association and 
freedom of assembly".345 In 2007, Pinheiro report maintained its negative tone, 
noting the "severe restrictions" on freedom of expression had not lessened. 346 
There are two reasons for continued failing, firstly the continued 
weakness of ASEAN' s efforts due to its inability to create substantive standards 
and secondly ASEAN's inability to present a coherent strategy on Myanmar, 
both familiar themes. Clearly, "mere" talk, be it about enforcement mechanisms 
or the norms that they enforce, is not enough, even if that talk comes in the form 
of treaties and resolutions that Myanmar signs up to. The biggest innovation in 
terms of the language used has been the gradual import of "democracy" into the 
pronouncements of ASEAN and member states at a variety of levels and the 
wedding of notions of Community and democracy and human rights. However, 
in the absence of detailed ASEAN standards about what those norm sets actually 
comprised, the talk was free floating. Agreement that something should be done, 
especially if that agreement is disingenuous, is easy compared to developing a 
shared understanding of what exactly should be done. As such, the problem that 
343 Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in Myanmar, A/61/369, 
18th October 2006. 
344 United Nations Committee on Human Rights, E/CN.4/2006/34, 7th February 2006. 
345 Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in Myanmar, A/61/369, 
19th October 2006. Para. 40. 
346 Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in Myanmar, 12th 
February 2007, A/HRC/4/14. Para. 51. 
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Rudolph Severino has noted, that ASEAN "has no central institutions to uphold 
compliance"347 and "no credible mechanisms for settling disputes in an objective 
and binding",348 remains essentially unresolved by the Charter, despite the 
institutional subterfuge represented by the Human Rights Mechanism. Perhaps 
the best evidence of this is that Myanmar, assuming no sudden volte-face on the 
part of the Junta and a new desire to "mend their ways", a seemingly safe 
conclusion, ratified the Charter in July of 2008. 
In explaining this, we must make recourse to the gap between the 
domestic and regional orders and questions of how the ASEAN Way and 
ASEAN heterogeneity interacted to retard socialisation efforts. 349 It remained the 
case that member states of ASEAN diverged significantly in terms of their 
democratic, and human rights, credentials, which again impacted on the ability of 
members to create a simultaneously inclusive and detailed normative consensus 
that could then be expressed through ASEAN itself. Even by 2008 only one 
member state of ASEAN was accredited the appellation "free" on the Freedom 
House ratings on Political Rights and Civil Liberties, Indonesia. 350 The 
Philippines, Malaysia and Singapore were ranked as semi-free and Thailand, that 
former motor of engagement with Myanmar was now rated unfree given the 
military coup to oust Thaksin Shinawatra on September 19th 2006. Quoted in the 
Singapore Strait Times, General Surayad Chulanont, the head of the interim 
government, noted to UN Special Envoy Gambari that such events weakened 
ASEAN's ability to talk to Myanmar saying, "I cannot preach too much about 
347 Rudolph Severino, ed., Framing the ASEAN Charter: An /seas Perspective (Singapore: 
Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2005) p. 6. 
348 Ibid. 
349 Chin Kin Wah, "Introduction: ASEAN - Facing the Fifth Decade," Contemporary Southeast 
Asia 29, no. 3 (2007) p. 400. 
35
°Freedom House "Map of Freedom". Accessible at 
http://www:freedomhouse.org/template.cfm'?page~"363&year=2008 
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democracy if our govenunent is not an elected one. We must not forget who we 
are and where we stand before thinking of pressuring the Burmese (sic) junta".351 
ASEAN could not be perceived as a legitimate interlocutor on democracy or 
rights or freedom of expression even if it had mentioned that phrase when its 
member states were so diverse with regards to their own commitments. ASEAN 
remains not a vanguard of democracy but an arena in which it is discussed. 352 
Finally ASEAN has found itself trapped, rhetorically and politically. It is 
unable to deny Myanmar that which Yangon values membership for, external 
political support vis-a-vis the west, even when engaged in sustained criticism of 
Myanmar. ASEAN, founded in the immediate aftermath of Western Colonialism, 
and committed to sovereign equality, would appear if it did limit its support of 
Myanmar, to be giving in to external pressure of a kind particularly corrosive of 
both its founding intentions and most deeply cherished ideational statements. At 
the 6th Asia-Europe Meeting held in Rotterdam in September 2005 ASEAN's 
economic ministers refused to attend as "a matter of principle" when the Dutch 
denied Myanmar's Minister a visa.353 This was at exactly the same time that 
ASEAN was exerting significant pressure on Myanmar over the chairmanship 
issue. The fact that ASEAN was willing, even when critiquing Myanmar as 
never before, to stand with them can only be seen as a sign that when ASEAN 
unity is threatened, ASEAN will side with Myanmar, providing the junta with 
exactly what it wants.354 At the November 2007 East Asian Summit held in 
351 Singapore Strait Times, 15th October 2007, p. 6, Quoted in Kin Wah, "Introduction: ASEAN 
- Facing the Fifth Decade," p. 400. 
352 Emmerson, "ASEAN's Black Swans," p. 81. 
353 Than, "Myanmar: Challenges Galore but Opposition Fail to Score," p. 195. 
354 For a fuller account of the role of Myanmar in the EU-ASEAN relationship refer to 
Petersson, "Myanmar in EU-ASEAN Relations." Of particular interest here is the apparent 
collapse of EU pressure on ASEAN resulting in Myanmar gaining a place in ASEM and the 
Europeans seemingly scaling back on pressurising ASEAN. 
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Singapore as an adjunct to the ASEAN Summit, the Myanmar Prime Minister, 
General Thein Sein, objected to the Singaporean invitation to Sergio Gambari, 
the UN Special Rapporteur on Myanmar, to attend the meeting and brief the 
delegations, ultimately successfully blocking Gambari's attendance.355 ASEAN 
had gone from condemning Myanmar to "caving in" to its demands that its 
human rights violations were not discussed, showing both a lack of coherence 
and of "moral courage and vision". 356 
I argue therefore that successful socialisation is dependent upon 
coherence in the full range of relations between community and target. The 
ASEAN case is an example where the community, despite the pressure it put 
upon Myanmar in some spheres of activity, acted with overall incoherence. It 
never presented a single attitude to Myanmar, nor did it ever link its pressure to 
threaten the temporary or permanent cessation of the reasons that Myanmar did 
value ASEAN membership. Despite the increasing tensions caused by 
Myanmar's continued membership of ASEAN, both in terms of intra-ASEAN 
tensions and extra regional complications, ASEAN as a Regional Community is 
highly unlikely to terminate Myanmar's membership.357 This helps explain why 
Social Sanctioning was ineffective. The denial of the rights of the chair was 
irrelevant to Myanmar because it did not value those rights and benefits, 
regardless of the opinions and intentions of others. Successful socialisation rests 
on coherence in the socialising agents behaviour. The incoherence of ASEAN, 
and the conflicting signals this transmitted to Myanmar, allowed Myanmar to 
ignore ASEAN' s efforts with impunity. 
355 For a fuller account of the diplomatic manoeuvring around this decision refer to Emmerson, 
"ASEAN's Black Swans." 
356 Rahim, "Fragmented Community and Un-Constructive Engagements," p. 69. 
357 Interview with Mahmud Rizali, 20/09/2006, Universitas Indonesia, Depok- Jakarta. 
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Myanmar has also played the diplomatic game well in response to 
A SEAN' s pressure whilst seemingly never changing from its fundamental 
course. Calls for caring societies? Myanmar has signed up to the rights of women 
and children within the ASEAN framework. Member states should be 
"democratic" and "harmonious"? Myanmar has pressed ahead with its Roadmap 
to Democracy and the National Constitutional Convention (indeed so committed 
is it that Cyclone Nargis was unable to derail the referendum on this). 358 As such 
it has proven itself sufficiently an active member of the Association to avoid 
calls for its exclusion to reach anywhere near critical mass whilst at the same 
time steadily ignoring calls to change because those calls cannot be made in such 
a way as to make membership conditional upon their fulfilment. Now these may 
be empty processes, but following Hathaway, 359 Smith,360 and Linton,361 even 
signalling that you are "moving towards human rights ... can result in substantial 
material benefits", 362 the continuance of membership and all the value added that 
flows from it Myanmar has acted sure in the knowledge that an ASEAN that 
excluded it would not be the same ASEAN that is currently valued by its 
members, it would be an all together different beast, and one which may well 
have not survived the last 40 years. 
358 See Andrew Seith, "Even Paranoids Have Enemies: Cyclone Nargis and Myanmar's Fear of 
Invasion," Contemporary Southeast Asia 30, no. 3 (2008). 
359 Hathaway, "Do Human Rights Treaties Make a Difference?" 
360 Heather M Smith, "Explaining Ratification of Global Human Rights Instruments: The Role 
of Regional Instability," in Journeys in World Politics Conference (University of Iowa: 2006). 
361 S. Linton, "ASEAN States, Their Reservations to Human Rights Treaties and the Proposed 




CONCLUSION: THE PRICE OFF AILURE 
Singaporean Foreign Minister Rajarathan, talking in May 1974 at the 
closing of the Seventh ASEAN Ministerial Meeting, noted dryly: 
You might recollect at the first meeting in 1967, when we had to 
draft our communique, it was a very difficult problem of trying to 
say nothing in ten pages, which we did. Because at the time, we 
ourselves, having launched ASEAN were not quite sure whether it 
was going anywhere at all.363 
The pithier observer may share those sentiments today. For a long time 
ASEAN slowly added issues to its remit, but never did it tamper with the source 
of its success, its informal and accommodating nature. Ironically its biggest 
achievements in sustaining peace in an otherwise fractious region of the world 
have been made by ASEAN stoically not doing very much at all. This sense of 
success led ASEAN to fulfil its long held dream to represent all of Southeast 
Asia in the hope that it could both influence these new members. 
This study has shown ASEAN and its members have expressed clear and 
consistent socialisation pressure on Myanmar. Rhetorical action, social influence 
and Social Sanctioning, all construed as part of a broader rationalist account of 
bargaining, have since the tum of the millennium come to the fore as 
socialisation processes resting on the evolving standards that community 
building has created. We can also discern the presence of persuasion based 
attempts through the very community building process itself, bringing Myanmar 
into discussion with states, and NGOs, who had varying assessments of the 
meaning attached to ASEAN membership. Membership resulted in both 
processes being present, although in differing configurations at different times. 
363 Cited by Michael Leifer, "The ASEAN States and the Progress of Regional Co-Operation in 
South-East Asia," in Politics, Society and Economy in the ASEAN States, ed. Otto Harrassowitz 
(Wiesbaden: 1975) p. 4. 
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The presence of these processes rejected the claims of those such as Khoo, Jones 
or Smith that ASEAN does little. It has attempted to socialise Myanmar in ways 
which given the prevailing ASEAN Way and the sensitivity of members to 
oversight can only be seen as radically innovative, given the framework from 
which it has emerged. The mode of socialisation here, resting on broad 
declaratory frameworks, is just as much a story of socialisation as what we will 
encounter in the next two chapters. The distinction between socialisation attempt 
and socialisation outcome means that whilst I disagree with those who claim 
ASEAN does nothing, I agree with the claim that it achieves little, at least in 
terms of the discussion of human rights presented here. Those who thought 
membership would bring Myanmar into discussion about its domestic 
arrangements and that this would, in and of itself, engender change have been 
proven woefully optimistic, and membership has both stymied ASEAN's own 
community building and jeopardised its relations with western powers. 
Members and ASEAN may regret the admission of Myanmar, but they 
cannot turn back the clock without fundamentally damaging why ASEAN exists, 
and was successful in the first place Furthermore ASEAN cannot now revise it's 
internal standards given Myanmar enjoys the powers of a member over that 
revision process. Wishing the Junta away does little given the Junta itself would 
appear to be the only practical agent of change in the game. 364 In light of the 
resilience of the regime there are few alternatives short of actual military 
intervention. ASEAN has attempted to exert considerable pressure over 
Myanmar, but it has failed to grapple with its inability to censure Myanmar in a 
way that would be effectively noticed by the Junta as anything other than 
364 Interview with Tin Maung Maung Than, 4/10/2006, !SEAS, Singapore. 
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background noise. That it may well prove forever unable to do so, if it is to 
remain true to the sources of its success, is a cause of considerable pessimism for 
those who would seek to make ASEAN matter, as well as a cautionary tale about 
the limitations of community building. 
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5. The OAS and Panama: Agency, Social Meaning and The 
Question of Success 
In this, the second empirical case of the dissertation, I turn to the 
relationship between the OAS and Panama. The OAS from its formation in 1948 
had a commitment to human rights and democracy, one which over the course of 
60 years has developed into a seemingly impressive set of institutions, charters 
and declarations that lock in commitments to freedom of expression as well as 
protecting and promoting the whole range of political and economic rights. 
When investigating this evolution, this chapter unpacks how differing modes of 
socialisation transition into each other, and how that transition affects the nature 
of the socialisation attempts that are made. The positioning of this study as the 
second of three is deliberate, exploring the conceptual gap between ASEAN's 
weak commitments and the EU' s highly legal standards that shall be encountered 
in the next chapter. Early OAS commitments to human rights were broad and 
imprecise, just as ASEAN's would be some 50 years later. However, the 
trajectory of community building has resulting in ever-stronger commitments to 
freedom of expression together with stronger bodies charged with the protection 
and promotion of that right. The Panamanian position within this assemblage of 
standards is a complicated but ultimately informative one. The many ways in 
which the OAS has spoken to Panama, and the development of the belief that 
those statements are in some way authoritative and legitimate, form the 
substantive analysis of this chapter. 
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STATEMENT OF ARGUMENTS 
Adopting the same two-layer approach as the previous chapter, I suggest 
that this case makes two contributions. The first generated by its empirical 
findings, the second its contribution to the broader conceptual analysis of this 
work. The story of Panamanian participation within the OAS as analysed through 
the prism of human rights is just as novel as was the discussion in the previous 
chapter about ASEAN and Myanmar. Nearly all academic enquiry into Panama 
in a regional context, in the English-speaking world at least, has mediated an 
interest in Panama either through the distorting lens of focusing on the Panama 
Canal, or at best on the role of the United States within Panama either 
specifically or more generally as an example of military intervention.365 I suggest 
that a focus on Panama within the OAS through the prism of the rights 
socialisation process, offers much benefit. Such a focus rejects the claim by 
many that the OAS is either a weak, or more extreme wholly passive, 
organisation, a charge that is levelled both at the contemporary OAS as well as at 
its actions in the past. 366 Even when there is a successful outcome, such as the 
OAS mediation through organising and chairing discussions between rival 
political factions, for example in Peru in the late l 990's and 2000, this is 
ascribed more to happenstance than a coherent strategic engagement by the 
365 The literature here is prodigious. See John Major, Prize Possession: The United States and 
the Panama Canal 1903-1979 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993) or Michael L. 
Conniff, Panama and the United States: The Forced Alliance (Athens and London: The 
University of Georgia Press, 1992). For a wider appreciation of the USA and Latin America, as 
an example of the US centricity that colours English speaking accounts, see lvan Musicant, The 
Banana Wars: A History of United States Military Intervention in Latin America from the 
Spanish-American War to the Invasion of Panama (New York City: MacMillan Press, 1990). 
366 See Arceneaux and Pion-Berlin, "Issues, Threats and Institutions: Explaining OAS 
Responses to Democratic Dilemmas in Latin America," for a contemporary analysis and Tom J. 
Farer, The Future of the Inter-American System (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1979) for an 
older retrospective. 
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OAS.367 True to the arguments I presented in my Introduction, disassociating 
questions of success and failure from the question of the practice of socialisation 
helps reveal that the OAS has, since the late 1970's, acted in increasingly 
coherent and structured ways through the extension of regular oversight and 
investigation of standards within Panama. 
At the broader conceptual level this study as a whole, the study of the 
relationship between Panama and the OAS tells us two preliminary things. 
Firstly, that states do not always join pre-existing communities, they can 
participate in their founding. Secondly, that states do not automatically engage 
with regional communities lagging in respect to their protection of freedom of 
expression. They can be in the vanguard of seeking to create regional protection 
for that, and other, rights. In such cases, regional communities can become a 
"lock-in" for pre-existing domestic standards, the act of raising them to the 
regional level indicative of the apparent concern in which they were held. The 
failure of this lock in permitted the gradual erosion of freedom of expression 
within Panama and sets the stage for the socialisation efforts we can discern later 
in our story. The subsequent thirty years of membership saw community building 
both in terms of extensive discussion of the norm of freedom of expression and 
the norm-set of democracy, but also in the gradual process of legal and 
institutional reform that was so lacking in the ASEAN example. However, 
whereas ASEAN was quick to start pressuring Myanmar, the OAS was 
exceedingly slow. Whilst Panama was part of the community building process, 
and engaged in discussion about the obligations and nature of membership, there 
is no evidence of the OAS actively seeking to impart its standards to Panama 
367 Andrew F. Cooper and Thomas Legler, "The OAS Democratic Solidarity Paradigm: 
Questions of Collective and National Leadership," Latin American Politics and Society 43, no. I 
(2001). 
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until 1978. The focus of our attention therefore falls, on the period up to 1978, on 
the role of community building, and persuasion, as states debate between each 
other the creation of revised communal identities and the role of human rights 
within that. The growing gap between Panamanian and regional standards up to 
1978 indicates that community building may have progressed on paper, but it 
most certainly had not created succeeded in affecting Panamanian respect for 
freedom of expression. In exploring this, I suggest that across this period a set of 
"social meanings" of membership undercut the socialisation attempts via 
discursive practice that we would expect to occur otherwise, denuding the 
community building process of any persuasive edge. 
The third period to be discussed is between 1978 and 1990, where we do 
see the development of hemispheric oversight of the situation within Panama 
with the introduction of Country Reports. Here I identify "Naming and Shaming" 
and Rhetorical Action pressure being exerted on Panama, and a rational choice 
analysis again starts to have traction in accounting for the relationship. However, 
these political machinations resulted in no great success in the face of the 
unrevised social meaning of membership. The period since 1990 and the forced 
restoration of Panamanian democracy has seen the linkage between national and 
regional standards so absent before. This has occurred not only because of the 
increasing relevance of hemispheric oversight, again through Rhetorical Action 
and Naming and Shaming, but also the changed social meaning of what it meant 
to be a member of the OAS. I attribute this changed meaning to the confluence of 
extensive revision of the OAS as well as broader political and economic 
processes that wrought their change during the 1980's onwards. 
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THE PANAMANIAN POSITION DURING NEGOTIATIONS FORMING THE OAS 
In terms of socialisation, the story of the role the OAS played with 
regards to Panama starts only after membership was achieved. The negotiations 
surrounding the creation of the OAS, running from the Mexico Conference on 
the Problems of War and Peace, (February 21-March 8 1945) through to the final 
OAS Charter being signed at the end of the Ninth Inter-American Conference 
which held in Bogota, Colombia, March 301h-May 2nct 1948, certainly represent a 
potential forum for socialisation. Panama was an active participant in discussions 
about the role of human rights and democracy within the nascent OAS. However, 
when we look at those discussions, we see an important fact. Socialisation, by 
any mechanism or process, rests on there being a gap between the standards of 
the socialising agent and the target of any socialisation attempt. Persuasion 
requires you come around to a better argument, just as bargaining necessitates an 
asymmetrical commitment to any particular material or social good. 368 During 
negotiations Panama was in the vanguard of a push to integrate a respect for 
democracy and human rights within proposed regional arrangements. Its 
positioning therefore retards the presence of socialisation because it breaks the 
link between socialiser and socialisee. 
At the Mexico Conference, Guatemala had led the charge to in some way 
sanction states that violated democratic credentials. It called for states to not 
recognise governments that were either non-democratic or had democratic rule 
interrupted, effectively denying membership of the Inter-American system to 
offending states. 369 Quickly rejected, the issue returned in November 1945 when 
368 See MUiler, "Arguing, Bargaining and All That: Communicative Action, Rationalist Theory 
and the Logic of Appropriateness in International Relations" pp. 397-398. 
369 Bryce Wood, "Human Rights and the Inter-American System," in The Future of the Inter-
American System, ed. Tom Farer (New York City: Praeger Publishing, 1979). See also Charles G. 
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the Uruguayan Foreign Minister Eduardo Larreta sought to "transform" the 
rhetorical commitment to democracy into reality,370 calling for the inter-
American system to somewhere install a mechanism for collective intervention 
to protect democracy, something that quickly became known as the Larreta 
Doctrine.371 This proposal was rejected by 13 other American states (eight 
approved including Panama itself).372 At the Bogota Conference Panama joined 
with Brazil in an attempt make the requirements for membership more onerous 
with regards to democracy, including the requirement that members of the OAS 
should subscribe to "the following principles: plurality of political parties, 
freedom of the ballot, the opportunity of private enterprise and the guarantee of 
the fundamental rights of man",373 this proposal was rejected under growing US 
worries that an overly strong democratic mandate in the OAS would weaken its 
anti-Communist campaign. Panama had pressed for the creation of a "Council of 
Solidarity" which would be based outside the U.S.A. and would "handle all 
political powers of the Inter-American System and withhold such functions from 
the Governing Board in Washington", with a focus as part of that on human 
rights concems.374 As part of this desire to institutionalise the political system of 
the proposed Community, Ricardo J. Alfaro, Panamanian Minister of Foreign 
Fenwick, The Organization of American States - The Inter-American Regional System 
(Washington D.C.: Kaufmann Printing, 1963) pp. 28-30. 
370 Ann van Wyren Thomas and Jr Thomas, A.J. The Organization of American States (Dallas: 
Southern Methodist University Press, 1963) p. 219. 
371 PAU, Consultation of the Government of Uruguay and Replies of the Governments on the 
Parallelism between Democracy and Peace, the International Rights of Man and Collective 
Action in Defense of those Principles (May, 1946). 
372 The United States government was strongly in support of the Laretta doctrine at the time, 
given its desire to strengthen the anti-Communist credentials of the evolving hemispheric 
arrangements. J. Lloyd Mecham, The United States and Inter-American Security, 1889-1960 
(Austin: University of Texas Press, 1961) p. 288. 
373 van Wyren Thomas and Thomas, The Organization of American States p. 57. 
374 Lawrence 0. Ealy, The Republic of Panama in World Affairs, 1903-1950 (Philadelphia: 
University of Pennsylvania Press, 1951) p. 135. 
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Affairs at the time, pushed to reinstate the Larreta doctrine, but mustered no 
support besides Panama and Guatemala themselves. 375 
This positioning of Panama as a "leader" in the debate between delegates 
over the issue of rights and democracy should not be surprising; Panamanian 
President Enrique Jimenez (June 1945 - August 1948) was a strong supporter of 
human rights, despite the oligarchic foundations of political power in the 
republic across the period. 376 Panama had enshrined human rights generally, and 
made specific mention to freedom of expression in Article 27 of the 1904 
Panamanian Constitution, which provided "extensive protection for freedom of 
thought and expression", 377 stating that "any person may express his thoughts 
feely, in speech or in writing, in print or in any other medium, without being 
subject to prior censorship". 378 The role of Panama as a leader, not laggard, in the 
drive to integrate rights into the OAS results in the period of joining the 
community not being significant for socialisation of freedom of expression. What 
was significant, both at the time and for the story I present further below, was 
that the failure of Panama and others to "lock-in" a respect for freedom of 
expression at the hemispheric level, whether that was through a commitment to 
democracy or a direct reference to that right. This created the permissive 
conditions for a serious degradation of the right to freedom of expression within 
Panama once it was a member. In charting this, I first present the final form that 
commitments to democracy and human rights took at Bogota, with reference to 
375 Ibid. p. 137. 
376 Ibid. p. 135. 
377 Report on the Situation of Freedom of Expression in Panama 3rd July 2003, 
OEA/Ser.L/V /11.117, Doc, 4 7, Chapter IV - Analysis of Freedom of Expression in Panama, The 
Historical Context, Paragraph 45. 
378 Ealy, The Republic of Panama in World Affairs, 1903-1950 p. 128. 
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their weakness, and then chart the domestic situation within Panama to act as a 
precursor for the coming analysis. 
The Charter represented a strange hybrid of "rules, agreements, principles 
and aspirations" that both defined the organisational set up of the community as 
well as the "emotional motive power" and aspirations of the continent. 379 
Democracy appeared in the Preamble that declared that American States were; 
... Confident that the true significance of American solidarity and good 
neighborliness can only mean the consolidation on this continent, within 
the framework of democratic institutions, of a system of individual 
liberty and social justice based upon respect for the essential rights of 
man.3so 
Article 5(d) sought to reaffirm the "solidarity of the American States" and 
further noted that its many aims to secure peace and freedom rested on the need 
for its members to ensure "the effective exercise of representative democracy".381 
Article 5G) proclaimed the "fundamental rights of man". A somewhat stronger 
commitment to human rights was contained in Article 13, which required, in 
relation to the evolution of member states political evolution that this 
development "shall respect the rights of the individual and the principles of 
universal morality" (italics added).382 
Superficially this appears to be a commitment that represents Panama's, 
and others, desires in the 1945-1948 period. However, a more detailed appraisal 
reveals that these commitments to rights and democracy are considerably less 
than they appear. Centrally not everything in the Charter was equally binding on 
members. As a hybrid between legal stipulations and aspirational statements, the 
379 John C. Dreier, The Organization of American States and the Hemisphere Crisis (New York 
City: Harper & Row Publishers, 1962) p. 32. 
38° Charter of the Organization of American States, Preamble. 
381 Ibid. 
382 van Wyren Thomas and Thomas, The Organization of American States. 
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wording and positioning of various clauses must be carefully considered. Article 
5(d) did not state that membership of the OAS was conditional on democratic 
government, such as had been proposed by Larreta, Brazil and Panama at various 
times, rather only that democratic solidarity should be promoted. The stronger 
commitme.nt to democratic values held in the Preamble was not legally 
significant given the fact it was in the Preamble, not a substantive clause. 383 The 
preamble "sets forth certain political ideals without guaranteeing their realisation 
by establishing a legal obligation to behave in a certain manner".384 
The commitment to human rights in Article 5G) was similarly weak. What 
exactly are these rights spoken of? How will they be protected and promoted? 
These were questions that found no answer within the Charter itself. Just as 
ASEAN had constructed a commitment to rights in its Human Rights Mechanism 
of 2008 in the absence of any appreciation of what those rights in fact were, so 
had the OAS in 1948 instilled a commitment to rights with no official 
understanding of that term. This interacted fatally with the established 
governance strategy that the Charter institutionalised. The OAS was more an 
"agency for the enforcement of the peace rather than the law". 385 The 
determination to restrict intervention, understandable in the post World War Two 
environment,386 created immediate problems of enforcement for any obligations 
within the Charter itself. Article 15 established that: 
No state or group of states has the right to intervene, directly or 
indirectly, for any reason whatever, in the internal or external affairs 
of any other state. This prohibits not only armed force but also any 
383 Ibid. p. 220. 
384 Ibid. 
385 van Wyren Thomas and Thomas, The Organization of American States p. 153. 
386 Tom J. Farer, "Collectively Defending Democracy in a World of Sovereign States: The 
Western Hemisphere's Prospect," Human Rights Quarterly 15 (1993) p. 720. 
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other form of interference or attempted threat against the personality 
of the state or its political, economic and cultural elements. 
The Charter was mute on "whether the OAS or its members could take 
enforcement measures against a member state who fails to respect human 
rights",387 and the Inter-American Juridical Council (IAJC), when asked opined 
that "it would be in vain to search in the Charter of the Organization for any such 
competence" and that any attempt to infer one was erroneous given that "in so 
serious a matter as this, one cannot speak of implicit faculties; they should be 
expressly stated". 388 The dangers of a Regional Community committed to the 
defence of democracy and human rights, but at the same time resting on 
sacrosanct non-intervention was not unremarked upon. Larreta had warned back 
in 1946, "non-intervention cannot be converted into a right to invoke one 
principle to be able to violate all other principles with immunity."389 
The interest expressed by Panama and others in human rights had not, 
however, been wholly rejected. Rather it was diverted away into a Declaration on 
the Rights and Duties of Man, which whilst also promulgated at Bogota, had no 
formal relationship with the OAS at all, although as we shall see becomes of 
central importance to later attempts to protect rights through the OAS.390 The 
Declaration went considerably further than the Charter in terms of human 
387 Lawrence J. LeBlanc, The OAS and the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights (The 
Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1977). See also David J. Harris and Stephen Livingstone, eds. The 
Inter-American System of Human Rights (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998) Chapter by Antonio 
Augusto Carcado Trindade, The Interaction Between Political Actors, Commission and Court, p. 
191. 
388 Inter-American Juridical Committee, Study of the Juridical relationship between Respect for 
Human Rights and the Exercise of Democracy (Pan American Union: Washington D.C., May 
1960)p.10. 
389 Quoted in Inter American Dialogue, "Inter-American Dialogue - a Conference Report -
Advancing Democracy and Human Rights in the Americas. What Role for the OAS?" 
(Washington DC, 1994) Chapter by Javier Corrales, Advancing Democracy and Human Rights in 
the Americas - The Rapporteurs Report, p. 2. 
390 General Secretariat, ed., The International Conferences of the American States - 2nd 
Supplement (Washington D.C.: Pan-American Union, 1958). 
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rights.391 In 38 Articles, it outlined a full range ofrights and duties of individuals. 
It covered political and economic rights, together with broader ethical aspirations 
that underlay any democratic system of government. The Declaration, in Article 
4 stated "Every person has the right to freedom of investigation, of opinion and 
of the expression and dissemination of ideas, by whatever medium 
whatsoever".392 The framers at Bogota had, however, through their separation of 
Charter and Declaration, underlined the collective opinion that these rights were 
clearly not laws, and as such the Declaration was not the lock in that some had 
wanted. It was neither possible nor desirable to make the Declaration binding,393 
and the IAJC noted that the Bogota Declaration did not create a legal contractual 
obligation.394 The Declaration was neither attached as an annex of the Charter 
nor was it a separate treaty in its own right; it held the status of an unattached 
"declaration" of principles, revealing quite clearly the opinion of states that it 
was considerably less than legally binding. 395 
In a portentous sequence of events that both evidences the failure of the 
OAS to lock in the protection of democracy and fundamental rights within the 
OAS and also presage coming events in the history of freedom of expression 
within Panama, the period following President Jimenez's departure from power in 
1948 was one of increasing political instability. The growing political ascendance 
391 A full appraisal of the Declaration is offered at van Wyren Thomas and Thomas, The 
Organization of American States pp. 223-227. 
392 The Inter-American Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man. Resolution XXX of the 
9th International Conference of American States (1948), Reprinted in Basic Documents 
Pertaining to Human Rights in the Inter-American System OEA/SER.L.V/11.82 doc.6 rev.I at 17 
(1992), Article IV. 
393 9th International Conference of American States, Acta Commission VI, 3a. 
394 Fenwick, The Organization of American States - the Inter-American Regional System p. 
444. 
395 For a fuller discussion of the OAS Charter and the Declaration refer to LeBlanc, The OAS 
and the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights pp. 8-19. 
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of the National Police, led by Jose Antonio Remon, led to the installation in 
November 1949, of Arunulfo Arias as president. Arias was no defender of 
political and civil liberties and "arbitrarily" annulled the Constitution of 1946 by 
executive fiat, a move that ultimately led to an attempt to "destroy the National 
Assembly and Supreme Court",396 but which ended up only with his 
impeachment. Panama passed the Instrument of Ratification for the OAS on 
March 16th 1951 and deposited that ratification on March 22nd. The Charter came 
into force shortly after, on December 13th 1951 with the 14th ratification, that of 
Columbia. Arias had therefore both dissolved national political parties and 
ratified a charter that despite its murky wording, enshrined democracy as a 
keystone principle. The argument is that the standards established within the OAS 
were so weak, because of the reduced legal nature of them together with the 
undercutting of the creation of strong norms through the outsourcing of rights to 
the Declaration, that they offered no impediment to domestic behaviour within 
Panama that violated those standards. The deterioration within Panama as the 
National Police and established aristocracy vied for power was not halted by the 
signing, ratification or operationalisation of the Charter. It was in no sense a 
"lock-in" of democracy or freedom of expression, as shown by Arias' blatant 
disregard for both. 
PLAYING COMMUNITY AND A LACK OF AGENCY: THE OAS AND PANAMA 1951-
1978 
The relationship between Panama and the OAS from 1951 until 1978 is 
seemingly contradictory. We see extensive community building efforts within 
the OAS, the erection of a Commission and then a Court to defend human rights. 
396 Walter LaFeber, The Panama Canal: The Crisis in Historical Perspective (New York City: 
Oxford University Press, 1989) p. 113. 
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We can also perceive extensive discussion and ultimate agreement on a detailed 
assessment of freedom of expression. Panama participated in both process, and 
consented to their outcomes. Panamanian participation would appear to indicate 
that it had, from its low base in 1951, been persuaded through discursive 
engagement over time, of the rightness of detailed discussions on democracy and 
freedom of expression. It would appear, superficially at least, that Panama should 
be socialised. It agreed to detailed meanings of freedom of expression, whereas 
in comparison Myanmar had baulked at anything other than the most anodyne of 
commitments within ASEAN. 
Despite this, Panamanian standards on freedom of expression show no 
correlation between regional and national sentiment. There are two parts to 
addressing why. First, there is no agency in the relationship. That is, the OAS 
over this period did not investigate, prosecute or in any other way engage with 
Panama explicitly over questions of freedom of expression. This renders as 
wholly absent the array of rational choice socialisation processes. Given this, the 
period represents an excellent way to investigate the power of community 
building and persuasion to, on their own, engender successful socialisation. In 
exploring the failure of this, I will investigate a set of understandings shared by 
Central and Latin American states that coloured their interpretation of these 
revised standards. I term this the "social meaning" of membership. The 
identification of this phenomena serves to both remind us of the importance of 
understanding the broader content in which socialisation efforts arise, as well as 
introducing the argument that community building does not, in and of itself, 
promote persuasion based socialisation attempts. The investigator must be aware 
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of the social interpretation of what community building was actually intended to 
do, and why states participated within it. 
BUILDING A COMMUNITY? HUMAN RIGHTS AND FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION WITHIN 
THE OAS 
The first step is to chart the evolving commitment within the OAS to the 
various norms, and norm sets, which are relevant for freedom of expression. 
These represent insight into the nature of the community building project. They 
reveal what should be a set of conditions where we would expect socialisation 
via persuasion to be successful. In establishing this claim I shall compare the 
documentary record with the scope conditions established through my 
methodological discussions in chapter three. I suggest that see Panamanian 
participation in a discursive environment where questions of rights were placed 
centre stage and then agreed upon. The process of creating an apparent new 
communal identity was seemingly successful. The OAS went from a community 
in 1951 with no substantive commitment to rights or democracy to one in 1978 
with a Court, a Commission, revised standards on human rights including a 
detailed appraisal of freedom of expression and a stronger commitment to the 
desirability of democratic government. On paper, this would appear to represent 
all the necessary methodological hallmarks for identifying a persuasion 
mechanism resting on a community building process. 
The first important movement on questions of rights came at the 1959 
Fifth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs. The meeting was 
charged with answering the question as to "whether, and if so to what extent, the 
American states could take collective action against dictatorship on behalf of 
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human rights without endangering the principle of "non-intervention" in the 
affairs of other states". 397 The solution was found in the creation of a 
Commission on Human Rights that would mediate the competing concerns with 
non-intervention and human rights. The Commission was created as an 
autonomous entity of the OAS and was expressly linked with the human rights 
enunciated in the Declaration,398 the first formal link between the OAS and the 
Declaration. In terms of actual "powers", the Commission was limited to firstly 
the preparation of country reports and secondly, after 1965, responding to 
individual petitions, a power granted to it at the Second Special Inter-American 
Conference of that year. It was a comparatively weak institution at this stage, but 
the very act of its creation is significant testimony to an apparent revision of the 
regional commitment to promoting and protecting human rights. 
Institutional revision sat alongside detailed discussion on democracy and 
freedom of expression. In addition to creating the Commission, Resolution One 
of the Fifth Meeting had called generally for all people of the Americas to live 
under democratic institutions based upon the respect for human rights. The 
Declaration, known as the Declaration of Santiago de Chile, started to outline a 
clearer hemispheric understanding of democracy; in its Preamble it noted that it 
was ''the general aspiration of the American peoples to live in pace under the 
protection of democratic institutions."399 In a further eight points, the various 
397 LeBlanc, The OAS and the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights pp. 46-47 
specifically the Dominican Republic accused Cuba and Venezuela of inciting unrest. The 
situation in Cuba also troubled the OAS political organs and the United States. Refer to Harris 
and Livingstone, eds. The Inter-American System of Human Rights Chapter Christine Cerna, The 
Inter American Commission on Human Rights - Its Organization and Examples of Petition and 
Communication p. 65. 
398 LeBlanc, The OAS and the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights. Article 2 of the 
resolution creating the Commission noted, "For the purposes of this Statue, human rights are 
understood to be those set forth in the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man." 
399 Declaration at the Fifth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Santiago, 
Chile, Augu~t 12 through 18, 1959, Final Act. Document OEA/Ser.C/II.5, pp. 4-6. 
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characteristics of what a western hemisphere democratic regime was were 
outlined, an "admission by the inter-American system that the hitherto vague 
statements of principles relating to democracy did little to provide a means for 
distinguishing democracy," from alternate political systems.400 The importance of 
democracy to freedom of expression was clear to participants of the OAS. This 
issue arose when the IAJC was requested in 1960 to explicate the relationship 
between representative democracy and human rights more broadly. In the 
resultant Advisory Opinion the Committee asserted that: 
[T]here is not only a possible, there is a clear, relationship between 
respect for human rights and the effective exercise of democracy. A 
democratic regime must necessarily be based upon certain essential rights 
and freedoms.401 
The "elective affinity between democratisation and specific human rights 
provisions clearly rests upon the maintenance of electoral democracy", indicating 
the interdependence of human rights and democracy.402 Participants of 
community building knew what the significance of democracy was to human 
rights. Advancing democracy was not done in a vacuum; it was a key portion of 
the apparent revising commitment to human rights. 
Not only had Panama consented to these, but it was once again in the 
apparent lead of a push to institutionalising freedom of expression ever more 
powerfully into regional arrangements. Evidence for this behaviour comes from 
investigating the considerable discussion within the Commission rotating around 
a proposed Draft Inter-American Convention on Freedom of Expression, 
400 van Wyren Thomas and Thomas, The Organization of American States p. 231. 
401 Inter-American Juridical Committee, Study of the Juridical Relationship between Respect 
for Human Rights and the Exercise of Democracy OEA I Ser.I I Eng. CIJ.52, May 1960 p. 2. 
402 Louise Fawcett and Monica Serrano, eds. Regionalism and Governance in the Americas 
(Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan, 2005) p. 150. 
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Information and Investigation. The Preamble of the Second Draft of the 
Convention noted, "freedom of expression ... is a right that must be respected and 
protected for the practice of democracy".403 The draft goes on to outline a detailed 
appreciation of the nature of freedom of expression.404The draft declaration was 
forwarded to members of the OAS for consultation. The United States was in 
general negative in its response arguing that the draft "shows the dangers of being 
too specific".405 The Panamanian response was far more positive, calling for the 
"right to be fully explored and situated within the regional system as a vital 
precursor to democratic government. "406 Whilst we can trace the diminution of 
the proposed Convention under US led hostility until its gradual final rejection, 
the key point to take is that Panama was clearly on the side of institutionalising 
respect for freedom of expression. 407 
By 1969, a mere 10 years after Commission was founded, another 
convulsive community building event occurred, and again Panama was active in 
this. Here the issue was the debate over reformulating and extending existing 
OAS commitments to human rights. The Inter-American Commission on Human 
Rights had not fundamentally altered the environment of membership of the 
403 2nd Report on Draft Convention on Freedom of Expression Information and Investigation, 
September 10th 1962, OEA/Ser.L/V /11.4 Doc. 4 (Eng). 
404 2"d Report on Draft Convention on Freedom of Expression Information and Investigation, 
September 10th 1962, OEA/Ser.L/V/11.4 Doc. 4 (Eng). 
405 Observations Regarding the Draft Inter-American Convention on Freedom of Expression, 
Information and Investigation, October I st 1962, OEA/Ser.L/V 111.5, doc. 11 (Eng), Letter from 
Durward V. Sandifer. 
406 Observations Regarding the Draft Inter-American Convention on Freedom of Expression, 
Information and Investigation, October I st 1962, OEA/Ser.L/V/11.5, doc. 11 (Eng), Letter from 
Gabrino Fraga. 
407 To chart the declining fortunes of the proposed convention compare 2"d Report on Draft 
Convention on Freedom of Expression Information and Investigation, September 10th 1962, 
OEA/Ser.L/V/11.4 Doc. 4 (Eng) with the 3rd Report on Draft Convention on Freedom of 
Expression, Information and Investigation, September 3rd 1963, OEA/Ser.L/V/11.8, doc. 3 (Eng). 
This latter document is both shorter and less precise about its terms and content. The final draft 
declaration is even further denuded on content, loosing another 4 articles. See Final Draft Inter-
American Convention on Freedom of Expression, Information and Investigation, October 13th 
1963, OEA/Ser.L/V/11.8, doc.15 (Eng). 
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O.A.S because "mere declarations, no matter how beautiful they may be, will be 
endowed with moral fibre alone, and will certainly be ineffective against a 
government that does not wish to observe them".408 The Commission had always 
been viewed as an interim institution pending the adoption of a coherent and 
binding human rights treaty,409 and it had been long felt that "only a Convention, 
properly ratified, will have legal contractual force. Only a Convention will be 
binding upon the states and adducible before an international tribunal".410 That 
treaty finally came in the form of the 1969 American Convention on Human 
Rights, signed in San Jose after the Inter-American Specialised Confere,nce on 
Human Rights held from November 7 - 22.411 
The Convention firstly arrived at a far more substantial, and nuanced, 
appreciation of the freedom of expression. Whereas the discussions of 1962 and 
1963 around the proposed Declaration were felt to be premature, by 1969 there 
was considerable groundswell in favour of institutionalising these commitments. 
The result was an Article 13 of the Inter-American Convention that went into far 
greater detail than previous articulations of freedom of expression, although I 
note that it was not as sophisticated as the right contained in the draft Convention 
of 1962-3. Article 13(1) restated the universality of the right to freedom of 
expression, "everyone has the right to freedom of thought and expression. This 
right includes freedom to seek, receive and import information and ideas of all 
kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing, in print in the form of art, 
408 Study on the Juridical Relationship between Respect for Human Rights and the Exercise of 
Democracy, May 1960, OEA/Ser.l/Eng.CIJ.52, p. 3. 
409 Article 50 of the Protocol of Buenos Aires notes that "until the Inter-American Convention 
on human rights, referred to in Chapter XVIII, enters into force, the present Inter-American 
Commission on Human Rights shall keep vigilance over the observance of human rights." 
410 Study on the Juridical Relationship between Respect for Human Rights and the Exercise of 
Democracy, May 1960, OEA/Ser.I/Eng.CIJ.52, p. 3. 
411 For a full version of the drafts, comments and travaeu:x preparatoire, refer to "The Inter-
American Specialized Conference on Human Rights" San Jose, Costa Rica, 1969, 
OEA/Ser.K/XVI.1.1.Eng. 
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or through any other medium of ones choice". Article 13(2) established the 
lawfulness of liability for the consequences of freedom of expression so as to 
protect the rights and reputations of others and "national security, public order, or 
public health or morals. 13(3) protects the various mechanisms through which 
freedom of expression can be exercised and requires the government to resist 
from interfering with it, although 13(4) allows for the protection of children and 
13(5) outlaws using freedom of expression as a cover for propaganda or the 
incitement of hatred. These rights are further enhanced in Article 14 that 
entrenched the right of reply and ensured that all organizations possess liability 
for any infringement.412 Panama during negotiations over the convention had 
consciously situated itself as again a leader in discussing rights within the 
proposed Convention framework, going so far as to link its previous commitment 
to the defunct Inter-American Convention on Freedom of Expression to its now 
desire to institutionalise that right within the broader Inter-American Convention 
on Human Rights framework. 413 
W c should also note out of an interest in completeness that the 
Convention created a Court of Human Rights.414 The idea of a Court of Human 
Rights can be traced back to Resolution XXXI of the 9th Inter-American 
Conference of American States, which called for a Court to be established within 
412 Inter-American Convention on Human Rights, Adopted at the Inter-American Specialized 
Conference on Human Rights, San Jose, Costa Rica, 22"d November 1963, Accessible at 
http://www.ci dh .org/Basicos/Engli sh/I3asic3. American %20Conven ti on. htm. 
413 The Inter-American Specialized Conference on Human Rights" San Jose, Costa Rica, 1969, 
OEA/Ser.K/XVI.1.1.Eng. 
414 An understanding agreed with by the OAS General Assembly- G.A. Res. 447, OAS G.A. 
9th Sess. OAS Doc. AG/447 (1979) The Ratification process for the Convention was protracted. 
Le Blanc Notes, writing in 1977, at a time when the fortunes of the Convention were at their 
nadir, that the prospects for ratification within the foreseeable future were not good, especially 
given the reluctance of the bigger states to devote time to ratification. It was only with the 
incoming Carter Presidency in the U.S.A, with its re-emphasis on human rights in foreign policy, 
that the U.S.A started to support the Convention process, and by 1980 11 states, the minimum for 
activation, had ratified it and brought the Convention to life. 
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the new organisational structure being discussed. The Court finally became 
active on 18th July 1978 with two broad functional roles: contentious and 
advisory jurisdiction.415 Whilst contentious jurisdiction was binding, advisory 
opinions . allowed states to use the court without the perceived dangers of 
subjecting themselves to compulsory jurisdiction.416 The Court, whilst a 
fascinating organisational response to human rights promotion, is relevant for our 
discussion only because Panama agreed to its creation. As discussed below, the 
Court was silent on the question of Panama and freedom of expression, and as 
such does not embody a substantive socialisation mechanism to concern us in 
this analysis. 
What was the nature of Panamanian participation in this process? I 
suggest that we can conceptualise it as a discreet set of persuasive arrangements 
were states debated with each other the creation of a future community identity. 
Referring back to the scope conditions in chapter three, I note that these 
discussions occurred without asymmetric arrangement between states. Nor was 
the content of these discussions about the enforcement of any particular standard 
as "correct". Rather as we have seen, Panama and others debated with each other 
what it meant to be part of the OAS. It did so in a long sequence of meetings, 
both regular and ad hoc, where questions of rights and freedom of expression 
were repeatedly debated and consensus sought on the "correct" way forwards. 
These lasting institutional contacts subscribe to Checkel's analysis as presented 
415 Annual Report of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights to the General Assembly. 
CEA/Ser.LN/111.3, 151h April 1980. 
416 Annual Report of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights to the General Assembly of 
the OAS, 15th April 1980, CEA/Ser.LN/111.3 p. 5. 
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in chapter three.417 Any socialisation that flowed from this arrangement would 
therefore be construable as persuasion based. 
THE FAILING OF AGENCY: THE ABSENCE OF BARGAINING MECHANISMS 
The above represents on paper a considerable set of revisions, upgrades 
and commitments to both freedom of expression in particular but also to 
democracy and broader questions of human rights. I have also clearly uncovered 
the position of Panama within those. Its active agreement to the Commission and 
Convention, together with its position as an apparent leader in the discussions 
over the proposed Inter-American Convention on Freedom of Expression would 
appear to suggest that Panama should be, by 1978, strongly protecting that right 
within its own domestic political structures and that socialisation had occurred 
between 1951 and 1978. 
It is, therefore, superficially mystifying to uncover that Panama across this 
period shows scant regard for freedom of expression. There is no correlation 
between the chain of upgrades to the regional arrangement and the situation 
within Panama. The shifting constellations of political power within Panama were 
united, regardless of the rhetoric in favour of democracy, against the actual 
establishment of true democracy and protection of freedom of expression.418 The 
coup of 1968 brought an end to civilian, if often oligarchic, government and the 
start of some 20 years of military rule. The National Guard led by General Omar 
Torrijos seized power and was to rule for the next 13 years. The National 
417 Checkel, "International Institutions and Socialization in Europe: Introduction and 
Framework," p. 813. 
418 Laurence Whitehead, "The Imposition of Democracy," in Exporting Democracy: The United 
States and Latin America, ed. Abraham F. Lowenthal (Baltimore: The John Hopkins University 
Press, 1991) p. 368. 
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Assembly was closed and all political parties proscribed.419 It is not without a 
sense of irony that the military coup that interrupted civilian government in 1968 
would, if Panama had been successful in integrating the Larreta Doctrine into the 
OAS commitment to democracy in 1945-48, have led to its suspension from the 
OAS. 
Substantiating the claim that the Panamanian position was unattached to 
regional standards, I draw on the empirical investigation of the Inter-American 
Commission of Human Rights report into the situation within Panama published 
in 1978. Whilst I will not analyse the conceptual significance of this report until 
the next section given when it was published, the report offers a retrospective 
analysis of the situation within Panama in the l 970's that is relevant to the study 
here. The Commission noted that Panama had ratified the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights420 on 8th March 1977, its optional protocol,421 as well 
as the Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.422 It also noted that the 
Panamanian Constitution of 1972 nominally protected the rights of freedom of 
expression, assembly and association though Articles 36 - 40.423 Article 36 read: 
Every Person may freely express his opinion orally, in writing or by any 
other means, without subjection to prior censorship. However, legal 
liability shall be incurred when by any of these means the reputation or 
honor of persons is assailed or when social security or public order is 
attacked.424 
419 Peter Calvert and Susan Calvert, Latin America in the Twentieth Century (London: 
MacMillan Press, 1990) p. 149. 
420 gth July 1977, Gaceta Oficial, 18.3 73 Panama City. 
421 4th February 1977, Gaceta Ojicial, 18.269 Panama City. 
422 18th May 1977, Gaceta Oficial, 18.336 Panama City. 
423 Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Panama. 22nd June 1978, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.44. 
doc. 3 8, rev. 1, chapter five, Para. I. 
424 Quoted in Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Panama. 22nd June 1978, 
OEA/Ser.LN/II.44, doc. 38, rev. 1, chapter five, Para. I. 
196 
The report established that a range of legal and judicial regulations could 
undermine constitutional guarantees of freedom of expression, such as existed in 
Article 36 of the Panamanian Constitution. For example, wide range use of 
Cabinet Decrees, such as No. 342 limited the right to freedom of expression in 
the name of public order.425 The IACHR noted that Decree 342 stated, "various 
types of Expression ... were considered a crime of subversion of public order". 
How can we explain the gap between Panama's behaviour within the OAS 
and its own domestic standards? The first step in investigating this refers to the 
total absence of bargaining processes. Whether one is discussing either 
conditionality or some form of social influence, both processes rest on the 
requirement that there is an actor socialising a target state. This dynamic is then 
expressed through various reports, pronouncements, suggestions, engagement and 
discussion, which are then available for the researcher to draw upon.426 The 
situation between Panama and the OAS did not resemble this. There are no 
reports of any kind across this period, at a fundamental level the OAS was not 
"talking" to Panama. There are no reports or dialogue. There is discussion at the 
OAS level about a range of relevant activities on democracy and freedom of 
expression, but where is the sense of agency to transmit those actively to 
Panama? There was none. This is not attributable to lethargy on the part of the 
Commission. The Commission had developed a surprisingly robust defence of its 
goals in the face of the potential limitations of hazy mandates in a process of 
"creative interpretation" of its founding documents. It did this because in the face 
425 Gaecta Oficial, No. 16.480, 31st October 1969. 
426 An example of this silence comes form an analysis of the Report Submitted by the Pan-
American Union to the Eleventh Inter-American Conference, 1959, OEA/Ser.DN.2 (Eng) which 
makes no reference to either Panama or human rights. 
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of such grave hemispheric wide abuses, there was the need to "establish and 
publicise what was happening and seek to change behaviour through negotiation, 
rather than adverse rulings in petition cases".427 However, the Commission was 
simply too small, and too under funded, to deal with all states and all issues, 
whatever its mandate may have been, and Panamanian respect for freedom of 
expression standards simply did not figure in its activities.428 
THE "FAILURE" OF MEANING 
If the lack of agency accounts for the lack of presence of various forms of 
bargaining socialisation, there is still the matter of community building itself as a 
socialising process resting on persuasion. Panama had agreed to a whole raft of 
revisions and enhancements to the OAS. It would appear to have been persuaded 
through ongoing discussions with other members that commitments to rights and 
democracy were the superior course of action. If the failure of the ASEAN 
community building process was because of a lack of standards, and a lack of 
clear mechanisms for protecting those standards, then the discussions in the OAS 
should suggest that socialisation occur. How then do we explain the gap between 
what Panama said at the regional level, and what it actually did domestically? 
This gap between national and regional standards was something the OAS was 
painfully aware of, the IAJC remarking: 
We have a multiplicity of declarations that are not carried out, that have 
remained in writing, while, to a surprised and perplexed public, there 
appears to be an extraordinary difference between these declarations 
and the political and international reality of the hemisphere [and that 
427 Harris and Livingstone, eds. The Inter-American System of Human Rights Chapter by David 
Harris, Regional Protection of Human Rights, The Inter American Achievement. p. 20. 
428 Interview with Christina Cerna, Principle Human Rights Specialist, Inter-American 
Commission on Human Rights, Organization of American States, Washington D.C., America, 
04112/2008. 
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consequently there exists an] absolute contradiction between the written 
law and reality.429 
Why would the states of the America's, and Panama in particular, agree 
to a whole raft of community building process and even go so far as to 
institutionalise this in Commissions and Courts if they had no intention of 
changing their behaviour to match their on paper declarations? In answering this, 
we must be aware that the OAS, indeed pan-American regionalism generally, 
was imbued with a set of pre-existing meanings that coloured both Panama's 
behaviour at the regional level, as well as its interpretations of the human rights 
standards that it had, on paper, agreed to. Notions of any specific hemispheric 
arrangement were constructed in relation to the continued importance not only of 
sovereignty and equality, but also in terms of a specifically "Latin American" set 
of understandings about what regional politics meant, which were constructed 
and interpreted historically. Following the final collapse of Spanish imperialism 
in the wars of Bolivarian Independence, and the failure of the Panama Congress 
of 1825, Latin American states arrived at four rules that became the basis of the 
shared meaning of regionalism to states in the hemisphere.43° Firstly, that old 
imperial boundaries would be honoured, secondly that sovereignty was to be 
rigorously upheld, thirdly that states should cooperate and mediate disputes and 
fourthly that implementation of agreements would be lax.431 This fourth point is 
significant because it hints that all the agreements, the on paper commitments to 
rights, democracy and freedom of expression previously explored, were not 
429 Study on the Juridical Relationship between Respect for Human Rights and the Exercise of 
Democracy, OEA/Ser.I/Eng.CIJ.52. 
430 Jorge I. Dominguez, "International Co-Operation in Latin America: The Design of Regional 
Institutions by Slow Accretion," (Cambridge, MASS.: Weatherhead Center for International 
Affairs, Harvard University, 2004). p. 12. 
431 Ibid. 
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interpreted by those who composed them as meaning you had to comply with 
them. This, I suggest, resulted in a specific approach to the OAS. Firstly those 
officials who formulate OAS level commitments never note that gap, even if 
they exploit it. Secondly, that states will continually work to advance the rhetoric 
regardless of the growing gap between that and implementation and thirdly that 
states are happy to sign agreements that are in contradiction to their earlier 
~ d . . 432 pro1esse normative commitments. 
This helps explain the disconnect Panama exhibited between regional and 
national standards. Panama could agree to community building processes in the 
sure understanding that the process was never intended to result in meaningful 
guides to identity. What this reveals is that community building in the OAS, at 
least before the late l 990's, did not create socialisation processes, despite all the 
on paper evidence that it had, because no one within that process was either 
persuaded to change their identity or, vitally, even to try and persuade others to 
do so. It is a remarkable example of states pushing forwards with behavioural 
patterns that only make sense if we understand the social context that generates 
meaning for those political acts. Community building therefore does not result 
automatically in socialisation efforts. The value of the OAS study here is that it 
helps us identify when, and why, community building is significant for 
socialisation via persuasion. Whilst further analysis is outside the remit of this 
case, it is fascinating to ponder how these various set of understandings arose, 
and the role that a constructivist enquiry into social identities would play. Once 
again, it would appear that to understand the nature of socialisation processes 
themselves, especially how and why they succeed and fail, we need to make 
432 Ibid. p. 19 
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recourse to a broader social enquiry to investigate why norms are, or are not, 
seen as in some way binding. 
Widening the field of analysis for a moment, the disingenuousness of 
community building in the OAS example is remarkable, as is the United States 
complicity with that. Across the period there is a general trend towards the 
establishment of military Junta's in Latin America, often with the complicity or 
support of the USA. Brazil fell under military rule in 1963, Bolivia in 1971, 
Chile and Peru in 1973 and Argentina in 1976 at exactly the same time as the 
negotiations over OAS standards on freedom of expression and the ways in which 
it is promoted and protected. The shift away from democracy, and the support this 
received from Washington as a necessary evil in the face of the Communist threat 
was decisive in undercutting the utility of the OAS's revisions to its democratic 
standards.433 Contemporary studies of US efforts to promote democracy in Latin 
America make scant reference to the OAS.434 American commitments to 
democracy were always subordinate to political priorities. Richard Nixon was of 
the belief that "the United States has a strong interest in maintaining cooperation 
with our neighbours regardless of their domestic viewpoint" (italics added),435 a 
view unsurprisingly echoed by Henry Kissinger who emphasised in 1973 a 
pragmatic relationship where human rights abuses could be ignored if they were 
not too offensive, and if they were, then the USA would just avoid dealing with 
433 See for example John D. Martz and Lars Schoultz, eds. Latin America, the United States and 
the Inter-American System (Boulder: Westview Press, 1980). 
434 An excellent example is offered by Abraham F. Lowenthal, ed. Exporting Democracy - the 
United States and Latin America (Baltimore and London: John Hopkins University Press, 1991 ). 
A focus on the early importance of security is Accessible at Mecham, The United States and 
Inter-American Security, 1889-1960 A study on the Latin American perspective is Howard J. 
Wiarda, ed., The Continuing Struggle for Democracy in Latin America (Boulder: Westview 
Press, 1980). 
435 Henry Kissinger, US Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign relations, Subcommittee on 
Western Hemisphere Affairs, United States Policies and Programs in Brazil, 92nd Cong. 1st 
Session, May 4,5 and 11, 1971, p. 290. 
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that country, a somewhat disingenuous claim given its relations with Chile and 
Uruguay at the time.436 
COMMUNITY OVERSIGHT AND THE FAIL URE OF DEMOCRATIC PROTECTION 
1978-1990 
Which was more important in explaining the failure of socialisation 
between 1951 and 1978, the established social meaning of membership or the 
lack of agency between the OAS and Panama itself? Put another way, could an 
activist and engaged OAS have overridden the established social meaning and 
forced Panama to live up to its commitments? Examining the period 1978-1990 
helps reveal clearly that it could not. The period between 1978 and 1990 sees a 
detailed OAS interest in Panama. It is illustrative that this interest did not take 
the form of a court case, but in the extension of the Commission's work in the 
form of investigation. Here socialisation was for the first time clearly intended, 
and we can discern the two social influence processes, explicitly Rhetorical 
Action similar to that we encountered before in the study of ASEAN, and 
novelly an attempt to "name and shame" Panama through the public 
dissemination of information about its domestic standards. However, neither 
process was successful, the events under Noriega in the late 1980's being clear 
testimony to that. Indeed, the OAS was ineffective in responding to that crisis, 
and it was only with the U.S. led intervention of 1989 that democracy was 
restored. 
436 Lars Schoultz, Human Rights and United States Policy Towards Latin America (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1981) p. 110. The Carter administration, it should be noted, adopted a 
different orientation to either the Nixon or Ford years, or indeed the Reagan years after. Carter 
was far more proactive on the protection of rights and in linking that to other areas of 
cooperation, arguing in his first major foreign policy speech that a regime that "deprives its own 
people of basic human rights" will suffer accordingly. 
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THE NATURE OF OAS SOCIALISATION PRESSURE 1978-1990. 
The nature of OAS interest in Panama over the period rests on the 
publication, and content of, the Reports of the Inter-American Commission on 
Human Rights Commission. The Country Reports on Panama of 1978 and 1989 
promote two related socialisation processes, both of which I suggest are rationally 
construable. Firstly, and echoing the process of Rhetorical Action seen previously 
in the ASEAN study, the reports presented discreet "recommendations" that 
outlined the direction of change that should occur in order to bring Panama "up" 
to regional standards. For example, the 1978 report closes on these 
recommendations calling for nine discreet reforms, from judiciary independence 
to greater adherence to international norms.437 The 1989 Report is more specific 
still, in Article 8 of its conclusion it explicitly links Panamanian future behaviour 
to Article 13 of the Convention.438 The OAS was linking its standards to the 
future behaviour of Panama, creating a map of future desired actions. Again the 
OAS here was not engaged in a process that is understandable as an account of 
identity creation, and resulting free debate where actors seek to persuade each 
other. Instead, these recommendations forwarded are clear truth statements, put 
forwards as correct and not negotiable, the provision of which are designed to 
censure Panama and provide it with a model of what "correct" future behaviour 
resembles. 
Secondly, we can discern a new socialisation process that rests on the very 
fact the reports were published. The Reports represent an attempt to disseminate 
437 Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Panama, 22"d June 1978, OEA/Ser.LN/11.44 
doc. 38, rev.I, "Conclusions". For a broader account of the relevance of this 1978 report, and its 
effect on the rules of conduct for Commission activities, see Tom Farer, "The Rise of the Inter-
American Human Rights Regime: No Longer a Unicorn, Not yet an Ox," Human Rights 
Quarterly I 9, no. 3 (1997) pp. 531-532. 
438 Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Panama, 9th October 1989, OEA/Ser.LN/11.76, 
doc. 16, Rev. 2, Conclusions and Recommendations. Article 8. 
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information regarding the shortcomings of Panamanian standards on freedom of 
expression. I term this a Naming and Shaming approach. I note that the 
Commission at the outset was not engaged in direct enforcement. Its mandate, to 
monitor and supply information did not provide any ability to articulate, or 
enforce, sanctions, although as just noted it was able to make discreet 
recommendations.439 It was not in the business of "protecting" rights in any direct 
way, rather it was engaged much more indirectly with "promoting" observance 
through "Naming and Shaming". Naming and Shaming is a process that has 
affinities with Rhetorical Action, the difference being that the process rests not on 
the provision of statements that are held to mark the way forwards. The process i:; 
dependent on highlighting clear "wrongs", vis-a-vis existing standards as 
expressed in the various statements of regional standards on freedom of 
expression. These are expressed to an audience in the belief that greater 
information about these infractions will lead to revision of that behaviour to avoid 
the loss of legitimacy that comes with "shame" .440 There is not engagement in 
communicative and persuasive acts here, in the sense that mutual constitution and 
identity issues are up for truthful debate. The Commission Reports make no 
allowance for maybe being "wrong" in their assessments, or in the standards that 
they apply. 
439 Pan American Union, Draft Declaration of the International Rights and Duties of Man and 
Accompanying Report p. 60. 
440 Lebovic and V oeten, "The Politics of Shame: The Condemnation of Country Human Rights 
Practice at UNHCR," p. 871. 
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1978-1990: THE FAIL URE OF SOCIAL INFLUENCE 
The period up to 1990 was one of marked turbulence with regards to 
freedom of expression within Panama.441 Drawing on the 1978 and 1989 
Commission reports on Panama, this section argues that the social influence 
processes deployed were wholly unsuccessful. There is no correlation between 
the oversight of the OAS and the standards within Panama. Indeed, there is in fact 
an inverse trend between those regional standards and pronouncements and the 
situation within Panama. I attribute this failure to the weakness of social influence 
processes deployed, together with the continuing social meaning of membership. 
Following General Torrijos' announcement that he would work towards 
general elections in 1984, he stood aside from the position of President in favour 
of Aristides Royo. Following the death of Torrijos in a plane accident on July 31st 
1981, a period of marked instability within the ranks of the National Guard and 
wider Panamanian Government ultimately led to Manuel Noriega becoming head 
of the Panamanian Defence Forces.442 The 1984 elections in particular became a 
source of considerable controversy, with international observers denouncing the 
government for massive electoral fraud. 443 On June 8th 1987 Roberto Diaz 
Herrera of the Panamanian Defence Force accused Noriega of involvement in the 
death of President Torrijos. The accusation dramatically escalated the tense 
situation in Panama, and led to the State of Emergency Decree of June 101h 1987. 
Without getting lost in the minutiae of the rumbling political crisis, ultimately 
441 For a broader assessment of the status of Latin American democracy at this time, refer to 
Thomas D. Anderson, "Progress in the Democratic Revolution in Latin America: Country 
Assessments - 1987," Journal of lnteramerican Studies and World Affairs 29, no. l (1987). 
442 Linda Robinson, "Dwindling Options in Panama," Fore~n Affairs 68 (1989-1990), p. 188. 
443 Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Panama, 9 October 1989, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.76, 
doc. 16, Rev. 2, Introduction. Also note Human Rights in Panama, American Watch Report, 
Washington D.C., April 1988, p. 6. 
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Panama was invaded by the United States on December 20th 1989, some 26,000 
troops participating in Operation Just Cause to remove Noriega, who was taken to 
Miami for trial on January 4th 1990.444 
The Inter-American Commission had noted that, starting in June of 1987, 
it "began to receive numerous and serious complaints of violations of the human 
rights set forth in the American Convention of Human Rights, of which Panama 
is a party".445 To investigate these, the Commission requested an invite to Panama 
to conduct a field mission, which was duly offered. The Commission noted that 
Panama had made increasing recourse to "declaring a state of emergency and to 
adopting special State security measures",446 and that under Decree no. 56 of June 
1 oth 1987, it had ordered the total suspension of the Right to Freedom of 
Expression (Article 3 7 of the Panamanian Constitution, as revised in the 
Constitutional Act of 1983). Although this suspension was lifted with Decree no. 
59 of July 7th 1987, Decree no. 63 of August 14th restricted the right of Assembly 
and Decree No. 70 of October 1987 prohibited public demonstrations indefinitely. 
In its concluding Comments, the Commission noted that: 
It is convinced that these [freedom of expression] Rights that are 
fundamental to the existence of a democratic society, have been violated 
by the government of Panama. These rights cannot be exercised in 
Panama due to restrictions imposed by the Government which include 
illegal actions, threats on the lives, liberty and personal integrity of 
independent journalists as well as measures taken against the media that 
have resulted in their closing the destruction of the same, the revocation 
of their licenses, and other forms of pressure that have led to the 
strangulation of these rights. 447 
444 Detailed in Musicant, The Banana Wars: A History of United States Military Intervention in 
Latin America from the Spanish-American War to the Invasion of Panama pp. 390-417. 
445 Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Panama, 9th October 1989, OEA/Ser.L/V /II. 76, 
doc. 16, Rev. 2, Introduction. 
446 Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Panama, 9th October 1989, OEA/Ser.L/V III. 76, 
doc. 16, Rev. 2, Chapter I - The Political and Legal System of Panama, Section 3 - Legal 
Restrictions on the Exercise of Human Rights in Panama. 
447 Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Panama, 9th October 1989, OEA/Ser.L/V/Il.76, 
doc. 16, Rev. 2, Conclusions and Recommendations. 
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The effectiveness of Naming and Shaming as a socialisation process was 
undermined when it was left uncertain who was the "audience for the 
Commission reports on conditions in particular countries".448 Naming and 
shaming only works when the audience is both wide and interested in the 
findings of any given report. The addition of the Country Reports to the 
operations of the Commission marked a vital potential first step, but whilst they 
evidence a clear interest in Panama by the OAS, I am not convinced they 
represent a consistent interest. There are only two over a 10-year period, and 
neither was followed up.449 This issue of "follow-up" is key, as in reality this 
debate is over the presence, and composition, of the audience that would receive 
these reports. There had been considerable debate within the Commission as to 
how to respond to country reports, particularly whether some sort of monitoring 
should be institutionalised to report back on whether the deficiencies identified 
had been rectified. The 197 4 IACHR report on Chile was so extreme that the 
General Assembly, for the first time, requested that the Commission report back 
on progress that Chile had made in addressing these issues.450 This 
"improvement" was never uniformly followed (there are no follow up for the 
1 97 8 Panama reports, for example) and in any event was short Ii ved. The 19 81 
IACHR Report on Argentina provoked such strong reactions from Buenos Aires 
and its allies that the General Assembly refused to discuss the report less it 
garner unpalatable attention.451 This resulted in the "lost all of the elements that 
once made them [the country reports] vehicles of political condemnation", with 
448 Farer,. "The Rise of the Inter-American Human Rights Regime: No Longer a Unicom, Not 
yet an Ox," p. 517. 
449 Wood, "Human Rights and the Inter-American System," p. 130. 
450 Refer to OAS General Assembly Resolution GARI 90 (u-o/75). 
451 Annual report of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, 1980-1981, 16th 
October 1981, OEA/SER.LN/11.54. 
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the concomitant belief that "the General Assembly should limit its role to the 
approval of the annual and country reports simply by verifying compliance with 
any formal requirements".452 As the recommendations contained in the reports 
were not "formal requirements", rather counted as recommendations, they were 
not followed up.453 Rhetorical action efforts could be ignored with apparent 
impunity if no one would ever judge you if you fail to heed the pressure. This 
denial of a public forum undercut the Naming and Shaming accounts within 
country reports as well.454 A secret report generates little sense of shame, 
especially when it 1s shown only to member states, many of whom are as 
egregious in their violations of community standards as the country documented 
in the report itself. 
Secondly, both Rhetorical Action and Naming and Shaming only work if 
there is an agreement about what is shameful and what is in some way "right". 
Whilst the evolution of the OAS and its understanding of freedom of expression 
may seem to provide the detail against which Panama's behaviour could be 
judged, the simple presence of standards expressed regionally does not 
necessarily equate with those standards being understood as binding on members. 
For there to be shame, or for the calls of the Commission to be seen as legitimate, 
there has to be a sense that certain behaviour is shameful and other behaviour is 
somehow less so, but the enduring social meaning of membership undercut that. 
There is a distinct disjuncture between regional and national assessments of just 
what shame appeared to mean. The failure of the OAS to create this sense of 
452 Harris and Livingstone, eds. The Inter-American System of Human Rights. Chapter by 
Antonio Augusto Carcado Trindade, The Interaction Between Political Actors, Commission and 
Court, pp. 193-195. 
453 Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Panama, 9th October 1989, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.76, 
doc. 16, Rev. 2, Conclusions and Recommendations. 
454 Again note the debate at Flockhart, "'Masters and Novices': Socialization and Social 
Leaming through the Nato Parliamentary Assembly," p. 367. 
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shame and to meaningfully link its standards to the expectation that they should 
be fulfilled, was the primary requirement for even partial socialisation to occur, 
and its absence explains, I suggest, the failing of socialisation via either 
Rhetorical Action or social influence over the period. 
MAKING MEMBERSHIP MATTER: THE OAS AND PANAMA SINCE 1990 
Whereas previously we have been studying the failure of socialisation 
attempts to successfully change Panamanian standards, the most recent period 
indicates the at least partial success of the various pressures brought to bear on 
Panama. I am careful to not overstate the case; the initial restoration of 
democracy in Panama after the December 1989 invasion came at the point of 
American guns, not the pen of regional politicians.455 I do suggest, however, that 
over time membership of the OAS came to a position of significance that it 
previously had not enjoyed. This has dramatically empowered the effectiveness 
of social influence techniques. To investigate these claims, I first outline the 
developing OAS commitment to democracy, before turning to chart the 
increasingly detailed interest in freedom of expression within the hemisphere. I 
note the role of Panama within that community building process. I then present, 
as before, the social influence processes that were deployed before turning to the 
reviving standards of freedom of expression within Panama. Finally, I will 
investigate the link between Panamanian change and OAS behaviour, attributing 
it both to the social influence mechanisms encountered as well as a shifting 
social meaning that came to characterise the OAS during the 1990's. 
455 The role of the United States in reconstructing democracy in Panama is explored in 
Whitehead, "The Imposition of Democracy," pp. 366-371. 
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DISCURSIVE AGREEMENT ON DEMOCRACY AND FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 
This section serves to present the sophisticated standards that were birthed 
by community building since 1990. I again suggest that these processes of 
forming and reforming the communal identity conform to the scope conditions 
established in chapter three, and as such present at least the potential for 
persuasion based socialisation efforts. 
There is a definite upswing in both the tone and outcome of community 
building. The first significant development in terms of democracy actually came 
as early as the 1985 Protocol of Cartagena de Indias, approved at the 14th Special 
Session of the OAS General Assembly. The Protocol amended the preamble of 
the OAS Charter, adding, "Representative democracy is an indispensable 
condition for stability, peace and development of the region".456 Furthermore 
Article 2 of Chapter 1 of the revised Charter constitutionalised the requirement 
for the OAS to "promote and consolidate representative democracy" although 
that is balanced with the need to do so with "due respect for the principle of non-
intervention".457 Further additions to the "emerging pro-democratic doctrine"458 
articulated at the OAS meeting in Santiago held in June 1991 to hammer out the 
"Santiago Commitment to Democracy and the Renewal of the Inter-American 
System" Here the OAS pledged to adopt an "efficious, timely and expeditious, 
processes 'to ensure the promotion and defence of representative democracy. "459 
The commitment empowered the Secretary General to call for the immediate 
456 Protocol of Amendment to the Charter of the Organization of American States "Protocol of 
Cartagena de Indias", approved on December 5, 1985, at the Fourteenth Special Session of the 
General Assembly. 
457 Ibid. 
458 Andrew F. Cooper and Thomas Legler, Intervention without Intervening: The 0.A.S. 
Defense and Promotion of Democracy in the Americas (New York City: Palgrave MacMillan, 
2006) p. 26. 
459 The Santiago Commitment, OEA/Ser.P/AG/Doc.2734/9, 4th June 1991. 
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convocation of a meeting of the Permanent Council in the event of any 
occurrences giving rise to the sudden or irregular interruption of the democratic 
political institutional process or of the legitimate exercise of power by the 
democratically elected government in any of the organizations member states. 
OAS General Assembly Resolution 1080 went further than Santiago inasmuch as 
it "instructed the Secretary General to convene immediately a meeting of the 
Permanent Council and to hold an ad hoc meeting of the ministers of Foreign 
Affairs or a special session of the General Assembly, all within a ten day period, 
with the goal of empowering the General Assembly to "adopt any decisions 
deemed appropriate, in accordance with the Charter". 460 It is significant in that it 
is the first attempt to make the "long standing commitments to democratic 
defence operable",461 marking a "watershed moment" for the OAS.462 Previous 
OAS efforts had engaged in a process of attempting to de-legitimate non-
democracies within the Americas, through the setting of standards and on paper 
commitments. 463 
The Washington Protocol of 1992 explicitly tied continued functional 
membership of the OAS to the maintenance of democratic standards. It allowed 
for the suspension of member states if their government is changed in a non-
democratic way, suspending them from participation in the OAS and its related 
bodies.464 In line with this Protocol, December 14th 1992 saw the amendment of 
Article 9 of the OAS Charter, which now read: 
460 General Assembly Resolution 1080, OEA/Ser.P/AG/doc.2739/91, Rev.I. 
461 Arceneaux and Pion-Berlin, "Issues, Threats and Institutions; Explaining OAS Responses to 
Democratic Dilemmas in Latin America," p. 49. 
462 Interview with Christina Cerna, Principle Human Rights Specialist, Inter-American 
Commission on Human Rights, Organization of American States, Washington D.C., America, 
04/12/2008. In the same vein, note Francisco Villgrand de Leon, The Organization of American 
States and Democratic Development (Washington D.C.: United States Institute for Peace, 1992). 
463 Ibid. 
464 Protocol of Washington, December 14th 1992, Accessible at 
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[A] Member of the Organization whose democratically constituted 
government has been overthrown by force may be suspended from the 
exercise of the right to participate in the sessions of the General 
Assembly, the Meeting of Consultation, the Councils of the 
Organization and the Specialised Conferences as well as in the 
Commissions, Working Groups and any other bodies established. 
The June 1993 OAS General Assembly resolution, the "Declaration of 
Managua for the Promotion of Democracy and Development" recognised that 
"the Organization's mission is not restricted to defending democracy wherever 
its fundamental values and principles have collapsed, but also calls for ongoing 
and creative work to consolidate democracy and a continuing effort to prevent 
and anticipate the very causes of the problems that work against democratic 
rule", a strong statement of the desire for the OAS to move towards proactive 
engagement with protection and promotion of democracy. 
The trend within the OAS with regards to democratisation came together 
in the September 11th 2001 Inter-American Democratic Charter (IADC).465 The 
IADC restated, in Article one, that "The peoples of the Americas have a right to 
democracy and their governments have an obligation to promote and defend 
it."466 The composite nature of democracy as a norm set is re-affirmed by Article 
3 that says that "essential elements of representative democracy include, inter 
alia, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms."467 Article 4 noted the 
centrality of the various component rights, in particular freedom of expression. 
Article 7 expressly restated the link between democracy and human rights more 
broadly construed. Articles 17 and 18 restate the ability of the OAS to take 
http://OAS.org/assembly200 I /assem bly/GAAssem bly2000/Protoco 1%20of'/o20 Washington. pdf 
465 Andrew F. Cooper, "The Making of the Inter-American Democratic Charter: A Case of 
Complex Multilateralism," International Studies Perspectives 5 (2004) p. 95. 
466 Inter-American Democratic Charter Doc. OEA/SerP/ AG/Res. I (2001 ); 28th Spec. Sess., 
OAS Doc. OEA/Ser.P/AG/RES.1 (xxviii-E/01) (OAS General Assembly) (Sept. 11, 2001). 
467 Ibid. 
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interest in the democratic health of any member state when requested, and to 
outline methods of assistance. Article 20 outlined the diplomatic measures to be 
taken to restore democratic constitutional practices, whilst Article 21 noted that 
should this fail, membership of the OAS could be suspended. As a charter, not a 
mere declaration, it has greater force than those pronouncements that preceded 
it.468 
Against this backdrop of revisions to the democratic credentials of the 
OAS, stands a more detailed appreciation of freedom of expression. The Inter 
American Convention had already institutionalised in Article 13 a strong 
understanding of what freedom of expression actually meant, but discussions 
now increased that depth further. Prime amongst these is the creation and then 
operation of the Spe~ial Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression, created as a 
result of the 97th Regular Session of the Inter American Commission in October 
1997. Whilst I analyse the conceptual significance of the Special Rapporteur as 
a promoter of socialisation below, here I note that the Rapporteur took the lead in 
researching, investigating and then drafting what would become the 17th October 
2000, of the Inter-American Declaration of Principles on Freedom of Expression, 
adopting 13 principles that together provide a coherent and detailed appreciation 
of the meaning of freedom of expression and the relationship between that right 
and the associated rights of assembly, opinion, thought and association. It notes 
the "fundamental and inalienable" nature of the right (Article One), and then 
outlined the content of that right in Article Two, which stated that: 
Every person has the right to seek, receive and impart information and 
opinions freely under terms set forth in Article 13 of the American 
Convention on Human Rights. All people should be afforded equal 
468 Arceneaux and Pion-Berlin, "Issues, Threats and Institutions: Explaining OAS Responses to 
Democratic Dilemmas in Latin America," p. 49. 
213 
opportunities to receive, seek and impart information by any means of 
communication without any discrimination for reasons of race, color, 
sex, language, religion, political or other opinions, national or social 
origin, economic status, birth or any other social condition. 
Article Four protected the right to access information held by the state, 
whilst Article 5 noted that prior censorship though any means "must be 
prohibited by law'. Article Six protected the right to communicate views "by any 
means and in any form", and outlines the protection of journalists from state 
interference, whilst Article Eight protects the right of confidential sources and 
Nine required the state to protect communicators of opinions from harassment of 
any form. The only restrictions on this are in cases where it can be proved that 
"in disseminating the news, the social communicator had the specific intent to 
inflict harm, was fully aware that false news was disseminated, or acted with 
gross negligence in efforts to determine the truth or falsity of such news."469 
SOCIAL INFLUENCE FROM Two DIRECTIONS: COMMISSION AND SPECIAL 
RAPPORTEUR 
With these broad revisions to regional standards mapped as a project of 
community building, we can now discern the exact way in which they were 
articulated to Panama. Much as in the previous period, the prime focus of 
interlocution between Panama and the OAS on freedom of expression comes in 
the form of country reports. However, there are now two origins of that pressure, 
the continuing reports of the Inter-American Commission but also the reports 
produced· by the Special Rapporteurship, either in the form of their annual 
general synopsis on the state of that right both generally and through country 
469 Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, 108th Session, "Inter-American Declaration 
of Principles on Freedom of Expression", accessible athttp://www.iachr.ornJdeclaration.htm. 
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specific investigation (from 1998 onwards) or in terms of country specific reports 
(as they produced with regards to Panama in 2003). 
In understanding the socialisation efforts that the OAS engaged in over 
this period, I note that conditionality remains inadequate in accounting for the 
changes within Panama. There is simply no court case on Panamanian 
compliance with freedom of expression standards, although there is considerable 
activity by the court with regards to other countries.470 Despite this, rational 
choice analysis through social influence is considerably upgraded. The Special 
Rapporteur is a vital "missing link" in the story. The Special Rapporteur on 
Freedom of Expression was by the 97th Regular Session of the Inter American 
Commission in October 1997. In terms of its enhancement of social influence 
processes, it is important to assess the Rapporteur's four roles. Firstly, it raises 
public awareness through information dispersion, organised seminars and 
meetings, conferences for journalists. Secondly, it acts as a norm entrepreneur 
advancing understandings of freedom of expression that not only collates 
information but that engages in forward thinking which provide options and 
opinions that the Commission, amongst other organs, can avail themselves of if 
desired.471 Thirdly, it conducts on site visits that report the current status of the 
Right to freedom of expression across the hemisphere and finally it has acted in 
470 The Inter-American Court had developed a meaningful body of jurisprudence on Freedom of 
Expression. The November 22nd 2005 decision of the Palamara lribame v. Chile case declared 
that "the state violated the right to freedom of thought and expression" in Article 13 of the 
Convention; and through article 269 (paras. 9-19) outlined a range of binding changes that Chile 
had to follow. This was followed by a November 30th 2007 Decision monitoring Compliance 
with the 2005 judgement filled which outlined progress towards those goals. The Court engaged 
in similar defences in the "Last Temptation of Christ" Case ("Olmedo Bustos et al.) on February 
5th 2001, the Ricardo Canese v. Paraguay decision of August 3151 2004 and the Herrera-Ulloa v. 
Costa Rica Decision of July 2nd 2004. In all of these the Inter-American system was successfully 
protecting freedom of expression through legal systems. 
471 Interview with Alejandra Gonza, Lawyer, Special Rapporteurship on Freedom of 
Expression, Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Organization of American States, 
Washington D.C., America, 04/12/2008. 
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an advisory role as a cluster of expertise and knowledge for notions of freedom 
of expression. It offers a nexus of expertise and practitioners that inputs into the 
d~cisions of the Commission and other OAS organs.472 It has played a role with 
regards to Panama in all four of these guises. The annual reports involved 
statements about what Panama should do to revise its current protection of 
freedom of expression to ensure greater adherence to regional standards. They 
are therefore documents that evidence Rhetorical Action. For example, in the 
most recent Annual Report of the Special Rapporteur it is noted that the revisions 
to Article 304 of the Panamanian constitution "are incompatible with the 
American Convention on Human Rights" and should be altered into adherence 
with that regional standard. 473 The reports published also stand as detailed 
Naming and Shaming accounts, publicly describing in considerable detail the 
faults of Panamanian compliance.474 
INVESTIGATING THE SUCCESS OF OAS EFFORTS: THE POLITICS OF OUTREACH 
How effective were these revised efforts? The evidence, garnered from 
both Commission and Special Rapporteur investigations show a substantial 
improvement over freedom of expression concerns within Panama, especially 
when once compares the first Special Rapporteur report of 1998 to the more 
recent investigations. 
472 Ibid. The Rapporteurship itself defines these as its three-fold mandate. The promotion and 
dissemination of knowledge, the conduct of country visits and engagement with hemispheric 
networds for the protection of the Right of Freedom of Expression. See Report of the Office of 
the Special Rapporteur for the Freedom of Expression, 1998 Annual Report. Accessible at 
http://www.cidh.org/RelatoriaJshowarticle.asp?artlD= l 34&1ID= I, pp. 10-12. 
473 Report of the Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression, Volume II, 8th 
March 2008, OEA/Ser.LN/11.131 para 225. 
474 Report of the Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression, Volume II, 8th 
March 2008, OEA/Ser.LN/11.131. The reprimands are present throughout the text. 
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Panamanian President Guillermo Endara (1989-1994) may have failed to 
deal with the structural consequences of invasion, but he managed to preside in 
1994 over the "freest and most competitive national elections in the history of the 
country"47:5 where opposition leader Balladares won. The Endara regime 
represented "a substantial improvement over the prior [Noriega] regime"476 in 
respecting freedom of expression, although "highly subjective" enforcement of 
technical operational requirements" represented a continual threat.477 The 
referendum held to ratify the new constitution in 1992 was acclaimed as one of 
the fairest and most open in Panamanian history.478 The first Annual Report of 
the OAS Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression, in 1998, noted that 
Panama "has a set of anachronistic laws on freedom of expression" that "rather 
than acting as an effective guarantee of rights, these laws have become a 
frequently used tool in the hands of government employees who wish to silence 
criticism".479 The Special Rapporteur noted that the continued outdated legal 
framework in Panama included Cabinet Decree 251 of 1969 on Censorship, 
Chapters I and II of Title III of the Criminal Code (Articles 172-180) on "crimes 
against honor" (delitos contra el honor); and Laws 11, 67 and 68 of 1978 on the 
media arid journalism, commonly referred to as the "gag laws". To this 
triumvirate should be added provisions on contempt derived from the Political 
Constitution and Article 307 of the Criminal Code, and which those who work in 
475 Orlando L. Perez, "Public Opinion and the Future of U.S. - Panama Relations," Journal of 
1nteramerican Studies and World Affairs 41, no. 3 (1999) p. 5. 
476 Situation in Panama, 1991, Human Rights Watch Report, Accessible at 
http://www.hrw.org/reports/l 992/WR92/ AMW2-04.htm. 
477 Ibid. 
478 Margaret E. Scranton, "Consolidation after Imposition: Panama's 1992 Referendum," 
Journal of 1nteramerican Studies and World Affairs 35, no. 3 (1993) p. 65. 
479 Report of the Office of the Special Rapporteur for the Freedom of Expression, 1998, p. 27, 
Accessible at http://www.cidh.org/Relatoria/showarticle.asp?artlD= 134&1lD00=1 
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the Judiciary, the Public Prosecutor's Office and the Electoral Tribunal often use 
to silence their critics.480 
The Special Rapporteur, in the 1999 Annual Report, stated that Panama 
had made significant progress in the protection of that right,481 attributable to 
new President Mireya Moscoso swift action after her election. In December 1999 
Law 5 5 repealed Articles 15, 16, 1 7 and 19 of Law 11 ( 1978) and Law 68 
(1978). These had "allowed the Ministry of Government and Justice to levy 
pecuniary fines and even shut down media outlets".482 The 2000 Annual Report 
noted that Panama had continued to make "advance in freedom of expression" 
such as when repealing certain gag laws, but that there remained indications that 
the media continued to be dealt with arbitrarily, with some 70 criminal 
prosecution brought against journalists for libel and slander.483 The 2001 Report 
continued this trend of noting positive improvements within a broader concern 
about continued misuse of archaic slander laws. 484 After a senes of three 
special visits to the country, In July 2000, June 2001 and April 2003, the Special 
Rapporteur noted that whilst there were "commendable" improvements, such as 
the repeal of gag laws, which facilitated the protection of freedom of 
expression,485 there remained numerous "anachronistic laws still on the books 
480 Ibid. 
48 i Report of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression, 1999, Section E - Freedom of 
Expression in some Member States, p. 43. Accessible at 
http://www.cidh.org/Re latoria/showai1icle.asp?artl 0°" 135&1 ID= l 
482 Report on the Situation of Freedom of Expression in Panama 3'd July 2003, 
OEA/Ser.LN/11.117, Doc, 47, Chapter IV - Analysis of Freedom of Expression in Panama, 
paragraph. 51. 
483 Annual Report of the Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression, 2000, Chapter IV.4 (a) 
- Pages 83-87. Accessible at http://www.cidh.org/Relatoria/showarticle.asp?artID=l36&1ID=l 
484 Annual Report of the Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression, 2001, Chapter II ( c ), 
paragraphs 169-179 Accessible at, 
http://www.cidh.org/Relatoria/showarticle.asp?art!D= 13 7 &I ID= I 
485 Report on the Situation of Freedom of Expression in Panama 3rd July 2003, 
OEA/Ser.LN/11.117, Doc, 47, Chapter V -Conclusions and Recommendations, paragraph 157. 
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that restrict effective exercise of the right" ,486 that required revision to bring 
Panama into full compliance with OAS Article 13 and the related jurisprudence. 
The Special Rapporteur's report continued that Constitutional guarantees alone 
were insufficient for the free functioning of the right itself. The Right could be 
undermined by criminal law, judicial review and the failure of governments to 
comprehensively review their own legal statutes. The Rapporteur noted, in 
Section IV.c. l that desacato, or contempt laws, often used to protect the "honor 
of officials acting in their official capacities unjustifiably grants them a right that 
is not available to other members of society",487 reversed the principle "that a 
functioning democracy is indeed the greatest guarantee of public order". 488 In 
making these, and other, assessments, the Special Rapporteur draws directly on 
the Declaration on Principles of freedom of expression as a benchmark against 
which to judge standards. 
We see then a developing protection of freedom of expression within 
Pa!lama, and a parallel set of reforms at the regional level to protect freedom of 
expression. Can we attribute one to the other? Change in Panama has been 
attributed to the OAS; membership of the OAS has been described as vital for 
the advancement and maintenance of freedom of expression in Panama in the 
contemporary period. 489 I suggest that most importantly, the process of 
informing relevant parties has heightened the receptiveness of member states to 
the opinions of various OAS organs because they now come to expect a degree 
486 Ibid. para. 158. 
487 Ibid Chapter IV -Analysis of Freedom of Expression in Panama, paragraph 63. 
488 Ibid. 
489 Interview with requested anonymous person, member of the Panamanian Delegation to the 
United Nations, New York City, 27/11/2007. Corroborated in interview with Leticia Linn, 
Associate Lawyer, Special Rapporteurship on Freedom of Expression, Inter-American 
Commission on Human Rights, Washington D.C. 7/12/2007. The documentary evidence for this 
causal relationship is scarce, although in no way contradictory. I rest my argument here on 
corroborated interviews together with my confidence in the source. 
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of domestic response to those pronouncements. 490 This I understand as the 
politics of outreach. The Special Rapporteur has taken the revised standards 
within the OAS and empowered various NGO's within Panama, as well as talked 
to the Panamanian government about that right. This is the transition moment 
be.tween modes of socialisation. Only with detailed understandings of a right can 
an institution such as the Rapporteur reach out, because only then does it have 
something to say and can be seen to be authoritative in those claims. 
Vitally, in distinction to the period between 1978 and 1990, the audience 
for these pronouncements has also expanded. This is significant because, in line 
with existing theoretical accounts, the wider the audience of such efforts, the 
greater the costs of ignoring the recommendations presented.491 This is the 
product of a conscious "outreach" by the Special Rapporteur to regional and 
national NGO's in an attempt to increase the effectiveness of its activities. Key 
to this process has been the steady, and intentional, integration of civil society 
actors into the OAS protection of freedom of expression.492 This is explicitly 
designed as a strategic act to make states "take notice" of the Special 
Rapporteur. 493 The Special Rapporteur was expressly charged with this as one of 
its key mandates with the task of educating actors, and the fostering of civil 
society has become central to the perceived success and failure of the inter-
American system more widely.494 In a process that looks very much like the 
490 Ibid. 
491 Flockhart, "'Masters and Novices': Socialization and Social Learning through the Nato 
Parliamentary Assembly," p. 367. 
492 Interview with Jessica Grebeldinger, Civil Society Expert, Summit of the Americas 
Secretariat, OAS Secretariat, 13/12/2007, Washington D.C. 
493 Interview with Leticia Linn, Associate Lawyer, Special Rapporteurship on Freedom of 
Expression, Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Washington D.C. 7/12/2007. 
494 Interview with Jessica Grebeldinger, Civil Society Expert, Summit of the Americas 
Secretariat, OAS Secretariat, 13112/2007, Washington D.C. 
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dynamics set up in the famous "boomerang effect" ,495 the Special Rapporteur has 
adopted the role of placing domestic NGO's into contact with each other and 
their international siblings, and then providing these networks with increased 
training and information. The intention here is to create self-sustaining domestic 
political processes to advance freedom of expression.496 
For example, the Special Rapporteurship has taken a leading role in 
promoting National Human Rights Institutions within member countries to 
facilitate this enmeshment.497 The Panamanian institution was established on 5th 
February 1997, and itself publishes regular reports on the situation within 
Panama.498 The Panamanian institution has adopted the policy of linking national 
human rights efforts to the OAS protection of that right in an attempt to ensure 
maximum awareness of these rights, in particular drawing on the education 
programmes offered by the Special Rapporteurship.499 Panama during the late 
1990's set up a series of internal committees whose mandate was either 
exclusively, or partially, related to questions of freedom of expression. The 
Committee to Evaluate Press-related Laws (February 1999), the Report of the 
Committee to Protect Journalists on the Situation of Freedom of Thought and 
Expression in Panama (March 1999) and the Final Drafting Committee for the 
Penal and Procedural Codes (April 1999) together produced a detailed appraisal 
495 Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink, The Power of Human Rights: International Norms and Domestic 
Change p. 18. 
496 Interview with Alejandra Gonza, Attorney in the Office of the Special Rapporteur on 
Freedom of Expression, Washington D.C., 4/12/2008. 
497 For example resolution on Strengthening the Role of National Human Rights Institutions in 
the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights in the Organization of American States, AG/Res. 
2421, 3rd June 2008. 
498 An archive of publications is provided by the Defensora de! Pueblo de la Republica de 
Panama, accessible at http://www/defensoriadelpueblo.gob.pa/ Role of the Special Rapporteur in 
this process discussed in Interview with Leticia Linn, Associate Lawyer, Special Rapporteurship 
on Freedom of Expression, Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Washington D.C. 
7/12/2007. 
499 See Instrumentos Intemactionales sobre Derechos Hmanos Reconocidos Por la Republica de 
Panama, November 2001, accessible at http://www.defensoriadelpueblo.gob.pa/ 
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of the conditions within Panama and the requirements, as they saw it, for the 
advancement of that right. These resulted ultimately in the creation of a Special 
Delegate on Freedom of Expression, established by the Denfensoria de/ Pueblo 
of Panama itself to audit government activity. 500 These committees and Special 
Delegate have become enmeshed with the Special Rapporteur through the policy 
of outreach and information sharing. The OAS and the standards on freedom of 
expression has become a model for domestic standards within Panama. The OAS 
has also, through its engagement with civil society actors, created an informed 
and politically literate constituency in Panama that helps to protect and promote 
freedom of expression on its own. 501 
If the functions of the Special Rapporteur help explain the efficacy of the 
Rhetorical Action and Naming and Shaming processes that we can discern, a 
final comment must be made about the role of community building and the 
processes of persuasion that are embedded therein. As discussed already, 
community building and the provision of stronger statements on democracy and 
freedom of expression represent a clear sequence of upgrades to the regional 
commitment. Did this process exert persuasion based socialisation attempts, and 
if it did, how did they relate to questions of social influence? Which was more 
important? Clearly Panamanian participation in community building had brought 
it into contact with those revised standards and had elicited its agreement with 
them. However, there is not sufficient evidence to state that persuasive processes 
500 Annual Report of the Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression, 2002, Chapter II, 
Paragraph 193, Accessible at http://www.cidh.org/Relatoria/showarticle.asp?artl D00 138&11 D0'l 
501 Interview with Alejandra Gonza, Attorney in the Office of the Special Rapporteur on 
Freedom of Expression, Washington D.C., 4/12/2007. For the growth of domestic NGO's with an 
interest in human rights, refer to Edward L. Cleary, The Struggle for Human Rights in Latin 
America (Westport: Praeger, 1997) p. 63. 
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actually account for the change that we see, hence my positioning them as the 
facilitators of social influence, much as in the ASEAN study. Further 
examination may help disambiguate persuasion from social influence, but at this 
point I cannot state that community building, in and of itself, was significant for 
socialisation outcome. 
THE CHANGED SOCIAL MEANING 
There is one final step to make. If my argument about social influence 
processes promoting socialisation is valid, then how do I account for that 
effectiveness if the previous argument about the prevailing social meaning of 
membership is also correct? I argue in this last section that the social meaning of 
membership shifted over this last period of analysis, through the co-action of 
three discreet processes. Firstly, the role of the Summit of the Americas process 
in reinvigorating the OAS and its behaviour. Secondly, the change within 
member states as the majority of Latin American returned to, or further 
consolidated, their democratic credentials. Third, the actual behaviour of the 
OAS "on the ground" as it started to reach out and engage with protecting and 
promoting democracy and human rights, re-energising its hitherto moribund 
commitment. 
The OAS has been re-invigorated by the Summit of the Americas 
process, an irregular meeting of heads of government outside the regular OAS 
structure, launched in Miami in 1994.502 The Summits "provided a 
complementary political forum to reinforce the attachment of the states within 
502 A recap of which is offered in Ambler H. Moss Jr, "Introduction: The Summit of the 
Americas, 1994," Journal of lnteramerican Studies and World Affairs 36, no. 3 (1994). 
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the hemisphere to democratic norms".503 Whilst official heads of state meetings 
organised under the aegis of the OAS have widely been labelled failures, 504 the 
American Summitry process as it now stands has proven resilient, successful and 
increasingly valued by members. After Miami, the Summit has met in Santiago, 
Chile in 1998, Quebec City Canada in 2001, Monterrey Mexico in 2004, Mar del 
Plata in Argentina in 2005 and scheduled again for Port of Spain in Trinidad and 
Tobago in 2009. At the Quebec Summit, Mexico and other Latin American states 
linked being a democracy to participation in the ongoing Free Trade Area of the 
America's negotiations, a process that had started at the Miami Summit of 
1994.505 The Miami summit may have been held outside the OAS remit because 
of a "negative assessment of the OAS's capacity to manage and deliver on the 
hemisphere's first post Cold War opportunity,506 but the OAS was soon central to 
the planning, running and follow up to the Summitry process, particularly in 
those fields where the "organization had long experience and a track record: 
democracy, human rights and security".507 
The OAS itself, and its member states, have "embraced the summit 
process and mandates and significantly revamped its missions and agenda". 508 
For example, the OAS General Assembly Resolutions has directed that the OAS 
503 Andrew F Cooper and Jean-Philippe Therien, "The Inter American Regime of Citizenship: 
Bridging the Institutional Gap between Democracy and Human Rights," Third World Quarterly 
25, no. 04 (2004) p. 736. 
504 Robib L. Rosenberg, "The OAS and the Summit of the Americas: Coexistence, or 
Integration of Forces for Multilateralism," Latin American Politics and Society 43, no. I (2001) 
p. 80. 
505 Dominguez, "International Co-Operation in Latin America: The Design of Regional 
Institutions by Slow Accretion." p. 32. 
506 Rosenberg, "The OAS and the Summit of the Americas: Coexistence, or Integration of 
Forces for Multilateralism," p. 85. 
507 Ibid. p. 87. 
508 Richard Feinberg, "Presidential Mandates and Ministerial Institutions: Summitry of the 
Americas, the Organization of American States (OAS) and the Inter-American Development 
Bank (Idb ), " Review of International Organizations I (2006) p. 71. 
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views the Summit mandates as binding on the OAS. 509 This has resulted in an 
"reinvigorated" institutional agenda.510 The meshing together of the American 
Summitry system with the OAS introduced renewed impetus to making 
meaningful commitments to rights, and it also upgraded the perceived 
importance of regional commitments. Importantly, we cannot simply ascribe this 
to US dominance after the Cold War. The governance structure of the OAS and 
its strict one member one vote approach restricted U.S. dominance. An analysis 
of the OAS shows that "relations amongst member states are more nuanced than 
many observers might anticipate,"511 where "Latin American members resist 
U.S. pressure and reject U.S. proposals" far more than a simple power 
relationship would suggest.512 Instead, all had to agree that the Summitry process 
was useful, and that this in turn created a new nexus of political authority that 
came to reinvigorate the OAS513 As many Latin American states returned to 
democracy after the prolonged military junta period of the 1970's and 1980's, so 
they turned to the OAS as an expression of that renewed commitment.514 
Democracies were far more perturbed by the failure of national standards to 
relate to regional commitments, and this shift in the politics of Latin American 
states undid the social meaning of membership as the tolerance of a disconnect 
between what a country says, and what it does, evaporated. 
509 Ibid. p. 85. 
510 Ibid. p. 87. 
511 Carolyn M. Shaw, "Limits to Hegemonic Influence in the Organization of American States," 
Latin American Politics and Society 45, no. 3 (2003) p. 88. An additional perspective is offered 
by Gordon Mace, Louis Belanger, and Jean Philippe Therien, "Regionalism in the Americas and 
the Hierarchy of Power," Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs 35, no. 2 (1993) 
which provides a strongly quantitative analysis of the power relationships between the U.S.A. 
and other American states with the aim to analyse outcomes. 
512 Shaw, "Limits to Hegemonic Influence in the Organization of American States." 
513 Feinberg, "Presidential Mandates and Ministerial Institutions: Summitry of the Americas, 
the Organization of American States (OAS) and the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB)," 
pp. 77-78 offers strong qualitative data supporting this claim. 
514 Shaw, "Limits to Hegemonic Influence in the Organization of American States," p. 84. 
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As a vital part of this process of re-definition is the dramatic changes the 
OAS has made in terms of its actual behaviour.515 The OAS up until the mid 
1980's was assumed to be a largely impotent force.516 We see a distinct upswing 
in OAS actions to actually protect and promote the rights it had for so long 
appeared committed to.517 Two conceptual points are warranted here. First, I note 
that the OAS was not acting directly vis-a-vis Panama, but_ that is not necessary 
for the argument I am forwarding here. The OAS actions have shown a 
commitment to make its standards meaningful that I suggest were then translated 
back to Panamanian perceptions of the validity of its own commitments. During 
the 1960's if even the OAS itself was not acting to protect democracy, why 
should Panama or any other actor take notice of its protestations? When the OAS 
started to engage with democratic promotion, then those commitments suddenly 
become more valuable. This in tum changed the meaning of the things the OAS 
did "do" in relation to Panama, creating the sense that they were not merely for 
show. The Naming and Shaming and Rhetorical Action meant something, and 
had to be responded to. Secondly, my argument does not hinge on the necessity 
ofthe OAS always being successful in its efforts from the 1990's onwards.518 Its 
recent engagements in the political process in Peru and Venezuela through the 
so-called "mesa" process, as analysed by Cooper and Legler reveal an OAS "tom 
515 For a complementary account of OAS activities, note the discussion at Arturo Santa-Cruz, 
"Constitutional Structures, Sovereignty and the Emergence of Norms: The Case of International 
Election Monitoring," International Organization 59, no. Summer (2005). Santa Cruz's 
arguments support, from a theoretical perspective, the growing OAS activism in support of 
democratic credentials. 
516 Farer, "The Rise of the Inter-American Human Rights Regime: No Longer a Unicorn, Not 
yet an Ox," p. 534. 
517 Cooper and Therien, "The Inter American Regime of Citizenship: Bridging the Institutional 
GaPs between Democracy and Human Rights," p. 737. 
5 8 Arceneaux and Pion-Berlin, "Issues, Threats and Institutions: Explaining OAS Responses to 
Democratic Dilemmas in Latin America," p. 49. For a critical perspective see Barry S. Levitt, "A 
Desultory Defense of Democracy: OAS Resolution 1080 and the Inter-American Charter," Latin 
American Politics and Society 48, no. 3 (2006). 
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between an urge to innovate and to maintain the status quo in terms of 
democratisation". 519 Even the brief evidence presented below shows marked 
fluctuation in outcomes, although arguably a greater consistency in intentions 
than other academic enquiry has given credit for. 
1990 saw the OAS, together with the Carter Foundation, assist m 
Nicaragua with the peaceful transfer of power at the close of the Sandinistas 
period. In 1994 election monitoring was undertaken in the Dominican Republic, 
although with limited success. In Peru in 1992, the response to President Alberto 
Fujimori's suspension of the Constitution and imposition of martial law saw 
immediate O.A.S response including condemnation and a call to suspend 
financial assistance. 520 More recently, the OAS has inserted itself into the 
political processes in Peru (2000) and Venezuela (2002-2004) through the 
"mesa" process.521 This process involved establishing dialogue with various 
contending domestic factions in order to mediate between and promotes their 
own desired political outcomes.522 Whilst the two cases show marked variation, 
the key point here is that they were extensive interventions into the domestic 
political process of member states to protect democratic standards. 523 This nexus 
between acting regionally, and the protection of democracy and freedom of 
expression was, I suggest, significant to Panamanian conceptions of membership 
519 Cooper and Legler, Intervention without Intervening: The OAS Defense and Promotion of 
Democracy in the Americas. 
520 Richard L. Millett, "Beyond Sovereignty: International Efforts to Support Latin American 
Democracy," Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs 36, no. 3 (1994) p. 15. Note Ad 
Hoc Meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Support to the Democratic Government of Haiti, 
OEA/ser.F.N.1-MRE/RES, 1/19 corr. 1 (1991). Also refer to Yasmine Shamsie, "Building Low 
Intensity Democracy in Haiti: The OAS Contribution," Third World Quarterly 25, no. 6 (2004). 
521 Examined at Andrew F Cooper and Thomas Legler, "The OAS in Peru: A Model for the 
Future?," Journal of Democracy 12, no. 4(2001 ). 
522 
---, "A Tale of Two Mesas: The OAS Defence of Democracy in Peru and Venezuela," 
Global Governance 11 (2005) p. 427. 
523 Ibid. p. 440. 
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of the OAS.524 On the ground, the vast majority of states became, or entrenched 
further, democratic governance.525 This was reflected at the hemispheric level in 
an institutional lock in of democracy through the evolution of the OAS 
normative and organisational sophistication. 526 This in turn legitimised the OAS 
as an actor and reduced the gap between rhetoric and reality in such a way as to 
give flesh to the commitments that the OAS had long been charged with and that 
resulted in member states thinking that that gap should be closed through 
behavioural modification on their part, as opposed to simply letting the gap 
continue, or revising the normative commitments of the OAS "down" to match 
the reality. 527 For Panama to remain a comfortable member of the OAS required 
more respect for the written words of the contract between Panama and the 
region.528 
CONCLUSION: THE OAS, SOCIALISATION AND PANAMA IN CONTEXT 
2009 sees a vibrant and entrenched democracy within Panama, rated as 
"free" by Freedom House.529 Whilst ongoing difficulties remain, especially with 
regards to journalistic freedoms, the changes within Panama have been 
remarkable. The story of OAS actions vis-a-vis Panama is a story that rejects 
524 There is considerable quantitative analysis of the effectivity of international organisations, 
particularly the OAS, to promote democracy. See, as an example, Jon C. Pevehouse, "Democracy 
from the Outside-In? International Organizations and Democratization," International 
Organization 56, no. 3 (2002). 
525 Refer to Terry Lynn Karl, "The Hybrid Regimes of Central America," Journal of 
Democracy 6, no. 3 (1995) p. 72. 
526 See Merilee Serrill Grindle, Audacious Reforms: Institutional Invention and Democracy in 
Latin America (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 2000) especiall)I chapters one and 
nine. 
527 For an analysis of the earlier importance of international commitments to the process of 
democratisation, see Alexandra Barahona de Brito, "International Dimensions of 
Democratisation: Brazil," in Working Paper (Lisbon: lnstituto Portugues de Relacones 
lnternacionais). 
528 Interview with requested anonymous person, member of the Panamanian Delegation to the 
United Nations, New York City, November 26th 2007. 
529 Freedom House: Freedom in the World, Panama 1997. Accessible at 
http://www.freedomhouse.org/inc/content/pubs/fiw/inc country detail.cfm?year=2007&country 
=7249&pf 
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accounts of OAS inactivity, although once again I note the disjuncture between 
questions of intention and questions of success. The role of the OAS in 
facilitating this alteration is at times hard to discern. For thirty years after its 
creation, the OAS either said nothing. From the late 1970's through to the mid 
1990's the OAS has said increasingly more and more about Panamanian 
standards, although this only became effective once the OAS became recognised 
as a legitimate source of pressure and guide to behaviour. 
Within this story, when we move to conceptualise the pressures 
uncovered, community building on its own, as in the ASEAN case, seems to be 
insufficient for socialisation to occur, although it is a necessary pre-condition. 
The unpacking of social influence pressures again also broadly agrees with the 
previous ASEAN study, although here we "gain" an account of Naming and 
Shaming, ·and "loose" the presence of Social Sanctioning. These processes I have 
suggested are again rationally construable, although it must be noted that the 
social meaning component of the story is one about norm and identity shifts that 
hints at the relevance of a constructivist enquiry. Whilst this falls outside the 
direct parameters of this study, it is a fascinating aide-memoire as to the 
importance of understanding not only the socialisation mechanism and process, 
but also the broader permissive conditions that allow for those processes to 
occur. This wedding of constructivist and rational appraisal goes beyond notions 
of bridge building about individual processes of socialisation and hints at the 
importance of a more holistic appreciation of the context in which those attempts 
arise. 
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6. Turkey and the EU: The Limits of Conditionality 
In this, the final study, we return our focus onto the socialisation efforts of 
the EU, specifically dealing with the candidature of Turkey. Turkey has long 
been integrated economically and politically into the majority of organisations 
that characterise Western Europe and the Atlantic. Turkey joined NATO on 
February 18th 1952, was a founding member of the Organisation for Security and 
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and joined the Council of Europe (CE) in the 
year of its inception, 1949. Within this dense organisational environment Turkish 
absence from the prime regional community, the EU, is notable. This absence is 
a product not of Turkish indifference, but of European delay, compounded by 
widespread conceptual confusion as to what "Europe" is and should become. 530 
Whilst many Central and Eastern European countries (known collectively as the 
CEEC's) moved quickly towards membership after the end of the Cold War, the 
Turkish membership experience has been protracted.531 Turkey has had a formal 
relationship with the EU since the 1960' s and applied officially for membership 
in 1987, but it was only in 1999 that the pre-accession process formally 
commenced, and on 17th December 2004 when the EU finally recognised 
Turkish compliance with all necessary pre-requisites for commencing actual 
membership negotiations. 
530 This question is intimately linked with the problem of drawing boundaries of Europe. 
Europe may possess relatively clear geographic boundaries, but efforts to delineate cultural, 
social and economic boundaries are considerably more problematic. This, paradoxically, provides 
the EU with considerable power over neighbouring states, given that if they remain included, 
even theoretically, in the list of potential members, the EU retains a degree of ability to socialise 
that state via membership. 
531 Literature on the application journey of the various CEEC's to membership, whether placed 
in historical perspective or a more specific socialisation context is prodigious. An interesting 
comparative focus is offered in Rachel A. Cichowski, "Western Dreams, Eastern Realities," 
Comparative Political Studies 33, no. 10 (2000). An examination of the reasons why the EU has 
expanded so fast, see Schimmelfennig, "The Community Trap: Liberal Norms, Rhetorical Action 
and the Eastern Enlargement of the European Union." 
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The socialisation stories of Myanmar and Panama have been ones of slowly 
increasing pressure after membership was granted. The Turkish study is one 
where freedom of expression has been centre stage, institutionalised both within 
the legal framework of the Union and in its own goals in extending membership. 
It is a mode of socialisation that rests on those detailed standards, which are then 
inserted directly into the domestic political context of applicant states. I will 
investigate this through examining four key periods; firstly the period 
surrounding the 1999 Helsinki summit which formalised Turkish candidature. 
Second the formal accession partnership of 2001 and the national election of 
2002. Third the period 2002-2005 charting the substance of the pre-accession 
negotiations, and then finally the period after October 2005 covering the 
accession negotiations. 
STATEMENT OF ARGUMENTS 
Given that this is a study of the EU, the "home turf' of the broader 
conceptual focus of both this study and the theoretical literature I am drawing 
and extending upon, there is a far closer linkage between the direct voice of this 
study and the broader conceptual arguments that it supports. However, the 
division is still useful. At the first level, the study of the relationship between 
Turkey and the EU reveals that the assertion that conditionality processes are 
successful rests on a rather optimistic assessment of their ability to alter the 
beliefs ofjudges and civil society, not merely on changes in the legal and 
constitutional frameworks of the target state. I will argue, at the close of this 
chapter, that this failure to complete the process is because both of the scale of 
the re-orientation required, but also because of the shortcomings identified in 
chapter two as to the nature of conditionality, and what is required to achieve 
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"full" socialisation. Requiring that Turkish providers of justice, as well as civil 
society broadly, believe that the EU standard on freedom of expression is the 
right one· requires persuasive attempts to alter their identities and beliefs. 
Conditionality does not do this, and whilst there are potential mechanisms for 
altered behaviour to filter through into altered identities, the EU is not engaging 
such processes. This defines the outer limits of what is feasible with 
conditionality mechanisms of socialisation. 
Returning to the broader conceptual argument, I suggest that that the 
rational choice accounts of asymmetric bargaining characterise the relationship 
between the EU and Turkey. However, accounting for the success of that process 
must pay regard to how it both a credible offer of membership and a structured 
financial relationship were required, either on their own was not sufficient. 
Further we must emphasise the importance of the domestic political orientation 
within Turkey in determining the scale and the timing of the process. An 
examination of the significance in the Turkish election of 2002 to the pacing of 
socialisation substantiates my claims here. 
PRE-ACCESSION: FORMALISING THE OFFER OF MEMBERSHIP: 1999-2001 
There exist distinct phases of the Turkish membership negotiations with 
the EU. The first stage, pre-accession, runs from 1999-2005, and itself can be 
broken down into distinct periods. This stage was designed to bring Turkey up to 
an initial threshold of standards to enable the second phase of the relationship, 
the substantive Accession negotiations (that run from 2005 to present). The 
period 1999-2001 sees, with the offer of formal membership, the starting of that 
membership process. The argument in this preliminary section is that the formal 
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offer of membership was a necessary organisational precursor for socialisation. It 
was not, however, sufficient in and of itself to actually start socialisation 
occurring via either mechanism. The reasons for this I suggest are two fold. 
Firstly, the offer of membership did not automatically create a structural 
relationship conducive to political change in Turkey. There was no financial 
assistance, and there was no clear EU investigation of the Turkish situation or 
pronouncements of what should be done. It was at this stage a vague promise of 
membership, not a structured path to it. Secondly, there existed serious doubt 
that, despite the formal offer of membership, Turkey would not be a member. 
The EU excluded Turkey from a number of key meetings which it invited other 
candidates. This "tainted" the offer and undercut, on the Turkish side, the desire 
to engage in a costly reform process. 
THE PRE-HISTORY OF ACCESSION 
The transition to formal candidature in 1999 closes a long "pre-history" 
between Ankara and Brussels. Turkey had applied for associate membership of 
the then fledgling European Economic Community as far back as 1957, and for 
full membership in 1987.532 Both had been rebuffed, and alternate structures put 
in place by the Europeans to structure the relationship in some way that was 
short of an offer of membership. Negotiations for a common market, and then a 
customs union, occurred fitfully from 1963 with the signing of the Association 
Agreement between Brussels and Ankara until its final, and much delayed, 
532 There is considerable shifting nomenclature to be aware of here, moving in step with 
revisions to the community. The European Economic Community (EEC) was founded in 1958 
with the Rome Treaties, and sat alongside two then separate organisations, the European Atomic 
Energy Community and the European Coal and Steel Community. The three organisations were 
merged institutionally, although retained separate political identities with the Brussels Treaty of 
1967 that created the European Communities. The Communities were merged into a single 
political entity, with a revised and extended mandate with the 1993 Maastricht Treaty that founds 
the EU itself. 
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ratification in 1995.533 The Europeans seemed unwilling to go beyond theoretical 
confirmation of Turkish eligibility, as long as that was accompanied by its 
practical rejection. In 1963 they had noted that as soon as the operation of this 
agreement has advanced far enough to justify envisaging full acceptance by 
Turkey of the obligations arising out of the establishment the Community, the 
Contracting Parties would examine the possibility of the accession of Turkey to 
the Community".534 In 1989, when rejecting Turkey's application, they again 
stated that Turkey would remain eligible for membership. 535 
Questions of human rights played a role within this "pre-history". The 
Turkish coup in 1980, and then the end of the Cold War in 1989 and the 
application of the CEEC's to join the Union both mark moments of upgrade in 
the role of rights in the Brussels-Ankara dynamic. The EC had made it clear that 
progress towards Customs Union would be conditional on political and human 
rights reforms. In the late 1980's Turkey responded to this through the reversal 
of numerous anti-democratic measures that had been initiated during the military 
period. 536 Articles 141 and 142 of the Criminal Code, which outlawed the 
establishment of, or propaganda by, communist, dictatorial and racist regimes 
was repealed. Article 163 which criminalized attempts to alter Turkey's basic 
social and political structure towards any religiously inspired principles was also 
reformed. The European Parliament in 1994 went so far as to suspend the 
533 Agreement Establishing an Association Between the European Economic Community and 
Turkey, 121h September 1963, in Official Journal of the European Communities (OJEC). 
24.12.1973, No C 113/2, pp. 2-8. For an analysis of the economic causes and consequences of the 
Customs Union, refer to Erkan Erdogdu, "Turkey and Europe: Undivided but Not United," 
Middle East Review of International Affairs 6, no. 2 (2002). 
534 Ibid. 
535 It is therefore in a qualitatively different category than say Morocco that had been clearly 
rejected in 1973 for being non-European. Refer also to Harun Arikan, "A Lost Opportunity? A 
Critique of the EU's Human Rights Policy Towards Turkey," Mediterranean Politics 7, no. I 
(2002) pp. 28-32. 
536 Ibid. 
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meetings of the Joint Parliamentary Committee until such time as the 
improvement of rights within Turkey was clear. This ongoing pressiire, and the 
threat of denial of the Customs Union led to reform within Turkey. 1995 saw 
revisions to the Constitution, aimed "at extending the right of association, the 
right and formation of trade union's in certain areas, and the right of academics 
to be active in political parties". 537 It further saw revisions of Article 8 and 13 of 
the Anti-Terrorism law to reduce the stringency of custodial punishments. 
Despite these relations, both bilaterally and multilaterally through such 
vehicles as the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership of 1995 onwards, the 
relationship between the EU and Turkey prior to 1999 was felt that to have gone 
"badly wrong'',538 and the clear concern with human rights expressed by the EU 
had failed to translate into substantial realignment of the Turkish state. What 
reforms there has been were spasmodic, undirected and seemed more attributable 
to political opportunism than a concerted Turkish commitment. The lack of a 
clear offer of membership to both structure European interest in Turkey, to act as 
a focusing channel for financial assistance, and then motivate Turkey to reform. 
It is only with that offer of membership that the story of socialisation, as a subset 
of the story of the fuller relationship between Turkey and the EU, starts. 
THE FORMALISATION OF CANDIDATURE AND EU STANDARDS 
If the failure of the relationship to result in any meaningful socialisation of 
Turkey before 1999 is attributed to the lack of a clear membership offer, we 
could expect the formalising of the membership process to be a considerable 
537 Jolanda Van Westering, "Conditionality and EU Membership: The Case of Turkey and 
Cyprus," European Foreign Affairs Review 5 (2000) p. 101. 
538 Barry Buzan and Thomas Diez, "The European Union and Turkey," Survival 41, no. 1 
(1999) p. 41. For a fuller account of the Euro-Mediterranean see Schmid, "The Use of 
Conditionality in Support of Political, Economic and Social Rights: Unveiling the Euro-
Mediterranean Partnership's True Hierarchy of Objectives?" 
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marker of change. This came with the acceptance by the EU of Turkish 
candidature. The official Pre-Accession process was opened with the Helsinki 
European Council of December 10-11 th 1999, which stated that: 
Turkey, like other candidates will benefit from a pre-accession strategy to 
stimulate and support its reforms. This will include enhanced political 
dialogue, with emphasis on progressing towards fulfilling the political 
criteria for accession with particular reference to human rights ... Turkey 
will also have the opportunity to participate in Community Programmes 
and agencies and in meetings between candidate States and the Union in 
the context of the accession process. 539 
Pre-Accession status regularised the relationship between Turkey and the 
EU formalising the status of Turkey as a candidate country. 540 As a candidate, 
Turkey had now assumed the burden of integrating the EU respect for freedom of 
expression within its own political structure. As opposed to either the ASEAN or 
early period of the OAS studies, the EU has had a clear commitment to 
democracy and human rights, with detailed appraisals and jurisprudence 
surrounding those standards. With regards to freedom of expression, there are 
two places to look to discern the content of that standard. Most broadly, the EU 
deployed what were known as the Copenhagen Criteria, introduced at the 
European Council of 1993. These points were originally developed to structure 
the expectations of the CEEC in their clamour for membership. Pre-Accession 
would require Turkey, like other states, to guarantee three things: 
• 
• 
Stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human 
rights and respect for minorities 
The existence of a functioning market economy as well as the capacity to 
cope with competitive pressures and market forces within the Union 
539 Conclusions of the Helsinki European Council, 11th December 1999 I ( 12). Accessible at 
http://europa.eu.int/counc i I/off/cone lu/ dec99/dec99 en.htm. #enlargement 
540 Meltem Muftuler Bae, "Turkey's Political Reforms and the Impact of the European Union," 
South European Society and Politics I 0, no. I (2005) p. 21. 
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• The ability to assume the obligations of membership, including adherence 
to the aims of political, economic and monetary union. 541 
Of these "deceptively simple" requirements,542 the most important obstacle 
facing Turkey was the political requirement, and in particular the pre-requisite 
for adherence to a specifically European standard of human rights.543 Not only 
did human rights have to be protected legally, but also that they were 
institutionally guaranteed by stable systems of governance. This introduced the 
necessity that such rights do not exist solely as statutes, but are fully 
implemented by government and the judiciary in a clear and consistent way. 
More specifically in regards to freedom of expression, the EU has at the heart of 
its commitment the standards created by another European organisation, the 
Council of Europe. Formed in 1949, the Council is the oldest extant organisation 
of European Integration, and lies at the heart of regional promotion of human 
rights across the continent. It does so through the European Convention on 
Human Rights (ECHR) and the associated European Court of Human Rights 
(ECrHR) of 1950. Whilst the EU and the CoE and its related organs are separate, 
the EU understanding of what freedom of expression looks like is rooted in the 
statutes and jurisprudence of the ECrHR. 544 Article 10 of the Convention 
specifically concerns the right to freedom of expression and is worth quoting at 
length. 
541 Fuller explanations can be Accessible at 
http://europa.eu.int/ comm/ enlargement/intro/ criteria.htm. 
542 Heather Grabbe, "European Union Conditionality and the Acquis Communautaire," 
International Political Science Review 23, no. 3 (2002) p. 249. 
543 Refer to Meltem Mufttiler Bae, "Turkey in the EU's Enlargement Process: Obstacles and 
Challenges" Mediterranean Politics, Vol. 7, No. 2 (2002). Duner and Deverell argue that the 
Copenhagen Criteria stretch across political economic and legislative dimensions. Berti! Duner 
and Edward Deverell, "Too Bumpy a Road? Turkey, the EU and Human Rights," The Swedish 
Institute of International Affairs (2000) p. 2. 
544 The full text of which can be accessed at http://www.hri.org/docs/ECHR50.htm.1 Note the 
analysis at Robert Harmsen, "The European Convention on Human Rights after Enlargement," 




Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include 
freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and 
ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of 
frontiers. This article shall not prevent States from requiring the 
licensing of broadcasting, television or cinema enterprises. 
The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and 
responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, 
restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a 
democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial 
integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the 
protection of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or the 
rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of information received in 
confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the 
judiciary. 
Whilst there is a degree of ambiguity over the full scope of this article 
and there is no single perfect case for the incorporation of it into national law it 
remains a relatively clear post against which to gauge a country's 
performance.545 It also offers an underpinning of the ongoing socialisation 
processes that membership negotiations elicited by providing an EU wide 
understanding of what compliance with freedom of expression would look like. 
As will be shown below, this standard is invoked repeatedly in the EU's 
investigation of freedom of expression within Turkey. Whereas neither A SEAN 
nor the OAS during membership negotiations had a specific understanding of 
what the freedom of expression would look like, the EU in its relations with 
Turkey was never encumbered with such silences. 
THE NATURE OF THE RELATIONSHIP AND THE INITIAL TURKISH RESPONSE 
Even at this early stage, we can investigate the nature of the relationship 
that was developing in terms of its comparability with the scope conditions for 
identifying socialisation. I note that because of the formal offer of candidature, 
545 William Hale "Human Rights, the European Union and the Turkish Accession Process" 
Turkish Studies Vol. 4, No. 1, (2003) p. 113. 
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the EU became elevated to the role of gatekeeper for benefits Turkey had clearly 
long desired. This, together with the increased institutionalisation of the 
relationship that flowed from the formalisation of membership candidature 
pushes one to viewing the relationship as subscribing broadly to rational choice 
scope conditions. 546 Substantiating this claim, I note that the detailed standards 
on freedom of expression are not "up for discussion", and Turkey has no option 
but to incorporate them fully, given the nature of the Copenhagen Criteria's clear 
commitment to democracy and the role that freedom of expression plays in that 
norm set. With this established, the last task in investigating the period 1999-
2001 requires us to ask whether or not the offer of membership was significant in 
terms of socialisation? To achieve this I compare the standards of freedom of 
expression within Turkey in 1999 and then the potential change in that by 2001. I 
argue that there is no distinct change, and as such, socialisation had not occurred, 
or even commenced. At this point the formal offer of membership was not 
sufficient. 
Investigating the efficacy of the shift to formal candidate status requires an 
appreciation of the condition within Turkey with regards to freedom of 
expression. This provides the basis against which we can understand the targeted 
nature of EU reform and the direction that change within Turkey took. There 
existed serious and sustained constitutional and legal limitations to freedom of 
expression within Turkey. Articles 22-26 of the Constitution stated that everyone 
has the right to freedom of communication, residence and movement, 
conscience, religious belief and conviction, freedom of thought and opinion and 
the freedom to disseminate there thoughts and opinions. Article 26 referred 
546 Checkel, "International Institutions and Socialization in Europe: Introduction and 
Framework," p. 803. 
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specifically to freedom of expression, although it also contained limitations 
notably the banning the "expression and dissemination" of ideas banned by 
law.547 The Turkish constitution as it stood was unique in that it has provisions 
within it that limit the freedoms it seeks to establish.548 Especially important was 
Articles 13, which stated: 
Fundamental rights and freedoms may be restricted by law, in conformity 
with the letter and the spirit of the Constitution, with the aim of 
safeguarding the indivisible integrity of the State with its territory and 
nation, national sovereignty, the Republic, national security, public order, 
general peace, the public interest, public morals and public health, and 
also for specific reasons set forth in the relevant articles of the 
Constitution. 
The limitations of this article in relation to the freedom of expression are 
clear, and effectively limit public expression to a defence of the political status 
quo.549 Article 14 extended the scope of Article 13 by indicating that none of the 
forgoing rights can be exercised with the aim of violating the integrity of the 
state or threatening its "fundamental rights and freedoms". Furthermore, Article 
68, which outlined the rights and duties of political parties, required that "statutes 
and programmes, as well as the activities of political parties, shall not be in 
conflict with the independence of the state, its indivisible integrity and its 
territory and nation", effectively banning Kurdish separatism, however it was 
promoted. Infraction of these Articles is not a criminal offence unless made so 
under the provisions of the Penal Code, or other legislative act, giving them 
effect. 550 Articles 159 and 312 of the Penal Code, together with Article 8 of the 
547 Yusuf Sevki Hakyemez and Birol Akgun, "Limitations on the Freedom of Political Parties 
in Turkey and the Jurisdiction of the European Court of Human Rights," Mediterranean Politics, 
Vol. 7, No. 2 (2002) p. 56. 
548 Ibid. 
549 Ibid. p. 57. 
550 William Hale, "Human Rights, the European Union and the Turkish Accession Process," 
(2003) pp. I 09-111. 
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Law for the struggle Against Terrorism do just that. Article 159 "provided that 
those who publicly insult or deride the moral character of Turkishness, the 
Republic, the Grand National Assembly or the government, or the ministries, the 
military or security forces of the state or the moral character of the judiciary shall 
be published by between one and six years severe imprisonment". Article 312 
criminalizes anyone who "openly incites the public to hatred and enmity with 
regard to class, race, religion, religious sect or regional differences". Also of 
importance, the Political Parties Law was "used to close down parties deemed to 
have supported separatism, or advanced illegal Islamist ideas". 551 Between 1993 
and 1998 the Turkish High Court dissolved six political parties, including the 
Welfare Party on 16 January 1998, then the largest party in the Parliament, on 
grounds of violating secularism, with the concomitant negative effect this had on 
freedom of expression in the political process. 552 
The vulnerable status of freedom of expression was noted by the EU in the 
First Annual Report on Turkish candidature, drawn up in 1998 when it noted that 
the situation in regards to freedom of expression was "not fully assured".553 
These reports had been introduced at the Cardiff European Council in June of 
that year as a means of providing an annual overview of Turkish preparedness, as 
well as providing insight onto reform that was still required. The Commission 
pointed to "an excessively narrow interpretation of the Constitution and other 
legal provisions",554 drawing attention to Articles 7 and 8555 of the Anti-Terror 
551 Ibid. p. 112. 
552 Refer to Yusuf Sevki Hakyemez and Biro I Akgun, "Limitations on the Freedom of Political 
Parties in Turkey and the Jurisdiction of the European Court of Human Rights," Mediterranean 
Politics 7, no. 2 (2002) p. 65. 
553 Quoted in "Regular Report From the Commission on Turkey's Progress Towards 
Accession" Accessible at p. 15. 
554 Ibid. 
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Law and Articles 158, 159, 311and312 of the Criminal Code. The Commission 
also noted severe issues with regards to the related fields of freedom of the press, 
freedom of association and freedom of assembly. 
Moving from this basis to an analysis of how the offer of membership in 
1999 altered the Turkish situation, we can discern no great change.556 The 1999 
Regular Report showed little progress in concern with human rights in general 
and the freedom of expression557 whilst the 2000 report states that " Turkey has 
not fulfilled these [the Copenhagen] criteria". 558 In regards to the freedom of 
information, however, the report noted that "there is still a serious problem"559 
and that "Turkish Courts continue to restrict the expression of views with which 
the state disagrees, notably when it concerns the situation of the population of 
Kurdish origin".560 It was concluded that reform of both "legislation and practice 
in this field is urgently needed". 561 
In the absence of any structured follow up to the formalisation of Turkish 
candidature, the Accession Partnership not being formalised until 2001, the 
period 1999-2001 helps show just how effective the shift from not being a 
candidate to being formally on the path to membership was for socialisation, in 
the absence of any other factor. The above evidence would appear to indicate not 
555 Article 8 forbids "written and oral propaganda aimed at disrupting the indivisible integrity 
of the State of the Turkish Republic, country and nation". This was revised slightly in a 1995 
Constitutional reform package that introduced the concept of intent. 
556 Note that this argument in part rejects the claims of Ziya Onis who argues that the "Helsinki 
Summit has accelerated the momentum of political and economic reforms" Ziya Onis, "Domestic 
Politics, International Norms and Challenges to the State: Turkey - EU Relations in the Post-
Helsinki Era," (2003) p. 12. Whilst I believe that Helsinki was significant in setting the longer 
term parameters of change which was to come, in and of itself it proved relatively ineffective. 
557 Regular Report From the Commission on Turkey's Progress Towards Accession, European 
Commission, 1999. Accessible at 
http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/en largement/report l 0 99/pdf./en/turkey en.pdf. 
558 Regular Report from the Commission on Turkey's Progress Towards Accession, European 
Commission, 2000. Accessible at 
http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/report 11 00/pdf./en/tu en.pdf. p. 7 




very much utility to this change at all. The first explanatory factor to consider is 
that not all offers of membership are equal. They vary in terms of their 
credibility. The formalisation of candidature did not mean that Turkey was fully 
assured of its position as an equal candidate. There were many signs that at this 
point, despite the formalisation at Helsinki, Turkey remained in a unique 
category where membership was not automatically inferred through the offer of 
candidature. At the Nice summit of December 2000 Turkey, alone amongst 
potential candidate countries, was excluded from the proposed discussion about 
institutional reforms that were thought necessary to prepare for EU expansion. 562 
Turkey was further excluded from the informal Ghent summit of October 2001 
to discuss who should participate in the Convention on the Future of Europe, and 
it was not until the December 2001 Laeken Council that Turkish participation, 
and thus candidacy, was placed on an equal footing with other potential member 
states. 563 Secondly, it was not until the Accession Partnership, also of 2001 that 
the EU and Turkey formalised and detailed their relationship. This would see the 
tying of financial assistance, through clear conditionality processes, to political 
and social goals, the fulfilment of which would be closely monitored. The offer 
of membership was not enough, given the scale of change required within 
Turkey and the costs that was involved to promote socialisation on its own. What 
was required was at least a credible offer of membership together with financial 
assistance to ameliorate the costs of the transition that was required. 
562 Presidency Conclusions, European Council Meeting, Nice, 7-lOth December 2000, 
Accessible at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/summits/nice I en.htm. 
563 Presidency Conclusions, European Council Meeting, Laeken, 14-1 Sth December 2001, 
Accessible at ec.europa.eu/govemance/impact/docs/key _ docs/laeken_ concl_ en. pdf. 
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THE ACCESSION PARTNERSHIP OF 2001 AND THE NATIONAL ELECTION OF 
2002 
The years 2001 and 2002 represent a tipping point in the relationship 
between Turkey and the EU. The changes to be discussed provide compelling 
grounds on which to map Turkish candidature as subscribing to rational choice 
expectations of socialisation. Building on the asymmetrical gatekeeper 
relationship formalised in 1999, this period sees the insertion of political 
conditionality into the relationship. This occurs in two relevant ways, the overall 
conditionality of the offer on membership with EU standards and also the 
programme specific conditionality attached to the various financial arrangements 
that from this point on underpinned Turkish reforms. The argument I develop in 
this section is therefore that the rising credibility of the EU offer, together with 
stronger and incremental conditionality that focused on individual steps that 
Turkey must take, helps drive socialisation of freedom of expression forwards as 
we see the dramatic empowerment of the EU as a socialising agent within 
rationalist understandings of that. To explore the shifting pacing of that 
socialisation relationship, we must make recourse to analysing the context in 
which EU conditionality was interpreted, namely the Turkish political system. 
The election of 2002 brought to the fore a political movement that was both 
strongly receptive to EU requirements on freedom of expression as well as in a 
position to implement those quickly and decisively. 
THE ACCESSION PARTNERSHIP 
On the EU side, the formalisation of Turkish candidature was 
considerably upgraded with the formulation, and implementation, of a single 
coherent framework for the relationship between EU and Turkey, known as the 
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Accession Partnership. The Accession partnership is significant because it shows 
us two things. Firstly, that the EU now had a clear interest in socialising Turkey, 
in a way that the mere formalisation of candidature did not convey. Whilst the 
period 1999-2001 might reveal a situation that can be mapped to rational choice 
scope conditions, it is only now that we se the confluence of that situation with 
an intention to socialise. Secondly, the content of the Accession Partnership 
reveals the centrality of conditionality within the EU socialisation effort. 
Council Regulation ED 390/2001 of February 261h 2001 that outlined the 
framework of assistance to be delivered under the pre-accession strategy. This 
was adopted on gth March 2001, when the Council of the European Union 
formally accepted the Accession Partnership. 564 The Accession Partnership 
created a "clear road-map" that Turkey must follow. 565 The provision of a single 
framework of relations between the Turkey and the EU would enable the closer 
targeting of financial assistance to specific policy initiatives aimed towards 
furthering Turkish compliance with the Copenhagen Criteria. It would also 
clearly and unambiguously link the changes required in Turkey for it to complete 
pre-Accession negotiations to existing EU standards that were already binding on 
members. The precise nature of this re-founded relationship was outlined in 
November 2000 in the draft Accession Partnership document. 566 The 
conditionality of that agreement was made explicit in the third introductory 
paragraph that stated "Community assistance is conditional on the fulfilment of 
essential elements and in particular on progress towards fulfilment of the 
564 Council Decision 2001/235/EC of 8 March 2001 on the principles, priorities, intermediate 
objectives and conditions contained in the Accession Partnership with the Republic of Turkey 
[Official Journal L 85 of24.03.2001]. 
565 Chris Rumford, "Failing the EU Test? Turkey's National Programme, EU Candidature and 
the Complexities of Democratic Reform," Mediterranean Politics 7, no. 1 (2002) p. 55. 
566 Official Journal of the European Communities, L85/15. 
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Copenhagen Criteria".567 It went on to outline the short term requirements in the 
field of human rights included the need to strengthen civil society and intensify 
human rights training of law enforcement officials so that reform as not just 
legal, but also filtered down into regular practice. Medium term political reforms 
focused upon the more comprehensive review of the Constitution and creation of 
total equality for all Turkish citizens. The document is also clear about the scale 
of the EU aims. The relatively uncomplicated legislative changes required to 
bring Turkey into legislative alignment with European norms on freedom of 
expression are, of themselves, insufficient, rather "incorporation of the acquis 
into legislation is necessary, but in itself not sufficient; it is necessary to ensure 
that it is actually applied". 568 What is required is nothing less than the recreation 
of the relationship, both formally and practically, between Regional Community, 
national government and the domestic sphere in order· to shape a society that is 
informed of its rights, various social organisations such as NGO's that can 
protect them and an institutional structure that respects those rights without 
prejudice. 
TRACING SOCIALISATION IN TURKEY 
The Turkish response to the Accession Partnership was the 19th March 
2001 National Plan for the Adoption of the Acquis (NPAA), which had been in 
preparation since the circulation of the draft partnership. 569 The NP AA was 
intended to highlight the discrepancies between EU and Turkish law as well as 
567 Official Journal of the European Communities, 2001/235/EC p. 1. 
568 Official Journal of the European Communities, L 85/15 point 3. · 
569 The Turkish National Plan for the Adoption of the Acquis, 19th March 2001, Accessible at 
http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/turkey/pdf./npaa full.pdf. 
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outline how the gap between the two could be closed. 570 The NP AA covered all 
areas where progress was required. Indeed it was so broad that ultimately it drew 
attention to the scale of the task confronting Turkey .571 The NPAA "represented 
an attempt on the part of the political authorities in Turkey to strike a balance 
between the need to meet the Copenhagen Criteria and the unwillingness to 
implement reforms on the most sensitive issues in the short term".572 For 
example, it stated, "this review will be undertaken on the basis of the 
fundamental principles of the Turkish Constitution, particularly those concerning 
the secular and democratic character of the Republic, national unity and the 
unitary state model". 573 This statement is testimony to the strongly entrenched 
desire to protect certain aspects of the Turkish state from Europeanisation, and to 
ensure that the Turkish state retained its ability to criminalise certain modes of 
expression that it found to be contrary to its understanding of "permissible" civil 
discourse. Both the European Parliament and Commission shared the opinion 
that the NP AA fell substantially short of "expectations outlined in the Accession 
Partnership document". 574 
Exploring the relationship further, in the context of the broader ways in 
which the EU operates substantiated my previous claim that the relationship 
subscribes to rational choice frameworks. Bargaining between the EU and 
candidate countries is characterised by power asymmetries. 575 Of great 
570 Rumford, "Failing the EU Test? Turkey's National Programme, EU Candidature and the 
Complexities of Democratic Reform," p. 60. 
571 Ibid. 
572 Onis, "Domestic Politics, International Norms and Challenges to the State: Turkey - EU 
Relations in the Post-Helsinki Era," p. 13. 
573 Ibid. 
574 Onis, "Domestic Politics, International Norms and Challenges to the State: Turkey - EU 
Relations in the Post-Helsinki Era," p. 13. Also Rumford, "Failing the EU Test? Turkey's 
National Programme, EU Candidature and the Complexities of Democratic Reform," p. 59. 
575 David L. Ellison, "Divide and Conquer: The European Union Enlargements Successful 
Conclusion?" International Studies Review 8, no. l (2006) p. 158. 
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significance is that candidates have no "power to vote along with EU member 
states on the actual terms of the agreement" that they are held to,576 with the 
result that discursive environments are not part of the relationship. The EU 
occupied a position of structural asymmetry vis-a-vis Turkey in two regards. 
Both the overall process of membership rested on legal conditionality and the 
explicit provision of financial assistance organised under the annual funding 
agreements was conditional on measurable performance outcomes.577 Whilst 
highly institutionalised by this point, the relationship was never truly discursive 
in the way required by persuasive theoretical approaches. The EU focused on the 
conditionality of its financial aid, and the conditionality of the overall offer of 
membership. The detailed investigation of the Turkish situation allowed the EU 
to focus that investigation very tightly on specific areas of concern. Nowhere in 
the process was the question of the EU being "wrong" or even open to discussion 
about its request ever present, although the EU has displayed some sensitivity to 
the Turkish situation. 
We can trace the relationship between the Accession Partnership, the 
NP AA and finally Turkish legal reform. The close linking between the 
Accession Partnership and then the NP AA is important evidence of the causal 
significance of the EU in promoting the changes within Turkey. A simple 
chronological coincidence is insufficient to denote significance of course, but 
traCing the process through these levels is possible, and a strong indicator of the 
EU's role as socialising agent given its positioning as gatekeeper. From these 
asymmetries we can trace the flow of a call for reform on the EU side through. a 
576 Ibid. 
577 Clearly expressed with relation to Turkey in a speech by Olli Rehn, EU Commissioner for 
Enlargement, Perspectives pour la politiiue d'elargissement 2009, une annee riche d'espoirs et 
de projets, Assemblee Nationale, Paris, 6 November 2008, SPEECH/08/603. 
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National Plan in Turkey, the reform of national legal and constitutional 
protection and the provision of financial assistance. The Accession Partnership 
noted as a short term political criteria the "strengthening of legal and 
constitutional guarantees for the right of freedom of expression in line with 
Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights".578 This request was 
reflected in Section 2.1.1. of the NPAA, titled "Freedom of Thought and 
Expression". Here the Turkish government states that it will review the 
constitution, article 312 of the Penal Code, articles 7 and 8 of the Anti-Terrorism 
Act, the Act on the Establishment of Radio and Television Enterprises and their 
Broadcasts and the Act on Press.579 Furthermore, in the medium term in plans to 
review the Act on Political Parties, as well as regulations on the Police and other 
security services, the various laws governing Cinema, Broadcasting and Musical 
Works and ultimately enact a new comprehensive Penal Code.580 
As a consequence of the NPAA the Turkish National Assembly passed 
the First Constitutional Package on October 3rd 2001. With regards to enhancing 
the protection of freedom of expression, it identified specifically Articles 13 and 
14 of the constitution. Article 13 was altered so as to restrict the ability of 
parliament to limit individual rights. Furthermore, reform of Articles 22, 26 and 
28 removed the constitutional impediments to broadcasting in languages other 
than Turkish. Article 26 was reformed, improving the standards of freedom of 
expression "by removing the clause that had enabled the lawmaker to prohibit 
578 Council Regulation (EC) No 390/200 I of 26 February 200 I on assistance to Turkey in the 
framework of the pre-accession strategy, and in particular on the establishment of an accession 
partnership {Official Journal L 58 of 28.02.200 I]. 
579The Turkish National Plan for Accession to the Acquis, March 181h 2001, Accessible at 
http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/turkeylpdf./npaa full.pdf. p. 21 
580 Ibid pp. 21-22. 
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the expression of ideas in certain languages", 581 bringing Turkish legislation into 
"rough correspondence" with Articles 10 and 11 of the European Convention on 
Human Rights.582 The revised Article 26 also, however, introduced new 
limitations on the grounds of defending the "fundamental characteristics of the 
Republic" and "national security, public order, public security and the integrity 
of the state with its territory and its peoples". This was a particularly onerous 
burden given that the Constitution defined the fundamental characteristics of the 
republic as "democratic, secular and social state governed by the rule of law; 
bearing in mind the concepts of public peace, national solidarity and justice; 
respecting human rights; loyal to the nationalism of Atatilrk and based on the 
fundamental tenants set forth in the Preamble". The August 3rd 2002, Third 
Constitutional Package further harmonised EU and Turkish legislation. 583 
Notably it included the abolition of the death penalty in peacetime, extending the 
right of broadcasting in languages other than Turkish, enhancing protection for 
minorities and easing press restrictions.584 Further, Turkey in 2002 passed a 
reform package of in February that amended articles 159585 and 312586 of the 
Turkish penal code, as well as Articles 7 and 8 of the Anti-Terror law. 587 
581 Hakyemez and Akgun, "Limitations on the Freedom of Political Parties in Turkey and the 
Jurisdiction of the European Court of Human Rights," p. 58. 
582 Refer to William Hale, Op. cit. p. 115. 
583 See Bae, "Turkey's Political Reforms and the Impact of the European Union," p. 23. 
584 Refer to Saban Kardas, "Human Rights and Democracy Promotion: The Case of Turkey-EU 
Relations," Alternatives - Turkish Journal of International Relations 1, no. 3 (2002). 
585 Refers to insults to the State and to State institutions and threats to the indivisible unity of 
the Turkish Republic. Prison sentences were reduced from six to three years and fines for 
criticising Turkish law were abolished, although the actual definition of the offence remained the 
same. This article was further reformed in August 2002 through amending the scope of the 
provision in the following way: expressions of criticism of the institutions are no longer subject 
to raenalties unless they are intended to "insult" or "deride" those institutions. 
86 The scope of this article was narrowed substantially. To the original offence of "incitement 
to hatred on the basis of differences of social class, race, religion, sect or region" was added the 
rejuirement that the act was intended "in a way that may be dangerous for public authority." 
87 Anti-Terror reforms were notably contentious, however, increasing sentences for some 
offences and introducing the notion of "visual" propaganda whilst also shortening sentences for 
other crimes and easing the bans of certain broadcasting equipment. It was again stated, however 
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The potency of this conditionality to promote change is revealed clearly 
when one considers that prior to the 2002 Turkish General Elections, a delicate 
three way coalition government composed of the Democratic Left Party (DSP), 
the Motherland Party (ANAP) and the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), held 
power. The MHP especially was ambiguous at best on the benefits of EU 
membership.588 Pre 2002 the Turkish response to EU conditionality was often 
coloured by a nationalist reflex589 that significantly misunderstood the 
requirements of membership in general and the rigour that the EU expected in 
negotiations in particular, hence their misjudging of the NPAA previously 
presented. Rumford articulates this as the "dominance of short term political 
thinking over more strategic considerations".590 Any account of this relationship 
must understand the importance of Kemalism to some segments of Turkey.591 
Mustafa Kemal, known to posterity as Atatilrk, was key to the creation of 
modern Turkey after the failures revealed by World War One and the collapse of 
the Ottoman Empire. Turkey focused on modernisation, westernisation and 
laicism,592 to force Turkey to become "modern", to become "European".593 This 
that "the interpretation of legislation is crucial to ensuring actual freedom of expression. There 
are as yet no signs that the interpretation of the law by judges consistently takes into account the 
rights of the defendant under the ECHR". 2002 report, p. 3 3. External corroboration of this point 
can be found in the 2002 Freedom House report on Turkey. 
588 In parliament it had refused to endorse the necessary reforms, despite being a signatory of 
the Accession Partnership Document. Refer to Selcuk Gultasli, "The Copenhagen Summit: A 
New Era or Another "Deja Vu" For Turkey?" Alternatives - Turkish Journal of International 
Relations l, no. 4 (2002). 
589 Ibid. p. 64. Also Ziya Onis, "An Awkward Partnership: Turkeys Relations with the 
European Union in Comparative Historical Perspective," Journal of European Integration 
History 7, no. 1 (2001). 
590 Ibid. p. 65. 
591 Senem Aydin and E. Fuat Keyman, "European Integration and the Transformation of 
Turkish Democracy," EU-Turkey Working Papers, No. 2, August 2004. Accessible at 
www.ceps.be. Aydin and Keyman here define Kemalism as a "will for civilization". A 
"nationalist discourse that produces at the conceptual level a boundary between what is civilized 
and what is uncivilized." 
592 A fuller analysis can be Accessible at Smith, Thomas, W., "Between Allah and Atatiirk: 
Liberal Islam in Turkey" The International Journal of Human Rights, Vol. 9, No. 3 (2005). 
593 A fascinating investigation of this is provided Ernst Gellner, Encounters with Nationalism 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994) chapter on Kemalism. Gellner argues that Kemalism 
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ideology in the military and government prior to 2002 coloured Turkish 
impressions of the EU Whilst the call for freedom of expression to the EU 
represented a settled and unthreatening standard, to Turkey it threatened 
fundamentally the Kemalist inheritance, which had reified the state and protected 
it from criticism for fear of religious or separatist pressures. The relationship 
between the EU and Turkey, and the onerous demands of membership, therefore 
came into conflict with the relationship between Turkey and itself. Freedom of 
expression to many actors within Turkey meant empowering both the religious 
and Kurdish separatists who actively sought through violent means to partition 
the Kemalist state. 594 
THE SECOND LEVEL OF CONDITIONALITY: THE FINANCIAL RELATIONSHIP 
The EU approach to conditionality rests on a far more complex and 
invasive set of tools than seen in the other studies. In terms of the actual political 
operationalisation of conditionality by the EU, there are five discrete categories 
that potentially exert influence: Gate keeping, Benchmarking, Model provision, 
Money and Advice/Twinning. 595 The EU is the gatekeeper of both the goal of 
membership and the various steps along the path towards that, it offers clear and 
precise investigation of Turkish performance, as well as the direction that change 
sought to reform both the state and society through a process of top down reforms designed to 
create in Turkey the necessary social conditions for western ideas and practices to thrive. 
Kemalist nationalism was not just a process of importing laws, it sought to import the mindset 
that made those laws viable. 
594 For a brief, but insightful analysis of the importance of Kemalism to visions of the Turkish 
state, refer to Chris Rumford, "Resisting Globalization? Turkey-EU Relations and Human and 
Political Rights in Context in Cosmopolitan Democratization," International Sociology 18, no. 2 
(2003). For a wider analysis of the question of membership through the prism of security 
cultures, see Hasan Kosebalaban, "Turkey's EU Membership: A Clash of Security Cultures," 
Middle East Policy 9, no. 2 (2002). 
595 Heather Grabbe, "How Does Europeanization Affect CEE Governance? Conditionality, 
Diffusion and Diversity," Journal of European Public Policy 8, no. 6 (2001) p. 1021. I suggest 
that all of these, except twinning, were relevant to the Turkish situation with regards to freedom 
of expression. The record of twinning between Turkey and the EU is recapped at 
http://www.euturkey.org.tr/index.php9 p=40990&!=2 
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should occur in, it provides a model of what "success" looks llke as well as 
financial assistance in the form of conditionality. As Grab be notes, there is a 
difference between the way say the World Bank applies conditionality to its 
financial arrangements with third parties, which is in terms of "ensuring 
execution of a contract",596 and the EU demands which are situated in a long 
term and evolving politicised relationship, with the result that "the linkage 
between fulfilling particular tasks and receiving particular benefits is much less 
clear than in International Financial Institutions conditionality because the tasks 
are complex, and many of them are not amenable to quantitative targets that 
show explicitly when they have been fulfilled". 597 As Gates argues, the EU has 
"picked a bargaining strategy that makes extraordinary demands and offers no 
guarantees of any sorts". 598 
Of the five tools of conditionality Grabbe presents, I suggest two, gate 
keeping and the provision of financial assistance, have particular relevance to the 
socialisation of freedom of expression. At the broadest scale, access to the 
benefits of membership, the gate-keeping role of the EU, requires macro political 
reorientation of the Constitution, statute and jurisprudence to clearly defined EU 
standards. They are articulated directly to Turkey through the Accession 
Partnership and its revisions. The overall conditionality of membership, together 
with the provision of a clear roadmap along which Turkey must progress, 
provides both a goal and a means to get to that goal. It is not, however, the only 
way in which the EU promoted change within Turkey. In parallel to this overall 
596 Grabbe, "European Union Conditionality and the Acquis Communautaire," p. 252 Also 
note Gates discussion on this issue at Andrea Gates, "Negotiating Turkey's Accession: The 
Limitations of the Current EU Strategy," European Foreign Affairs 10 (2005) pp. 382-386. 
597 Grabbe, "European Union Conditionality and the Acquis Communautaire." 
598 Gates, "Negotiating Turkey's Accession: The Limitations of the Current EU Strategy," p. 
387. 
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conditionality there is a sequence of ever-larger financial linkages between 
Turkey and the EU. These again are based on conditionality, but here the 
conditionality is tied to the ongoing funding of a particular programme, each 
with a very narrow and focused "on the ground" concern. Financial 
conditionality within the broader relationship was never therefore along the lines 
of "we will give you x amount of Euro' s if you change this law". It was 
concerned with targeted but ultimately cumulative reforms within Turkish 
government to ensure that those revising legal and constitutional standards were 
implemented. Financial assistance is designed to aide the shift from on paper 
reform to in practice protection of standards. 
Exploring the financial relationship, the first restructured financial 
package was issued in 2002,599 when total financial assistance was to total some 
€126 million, of which just over €2 million was designated, under programme 
TR 0201, towards addressing human rights concerns. This was especially 
important given that by 2001 Turkey was "the only candidate country which 
does not meet the political criteria set out in Copenhagen"600 and as such had by 
far the fmihest to go before accession negotiations could commence. Financing 
under this new programme was designed to be multi-year (programmes run over 
three years) and co-funded, with Turkey providing some 10% of the total 
programme costs. This was intended to provide Turkey with the role of a 
stakeholder in the process, enhancing Turkish desire to fulfil the requirements.601 
599 2002/002-555 National Pre-Accession Financial Assistance Programme for the Republic of 
Turkey. Accessible at 
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/fiche projet/index.cfm?page=415392&c=TURKEY. Note that 
each finance memorandum outlines programmes that run for a three year fixed period. At any one 
point, therefore, there are three finance packages operative, each at a different stage of maturity. 
The programmes contained within them are designed to be cumulative. 
600 Ibid. 
601 Section 4.4 of the financial assistance programme restated forcefully the centrality of 
conditionality: "the Commission may reduce, suspend or cancel assistance in respect of the 
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Within this framework, only one project was undertaken under the 2002 Finance 
Memorandum; project TR 0201.01 - "Improvement of Statement Taking 
Methods and Statement Taking Rooms in the Republic of Turkey". The nature of 
this package is important. In the justification for this package, the finance 
memorandum explicitly stated that the October 2001 Constitutional package, 
together with harmonisation packages passed in April and August 2002, whilst 
changing the legislative framework, had not altered conditions on the ground 
sufficiently. There remained the pressing requirement to ensure that the reforms 
these embodied were carried through to day-to-day practice. Within this micro 
level projects, conditionality was just as prominent, and there was equally no 
"discussion" in the persuasive understanding of the term. Here, as in elsewhere 
in the story, the EU was "right" and the nature of Turkish reform was not 
negotiable. 
THE IMPORTANCE OF DOMESTIC SALIENCE 
Identifying the nature of the socialisation relationship between Turkey 
and the EU is not sufficient. An investigation of bargaining driven socialisation 
should concern itself not solely with the end product, a socialised state, but with 
the nature of that journey and the reasons why it ebbed and flowed as it did. 
Whilst the provision of membership negotiations ultimately depends on the EU, 
the actual pacing of those negotiations cannot be considered in isolation of the 
context of the Turkey. Whether or not socialisation actually occurs is dependent 
upon domestic political configurations, and most importantly on political elites in 
measures concerned if the examination reveals irregularity, an improper combination of funds or 
a failure to comply with one of the conditions in the Financing Memorandum". 
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the state to be socialised believing membership to be valuable.602 Attempting to 
understand the relationship between Turkey and the EU merely by pointing to 
the presence of external phenomena such as conditionality in both membership 
and financial assistance is only half the story. Explaining the variegated texture 
of socialisation requires recourse to an appraisal of the domestic context within 
the target state, 603 and then how the domestic level interacted with international 
pressures for socialisation and compliance.604 
I suggest that whilst the process of bargaining resting on EU 
conditionality is necessary in creating change, it is never determinative of the 
precise nature of that change, or indeed the timing of it. Diez, Agnantopoulos 
and Kaliher in their study of the role of civil society in Turkey adopt this 
position, arguing that change is "driven by civil society actors" who collectively 
interpret what external conditionality actually means, and whether the costs 
associated with it are ones worth paying.605 The importance of domestic 
considerations is most clearly revealed by analysing the consequences of the 3rd 
November 2002 Turkish election, a landslide in Turkish politics. The Justice and 
Development Party (Ada/et ve Kalkinma Partisi - AKP), a right wing moderately 
Islamist group606 born of the dissolved Welfare Party, garnered 10,779,489 votes, 
602 Rumford, "Failing the EU Test? Turkey's National Programme, EU Candidature and the 
Complexities ofDemocqltic Reform," p. 63. 
603 Such an approach is found Trine Flockhart, "Uses and Abuses of Hegemony: Socialisation 
ofDemocratic Norms in Post-War Germany and Post-War Iraq," Discussion Paper 27 I 2004 -
School for Postgraduate Interdisciplinary Research on Interculturalism and Transnationality, 
Aalborg University (2004) and Schimmelfennig, Frank, "Strategic Calculation and International 
Socialization: Membership Incentives, Party Constellations and Sustained Compliance in Central 
and Eastern Europe," International Organization, Vol. 59, No. 4, (2005). 
604 For a comparative analysis of the importance of domestic political configuration between 
Turkey and Poland, refer to Ziya Onis, "Diverse but Converging Paths to EU Membership: 
Poland and Turkey in Comparative Perspective," in Second Pan-European Conference - Standing 
Group on EU Politics (Bologna: 2004). 
605 Thomas Diez, Apostolos Agnantopoulos and Alper Kaliher, "File: Turkey, Europeanization 
and Civil Society" South European Society and Politics, Vol. 10, No 1 (2005) p. I 0. 
606 It considers itself to be the Turkish equivalent of the Christian Democratic parties of 
Europe. 
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some 34.3% of those who voted.607 With 363 seats, the AKP found itself with 
just one represented opposition party, the Republican People's Party, which 
gained 19.4% of the vote and 178 seats. All previous parties of government 
failed to score above 10%, and were banished from parliamentary 
representation. 608 
Should external conditionality be the only determinant of the pace and 
strength of Turkish reforms we would expect no differences before and after 
2002, given that the external set of incentives and costs remained static. Such a 
simple account would note a "linear relationship, driven by EU conditionality, 
between externally demanded conditions that are accepted domestically by 
adoption policy reforms".609 This, however, is not the case, 2003 marked a year 
of increasing reform. January saw the fourth Constitutional Package enacted, 
. February the fifth, July the Sixth and August the seventh. Together these 
addressed the full gamut of human rights concerns. Furthermore, the 
International Covenants on Civil and Political and Economic, Cultural and Social 
rights, signed in 2000, were finally ratified, although with reservations 
concerning the right to education and the rights of minorities.610 
Explaining why the AKP's election was significant for the pacing of. 
socialisation requires an appreciation of two things, firstly, its vision of Turkish 
geopolitical security and secondly its own domestic political programme. The 
607 For an interesting account of the 2002 Election and the rise of moderate political Islam, 
refer to Omer Caha, "Turkish Election of November 2002 and the Rise Of "Moderate" Political 
Islam," Alternatives - Turkish Journal of International Relations 2, no. I (2003) For a longer 
perspective, note Thomas W. Smith, "Between Allah and Atatiirk: Liberal Islam in Turkey," The 
International Journal of Human Rights 9, no. 3 (2005). 
608 The MHP in particular suffered as a result of its participation in the Europeanization 
process, many of its members viewing any move that threatened the unitary nature of the state as 
tantamount to concessions to terrorism. 
609 Nathalie Tocci, "Europeanization in Turkey: Trigger or Anchor for Reform," South 
European Society and Politics IO, no. I (2005) p. 75. 
610 Regular Report on Turkish Progress towards Accession. European Commission, 2003. 
Accessible at http: I /www.europa.eu.int/comm/en largement/report 2003/pdf./rr tk final.pdf. 
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AKP was firmly part of the pro-European discourse for a number of reasons. It 
viewed the EU as a safe harbour from the stresses of globalisation as well as a 
necessary economic stimulus. The AKP also possessed a different understanding 
of national security to its predecessors. Previous approaches to security were 
"internal" inasmuch as they rested upon security of the state vis-a-vis a perceived 
Kurdish insurgency. It was only after the success of the AKP that the domestic 
power configuration was such that a majority of those in power came to believe 
that "the development of the Turkish state is guaranteed less by its ability to 
insulate itself from international norms and more by its capacity to integrate with 
international democratic regimes".611 The AKP understood Turkish security in a 
broader way that emphasised the importance of a collaborative effort with 
Western powers, and the EU as the archetypal entity within that set of 
overlapping structures.612 Finally the AKP used the EU and its offer of 
membership as an external hook upon which to rest its own domestic agenda. 
Nathalie Tocci unpacks this conceptually by characterising the EU as either a 
trigger of reform, or an anchor for it.613 The AKP when it came into power with 
an agenda to reform the Turkish state and relax the strict Kemalism came to see 
EU membership and the processes that surrounded it as a convenient external 
justification for policies that they desired. EU membership came to be the 
common ground between diverse political actors who desired the same thing, the 
enhancement of freedom of expression, but for differing motives. This 
61 I Ibid. p. 64. 
612 Although note that this approach has its limits, most forcefully shown in the ultimate refusal 
to allow American military forces access to northern Iraq during the 2003 Iraq War. 
613 Nathalie Tocci, "Europeanization in Turkey: Trigger or Anchor for Reform?" South 
European Society and Politics, Vol. 10, No. I (2005). Also refer to Ziya Onis, "Domestic 
Politics, International Norms and Challenges to the Sate: Turkey-EU Relations in the post-
Helsinki Era," Turkish Studies (2003). 
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dramatically increased the "intention" to be socialised on the Turkish side of the 
debate from the situation that had occurred prior to 2002. 614 
Given such an overwhelming mandate and the fact that the AKP could 
assume office with no need for a coalition, the new Turkish government found 
itself considerably less inhibited than its predecessor. The AKP successfully 
positioned itself so as to draw many centre right votes away from the established 
parties whilst at the same time appealing to Kurdish and moderate Islamic 
segments of the population.615 This reorientation of political allegiances has 
dramatically increased the power of the pro-EU lobby, especially given the 
ascendancy of moderate and politically literate Islam, a force that is capable of 
mass public support and is committed to, if not overthrowing, then certainly 
modifying the laic structure of Turkish politics and society, and perceives 
Europeanisation, with its focus on human rights and the separation of 
government, religion and the military, as the best way to achieve this.616 
THE CONDITIONS OF CONDITIONALITY: 2003-2005 
The period from 2003 to 2005 is one of consolidation of existing reforms 
as well as revealing areas of continued resistance to socialisation. This period 
sees a fuller financial relationship underpinned by strict restatements of 
conditionality, and continued Turkish receptiveness, at least at the government 
level. It also reveals still incomplete socialisation of freedom of expression. The 
614 For example in a 2004 speech Erdogan called directly for "unconditional full membership". 
Recep Tayyip Erdogan: Taking Part in the EY Will Bring Harmony of Civilisations - It is the 
Project of the Century" The Independent (UK) 13th December 2004. Accessible at 
http://www.independent.co. uk/news/peop le/profi les/recep-tayyip-erdogan-taking-part-in-the-eu-
will-bring-harmony-of-c ivi lisations--it-is-the-project-of-the-centurv-685 203 .htm. I 
615 Omer Caha, "Turkish Election of November 2002 and the Rise of 'Moderate' Political 
Islam" Alternatives - Turkish Journal of International Relations, Vol. 2, No. 1 (2003) offers a 
detailed analysis of the shifting voting patterns and the rise of the AKp. 
616 Refer to Kosebalaban, "Turkey's EU Membership: A Clash of Security Cultures," for an 
analysis of the empowerment of different domestic actors through Europeanisation in the military 
sphere. 
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presence of these limitations powerfully delineates the outer limits of what EU 
conditionality could do. I will investigate the developing EU commitment to 
Turkey, the continued Turkish response to that and how it was the continued 
issue of credibility that undermined Turkish socialisation, although this 
credibility was no longer formally expressed through denying Turkish 
participation in various meetings. Instead it was embodied in national and 
community level within the community itself. 
EXTENDING THE FINANCIAL RELATIONSHIP 
The course through membership negotiations was to be both incentivised 
and facilitated through direct financial aid that was conditional in much the same 
way as the broader offer of membership itself. EU financial assistance for the 
year 2003 was organised under the aegis of the 2003 National Programme for 
Turkey Finance Package,617 that amounted to some €145.l million, of which 
€9.521 million was assigned to supporting the Copenhagen Criteria, and thus is 
of relevance to freedom of expression.618 The three programmes in 2003 were 
targeted towards implementing political reforms and creating the conditions in 
which the new normative agenda could flourish. TR 0301.01, the strengthening 
of police accountability, efficiency and effectiveness. The project fiche states 
that the purpose of the project is to enable the police to carry out "its 
responsibilities in respect of the enforcement of law in accordance with 
617Financing Memorandum Between The European Community and the Republic of Turkey, 
TR 2003/005-667.01 to TR2003/005-667 .07. 
618 The full breakdown of funding saw funding split into seven streams. TR 0301, Copenhagen 
criteria, received €9.521 million, TR 0302 Economic assistance received €22.565 Million. TR 
0303 Public Administration saw some €25.027 million. TR 0304 Justice and Home affairs 
garnered €10.268 million. TR 0305 Economic and Social Cohesion saw €45.300 million, whilst 
TR 0306 Programme Preparation €31.319, million whist finally TR 0307 Communications costs 
totalled €1.100 million. 
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democratic principles and having regard for the Human Rights of all citizens".619 
It proposes detailed training and education programmes to make the police 
system more aware of the new legislative environment and also able to act in a 
social context where citizens themselves are more aware of their legal rights. The 
need to educate the people in their new rights is another attempt to improve 
standards of implementation. TR 0301.02 aims at the "development of human 
rights, democracy and citizenship education"620 through altering educational 
curricula, capacity building within the education system and a communications 
strategy to "parents and other stakeholders".621 TR 0301.03 focuses on the 
development of civil society, and on enhancing NGO democratic participation as 
a means to further consolidate human rights within the domestic sphere.622 
Together, these three programmes outline a detailed and far ranging attempt to 
create the social and institutional conditions for a revised conception of human 
rights to thrive in the domestic arena by empowering both individuals and social 
actors such as NGO's with the knowledge of their various rights and enhanced 
expectations about their protection. 
The 2004 Financial Assistance Package623 saw pre-accession assistance 
nse to some €236 million, a substantial increase on previous years. The 
619 Standard Summary Project Fiche, TR 0301.01. Strengthening the Accountability, Efficiency 
and Effectiveness of the Turkish National Police, Accessible at 
http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/fiche pro jet/ document/TR %20030 l .O l %20 
Strengthen i ng%20accountabil ity%20of''.l/o20po I ice. pd f. 
620 Draft Standard Summary Project Fiche, TR 0301.02, Development of Human Rights, 
Democracy, and Citizenship Education. Accessible at 
http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/fiche projet/document/TR%20030 l .02%20 
Development%20ot%20human%20rights%20education.pdf. 
621 Ibid p. 1. 
622 Standard Summary Project Fiche, TR 301.03, Improving Cooperation Between NGO's and 
Public Sector 
http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/fiche projet/document/TR %20030 I .03%20 
lmproving%20cooperation%20between%?0NG0s%20and~o20public'%20seclor.pdf. 
623 Financing Memorandum Between the European Community and the Republic of Turkey, 
2004, TR 2004/016-779 
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Copenhagen Criteria packages amounted to just over €19 million of this.624 The 
specific programmes constructed by the EU in regards to the Copenhagen criteria 
are again informative of the status of the Turkish application and its particular 
weaknesses. As can be seen, there was a general refocusing on the 
implementation of previous reforms and the development of the capacity of the 
Turkish state to implement and monitor these legal provisions coherently. TR 
0401.01 specifically deals with concerns about Turkish implementation of 
reform and aims to ensure that the Turkish human rights situation is compatible 
with the ECHR,625 building directly on concerns outlined in the 2004 Annual 
Report. Working through civil society and the various human rights bodies 
within the Turkish government, the project is intended to raise awareness of what 
rights individuals have, and to reinforce their impartial and consistent 
enforcement. Other activities funded were 0401.02, which supported the 
establishment of Court of Appeal to the amount of €1.400.000. 0401.03 called 
for the improvement of public service/quality standards-civil society 
organisations and was funded for €7.127.000, whilst 0401.04 was targeted at 
strengthening the right to freedom of association, and predicted to cost 
€2.520.000. 0401.05 saw €1.170 million used to support the running of Turkish 
Ombudsman whilst finally 0401.06 targeted the promotion of cultural rights with 
€2.500.000 of aid. 
http:/iwww.europa.eu.int/comm/en largernent!fiche projet/document/2004-0 l 6-
779'%20&%202004-0 l 6-180°/o20Turkev%20National%20programme.pdf. 
624 TR 0401, Copenhagen, €19.001.500 TR 0402, Acquis approximation, €31.827.420 TR 
0403, Public Admin Strength, €56.549.600 TR 0404, Justice and Home, €11.488.700 TR 0405, 
Economic and Social Cohesion, €77.556.000 TR 0406, Programme Prep, €39.176.780 TR 0407, 
Communication, €1.120.000 
625 Standard Summary Project Fiche, TR 401.01. Support to implementation of human rights 
reforms in Turkey. 
http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/fiche projet/document/TR%200401 
.0 l %20Suppo11%20to%20Implementation%20of%20Human%20Rightso/o20Refom1s%20in%20 
Turkey.pdf. p. 1. 
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INVESTIGATING THE SOCIALISATION RECORD 2002 - 2005 
This funding of "micro level" projects continued in tandem with macro 
level political change throughout 2003 and 2004. Numerous further restrictions 
were lifted, a process that led to acquittals and the early release of certain 
prisoners. The sixth reform package of May 2003 repealed Article 8 of the Anti-
Terror Law (the criminalisation of propaganda against the divisibility of the 
state). 626 Freedom of expression in relation to broadcasting was enhanced in the 
sixth reform package by narrowing the scope for suspending or banning works. 
The reform limited banning to those works considered to undermine the 
"fundamental characteristics of the Republic and the indivisible integrity of the 
state".627 The seventh reform package reduced the minimum sentence under 
Article 159 of the Penal Code628 from a year to six months. This further brought 
it into line with previous reforms that exempted from punishment the expression 
of opinions that were designed only to criticise the state, not to either insult or 
deride, those institutions.629 The seventh package also narrowed the scope on 
Article 169 of the Penal Code630 and strengthened further the 2002 amendments 
to Article 7 of the Anti-Terror Law.631 The gth Package of May 7th 2004 
substantially revised the constitution, improved the freedom of the press and 
626 Article Eight criminalised propaganda against the indivisible unity of the state 
627 Regular Report on Turkey's Progress Towards Accession, European Commission, 2003. p. 
30. Accessible at. http:l/www.curopa.eu.int/comm/en 1argement/repoI1 2003/pdf./rr tk final.pd!. 
628 
"Insulting the state and state institutions and threats to the indivisible unity of the Turkish 
Republic" 
629 Regular Report on Turkey's Progress Towards Accession, European Commission, 2003. 
Accessible at http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/report 2003/pdfitT tk final.pdf. p. 
30 
630 Article on the aiding and abetting of terrorist organisations. 
631 The reformed Article 7 introduced the notion of "propaganda in connection with the 
terrorist organization in a way that encourages the use of terrorist methods", thus moving away 
from the blanket criminality of any relation to a terrorist organization. In the Turkish context, 
terrorist organization specifically means those organizations concerned with the Kurdish 
question. In the latest reform the words "terrorist methods" were replaced with "resorting to 
violence or other terrorist means." 
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gave priority to supranational treaties over domestic law.632 Turkish attention 
was focused not only on legal reform, but also on attempts to ensure that those 
rights were implemented. Human Rights boards were established in all 81 
provinces and 849 sub-provinces of the Turkish state and were tasked with 
handling and forwarding human rights complaints to the prosecutors office. 
Human Rights Council was established within the National Government, chaired 
by the deputy Prime Minister, and a Reform Monitoring Group was established 
in September 2003 tasked with ensuring the various legal reforms were 
implemented across the range of government departments. 
It is estimated that between 2002 and 2003 the number of prosecutions 
relating to freedom of expression within Turkey halved, whilst those cases filed 
under Arts. 159, 169 and 312 as well as the Anti-Terror Law are "also believed 
to have decreased significantly".633 Whilst part of the reason for this should be 
attributed to the revised statutes just outlined, it is also important to note that the 
methodological differences that used to separate the Turkish judicial system from 
that of the European Court of Human Rights have been reduced. Previously, is 
assessing violations of the right to freedom of expression, the ECtHR took into 
account four conditions when assessing the threat of a statement to public order: 
"the content of the relevant statement, the identity of the speaker, the context in 
which the statement is made and the form of the expression of the statement".634 
In contrast, the Turkish Courts tended to apply only one criteria that of the 
632 For a fuller account of the substantive details of these Constitutional Packages, refer to 
Meltem Muftuler-Bac, "Turkey in the EU's Enlargement Process: Obstacles and Challenges," 
Mediterranean Politics 7, no. 2 (2002). 
633 Senem Aydin and E Fuat Keyman, "European Integration and the Transformation of 
Turkish Democracy," in EU- Turkey Working Papers (Brussels: Centre for European Policy 
Studies, 2004). p. 27. 
634 Ibid. p. 29. 
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content itself.635 Before 2004, however, judicial reform saw the partial adoption 
of European methodology, although at currents this remains an incomplete 
process.636 
As before, however, socialisation remained incomplete. For example, 
drawing on the work of a joint OSCE/ODIHR report on the 2002 Election 
Monitoring programme,637 it was noted that despite extensive legislative reform 
efforts "there is still a tendency for prosecutors to use alternative provisions of 
the Penal Code (312 and 169) and of the Anti-Terror Law (Article 7) to limit 
freedom of expression". 638 The report notes that the use of these and other 
articles limited the "parameters of allowable legal debate". 639 Furthermore, 
although Turkey reformed the laws on broadcasting in languages other than 
Turkish, it retained Article 58 of the Law on Basic Provisions on Elections and 
Voter Registration that strictly forbids the use of any language aside from 
Turkish in electioneering. This had severe consequences for the Democratic 
People Party (DEHAP), which asserted its ability to communicate with the ethnic 
Kurds that constitute a majority of its supporters was severely retarded by.640 A 
similar example can be drawn from 2004, when reputable NGO Rapporteurs sans 
Frontieres indicated that press freedoms were little altered over the year, and that 
635 Refer to Oktay Uygen, "Freedom of Expression and the ECHR and Turkish Law," paper 
presented at the Human Rights General Assembly: European Convention of Human Rights and 
Turkey, Istanbul 17-19 May (2004). 
636 Aydin and Keyman, "European Integration and the Transformation of Turkish Democracy." 
p. 29. 
637 Republic of Turkey Parliamentary Elections, 3rd November 2002, OSCE/ODHIR 
Assessment Report, Warsaw 4th December 2002. Accessible at 
http://www.osce.org/documents/odihr/2002/ 12/1463 en.pdf. 
638 Regular Report on Turkey's Progress Towards Accession, European Commission, 2003 
http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/report 2003/pdf./JT tk final.pdf. p 30. 
639 Republic of Turkey Parliamentary Elections, 3rd November 2002, OSCE/ODHIR 
Assessment Report, Warsaw 4th December 2002. Accessible at 
http://www.osce.org/documents/odihr/2002/ 12/ 1463 en.pdf. 
640 Ibid. p. 8. Note that DEHAP announced its merger into the Democratic Society Movement 
on August 17th 2005. 
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preparations for EU accession had not improved the condition of freedom of 
expression.641 Whilst this may be a little polemical, it testifies to a fundamental 
truth, that reform was incomplete. The EU itself noted this in the 2004 Progress 
Report on Turkish Candidature, remarking that the Penal Code, introduced in 
September 2004, "provides only limited progress on freedom of expression".642 
The report stated, "Articles that have been frequently used to restrict freedom of 
expression and have been assessed as potentially conflicting with Article 10 of 
the ECHR have been maintained or changed only slightly".643 
THE CONTINUING ISSUE OF CREDIBILITY 
Vitally, the credibility of the EU offer of membership was, through to the 
final December 2004 decision to commence accession negotiations in October 
2005. and indeed beyond, ambiguous in a way that has not been the case with 
previous EU applicant states. We must be careful here. I suggest that there are 
graduations in credibility that promoted or retarded socialisation at any one time. 
When the membership candidature was placed on a formally equal footing with 
other applicants in 2001, so socialisation could commence. However, that is not 
to say that after 2001 there were no further doubts about Turkish admissibility. I 
suggest that this ambiguity was not strong enough to negate the socialisation of 
freedom of expression, but it does serve as a useful point of analysis as to why 
that socialisation remained incomplete. Whilst the EU has committed sizeable 
resources to Turkey and commenced pre-accession negotiations, and in formal 
terms offered as much credibility to the offer of membership as with any other 
641 Turkey 2004 Annual Report. Reporters Without Borders, Accessible at 
http://www.rsf.org/article.php3'!id article~~ I 0265& Valider=OK 
642 Regular Report on Turkey's Progress Towards Accession, European Commission, 2004 
http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/report 2004/pdf./rr tk final.pdf p. 38 
643 Ibid. 
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applicant, there remains a discourse at the public, national and European levels 
that indicates significant reticence over Turkish membership and impacts 
strongly on the credibility of membership offers outside of the formal offer. The 
very existence of such a debate is received in Turkey as evidence of the lack of a 
clear and consistent EU strategy and commitment, 644 and as such we can expect 
it to have an impact on Turkish cost I benefit analysis in such a way as to, if the 
theoretical construct is correct, retard the socialisation of freedom of 
. 645 
express10n. 
There continued to be "informal" yet authoritative questioning about the 
likelihood of Turkish membership.646 The sources for this are various, ranging 
from emotional opposition that Turkey simply is not a European country in the 
same way as the Eastern European countries unambiguously are through to 
serious concerns on the institutional affects of admitting a large and 
comparatively poor state into the Union, both in terms of the financial 
consequences as well as the affects of Turkish participation in the Parliament, 
Commission and Council of the Union.647 This ambiguity is expressed at two 
levels. Firstly the groundswell of public opinion with the EU and the effect that 
this has had on national governments, Public opinion within the EU is against 
Turkish accession; a 2005 Eurobarometer poll found some 52% of EU citizens 
644 Nathalie Tocci, Op. Cit. p. 77. 
645 Pollack, "Rational Choice and EU Politics." p. 4. 
646 Speech by Olli Rehn, EU Commissioner for Enlargement, EU and Turkey on the Threshold 
of a New Phase, European Parliament Plenary Session, Turkey Debate, Strasbourg, 13th 
December 2004, SPEECH/04/538. 
647 Gates, "Negotiating Turkey's Accession: The Limitations of the Current EU Strategy," pp. 
392-393. Note the role of Turkish Islam in facilitating these views. See Netherlands Scientific 
Council for Government Policy, The European Union, Turkey and Islam (Amsterdam: 
Amsterdam University Press, 2004). 
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remain against Turkish entry into the EU648 Significant figures in a wide range of 
EU member states have expressed strong reservations to Turkish entry.649 
Second, the EU Commission itself has also been the source of conflicting 
messages, continuing to talk of alternatives to membership and increasingly 
emphasising the Union's capacity to include new members as a new criteria for 
membership.650 The Negotiating Framework for accession in the second clause 
noted that eventual membership was conditional both on the Copenhagen 
Criteria and "the absorption capacity of the Union",651 placing another hurdle in 
the way of Turkish entry, one that Turkey itself has no control over. The 2005 
Enlargement Strategy Paper from the Commission elaborates this point, 
indicating that in regards to future enlargement, the "Union has to ensure it can 
maintain its capacity to act and decide according to a fair balance within its 
institutions; respect budgetary limits; and implement common policies that 
function well and achieve their objectives".652 The "danger" of admitted a 
populous, comparatively poor, political different and ethnically diverse Turkey 
from this perspective is clear. 
648 The full range of Eurobarometer reports can be accessed at http://curopa.eu.intlcomm/ 
public opinion/enlargement en.htm. Also note the importance of the perception of religious 
difference between the EU and Turkey, as a majority Islamic country, even if the state remains 
secular. Refer to Elizabeth Shakman Hurd, "Negotiating Europe: The Politics of Religion and the 
Prospects for Turkish Accession," Review of International Studies 32 (2006) p. 405. 
649 Austrian President Heinz Fischer has suggested the need for a pan-European referendum on 
the issue, and Jacques Chirac in the Constitution referendum campaign in France promised a 
national referendum on Turkish entry. We should also pay regard to the Greek role, given the 
improved but still not normalised relations between Ankara and Athens. Note Harun Arikan, 
Turkey and the EU: An Awkward Candidate for EU Membership? (Aldershot: Ashgate 
Publishing Limited, 2003) pp. 159-163. 
650 There is little doubt that Turkey represents a serious "cost" to the Union were it to be come 
a member. A detailed appraisal of this is offered at Ibid. pp. 11-18. 
651 Negotiating Framework for Turkey, Luxembourg 3rd October 2005. Accessible at 
http://ec.europa.eLLlenlargement/pdf./st20002 05 TR framedoc en.pdf. 
652 2005 Enlargement Strategy Paper, COM 92005) 561, Final, Brussels, 9th November 2005, 
Accessible at 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargernent/repott 2005/pdf./package v/com 561 final en strategy 
paper.pdf. 
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We need to be careful in discussing this line of reasoning about the role 
of existing members. Could their reticence be evidence of member state efforts to 
socialise Turkey via the offer of membership, just as Thailand did with 
Myanmar's membership process? Superficially there are similarities. Member 
states of the EU expressed a whole range of differing opinions about the 
"correctness" of Turkish entry, regardless of its potential conformity with the 
legal framework of membership. This seems to rotate around questions over 
what it means to be "European" in a way that is not quite encapsulated by even 
the EU' s legal complexity. This is evidenced by the recent step by the EU to add 
notions of its own ~'absorption" capacity as a determinant of when membership is 
to be granted? There is no legal stipulation as to what this means, or how Turkey 
can meet that requirement. Rather it is based upon a wide range of concerns 
about what the EU is, and wants to become. To join the Union you have to be not 
only in alignment with the acquis, but also with notions of Europeanness. I 
suggest, however, that this is not a socialisation process, but rather an attempt to 
deny membership by creating non-legal hurdles that are effectively 
insurmountable by Ankara. In the ASEAN case the process of membership was 
perceived as an opportunity to do make something more of the moment than 
ASEAN itself could carry. There was a clear intent to socialise. Here, we see no 
intent to socialise, indeed the desire to deny membership would appear to be the 
very antithesis of socialisation. The sheer size and "otherness" of Turkey scares 
many in the Union. Membership should never happen, because if it did it would 
kill the integration project, or at least retard it by decades. 
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ACCESSION NEGOTIATIONS: 2005- 2009 
The previous analysis has charted the importance of both an 
unambiguous offer of membership and the maintenance of focused financial 
assistance. It has investigated, and substantiated, just how rational choice 
accounts of socialisation can proceed. The benefit of extending this analysis 
through from 2005 until is that it suggests one final relevant conclusion. I argue 
that the continued failure to socialise, despite the transition to full blown 
membership negotiations and continued financial assistance reveals that what is 
missing in the EU socialisation effort is persuading Turkey, and the various 
judges, civil society actors and the like, that these changes are the right ones. As 
identified in chapter two, conditionality processes fail to "get inside the heads" of 
the targets of socialisation, and yet this is vital for the EU effort to promote 
consistent on the ground stable implementation. I argue that in explaining the 
continued failure, even as Turkey moved from pre-accession to direct accession 
negotiations, can be explained by the inbuilt limitations of the very socialisation 
strategy the EU has deployed. 
THE CONTINUING RELATIONSHIP 
The previous discussion has been about the extensive negotiations to 
bring Turkey into alignment with the Copenhagen Criteria, allowing it to move 
onto Accession Negotiations. The European Commission communicated to both 
the European Council and the European Parliament in October 2004 "Turkey 
sufficiently fulfils the Copenhagen political criteria". 653 Superficially, this would 
appear to be the end of the story. If the Copenhagen Criteria required the 
653 Communication of 6th October 2004 from the Commission to the Council and the European 
Parliament: Recommendation of the European Commission on Turkey's progress towards 
Accession. Com(2004) 656. Accessible at http://europa.eu/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/e50015.htm. 
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acceptance of human rights and democracy, then the statement that Turkey now 
fulfils them would indicate that socialisation was at a successful close. The key 
word in that statement, however, is "sufficiently", a significant qualifier because 
both before, and after, October 2004 sustained questioning of whether or not 
Turkey had actually moved into alignment with Copenhagen remained. It was 
felt necessary in the Negotiating Framework to restate the Copenhagen criteria as 
a framework against Turkish preparedness could be measured. Whilst we can 
note that the Copenhagen Criteria are "very broad and open to considerable 
interpretation", 654 and more troublesomely, considerable alteration over time as 
aspects are removed, played down, enhanced or added upon, 655 the leeway given 
to Turkey in this regard was considerable. 
Regardless, Accession negotiations between Turkey and the EU 
commenced on the 3rd October 2005. Whereas pre-Accession negotiations 
focused on the fulfilment of the Copenhagen Criteria, that is the democratic and 
human rights situation together with the ability to incorporate the acquis 
communautaire (the collected treaty and jurisprudence of the Union), actual 
Accession negotiations covered the substantive Chapters that together are the 
acquis with the aim of actually incorporating it. The first stage of this is known 
as "screening" where the full 35 chapters of the acquis are presented to Turkey, 
and the situation within Turkey graded in terms of what the areas of 
incompatibility are, and how to address those. 656 Within this shifting set of 
arrangements, the financial assistance continued, at a larger scale. The Financial 
654 Grabbe, "European Union Conditionality and the Acquis Communautaire," p. 251. 
655 Ibid. Also note Heather Grabbe, "A Partnership for Accession? The Implications of EU 
Conditionality for Central and Eastern European Applicants"," EUl/RSC Working Paper No. 
991!2, Robert Schuman Centre, European University Institute, San Domenico di Fiesole, Italy 
(1999). 
656 The full rundown of these chapters and their current status is accessible at 
http://ec.europa.eu/en largement/how-does-it-work/negotiations/in dex en .htm. 
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Assistance Programme for 2006 totalled some €450-470 million, so large that it 
was subject to two Financing Decisions. Financing for the first time also engaged 
in the "promotion of Civil Society Dialogue" with the aim of "preparing civil 
society from the EU and Candidate Countries for future enlargement, by 
encouraging a societal debate around related issues".657 As always, the 
"agreement of the 2006 pre-accession financial assistance programme will 
depend on the Turkish authorities' commitment to the continued forceful 
implementation of the pre-accession strategy".658 Council resolution 1085/2006, 
of 1 ?1h July 2006 established an "Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance" with 
Turkey that re-based the relationship between the EU and Turkey.659 Under this 
programme, the IP A-Transition Assistance and Institution Building Component 
for 2007 was set at €256,202,720.660 It noted in regards to the Copenhagen 
Criteria, "assistance will be provided to consolidate the reforms that have been 
adopted and to improve their implementation on the ground".661 It did so through 
the creation of five projects. Of these, particularly important were TR 0701/03 
that trained military judges and human rights prosecutors, TR 0701/04 that 
funded civil society funding for programmes to empower women's N.G.O.s and 
TR 0701/05 that supported implementation of various administration reforms. 
All of these relate again to securing the protection of freedoms within the 
domestic environment. 
657 Commission Decision c/2006/2206, 9th June 2006, "Establishing a National Pre-Accession 
Financial Assistance Programme for the Republic of Turkey - Part One." 
658 Ibid. p. 9. 
6
.
59 Refer to EC 1085/2006, 17th July 2006. 
66° Commission Decision C/2007/6423 of 20th December 2007 p. 1. 
661 Ibid. p. 4. 
272 
COMPLIANCE WITH EU STANDARDS: THE POLITICAL LIMITS OF CONDITIONALITY 
The Turkey 2006 Progress Report noted that the Ministry of Justice 
issued a circular that instructed prosecutors to take into account both Turkish 
Legislation and the ECHR, as well as establishing a monthly monitoring system 
in regards to the freedom of expression and the related cases within the Turkish 
legal system.662 The report continues to note that restrictive jurisprudence 
surrounding article 301 of the Turkish Penal code had been "repeatedly used to 
prosecute non violent opinions expressed by journalists, writers, publishers 
academics and human rights activists",663 301 penalising perceived insults to the 
notion of "Turkishness", the republic and the organs and institutions of state. The 
report concluded, "freedom of expression in line with European standards is not 
yet guaranteed by the legal framework". 664 2006 also saw EU Enlargement 
Minister Olli Rehn note that there was a need for Turkey to rewrite those laws 
that restrict or limit the full right to freedom of expression.665 
The re-election of the AKP in 2007 further entrenched the pro-EU lobby 
within Turkish politics. Prime Minister Erdogan stating that "our government 
sees the EU entry talks both as a way of integration and a reform process to 
improve political, economic, social and legal standards".666 The Turkish 
Parliamentary Elections of 22nd July 2007 where "characterised by pluralism and 
a high level of public confidence underscored by the transparent, professional 
662 Turkey 2006 Progress Report, Commission Staff Working Document, SEC (2006) 1390, 
Brussels 8th November 2006. 
663 Ibid. p. 14. 
664 Ibid. p. I 5. 
66
·
5 EU Criticises Turkish Law on Insulting Turkishness, James McConalogue, 19th July 2006, 
The Brussels Journal, Accessible at http://www.brusselsjoumal.com/node/I 197. Also see Speech 
by Olli Rehn, EU Commissioner for Enlargement, Reforms in Turkey - The First Place it is the 
Interest of the Turkish Citizen, European Parliament Debate on Turkey, Strasbourg, 261h 
September 2006, SPEECH.06/536. 
666 Quoted in "Turkish Leader Promises Reforms". Washington Post, 31 51 August 2007. 
Accessible at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2007/08/3 l/AR2007083IOl692 pf.htm.l 
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and efficient performance of the election administration". 667 The return to power 
of the AKP under Prime Minister Erdogan was immediately followed by a 
restatement of that government's commitment to implementation of the Turkish 
Road map for EU Accession, presented in April 2007.668 
In broad terms, compliance with international human rights accords 
continued. The ratification of the First Optional Protocol to the ICCPR entered 
into force, allowing individual Turkish citizens to petition the UN Human Rights 
Committee. However, some 330 judgements were passed down by the European 
Court of Human Rights finding for Turkish violation of the ECHR, although it 
was noted that compliance with the judgements of the Court was improving, 
especially with regards to freedom of expression. 669 It was further noted that 
whilst "open debate continued in the Turkish media" in regards to sensitive 
issues, "the prosecution and conviction for the expression of non-violent 
opinions under certain provisions of the Turkish Criminal Code are a cause of 
serious concern".670 Article 301 was singled out for particular criticism, 
becoming the focus for European criticism over freedom of expression in 
Turkey.671 301 stated that: 
1. A person who publicly denigrates Turkishness, the Republic or the 
Grand National Assembly of Turkey, shall be punishable by 
imprisonment of between six months and three years. 
2. A person who publicly denigrates the Government of the Republic 
of Turkey, the judicial institutions of the State, the military or security 
667 Turkey 2007 Progress Report, Communication from the Commission the European 
Parliament and the Council, Sec. 1436, 6th October 2007. 
668 See the discussion in Ozlem Onaran, "Speculation-Led Growth and Fragility in Turkey: 
Does the EU Make a Difference or "Can It Happen Again"?" Vienna University of Economics: 
Department of Economics Working Papers Series, No.93 (2006). 
669 Turkey 2007 Progress Report, Communication from the Commission the European 
Parliament and the Council, Sec. 1436, 6th October 2007 p. 12. 
670 Ibid. p. 14. 
671 Ibid. p. 15. 
274 
organizations shall be punishable by imprisonment of between six 
months and two years. 
3. In cases where denigration of Turkishness is committed by a 
Turkish citizen in another country the punishment shall be increased 
by one third. 
4. Expressions of thought intended to criticize shall not constitute a 
crime. 
The willingness of Turkish courts to prosecute under 301 had raised 
awareness of its incompatibility with Article 10 of the ECHR. 672 In December 
2005 Journalist Perihan Magden was prosecuted for a newspaper column where 
she defended the right to deny military service. This, together with other cases, 
caused Amnesty International to focus specifically on 301 and its incompatibility 
with European norms.673 This welter of negative publicity led Turkish Foreign 
Minister Abdullah Gul to note that there was a need to change 301, the reforms 
being passed by Parliament April 301h 2008. Outside of 301, Articles 
215,216,217 and 220, that together criminalizes freedom of expression with 
regards to public order as well as Article 228 that restricts freedom of expression 
with regards to notions of fair trial also substantially curtailed the rights that were 
guaranteed constitutionally. This led the Commission to conclude that "the 
Turkish legal system does not fully guarantee freedom of expression in line with 
European standards'', 674 and that the growing jurisprudence these various 
Criminal Code articles was creating was establishing a "climate of self-
censorship in the country"675 The 2008 Council Decision on the Principles, 
Priorities and Conditions contained in the Accession Partnership with the 
672 Speech by Olli Rehn, EU Commissioner for Enlargement, Enlargement Policy in 2009 - An 
Outlook, ECOSOC External Relations, Brussels, 5th February 2009, SPEECH/03/39. 
673 
"Turkey: Article 301 is a Threat to Freedom of Expression and must be repealed now!" 
Amnesty International, l st December 2005. Accessible at 
http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/info/EUR44/035/2005 
674 Ibid. p. 15. 
675 Ibid. p. 61. 
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Republic of Turkey saw the resolution of this issue as laying in bringing Turkish 
legislation and judicial practice "in line with the ECHR and with the case law of 
the ECtHR",676 whilst stating most forcefully that "failure to respect these 
general conditions could lead to a decision by the Council to suspend financial 
assistance on the basis of Regulation (EC) No. 2500/2001 or on the basis of 
Article 21 of Regulation (EC) No 1058/2006" .677 
THE CONCEPTUAL LIMITATIONS OF EU SOCIALISATION ATTEMPTS 
Despite considerable reform, and the machinations of conditionality, 
socialisation of freedom of expression remains incomplete. 678 That it took until 
2008 for Article 301 of the Criminal Code to be revised, and the continual 
presence in EU financial conditionality focusing on advancing the right of 
freedom of expression within the Turkey are evidence to both the failure of the 
EU to close the process and also to perhaps a more fundamental weakness. The 
Turkish Progress Report of 2008 has continued to highlight how both the 
"institutional framework for human rights promotion and enforcement does not 
meet the independence requirement and lacks financial autonomy and 
transparency. "679 The EU remained concerned about the continued lack of reform 
of Articles 215,216 and 217, and the slow pace of change.680 It noted that that the 
wide interpretation of these by judges, especially when dealing with Kurdish 
questions, was "not in line with the ECtHR case law on freedom of expression 
676 Council Decision on the Principles, Priorities and Conditions contained in the Accession 
Partnership with the Republic of Turkey and Repealing Decision 2006/35/EC, 2008/157 /EC, I 81h 
February 2008. 
677 Ibid. Chapter Five. 
678 Memorandum by Olli Rehn, EU Commissioner for Enlargement, Key Findings of the 
Progress Reports on the Candidate Countries, Croatia, the Former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia and Turkey, Brussels 6th November 2007, MEM0/07/447. 
679 Turkey 2008 Progress Report. SEC 92008) 2699 Final, Brussels 5th November 2008. 
Accessible at http://www.avrupa.info.tr/Files/File/Docs/turkey progress report en.pdf. p. 12 
680 Speech by Olli Rehn, EU Commissioner for Enlargement, Turkey and the EU: A Win-Win 
Game, Opening Address at Bosphorus Conference, Istanbul, 20th October 2008, SPEECH/08/520 
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and implies in particular a lack of distinction between violent and non-violent 
opinions".681 The 2007 IPA-Transition Assistance Programme also noted, with 
regards to human rights, that "the promotion of human rights ... has been 
addressed though a number of projects aimed at the police and gendarmerie 
services, the judiciary and civil society" but that despite this there has been "no 
definitive resolution to the identified problems" and that part of the reason for 
this should be found in the "deep divisions within the [Turkish] public 
administration, for example judiciary reform, not all segments of which 
supported the aims of EU Assistance".682 
We cannot ascribe the ongoing failure by Turkey to reform its protection 
of freedom of expression to a lack of information, or an unclear set of criteria on 
the· EU's side. It would appear that socialisation via the scope conditions 
established for rational choice accounts of bargaining should be successful.683 It 
has a clear intention to socialise, and Turkey has proven sustainedly receptive to 
socialisation. The 2008 Revised Accession Partnership again states clearly the 
requirements for Turkish Accession, to "yardstick" the status of compliance. 684 
Nor can we in some way fault the EU's assistance to Turkey. It has been 
extensive, sustained and minutely detailed. The sequence of Annual Reports and 
funding agreements clearly established what the EU desired, and did so in a 
public way. Turkey was operating in an information rich context, and yet still has 
not translated the clear requirements into domestic reform, despite the fullest 
631 Turkey 2008 Progress Report. SEC 92008) 2699 Final, Brussels 5th November 2008. 
Accessible at http://www.avrupa.info.tr/Files/File/Docs/turkey progress report en.pdf. p. 16 
682 Commission Decision C/2007/6423of20th December 2007 p. 20. 
683 Checkel, "International Institutions and Socialization in Europe: Introduction and 
Framework," p. 803. 
684 Speech by Olli Rehn, EU Commissioner for Enlargement, An Open and Self-Confident 
Society: Fundamental Freedoms, constitutional reform and democratisation in Turkey, 
Conference of Constitutional Reform in Turkey, European Parliament, 3rd March 2008, 
SPEECH/08/121. 
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deployment of conditionality encountered anywhere in the world.685 The reason 
for this is that the process of conditionality, even in its multi-faceted guise 
encountered here, has limits, limits that are suggested by the theoretical studies 
of it as advanced in chapter two. How do you go from altering someone's 
behaviour to altering their beliefs?686 The EU requires just that transformation; it 
requires judges to consistently apply revised standards. It requires civil society to 
promote and protect freedom of expression for itself. This is not happening, as 
just noted judges apply even revised standards in ways that are compatible with 
their own atavistic beliefs, not the intentions of the EU in prompting those 
reforms. 
In explaining this, I suggest that theory casts additional light. What has 
been lacking in the account presented here is an environment where the EU 
persuades Turkey that these changes are "right" in a way deeper than simply 
being intervening variables between it and membership. In part this is 
understandable given that the EU is not engaged in negotiating with Turkey in a 
discursive sense. Turkey must simply accept that it must change into EU 
standards or not become a member. The dominance of conditionality as the 
conditioner of change in Turkey is a result of the intense, complex and 
supranational nature of the EU, both in terms of human rights but also with 
regards to the full gamut of its activities. It also, paradoxically, interacted 
685 Speech by Olli Rehn, EU Commissioner for Enlargement, Turkey on the Road of Reforms, 
European Parliament Plenary Session, Strasbourg, 24th October 2007, SPEECH/07 /651. 
686 There is a body of literature that engages with this question. Cognitive Dissonance Theory 
argues that actors, who--for ulterior reasons-act in a certain manner and need to justify these 
activities to themselves and others, begin to internalize the justification even if they were initially 
critical of it. Checkel, "Getting Socialized to Build Bridges: Constructivism and Rationalism, 
Europe and.the Nation-State," p. 1053. The work is interesting, but not relevant here. Cognitive 
Dissonance Theory rests on a single actor engaging in behavioural patterns at odds with their 
own beliefs, and then altering those beliefs to avoid dissonance. The Turkish situation under 
discussion here is different. We are dealing with at one level Turkey as a political actor changing 
its behavioural patters, and then the dissonant behaviour of individual judges. These different 
layers of analysis preclude dissonance from arising. 
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negatively with the requirements of the EU. The recourse to conditionality was 
not a choice, it was a necessity, but in becoming the socialisation preference of 
the EU the community lost its ability to convince others of the rightness, at an 
identity level, of its actions. This may have not been a significant issue with the 
ex-communist states, whose common heritage and unique political situation after 
the Cold War rendered them especially amenable to identity change without the 
EU having to promote that persuasively. It is vitally significant to the Turkish 
situation, where deep-seated and highly valued political and social codes have to 
be transformed by membership, and yet nowhere are the practitioners and 
holders of those codes being convinced that the new way is better. They are only 
being convinced that to be a member, they must change their behaviour. 
The EU itself has recognised the difficulty of truly matching its 
requirements for stable protection of human rights within the domestic sphere 
and the limitations of conditionality approaches. 687 The 2007 Financial 
Agreement is notable in its inclusion of extensive provisions for the "Promotion 
of an EU-Turkey Civil Society Dialogue"688 that provided for the "establishment 
of partnerships and promotion of dialogues between civil societies of Turkish 
and EU Counterparts". 689 The EU has also funded a concerted effort to develop 
civil society through educating Turkish domestic actors about freedom of 
expression under the authority of the Delegation of the European Commission in 
Turkey, through the broader "European Instrument for Democracy and Human 
687 Speech by Olli Rehn, EU Commissioner for Enlargement, Civil Society at the Heart of the 
EU's Enlargement Agenda, Conference on Civil Society Development in Southeast Europe -
Building Europe Together, Brussels, 17th April 2008, SPEECH/08/20 I. 
688 Refer to Commission Decision C/2007/6423 of 201h December 2007. 
689 Ibid. 
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Rights" (EID HR) programme. 690 The Delegation funded direct, in grants not 
financial conditionality, N.G.O activity to raise "Turkish citizens awareness 
about restrictions on freedom of thought and expression in Turkey" through 
€509,000 grant to the Association for Liberal Thinking in 1999. In 2006 the 
Delegation funded the creation of a Centre for Freedom of Expression, with the 
aim of creating domestic pressure on the Turkish government by highlighting 
areas of continuing incompatibility in existing legislation compared to European 
standards as well as publicising that right to the public at large. Other efforts 
include grants to human rights promoters and efforts to reform Turkish education 
standards to reflect the central importance of human rights. 691 EU engagement 
with Turkey was not solely through the prism of the funding memoranda. Rather, 
in an attempt to ensure true adherence to the acquis and Copenhagen Criteria, the 
EU reached out to civil society to create both a sense of ownership of freedom of 
expression as well as an indigenous system for addressing the government's 
transgressions of that right. 
I suggest therefore that the continued track record of reform in Turkey 
never reaching the level desired by the EU powerfully denotes the ultimate outer-
limits of the effectiveness of conditionality. Conditionality is an excellent tool 
for altering political arrangements, laws and constitutions. Where it is lacking, 
however, is in completing the process of transformation at a social level. Holding 
governments conditional on certain behaviour, such as human rights compliance, 
is ultimately a thankless task in the face of continued social resistance. Indeed 
690 The broader importance of civil society to EU democratic promotion is charted with 
reference to the ex-Soviet bloc in Kristi Raik, "Promoting Democracy through Civil Society," in 
CEPS Working Document (Brussels: Centre for European Policy Studies, 2006). 
691 A full account of these grants to large and small projects is found in European Instrument 
for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR): Turkey Programme, Delegation of the European 
Commission to Turkey, January 2008. Accessible at 
http://www.avrupa.info.tr/EUCSD,D.hag.htm.I 
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the record of conditionality to diffuse complex social norm-sets such as human 
rights or democracy is "not completely convincing". 692 This is because whilst 
governments can be conditioned into changing their behaviour in pursuit of a 
goal, societies are much more unwieldy affairs. Just because a government is 
held accountable does not automatically alter the decisions and opinions of the 
judicial system, of sub-national actors such as political parties and members of 
civil society. 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The socialisation of Turkey into EU standards is a story of remarkable, 
but not complete, success. The growing credibility of the European offer of 
membership, and the growing financial relationship between Brussels and 
Ankara to ease the necessary transition has seen extensive legislative and 
juridical realignment in Turkey towards European standards. These standards, 
expressed in clear legal documents that are binding upon ~isting members 
prompt my agreement with that scholarship that focuses on the centrality of 
rational understandings of bargaining in the European Regional Community 
example.693 Whereas the other studies reveal the significance of social influence 
tools, the extensive deployment of conditionality here suggests that it is the 
preferred mechanism when strongly held legal standards have to be socialised 
prior to a state becoming a member. 
This conclusion is based upon a belief that the texture of the EU 
relationship with Turkey cannot be explained without recourse to deeper 
692 Schmid, "The Use of Conditionality in Support of Political, Economic and Social Rights: 
Unveiling the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership's True Hierarchy of Objectives?" p. 401. 
693 Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, The Europeanization of Central and Eastern Europe p. 
224. See also Frank Schimmelfennig and Ulrich Sedelmeier, "Governance by Conditionality: EU 
Rule Transfer to the Candidate Countries of Central and Eastern Europe," Journal of European 
Public Policy 11, no. 4 (2004) pp. 661-663. 
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reasoning. To understanding the varying timing of negotiations, why periods of 
progress are meshed with periods of apparent lethargy attention must be paid to 
two further explanations. An appreciation of the importance of credibility of the 
EU offer of membership is central in understanding how it is that freedom of 
expression remains partially unprotected within Turkey. Of course, the time it 
takes to re-orientate a police and justice system, not to mention Civil Society 
more broadly, towards the full protection and promotion of European standards 
on freedom of expression is considerably longer than the comparatively simple 
task of promulgating new laws and repealing offending ones. The continuing 
shortcomings of the Turkish political system with regards to freedom of 
expression despite the continuing EU financial assistance should be attributed to 
the increasing obstacles to membership, whether they are originating from the 
EU itself of various member states. Into this we must also remain away of the 
role of Turkish domestic political and civil society in translating the external 
incentives into a set of meanings about what membership is and what costs are 
suitable to achieve that. Rational accounts of socialisation based solely on the 
existing scope conditions may fail to comprehend why socialisation occurs in the 
way, and at the pace, that it does. They also fail to identify how socialisation 
works at the level of sub-national groupings whose behaviour cannot be held up 
to conditionality in the same way Turkey's can. Just as before, we are presented 
with the dual need to explain the conditions in which socialisation arises, as well 
as the actual mechanisms of that socialisation. 
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7. Conclusions and Extensions 
At the close of this dissertation, I return to my research question, "What 
are the socialisation mechanisms that arise from applying, achieving and 
maintaining membership of regional communities?" In answering this 
question, I have had to make a range of innovations in order to shed light upon 
the phenomena at hand. New areas of empirical insight have been studied, and 
these have prompted analytical, methodological and definitional innovation in 
order to best conceptualise answers to the questions posed and to respond to the 
explanatory weaknesses I identified in the introduction. Analytical eclecticism, 
which I expand on here by rearticulating the importance of definitions, corrects 
existing explanatory shortcomings and permits more robust conceptualisations of 
how socialisation occurs. The empirical, analytical and conceptual arguments 
flow into and complement each other, although each level speaks to differing 
audiences. In this concluding chapter I present a summary of my findings before 
drawing these answers together to address the various contributions made by this 
thesis. I close by outlining the possibilities for extending the findings of this 
project in ways that would further both my own research and the broader agenda 
of work on socialisation. 
THE SURPRISINGLY VARIED NATURE OF SOCIALISATION 
This study has revealed a range of different socialisation mechanisms as 
states, apply to become, and then continue to remain, members of regional 
communities. Both before and after the point of acquiring membership, 
rationalist and constructivist approaches have something to say about those 
processes. Rationalists focus our attention on the various ways in which 
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hierarchy influences socialisation. Before membership is gained, the process of 
conditionality, underpinned by bargaining mechanisms, is ubiquitous across all 
three studies, although it was significant for freedom of expression in only the 
EU case. After membership, the role and insight of rationalist accounts changes. 
Where court systems either exist or come to exist, rationalists have something to 
say about the placing of sanctions on states that transgress agreed standards. 
However, and drawing on Risse's and Schimmelfennig's work, I have also hoped 
to show how the core rationalist focus on static identities provides a platform for 
it to investigate the presence of Rhetorical Action, Naming and Shaming and 
Social Sanctioning within the membership context. Shifting the rationalist focus 
here away from simple bargaining accounts towards an analysis of the strategic 
deployment of language adds a healthy corrective to the rather narrow confines 
of the rationalist account of socialisation which has, in pre-existing scholarship, 
been promoted by the focus on EU socialisation through membership. 
Alongside these processes I have shown that a constructivist sensibility 
offers significant value added, again as a corrective to the EU set of conclusions. 
The use of the formal membership process by other members to exert pressure 
occurs as discursive engagement, operating around the forwarding and debating 
of various ideas about what the identity of membership within a community 
entails. The addition of a discursive awareness to the study of the membership, 
regional community and socialisation nexus facilitates an appreciation of the 
evolving nature of communities. It would appear that regional communities are 
highly valued, even when they appear dysfunctional. Even the OAS at the nadir 
of its fortunes in the mid l 960's was never seriously considered for abolition. 
Instead, states and the broader regional civil society and domestic actors, engage 
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in ongoing attempts to transform a given community and to construct a better set 
of agreements and norms to overcome the deficiencies encountered. Community 
building in both the ASEAN and OAS cases came· to talk explicitly about human 
rights, indeed it became a defining feature of both processes. The constructivist 
focus on persuasion and identity construction can account for this in a fuller and 
richer way than even the most sophisticated rationalists can account for. It 
focuses our attention on truth claims and complex debates, and on the power of 
norms and the need for their promoters to develop convincing arguments. Whilst 
outside the remit of this study, a focus on framing and norm entrepreneurs would 
shed additional valuable light on these events. 694 
In addition to the identification of differing mechanisms by which 
socialisation pressures are exerted, comparison between the three cases has 
reveals two different modes of socialisation. These modes refer to the different 
basis upon which socialisation pressure is exerted, either detailed understandings 
of freedom of expression such as in the EU or later periods of the OAS case, or 
broad declaratory commitments to democracy and human rights, as seen in the 
ASEAN study. The recognition of these two different bases for socialisation 
attempts is significant for how we understand when and where socialisation 
occurs. Due to the conflation of socialisation attempts with successful examples 
of socialisation, there is a mistaken belief that socialisation is only attempted 
where detailed standards are present.695 ASEAN has engaged in socialisation 
attempts, but has rested those efforts on broad standards in the absence of any 
694 See for example the utility of a focus on norm entrepreneurs in Christine Ingebritsen, "Norm 
Entrepreneurs: Scandinavia's Role in World Politics," Co-operation and Coriflict: Journal of 
Nordic International Studies Association 37, no. 1 (2002), Payne, "Persuasion, Frames and Norm 
Construction." 
695 Indeed the bleeding together of the established scope conditions between identifying the 
presence of socialisation and identifying its success is illustrative of this fact. 
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detailed appreciation of the content of "democracy" or "human rights". This 
observation suggests that the claim that socialisation rest on the deployment of 
mechanisms that "link specified initial conditions and a specific outcome" is 
erroneous.696 If socialisation can be attempted on the basis of broad declarations, 
then there is no specific outcome for mechanisms to link with. Socialisation can 
be attempted without an understanding of what the end point of that process can 
and should be. Whilst this lack of a definite outcome is significant for questions 
of success and failure, it does not exclude the very presence of socialisation 
attempts. 
Turning to that question of success and failure, analysis must rest on a 
number of assessments. First is an accurate account of intentions, on top of 
which should rest a range of predictions as to what promotes success via the 
various mechanisms that exist. I have based my account of success and failure on 
the scope conditions for identifying rational and constructivist processes. That 
there are established accounts of when something is successful or not is no 
excuse for complacency, and I have deployed these conditions critically. The 
story of ASEAN, and much of that of the OAS is one of failure, where the 
regional community has proven unable to transfer its wishes into outcomes. 
Rationalist accounts of bargaining focus more heavily on questions of credibility 
and domestic political alignment than previously thought. The pacing and depth 
of socialisation in the Turkish case is dependent on both of these criteria. 
However, the comparative study also reflects the need to expand our framework 
for conceptualising the success that, while remaining true to rationalist 
ontological commitments, rests on something other than bargaining. Rhetorical 
696 Michael Zilm and Jeffrey Checkel, "Getting Socialized to Build Bridges: Constructivism and 
Rationalism, Europe and the Nation-State," International Organization 59, no. 04 (2005) p. I 049. 
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action requires the presence of parties who are willing to listen. Panama was not 
willing to listen before the mid l 990's, and Myanmar still turns a deaf ear to the 
entreaties of ASEAN. Social sanctioning, defined as the denial of membership 
rights, which would otherwise be bestowed, seeks to alter the legitimacy of 
membership. Legitimacy and value are not synonymous facts. Myanmar did not 
value the chair of ASEAN in the way that would be necessary for it to act as a 
hook upon which change could be hung. Naming and shaming, in a related set of 
expectations, requires both a wide and meaningful audience, preferably one 
linked to civil society at the regional and national level to create a positive 
feedback loop through which to press for enhanced compliance. It also requires 
that there is agreement about what is, and is not, "shameful" to begin with. 
Constructivist approaches to persuasion show less variation. The established 
scope conditions travel relatively unscathed from existing literature to this study, 
although the cases emphasise awareness of the various strengths of standards 
(defined in term of how detailed they are, whether that detail is "in-house" and 
whether communities are promoting individual norms or composite norm-sets). 
Not all standards desired by communities are strongly enunciated, universally 
admired and unproblematically welcomed. Norms emerge through competition 
and contestation, and even at their earliest stage actors seek to promote them. 697 
In making these arguments, each individual study has its own role to play 
in painting this broad picture. This is not, however, to deny them their own 
unique voices. Each case is an addition to the scholarship that has focused on 
those communities. The ASEAN study indicates that the claims of those who 
seek to argue that ASEAN is a chimera in any practical sense are substantially 
697 The question of norm origins is explored in Bjorkdahl, "Norms in International Relations: 
Some Conceptual and Methodological Reflections," pp. 16-17. 
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off the mark. 698 An appreciation of ASEAN' s ability to act is a healthy rejoinder 
to those who all too quickly write it off as in some way deficient. Such 
assessments tend too often to cluster around a western-centric account of what 
constitutes a community. ASEAN has acted differently, through the articulation 
of broad standards. We can say that this is less successful than alternative modes 
of socialisation but we cannot, and should not, say that it is not acting in ways 
which, to itself and members, are revolutionary in scale and intention. The OAS 
study extends the work of those who have studied that community's standards of 
democratic promotion by examining the multifaceted way in which the 
community talks to its members, revealing a far subtler range of strategies 
deployed than existing accounts have admitted. 699 The EU study develops a 
critique of existing approaches that have focused on the success of conditionality 
by delineating the outer boundaries of what it can, and cannot, achieve.700 Each 
of these contributions is complementary to the conceptual line of reasoning 
forwarded, but simultaneously talks to different people and differing research 
agendas. 
THE ECLECTIC MOMENT IN SOCIALISATION STUDIES 
Any attempt to theorise social life comes up against the (in)famous 
debate between rational choice theorising and the range of sociological theories 
that sit against it. Approaching this debate requires a firm footing. Rationalist 
accounts enjoy a degree of parsimony that their sociological cousins may never 
emulate because they interrogate the world for different purposes and with 
698 Khoo, "Deconstructing the ASEAN Security Community: A Review Essay," p. 45. 
699 Cooper and Legler, "The OAS Democratic Solidarity Paradigm: Questions of Collective and 
National Leadership." 
700 Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, The Europeanization of Central and Eastern Europe p. 
224. 
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different tools.701 Socialisation flowing from clear power imbalances is easily 
identified and comparatively straightforward to conceptualise. Constructivist 
accounts, however, benefit from a far richer and more textured account of 
politics, although this comes at the cost of increased theoretical and 
methodological complexity, as they attempt to come to terms with the intense 
social relationships that shape the world.702 This study speaks to that debate. It 
suggests that whilst theoretical conjecture is a vital part of academic enquiry for 
those whose focus is essentially practical in nature, this can never come at the 
expense of empirical insight. This is not a naive call for bland empiricism. 
Indeed, the focus on definitional issues here says much about how our appraisal 
of the world influences our assessment of it. It is, however, a call for the theorist 
to reflect back on their own reasons for definition, and the opening and closing 
doors that result from any one particular stance. Eclecticism all the way down 
may not solve the intractable relationship between viewer and vista, but it at least 
warns of the perils of not reflecting actively and critically on the gap between 
events in the world and our awareness of them. 
When thinking conceptually, there comes a point where one must choose 
either to adopt a combative single perspective, or to develop an empirically 
driven account that rests on both rationalist and sociological traditions.703 The 
question as to which is preferable is intractable in any absolute sense, and any 
answer forwarded is attributable more to the nature of the questions being asked 
of theorising and the personal preference of the individual posing those 
701 For an investigation of the broader debate between these camps within International 
Relations; see Fearon and Wendt, "Rationalism Vs. Constructivism: A Skeptical View." 
702 The methodological aspect of investigating norms is well presented in Bjt>rkdahl, "Norms in 
International Relations: Some Conceptual and Methodological Reflections," pp. 9-13. 
703 The analysis at Jeffrey W. Legro and Andrew Moravcsik, "Is Anybody Still a Realist?" 
International Security 24, no. 2 ( 1999) represents a distinct view on this in counterpoise to the 
eclecticism advocated in this work. 
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questions, than to the uncovermg of any universal truth. I have consciously 
adopted the eclectic position, in the belief that doing so provides us the greatest 
opportunity to develop insights that are meaningfully based on the best 
appreciation of empirical evidence. To cut the Gordian knot of theorising 
socialisation one must draw on multiple perspectives. In doing so this study has 
found itself in good company. The move towards eclectic theorising as a 
corrective to the explanatory limitations of existing single conceptual 
frameworks is growing. 704 Frustration with the internecine wars that have both 
framed, and arguably plagued, the discipline has resulted in a renewed emphasis 
on empirical insight over theoretic rigidity. The rationalist focus on parsimony 
and predictive power acts as an aide-memoire to a constructivism that is oft 
criticised for losing its predictive edge in the face of the welter of "facts" that 
emerge from its more nuanced account of history. The constructivist potential to 
present a more textured response to ideas, history and identity promotes a fuller 
appreciation of the context in which political actions occur. 
Across the spectrum of membership, actors attempt to socialise states in 
different ways, and with different tales of success and failure. Conditionality is 
joined with persuasion, and community building results in various outcomes 
depending on both its substance and the nature of the community in which it is 
occurring. It is a complicated tapestry of processes, a melange of intentions and 
outcomes, a maelstrom of power and identity. Socialisation is complex and 
multifaceted, and former rival approaches can provide complementary accounts 
of the phenomenon. The studies reveal an oft-ignored relevance of constructivist 
appraisal in regional community driven socialisation across the membership 
704 Although I note that many still argue the importance of discreet single theoretical 
frameworks as the hallmark of"good" academic debate. 
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spectrum. While persuasive mechanisms alone seem to not result in successful 
socialisation, the act of community building is a necessary precursor for the 
deployment of social influence processes. The ASEAN and OAS studies both 
indicate the preponderance of social influence mechanisms once a state is a 
member of a community, but it would be impossible to imagine those 
mechanisms in the absence of broader reform processes. The investigation into 
the origins of revised standards, and the necessity of including a discursive lens 
when analysising those, is a timely reminder as to the relevance of double 
interpretation when it comes to theorising social interactions. 
Underpinning this eclecticism, and extending more broadly the claims of 
those who already think eclectically about EU socialisation is the suggestion 
forwarded in this study that we position analysis on a Critical Realist inspired 
definitional framework. The role of definitions is important to the nature of the 
analysis that is based upon them. Some definitional structures are exclusionary 
through linking specific understandings of an event or process to some universal 
claim. Just as we could never imagine snowflakes if we defined precipitation as 
falling liquid water so I have suggested that partisan accounts of norms and 
socialisation are obstacles to empirically driven comparative analysis. Norms are 
incontrovertibly complex, and their presence or absence invokes complicated 
responses from actors, which are sometimes identity related and arrived at 
through discursive means, and at other appear significant only in terms of 
behaviour. Our definitions must be inclu.sive not only if we are to capture 
significant empirical events, but also if we are to be true to eclectic theorising. 
Analytical eclecticism, and the bridge-building that it promotes, cannot happen 
in the absence of rigorous investigative parameters. Whilst conceptual 
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agnosticism is one thing, statements and discussions that rest on definitional 
"grey areas", rival accounts and rival definitions, are not doing justice to the 
intention of eclectic theorists. I have argued that the provision of a basis for 
defining norms and socialisation cannot come from within established accounts. 
Through an analysis of how definitions are ultimately derived from 
understanding particular cause-effect relationship, I have suggested a Critical 
Realist counter-approach to defining norms and socialisation. These have 
emerged not from the strict necessity of behavioural regularity, but through an 
appreciation of the complex social world that norms exist in, and through which 
they exert multiple differing effects. Breaking this focus, and then reattaching 
existing rationalist and constructivist approaches on top of that has been a vital 
cognitive first step, one that facilitates comparison across case studies and 
meaningful eclecticism between theories. 
THE BROADER SIGNIFICANCE OF HUMAN RIGHTS SOCIALISATION 
The study of regionalism, and regional communities within that 
phenomenon, would benefit from an appreciation of the role of human rights as 
both a process of integration but also a defining feature of the regional 
community phenomenon. The quest to study the nature of regional arrangements 
requires something to tie that region together, to make sense of the grouping as a 
region, as opposed to any other arrangement, assortment or assemblage of states 
that may be arranged. Quests to understand these groupings through a focus on 
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security, or through economics, ethnic similarity or cultural difference have 
provoked fierce criticism.705 
This study has adopted a different approach, focusing on the role of 
human rights socialisation. Rights transcend the reified boundaries between 
states, and between the domestic and international. They can be a moment of 
transformation and also an agent of that change. An understanding of the origins 
of human rights commitments, and their role in defining how communities 
operate, is a vital part of a broader appreciation of the role of communities in 
giving texture to international relations. By linking the research agenda on 
international organisations as norm teachers and an explicit focus on regional 
communities, new light is shed on those communities and the functions that they 
perform.706 This focus, in comparative perspective, acts as an investigation both 
of the nature of those regional community activities but also a suggestion about 
the type of theoretical tools we need when discussing those bodies. Whilst this 
study has focused explicitly on the spreading of those rights, the interplay 
between rights and other aspects of the regional arrangement is significant. 
Especially central is the relationship between rights and security. 707 The ASEAN 
development of a Security Community has become intimately linked to a broader 
sense of human security.708 The African Union has sought to advance human 
security as a pre-requisite for continental security. The linking between regional 
705 International Political Economy particularly has its own take on regions, which has been 
fiercely fought over. See the debates in Edward D. Mansfield and Helen V. Milner, eds. The 
Political Economy of Regionalism (New York City: Colombia University Press, 1997). 
706 Martha Finnemore, "International Organizations as Teachers of Norms: The United Nations 
Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization and Science Policy," International 
Organization 47, no. 4 (1993). 
707 James J Hentz and Morten Boas, eds. New and Critical Security and Regionalism: Beyond 
the Nation State, The International Political Economy of New Regionalism Series (Aldershot: 
Ashgate, 2003). 
708 The trend towards human security is a notable innovation within the broader global security 
literature. An excellent example of this is Ken Booth, ed., Critical Security Studies and World 
Politics (Boulder, CO: Lynne Reinner Publishers, 2004). 
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arrangements and security can be better explored if we assess the relationship 
between different types of security, and the role of human rights and their 
diffusion in that agenda. Traditionalist interpretations of state security seem ill-
prepared as a cognitive basis for appreciation regional political behaviour if a 
substantial part of security-building is linked to notions of human rights.709 
This focus on human rights contained within this study also has relevance 
for the extensive literature that considers questions of the universality of human 
rights. What is truly universal, and what is particularist?710 A fundamental part of 
answering this question is an examination of the process by which rights are 
claimed by people across the world. It is interesting that the study of ASEAN's 
efforts to socialise Myanmar reveal deep-seated and indigenous efforts to claim 
democracy and human rights from within the region. This was the same region 
that in the early 1990s was the source of an "Asian Values" debate that rejected 
the explicit universality that resided within the international human rights 
regime.711 Despite this, we can discern considerable effort on the part of various 
NGOs, governments and political groupings to claim exactly such rights as their 
own, and to use those as a cognitive map for the future development of ASEAN 
itself. Whilst the explicit question of Asian values has decreased in relevance, the 
quest to understand how rights become embedded in different societies, 
709 A classical interpretation of regions and security is offered at David A. Lake and Patrick M. 
Morgan, eds. Regional Orders: Building Security in a New World Order (University Park: 
Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997) Despite its broad range of enquiry, notions of human 
rights are not explored systematically here in the formation and operation of regional bodies. 
710 The literature on the universality of rights is vast and ever expanding. Excellent 
introductions to it are offered by Jack Donnelly, Universal Human Rights in Theory and Practice 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989). Also note Michael Perry, "Are Human Rights 
Universal? The Relativist Challenge and Related Matters," Human Rights Quarterly 19, no. 3 
( 1997). An innovative recent approach is offered in Anthony Langlois, The Politics of Justice and 
Human Rights - Southeast Asia and Universa!ist Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2001 ). 
711 Much is written on this subject. Introductions are offered by Daniel A. Bell, "The East Asian 
Challenge to Human Rights: Reflections on an East-West Dialogue," Human Rights Quarterly 
18, no. 3 (1996) ---, East Meets West: Human Rights and Democracy in East Asia (Ithaca: 
Princeton University Press, 1998). 
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especially those that seem intransigent, remams important to the academic 
investigation into those rights. This work shows how regional communities and 
the variety of actors that surround communities act as interlocutors in the process 
of rights spreading across the world. As a layer of governance between the global 
and the national they facilitate in mediating global norms into local contexts, an 
interpretation and re-valuation that is so vital if people are ever to accept those 
rights as "theirs" as opposed to a cold impersonal global enterprise. They are the 
very instruments through which the elusive over-lapping consensus, if one is 
indeed possible, shall be most likely made manifest. This mediation is not fast, 
nor is it easy, and it does not result in a clean translation of global norms to 
regional standards. A focus on the processes by which standards spread is vital to 
those whose interest is in the moral rightness of that expansion. Identifying who 
claims rights as their own, and why that should be the case, offers insight when 
we seek t6 understand whether rights are "ours", "theirs" or "everyone's". 
PROPOSED EXTENSIONS 
I suggest two future directions to extend this work, the empirical and the 
theoretical. These are not mutually exclusive; indeed they help to shape each 
other and I hope to pursue both in order to develop a more complete picture of 
how membership varies, and the significance of that variation is to socialisation. 
As a comparative study the clearest extension for the project at hand would be an 
expansion of the range of studies, aimed at investigating how the relationship 
between membership and socialisation is managed in varying sites. The original 
impetus of this study was to expand the horizons of the scholarship that exists 
around the European example, especially that of the EU, and so the continuation 
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of that sentiment may well result m greater prec1s10n and insight to the 
conclusions offered in this study. 
An initial avenue of extension via which to further this study therefore is 
to investigate more regional communities. Here perhaps the most interesting 
extension is that offered by the African Union (AU).712 The AU was founded in 
2002 as the successor to the Organization of African Unity that had been formed 
in 1963. All states on the African continent, except Morocco, which withdrew in 
1984, are members, although currently Mauritania has been suspended following 
the coup d'etat of August 2008. The AU is organisationally complex, possessing 
a Parliament, a Commission and various committees and councils. Most 
interestingly, it subsumed a pre-existing African Commission on Human and 
Peoples' Rights. The Commission, established since 1986, has been joined by a 
parallel Court since 2006, which ultimately should merge with the pre-existing 
African Court of Justice. The Commission, based on the African Charter on 
Human and Peoples Rights of 1986, includes a bill of rights that protects in 
Article 9 the right to "express and disseminate his opinions within the law"713 
and possesses a Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression. In institutional 
form, then, it is surprisingly similar to the OAS. Where it differs is in its 
historical origins as a post-colonial enterprise of the 1960' s and the nature of the 
states in Africa that it covers. An investigation of how these issues intersect with 
the question of socialisation remains unanswered in the literature that seeks to 
understand just how it is human rights are disseminated. 
712 The academic response to African notions of human rights is limited at currents. A good 
overview is presented in Rachel Murray, Human Rights in Africa: From the OAU to African 
Union (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), whilst a more specialised account of one 
aspect of the AU is Mei, "The New African Court of Human and Peoples' Rights: Towards an 
Effective Human Rights Protection Mechanism for Africa?" 
713 The African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, Accessible at 
http://www.achpr.org/english/ info/charter en.htm .I 
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The biggest area of intellectual development for this project is to deepen 
and widen the Critical Realist contribution to the study of socialisation. In this 
work Critical Realism has been used as a critique of existing bridge-building 
approaches between rationalist and constructivist accounts of socialisation as 
well as providing a stepping stone towards justifiable definitions of norms and 
socialisation, which do justice to the range of empirical outcomes this work 
reveals. There is, however, a deeper contribution that I feel Critical Realism can 
make. Ultimately this would require the operationalisation of a distinct Critical 
Realist methodology to frame an investigation of socialisation. This study has 
focused on using Critical Realism as an intellectual tool to both critique existing 
definitional accounts and to suggest ways forwards in that debate. In doing so, it 
has consciously situated the contribution at the "pre-theory" stage, which is as a 
setting for the empirical data, and conceptual innovation, that is to come. 
However, a broader line of enquiry is possible that builds upon those definitions 
and analytical eclecticism through the translation of a Critical Realist definitional 
frame to a full-blown Critical Realist methodological account. 
The Critical Realist contribution to socialisation studies may well 
represent the de-fetishisation of the hunt for specific and exacting causal 
relationships and a refocus on the methodological accounts of the notion of 
inference to establish plausible arguments about how and why socialisation 
occurs.714 - This shift from critique to operationalisable research agenda is a 
difficult one. Critical Realism remains largely a philosophical argument that 
works at a meta-level when compared to other debates within International 
714 Lynn Savery, "Womans Human Rights and Changing State Practices: A Critical Realist 
Approach," Journal of Critical Realism 4, no. l (2005). Savery's study takes a very different 
approach to that forwarded in this work, but she does much to substantiate the ability to translate 
Critical Realism into a_ fuller analytical framework. 
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Relations.715 However, I take inspiration from how Critical Realism has shifted 
from this level to a more substantive research agenda in different fields of 
enquiry.716 A Critical Realist methodology would rest on the acceptance of a 
social world that is ultimately unknowable, and link that ontological statement to 
a methodology that rests on identifying the presence, if not the totality, of social 
structures of the world that .permit certain forms of behaviour.717 The ultimate 
end of this reorientation is to frame the whole investigation within a fully-
fledged Critical Realist methodology. The operationalisation of this methodology 
is one that offers a solution to a known problem with the main methodological 
choices of positivist epistemologies. Even process tracing, which I have 
deployed in this study to bind my eclectic aims to an operationalisable project 
that talks to rationalist and constructivist approaches, may well ultimately rest on 
epistemological accounts that are fundamentally at odds with the interpretevist 
epistemology that underpins the vast majority of constructivism.718 The total 
shifting of the philosophical foundations of how we approach socialisation away 
from Humeanism offers a way to avoid this danger by relocating how we 
understand what socialisation is and how we identify it at any one given time. I 
note that in taking this step we would indeed be moving beyond an eclectic 
account of socialisation towards a full Critical Realist project. 
715 See Brown, "Situating Critical Realism," and the worry that "what we have here are 
sophisticated and intelligent contributions to debates in the epistemology and ontology of the 
social sciences, but it is much less clear .... that these are debates that ordinary practising social 
sciences need to get too worked up about". pp. 415-416. 
716 See Dobson, "The Philosophy of Critical Realism - an Opportunity for Information Systems 
Research." 
717 A sophisticated account of which is offered at Dave Edler-Vass, "Emergence and the Realist 
Account of Cause," Journal of Critical Realism 4, no. 2 (2005). 
718 Checkel, "Constructivist Approaches to European Integration." p. 9. 
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FINAL REMARKS 
The role that regional communities play in world politics is multi-faceted. 
They regulate the behaviour of states and act as channels through which those 
groupings relate to others. Communities help define regional identities and at the 
same time are defined by the actions of their members. They exist to serve their 
members and evolve largely at the behest of their constituent states. They are 
part of the interlocking assemblage of norms and institutions that characterise the 
globe and at their most complicated they transect the global, regional, national 
and local levels. In so doing, they have come to intersect with questions of 
human rights, their diffusion and the notions of enforcing compliance in the 
period since the end of the Cold War. At the confluence of regional communities 
and human rights are questions of socialisation, of how communities condition 
the behaviour and identities of their members, and of how other member states 
use that common membership to promote their own goals. The processes by 
which this occurs are various, and of interest to both academics and practitioners. 
Some rest on the powerful telling the weak how to behave, whilst others rest on a 
more consensual discussion about what is correct. 
The various, and varying, pressures that states encounter as they progress 
from the application to join a community, through to the constant requirement to 
maintain that membership, all serve the same purpose. The delineation of distinct 
schemes of cooperation draws boundaries between various clusters of actors, 
helping to engender pools of more or less homogeneity. It defines what is 
European, in the same way as it defines what is Southeast Asian. Sometimes 
these boundaries are contiguous with geographic providence, other times 
communities carve themselves out of a variety of potential configurations. The 
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drawing of boundaries, and the role of rights within that process, is a motor of 
both defining common identities within the global system, and in constantly 
revising those attachments. The changes identified in this work, and their 
occasional success, are part of broader efforts to bear and then nurture, 
cooperative schemes of the social good. The process of creating ownership of 
rights and institutionalising them in varying ways is a vital part of assuaging the 
most damaging consequences of globalisation. Rights as the defence against the 
inequities generated by the unchecked spread of market forces and the ever-
present threat of social and political degradation can play a positive role in a 
variety of contexts. Generating a sense of ownership of various rights 
propositions by linking them to nascent identities and indigenous regional 
communities is a process that holds great promise for those who believe in the 
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